Napoleonic wargamers, like other miniatures players, must quantify history to produce an accurate simulation. Such quantification must be based upon individual historical interpretation and is therefore subjective. One cannot, therefore, prove his ratings numbers are ,right', but only logical or consistent, or reflect factors that actually caused differences between historical units. In this article, we'll look at the basis of some current ratings systems to see what they emphasize, suggest an alternative and discuss where we might go from here.
This article is actually a compilation of correspondence on the subject of ratings that I've had with Richard Burnett, Paddy Griffith, Peter Hofschroer, George Jeffrey, John Koontz, George Nafziger and Joe Park. Almost every point in the article was made either directly or indirectly by one or (usually) more than one of these gentlemen, to whom all credit is due. Any errors in compilation or representation are mine, and I hope they will point out any that may occur.
What is the purpose of a rating? It is a numerical value assigned to our model historical units to represent it's performance during the Napoleonic Wars. It cannot be entirely predictive, but is used to weight the odds of something happening to a given unit in our probability- based games. Some games rate for a broad 11 combat value" of a unit; others for different factors, such as morale and firepower. A third type uses one rating to modify another during play. In any case, all such ratings may be said to rest upon historical hindsight.
There is nothing wrong with trying to rate our units, as long as we admit that we can never truly quantify quality. Historians often make statements about trends of behavior or comparing troops to one another. We are only doing so in more detail. It is reasonable to some sort of "impressionistic statement" through Vul numbers that some group of regiments are roughly equivalent. We can say how much combat experience a unit has, how much training it has and what sort of leaders command it. For example, we know that the British (mostly 2nd battalions) units at Bergen op Zoom in 1814 were inferior in their performance, and that some of those same battalions, such as the 1st/33 and the 69th, also had trouble at Quatre Bras and Waterloo. Non-Peninsular units at New Orleans also had their share of problems.
Boardgame Tradition
Napoleonic ratings systems have traditionally differed between boardgames and miniatures games; often with more accurate results on the part of the boardgames! This has been primarily for three reasons.
First, because boardgames have usually portrayed a higher command level of many thousands of men. A general value is there justified and less likely to be in error, since the margin of error is so great. Secondly, while most boardgames deal with an historical battle or campaign, at least in the initial set up, most tabletop games portray fictional actions. Third, and perhaps most important, boardgames have rated units in relation to the specific combat environment of an historical battle or campaign, while most miniatures ratings have dealt with all or part of the "Napoleonic era".
Thus, boardgames might rate the same unit differently in two different games, where each is of a different battle, since the situation differed. The lead unit though has the same value for any situation it is in.
Most miniatures ratings systems have used troop types (ie, line, light, grenadier infantry, cuirassier, dragoons, hussars, etc.) as the basic qualitative factor. These have usually been listed by nation, and sometimes modified by year. Often these classes have been further subdivided, such as flank companies within battalions of a certain designation or title. Occasionally, certain "famous regiments" have been given more detailed ratings for rather tenuous reasons. Thus, the unusual unit dressed in a kilt, or the 95th Rifles, from whose ranks many memoirists have come, are often rated highly. Sometimes the question of how much difference is needed before that difference need be simulated, comes up. That often depends upon whether or not the game uses 6-sided or 20-sided dice! Readers of the old Courier will recall the debates on National Differences and those on the differences between French Chasseurs a Cheval and French Hussars and how those units should be rated. This approach has been made easier since names and types of units are easily accessible and often cut across national lines.
However, current ratings systems have some serious flaws. Can one really say that all French line infantry in 1809 was the same, and that they all differed from all French light infantry? There are several false assumptions here. The first is that the official series in a national establishment (ie hussars, dragoons, line infantry, light infantry) correspond to quality classes. The second that there must necessarily be a qualitative difference between such classes and third, that there is no variation within such classes.
There are many historical examples that don't fit neatly into these assumptions. In the British Army, for example, we find that whole classes of troops weren't raised at one time, as in Prussia or Austria. Many Napoleonic gamers rate their British 'Fusiliers' as elite, yet the Fusilier designation didn't occur until after 1815. British Grenadiers weren't chosen for superior ability, but only for their height, being the tallest 10% of the battalion. Light infantry companies of the line battalions were still line troops. Yet in most of Wellington's battles, he massed those companies and used them as "light" units. (At Hougoumont, most of the Guards battalions had two light companies, and these were overstrength. Thus, this large force was used for purposes different than one might assume if one only referred to the troop "type".)
French officers, in their discussions after 1815, seemed to think that there was absolutely no difference in any way at all between what were designated "light infantry" and "line infantry" regiments, though they did recognize 'personality differences' of individual battalions.
Most authorities would probably agree that the line regiments that went to Portugal with Junot were probably not of the same quality as regiments that had been serving with the Grande Armee since 1805. In the French line regiments, over 20% by the end of the wars had been converted from National Guard. And there were the National Guard of 1809 and then an 1813 National Guard; the latter with a year's training.
Cavalry
Cavalry, it might be said, is cavalry. While the amount of experience might differ, the basic training was pretty much the same. Many cavalry classes were created from others. Thus, in 1812 lancer regiments were converted from dragoon regiments, while many dragoon regiments had been "newly" converted from heavy cavalry or hussar regiments. The Young Guard squadrons attached to the famous Guard cavalry regiments in 1813-1 - 4 would probably have been more different from the senior squadrons of their regiment than those senior squadrons would have been from the senior squadrons of another regiment.
If we can't depend upon the troop class as a basic quality indicator, what can we use? The one common denominator would seem to be field experience. Two more important factors would be training and leadership, though each in its own way is either secondary to or derives from field experience of some sort. A unit with training is better off than one without, and a good leader can get more from his unit than could a poor leader. For purposes of finding a general rule-of-thumb, though, experience would be the most important. Other secondary considerations for our ratings might be a given theater and a given year.
Like any other "rule of thumb", experience is subject to many mitigating circumstances, such as casualties, disease, fatigue, hunger, recent victory or recent defeat. For example, regiments that served in the West Indies for several years were ruined, and stayed that way until pulled out and reconstituted. Very few of the British battalions who caught "fever" at Walcheren were worth much after that. Sometimes the material of similar units might differ. The cuirassiers of 1815 were mounted on different horses than in times past. The Russian campaign also made a serious dent upon the amount and quality of horseflesh available.
Large numbers of casualties in a relatively short period could create differences in troop quality. A highly experienced unit that lost most of its personnel would lose much of the benefit of the unit's field experience. One of the advantages of Napoleon's veteran Guard was that Guardsmen were capable of stepping up in rank in the line, and were able to provide experienced cadres around which Napoleon could rebuild an army in 1813.
Expansion of forces, as well as casualties, could lead to the dilution of quality, even among experienced units. The numbers and distribution of draftees was another factor one must take account of. For example, one of the differences between the French, British and Russian Guard troops was that the French only took veterans; the others took in fairly raw draftees. The French army in 1809 was expanded with draftees, and did suffer some quality loss. In 1812, the 5th field battalions were often draftees, too. In the First Corps, though, Davout chose to spread his draftees throughout the Corps instead of concentrating them in one place.
And yet, the performance in 1813 of the "Marie Louises" defied prediction.
Leadership and Organization
Combat experience can also be tempered by leadership and organization. One of the problems for the French in 1815 was the new Divisional organization and commanders. Without time to work together, the constituent parts lost some of their effectiveness. In the Austerlitz campaign, Generals had regiments under their command switched sometimes daily, with attendant confusion and inefficiency. The Prussian army used a similar system until 1805 and tried "mixed divisions" in 1806. Without the training or experience for that type of organization, they suffered the consequences. From 1808 they trained properly in brigade and Division groups. The experience of the Auxiliary Corps in 1812 and 1813 was diluted in the influx of new units in the Autumn of 1813. By 1814, the surviving formations had gained a lot of experience both in the field and with each other.
One aspect of experience in the Napoleonic era has not been much explored, and needs to be mentioned. in the Second World War, units were found to 'burn out' if left in the field after having reached their peak. Did the same conditions apply to conscripted Napoleonic units, or to those composed of seven-year or life-term volunteers?
With this in mind, and remembering that any 'formula' we come up with is only an educated guess, how can we approach a ratings system that will be based upon experience? In many cases it will mean looking at individual battalions. For example, in Britain most British regiments raised their 2nd battalions after 1803, and used the 1st Battalion in the field, while keeping the 2nd at home. However, sometimes the 2nd was the field unit, sometimes both were used when a 3rd battalion was raised, etc. Officers and drafts often went back and forth between battalions. Thus the need for individual attention.
One would need, therefore, to ignore designations such as "line" or "light", "hussar" or "dragoon", and instead concentrate on unit experience. We would have to first find when a battalion was raised or first entered the Napoleonic wars. (RAFM's new book THE BRITISH MILITARY has such information for British units.) It would take perhaps two or three years of field service before such a unit got to first-class experience status. While experience would raise value, this would have to be measured against debilitating factors, such as disease. Casualties that keep a unit understrength would probably also offset any experience gain of the survivors, since the influx of inexperienced replacements would have to be considered.
This is certainly not easy, and would involve a lot of research. For those with access to primary documents, there are sure to be reports of various inspections and states in the European archives. Sources might be the Orders of Battle for several campaigns in a row. For researching grand tactical values, one would look for Divisions that underwent little internal reorganization, such as the Russians from 1812-1814. In looking at such OB's one could assume that Divisions inherited from, say, the previous year's campaign, would be better than newly formed ones. It should be noted that any such research will always have the danger of being taken out of context and thus lose whatever value the original idea may have had.
It has been the purpose of this article to suggest that we rate our units based upon combat experience instead of by troop type. Still, until such research is done, the weekend gamer needs some sort of guideline. That can probably be done by finding the battle or campaign honors of units or regiments and using those instead of unit types as a measure of their "eliteness".
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