In 1895 Chitral was a small, independent "country" high up in the Himalayas. The Chitralis were close cousins to the Pathans; lean and fierce, cruel and treacherous. They were also charming and ingratiating, friendly and fun-loving. In short, they were the type of enemy the British most respected and admired.
In 1895 Chitral lay on the Durand line, the border between Afghanistan and India. It was claimed by neither country. Umra Khan, the aggressive ruler of Jandol to the south, had long had his eye on Chitral. 1892 saw the death of the Mehtar (ruler) of Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk. The event was -- of course -- followed by a long power struggle for the vacated throne (such as it was). There was unrest for several years. Umra Khan bided his time until he saw his chance, and in 1895 moved in an army in support of Sher Afzal, the dead Mehtar's younger brother.
The British had not been ignoring the situation in Chitral. One can imagine a jaunty "I say, the Mehtar of Chitral's died, don't you know?" being said over tea in some airy Peshawar verandah. Noting the increased activity by Umra Khan in the Chitral area, the British dispatched a force to the area to keep order and at the same time ordered Umra Khan to cease his meddling. Umra Khan ignored them.
In January of 1895 Surgeon-Major George Robertson arrived in Chitral with 100 of the 14th Sikhs and about 300 Kashmiri light infantry. He had six other British officers with him. Robertson was the British agent in Gilgit, to the east. He had been the surgeon for the previous agent, Colonel Durand. He had studied the country and its inhabitants and was relatively familiar with them. When Durand went home on leave Robertson was chosen to take his place. His first act upon entering Chitral was to dethrone the current Mehtar -- Amir-ul-Mulk -- a son of the last one, and replace him with a younger brother named Shujab-ul-Mulk. Robertson based himself in the town of Chitral, where there was a small fort.
Knowing that Sher Afzal was on the loose with part of Umra Khan's army, Robertson sent out 250 of his Kashmiris to make a reconaissance. Unfortunately they ran into Sher Afzal and about 1200 tribesmen. Fifteen Kashmiris were killed and forty wounded, along with Captain C.P. Campbell, the senior line officer. Most of the Kashmiris fled back to the fort, with the stout Sikhs covering their retreat. The next day, 4 March 1895, began the siege of Chitral.
And what a siege it was. Chitral fort was approximately 80 yards square, with walls of wooden beams cemented together with a mixture of mud and stone. The walls were 25 feet high and 8 feet thick. At each corner was a tower 50 feet high. A covered walkway led to the river and a tower protected it, too. 543 people were crammed into the fort: Robertson and his soldiers, Shujah-ul-Mulk and his relatives and many servants and other non-combatants. 343 of the besieged were soldiers. 83 Sikhs, 52 Chitralis and the rest Kashmiris made up the garrison. Available artillery consisted of two seven pounders with no sights and 80 rounds of ammunition between them. There were 30,000 rounds of ammunition for the Martini- Henrys of the Sikhs and 70,000 rounds for the old and worn Sniders of the Kashmiris. There was food enough for ten weeks, on half rations.
Upon the injury of Captain Campbell, command of the troops fell to Captain C.V.E. Townshend. Townshend would later gain more fame from another siege he was involved in. In April of 1916 Townshend surrendered 10,000 men to the Turks at the siege of Kut, in Iraq. This was the largest British force ever to surender. Townshend was never forgiven by the Government or the British people.
While the defenders of the fort fortified its walls and saw to their safety, the besiegers slowly closed the ring around them through the use of sangars. Sangars were large breastworks of stone that they would build up at night and slowly move closer. There was skirmishing almost daily. Several times truces were called and the possibilities of surrender were discussed. Neither side really took these meetings seriously. They passed the time and served as means to exchange information. It was at one such meeting that Robertson learned the fate of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler.
On 5 March the two lieutenants set forth from Mastuj on a routine supply mission to Chitral. They did not know about the siege. With them they had 60 soldiers and 150 porters. They soon encountered some of Sher Afzal's men gathering to oppose them. Being vastly outnumbered, they sent word back to Mastuj asking for reinforcements. Captain C.R. Ross, the post Commanding Officer, Lieutenant J. J. Jones and 60 Sikhs set out to help them. They were ambushed on 11 March and only Lieutenant Jones and 13 men escaped back to Mastuj.
Meanwhile, Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler had continued on and were attacked near the small village of Reshun by a force led by Muhammed Isa, Sher Afzal's foster brother. They beat off the initial attack and garrisoned Reshun. They prepared to endure a long siege. The Chitralis, fearing to make a frontal attack, lured the two young officers out by treachery. They invited them out to see a polo match, of all things. The two officers accepted, thinking that their men on the walls of the town would be able to protect them. Well, as the match wore on the men became complacent and the Lieutenants were captured. Their men were demoralized and the Chitralis easily took the town and slaughtered the defenders to a man. The two Lieutenants were bundled off to Umra Khan as prisoners.
At right, Afghan Mountaineers from (Illustrated London News)
The Siege Continues
On 22 March Robertson and his men started to eat their horses. On 6 April one of the towers of the fort caught fire. It was finally put out by the Sikhs, under heavy fire from the besiegers. Robertson was wounded in the shoulder. In order to pass the time, Robertson had the men make a Union Jack to fly over the fort. They made up fire bombs of pine chips and straw sewn in a bag and soaked with kerosene. These did not do much damage but kept the enemy from coming too close.
On 17 April the defenders perceived that the attackers were attempting to tunnel under the walls and blow up the fort with a mine. The tunnel could be seen to start from the summer house just outside the walls. Lt. H. Harley, commander of the Sikhs, volunteered to lead a sortie. With 40 Sikhs and 60 Kashmiris he took the besiegers by surprise and in a short but sharp fight blew up the tunnel and killed 40 or 50 of the enemy. Harley's losses were 8 killed and 13 wou nded.
On 20 April 1895 Chitral was relieved by Lt. Col. J.G. Kelly. Total losses in the fort were 41 killed and 62 wounded.
Colonel Kelly's March
Lt. Col. James G. Kelly was stationed at Gilgit. He commanded the 32nd Sikh Pioneers, an untested unit formed in 1887. With 382 Pioneers, 34 Kashmiri sappers and two 7 pounder mountain guns he set forth on 27 March to relieve beleaguered Chitral. It is hard to describe the difficulties faced by Kelly and his men. He had to traverse dangerous mountain tracks, cross deep gorges and plow through snow three to five feet deep. Temperatures fell below freezing at night and the men had no tents and insufficient clothing. Many, including two of the officers, suffered from snow blindness. Frostbite was common. Colonel Kelly also faced the dangers of Sher Afzal's men. Twice he pushed them out of strong defensive positions lining narrow gorges.
On 9 April he encountered the enemy in the Chakalwat Valley. They lay behind defensive sangars built on the opposite side of a ravine. Kelly brought up his guns to within 400 yards under heavy fire and commenced a combined infantry and artillery assault that forced the enemy out of his position. Kelly then crossed the ravine and proceeded to Mastuj. Here he relieved Lieutenants Moberly and Jones with 100 Kashmiris and 100 native levies. These he added to his small force. After several days of rest he pushed on. Eight miles further on he encountered the enemy in what was supposed to be the strongest natural defensive position in the land. It was known as Nisa Gol. Once again he effectively deployed his guns and destroyed many sangars while his men advanced through steep and treacherous ravines, at times having to lower themselves by ropes. The enemy was finally pushed out of his position by the resolute attack of the infantry.
Finally Kelly lay a day's march from Chitral. In front of him was a deep gorge with a fast moving stream at the bottom. Sher Afzal's men lined the far side. For several days they faced each other and skirmished as Kelly tried to find a way across the gorge. Then one day the Chitralis abandoned their positions. Col. Kelly built a bridge and advanced to Chitral unopposed. Without a shot he marched up and relieved the garrison. He had done an amazing thing in marching 220 miles in 28 days, fighting and winning two hard battles and rebuilding all the bridges the Chitralis had destroyed. Had he been leading British troops it seems certain that Colonel Kelly's March would be among the most famous of British military exploits, instead of the relatively unknown event it is today. Approximately one week after Kelly reached Chitral Major General Sir Robert Low arrived on the scene with an army of 15,000 men.
General Low's March
Upon hearing of Robertson's predicament the Government of India began to assemble a massive relief force. After several weeks General Low marched out of Peshawar with a force consisting of three infantry brigades, two cavalry regiments, four artillery batteries and three companies of sappers. Altogether there were 15,000 men and 20,000 animals. This army consisted of native troops and some of the best British regiments in India. The force included the Gordon Highlanders, the Seaforth Highlanders, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the King's Own Royal Rifle Corps, the Buffs, the Bedfordshire Regiment, the East Lancashire Regiment, the 4th Sikhs, the Bengal Lancers, Gurkhas and the Guides. Needless to say, General Low expected a victory.
On 3 April he fought his first battle at the Malakand Pass where about 12,000 of Umra Khan's men had gathered. The battle commenced with a shelling of the enemy positions along the pass. The Sikhs and Guides advanced to turn the enemy's right flank, pushing them out of their sangars at bayonet tip. They worked their way along the crest and rolled up the flank of the enemy. The Scottish Borderers and the Gordon Highlanders advanced up the center of the pass with the Royal Rifles, Bedfords, and native infantry in support. They then climbed the precipices of the pass, siezed and burned the village at the top and advanced across the ridge to the Swat Valley beyond. Total British losses were 8 officers and 61 men.
The next day the infantry advanced under heavy fire to the Swat River. Two companies of the Bedfords were attacked by vastly superior numbers but they managed to beat back the enemy with the use of magazine fire at short range. The only ford of the Swat River was at Chakdara. Chakdara was dominated by surrounding hills which were, of course, swarming with about 4,500 of U mra Khan's men. Low sent the sappers forward to attempt to build a bridge over the river but they were driven back by heavy enemy fire. The artillery was then brought forward, along with a Maxim gun of the Borderers. While these weapons kept the enemy's heads down the Bengal Lancers and the Guides crossed the river. The Chitralis did not like lances and were soon disbursed by the cavalry. The Bedfords contrived to cross the river higher up, linked arm in arm. They then siezed a small fort. The Sikhs crossed the river lower down by the same method and quickly took two small villages. With each side of the ford secured the main army was now able to cross unopposed.
On 12 April the army came to the Panjkora River. The Guides crossed first but they were stranded when the river rose unexpectedly and the Chitralis sent logs down the river which broke the bridge away. The Guides were unable to cross the river and prepared a fortified camp for the night. They defended themselves against 2000 attackers with the help of starshells and a Maxim gun that was floated across the river on inflated animal skins by the Sikhs. They lost 5 killed and 22 wounded that night.
Subsequent to this there were no major battles, although there was constant skirmishing. Once past the Panjkora the road became a mere track through the Jambati Pass to Dir, where Umra Khan ruled. Here General Low was able to secure the release of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler. Sixty miles further on was the Lowari Pass, and then Chitral. Low and his army were extremely disappointed to find that Kelly had relieved Chitral before they had. But certainly Colonel Kelly never would have made it had not General Low distracted most of the enemy to the south. Had he not done so, Chitral probably would have been another Lucknow, with Kelly joining the besieged as soon as he had relieved them.
Notes for a Campaign Simulation
The siege and relief of Chitral provides an almost perfect basis for a campaign simulation. It is a short campaign, taking no more than two months. It covers a relatively small, self-contained area.
Large Chitral Campaign Map (slow: 111K)
It involves a large variety of interesting troop types, from the Gordon Highlanders to Kashmiri Light Infantry. The weapons involved are various -- from Sniders to Lee-Metfords to lances to firebombs.
The main advantage of this campaign is the variety of battles it offers. From the smallest skirmish to tactical battles with thousands on a side there should be something for everyone. For those who fancy small skirmishes the opportunities are limitless. There was skirmishing on all fronts over just about any terrain type you could ask for. Small battle opportunities include the sortie against the mine, the ambush of Captain Ross and his force and the battle of Reshun. For medium sized battles you have the first Chitral reconaissance, Col. Kelly at Chakalwat and Mastuj and the Sikhs at the Panjkora River. For really large battles there are the battle at Malakand Pass and the crossing of the Swat River.
The campaign also lends itself to simulation because the forces were almost equal. The Chitralis were cunning and brave enemies, they were not prone to running away at the first sign of something going bad for them. If one were to adjust the numbers of men in the armies and impose some time restrictions on relieving the fort then neither side would be assured of a victory. As it was, there was little doubt the awesome force of General Low would succeed. Even without any modification the campaign would be interesting. If Umra Khan had supplied Sher Afzal with more men it is quite possible Col. Kelly never would have made it to Chitral. The possibilities are endless for making this a fascinating campaign. Besides the battles unique to the campaign one could imagine this as the beginnings of something much larger, with Russian forces moving in to support the "rightful" Mehtar against British Imperialism. The human element also enters into this campaign as it supplies many interesting characters to assume if the gamer is inclined towards (dare I say it?) role playing. You too could be the wily and dangerous Umra Khan or the sullen and disliked Captain Townshend. The possibilities really are limitless!
Bibliography
Barthorp, Michael; The Northwest Frontier; Blanford Press; 1982.
Callwell, Colonel C.E.; Small Wars, Their Principals and Practice; EP Publishing, Ltd. 1976. (Originally published 1906)
Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 5; Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.; 1952.
Farwell, Byron. Queen Victoria's Little Wars; Harper and Row, New York, 1972.
Featherstone, Donald. Colonial Small Wars 1837-1901; David and Charles, Newton Abbot. 1973.