by George Gush
Two years ago THE COURIER published George Jeffrey's TACTICS AND GRAND TACTICS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS (still available from THE COURIER, Box 1878, Brockton, Mass. 02403 for $12.00). There, George presented wargamers for the first time with a systematic approach for calculating battlefield maneuver and formation-changing times for Napoleonic units and grand tactical formations. Such a large topic meant using some hypothetical unit strengths and sizes and covered a large time period. However, it was hoped the book might inspire others to use the methods for more specific research and share the results with other Napoleonic enthusiasts. We are therefore pleased to present this article by George Nafziger, who analyzes primary source material on French infantry after 1808 in a similar light. Please let us know through your "Volley Fire" responses if you would like to see more articles like this in THE COURIER - NED ZUPARKO, Napoleonic Editor The mechanics of linear movement under the Reglement de 1791 is a theoretical study of time and motion. It is theoretical because, though the basic principles are established by regulation, the actual facts of variable company strength training, the ability of soldiers to maintain a constant length' stride and man's inability to tell time without a clock cause variations between fact and theory. This study is based on primary source documents. in order to do a complete study of the basic maneuvers of interest to the historian and gamer it is necessary to return to.the fundamental building blocks of maneuver. The first point to address is distance. The distances involved in maneuver are directly related to the formation of the infantry maneuvering. The company, called a "peloton" for maneuvering purposes, established by the Decree of 18 February 1808 had 140 men. Each battalion was established with six companies and a staff, but the staff maneuvered independently of the companies and does not enter intothese calculations. The companies did vary slightly in the positioning of some individuals, but aside from those few, insignificant variations, they were universally structured as shown in Figure 1. This formation had a frontage of 44 files. The distance allocated to a man by the Reglement is two French "pieds" or 26 inches, however other sources (P. Escalle, Des marches dans les armees de Napoleon) indicate that 22 inches would be a more appropriate interval. For the purpose of this study the 22 inch interval will be used. This will have the effect of speeding up slightly the maneuvers discussed, but with the high probability of any unit being below TO&E strength, this compromise is in the direction of increased faithfulness to fact in the field. The 22 inch interval means that the length of a peloton at full strength is 80 feet. This is what is known as the "disance entiere". This is also the interval between companies when a battalion formed at the "distance entiere". (Ed. note: also known as "open column at full distance".) The second factor to develop is the velocity of the maneuvering infantry. Velocity consists of two factors, the length of the individual pace or step of the soldier and the number of paces or steps he takes a minute. The length of the pace was eventually regulated and established as shown in Table 1.
According to the Reglement and the Manuel d'Infanterie the most commonly used pace was the pas de deux pieds, 26 inches. This is the pace that will be used for all calculations in this study. (Editor's note: ground or other battlefield conditions that might disrupt a consistent pace distance and increase maneuvering time will not be discussed in this study.) There were several marching cadences established by three regulations. These rates are shown in Table II.
In order to maintain consistence between formation, established in 1808, and regulations, it is necessary that the 1791 cadences be used. The Manuel d'Infanterie and the 1811 edition of the Reglement both clearly state that maneuvers are executed at pas de charge,120 paces per minute. It is also noteworthy that the 1776 pas de manoeuvre or maneuver cadence is also 120 paces per minute. Using this cadence and the 26 inch pace we derive a speed of maneuver of 260 feet per minute. As a peloton has been calculated to have a "distance" of 80 feet, the peloton can cover its own length in about .31 minutes. It can wheel 90 degrees, a distance of 125.7 feet (rounded to 126 feet) in .483 minutes (rounded to 5 minutes). With these two times the theoretical time necessary to perform any maneuver can be calculated. The first maneuver to examine is the deployment of a column to a line. There are several types of column and several methods of forming line from those columns. This study will examine the two columns and methods of changing which represent the fastest and slowest methods of changing from one formation to the other. The first maneuver is the deployment from a colonne par peloton to a line forming to one flank. This is illustrated in Figure If and is the slowest method of deploying from column to line. Figure III is the deployment from a colonne d'attaque to a line, forming on the center. This is the quickest method of forming a line from a column, formed at the "distance entiere". Operating on the assumption that a facing maneuver, an "about face" or a "left/right face" takes only a couple of seconds and is not worth taking into the time calculations, we have in the case of Figure II a situation where the movement of the grenadier company to the extreme right of the line is the movement that governs the time necessary to form the line. That is to say, the grenadiers must move farther than any other company. They move to their right a total of five company intervals (80 feet x 5 x 400 feet) and advance forward another five intervals (400 feet). In addition, the movement to the right in a file will cause an accordion like expansion of the unit because the men will not walk on the heels of the man in front of them. This is a natural phenomenon and must be considered in a filing movement. The result is that the grenadiers cover a total of eleven company intervals which, in theory, requires (0.31 x 11 x) 3.4 minutes to execute. In the maneuver shown in Figure III the grenadier and voltigeur companies move the maximum distance, however, in this instance they move two intervals to the flank and two forward. This, allowing for the accordion effect, means five company intervals (5 x 80 x 400 feet) and requires a minimum of 1.55 minutes. When a line ploys from line into column (the act of converting a line to a column) the time would be either the same if forming column in front of the line, or slightly longer in the instance of forming a column behind the existing line because of the necessity to perform two "about faces". The second formational change to examine is the formation of a square. Here time is a very critical element. Being slow to form square can have some very nasty results. After 1808, when the French changed from a line into a square they passed through the intermediary colonne par peloton, distance entiere (column of pelotons at full interval) formation, which makes calculations quite easy and eliminates the necessity of making two separate sets of calculations. Figure IV shows how this was done. In this maneuver the 4th Fusilier and the Grenadier Company stood fast, closing the interval between them. The Voltigeur Company and the remaining three fusilier companies "about faced", did a wheel to the left and advanced until the 3rd Fusilier Company formed the far face of the square, the 1st and 2nd Fusilier Companies formed the back face of the square and the Voltigeur Company formed the last face of the square. in this instance it is not the Voltigier Company that advances the greatest distance and whose movement regulates the time necessary to form the square. but the movements of the 1st and 2nd Fusilier Companies who wheel twice (0.5 x 2 x 1 minute) and advance two intervals (0.31 x 2 x 0.62 minutes) giving an optimum time to form square of 1.62 minutes. It should be understood that if the square were formed on the center (2nd & 3rd Fusilier Companies) this evolution would be much faster. Forming the square from a colonne par peloton, distance entiere, takes one less wheel on the part of the key companies and makes the time necessary to form the square "potentially" 1.12 minutes. Figure V shows the evolution of forming square from a colonne d'attaque. The process is not quite identical in that the center companies wheel outward to form the flank faces of the square and the rear two companies merely advance to close up the back of the square. In this maneuver the governing movement is the wheel of the 3rd and 4th Fusilier Companies. The Voltigeur and Grenadier Companies cannot assume their positions until they are in position. As all they are executing is a wheel, the entire maneuver takes only .5 minutes. The "about face" of the two elite companies adding a few seconds to the maneuver really make little addition to the maneuvering time. This approach can be applied to pre-1808 maneuvers, but the times for a wheel or to cover a company interval are not accurate for that purpose. The period between 1789 and 1808 saw many changes in the TO&E strength of the infantry company and during the Revolutionary period there are the double problems of very inconsistant company strength as well as a very low level of training, both of which would have increased maneuvering times. BIBLIOGRAPHYManual d'Infanterie ou resume de Tous, les Reglements, Decrets, Usages et Renseignernents propes ou Sous-Officiers de cette Armee, Paris, 1813 Reglement concernant 'Exercise et les Maneuvres de l'infinterie du Premier A out 1791, Paris, 1811 edition. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VI No. 3 Back to Courier List of Issues Back to Master Magazine List © Copyright 1985 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |