The year 1078 saw one ot the most surprising actions of the whole Middle Ages. Alexius Comnenus, as Domestic of the Scholae under the Byzantine Emperor Nikephorus III Botaniates, defeated a rebel army outnumbering his own by almost two to one. Kalaura is also one of the few battles from the period for which we have good documentation. There are two reliable accounts of the engagement; one written by Anna Comnena, the daughter of Alexius, and the other by Nikephorus Bryennius, the son of the rebel leader (father and son shared the same name). The younger Bryennius fought at Kalaura alongside his father. While the main events of the battle are clear, there are gaps in our knowledge of many of the details. In reconstructing Kalaura, then, there is quite a bit of room for detective work and conjecture. THE BYZANTINE ARMY At the height of its power in the tenth and early eleventh centuries, the Byzantine Army was the best paid, trained, and equipped force in the world. No other army was a match for its terrible efficiency. The Byzantines' main strength lay in their heavy cavalry (kataphractoi), organized into units of mixed lancers and archers, and providing a balance of shock and firepower unequaled by any contemporary Western army The nucleus of the army were the full-time regulars based in Constantinople. These regiments, the Scholae, Excubiti, Arithmos, and Ikanatoi collectively comprised the Tagmata. They were supplemented by the provincial or Thematic troops. The Thematic forces were not as well trained or equipped as their Tagmatic counterparts though their organization was similar. Under the Emperors Nikephorus II, John Tzmiskes, and Basil II, the Byzantines re-conquered much of Palestine, annexed Bulgaria and consolidated their influence in Europe. After the death of Basil II, the army declined drastically as a result of the anti-military policies of Basil's successors. This decline culminated in the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, in which the Tagmata and the troops of the eastern Thernata were virtually annihilated. Following Manzikert, the Seljuk Turks quickly gained control of the Empire's Anatolian provinces comprising one-half of the Empire's total Themata. BRYENNIUS' REBELLION In 1078, Nikephorus Bryennius, Dux of Dyrrachiurn led a rebellion against the Emperor Nikephorus Ill. The Emperor, himself a recent usurper, had good reason to fear for his throne; his army was composed of only a few Thematic veterans and a handful of green recruits to oppose the battle-hardened troops of Thrace, Thessaly, and Macedonia. Furthermore, Bryennius' control of Thrace put him firmly in control of the Empire's granaries. Nikephorus Ill was, therefore, confronted with a powerful army advancing unopposed on his capital simultaneously with a deteriorating political situation inside Constantinople itself. Byzantine rulers often had more reason to dread an unhappy, hungry populace in the city than a besieging army. The Emperor took two steps to counter the threat: first, he solicited 2,000 men and a promise of more reinforcements from the Turks; second, he dispatched Alexius with a hastily assembled force consisting of scrapings from the eastern Themata, a few Franks, and the Turks. Alexius was ordered to engage the rebels immediately. Alexius advanced into Thrace and pitched camp near the fortress of Kalaura, at some distance from the rebel camp. Alexius prepared for the coming battle by sending spies into the insurgents' camp. Bryennius was confident of victory, and had allowed his security to become lax enabling Alexius' spies to come and go as they pleased. Their information alarmed Alexius; Bryennius had stripped the West of troops and raised a 12,000 man army. Alexius had only some 7,000 troops and realized that he could never win a straight-forward battle. Thus, he planned to defeat his enemy through cunning. THE FORCES On the morning of the battle, Bryennius advanced to meet Alexius with his army divided into three wings. The right wing consisted of 5,000 men under the command of John Bryennius, brother of Nikephorus Bryennius. This wing included Thessallians, Franks, and a moira (regiment) of the Heteira (mercenary cavalry who formed part of the Emperor's personal bodyguard). The precise number of men in a moira at this date is uncertain, but in this case it seems to have been about 1,000. Anna Comnena related that all but insignificant numbers of the West's Thematic troops were present. Since the cavalry strength of a single Thema was about 3,000, this leaves roughly 1,000 Franks to complete the right wing. The left wing was composed of 3,000 Macedonians and Thracians commanded by Catacalon Tarchoniotes. The center was under the command of Nikephorus Bryennius and also consisted of Macedonians and Thracians. This division numbered about the same number of men as the left. In addition to these forces, a detachment of approximately 1,000 Pecheng light cavalry was posted a quarter-of-a-mile from the left wing to outflank the imperial right. Alexius formed his army into three divisions. 2,000 of the so-called "Immortals" were on the left. This unit was newly recruited from some veterans but was mainly composed of troops "who had only touched spear and sword a short time before," though they were classified as an elite unit. Alexius' Frankish mercenaries were in the center. Presumably, the unit was a turma, which seemed to have been about 3,000 men. Alexius retained both of these groups under his command. The right wing was under the command of Constantine Catacalon and included a flankguard of Turkish light cavalry and a unit called the Chomatenoi. Like the Immortals, the Chomatenoi (recruited from Choma in Phrygia) were a newly raised unit though not of elite troops. At full strength they probably numbered about 1,000 men. The number of the Turkish flankguard will be discussed in a moment. Alexius chose his ground carefully. The area was a plain cut by several ravines and dotted with small hills. The wily Alexius concealed an ambush in a gully on his extreme left. Subsequent events demonstrate that the majority of Alexius' 2,000 Turks were used for the ambush. The remainder (400-500) were assigned to Catacalon for his flankguard. Alexius' plan was to attack the rebel's right wing in the rear with his concealed troops while simultaneously charging frontally with his left and center divisions. The weak right wing would be refused to prevent any outflanking maneuvers by the Pechenegs. Both armies must have been poorly equipped by previous Byzantine standards. At this date, only generals, nobles, and their personal retinues would likely ride armored horses (though perhaps the element of the Heteira present should be included in this group). Anna Comnena finds it worth remarking upon that all the Thessallians present wore Breastplates. The armor she refers to is the lamellar klibanion, which was routinely worn over mail by the Tagmata and first-class Thematic cavalry. Byzantine heavy cavalry continued to operate in units of mixed lancers and archers, though mounted archery among native Byzantine elements in the army was in decline. THE BATTLE BEGINS Bryennius began the battle with a direct advance on Alexius, who waited in an apparently defensive posture. Bryennius felt assured of an easy victory as he led the cream of the West's nobility. Many of his men had seen action under George Maniakes, where they had successfully repulsed a Norman invasion. Some were survivors of Manzikert and others had been the victors in campaigns in Syria and Anatolia. Bryennius' last obstacle to the throne was a "rag-tag" force of 7,000 men led by a 22 year old novice general. As Bryennius' right wing passed through the ambush zone, Alexius signalled the Turks to charge into the enemy. They struck "with loud war-cries, each man striking and killing any who happened to come in his path." Alexius then charged at the head of the Immortals and Franks. The insurgents' right wing was thrown into confusion and began to crumble as men fled in the face of an unexpected assault on two sides. Only the discipline and the personal courage of John Bryennius enabled the stricken wing to survive. After rallying his fleeing men, John led a ferocious counterattack that shattered the Immortals. On the right, Alexius' Turks were routed by the Penchenegs who then wheeled and took the Chomatenoi in the rear and broke them too. The rebel heavy cavalry on the left swung in upon Alexius' center, which was already engaged with Bryennius' center. With their flank support stripped Alexius' Franks surrendered. Ironically, the Penchenegs saved the Imperial army. Rather than pursuing the routed Chomatenoi and Turks, they attacked and looted the rebel camp! The camp servants ran out onto the battlefield where they became intermingled with Bryennius' troops, adding to the existing confusion. Meanwhile, Alexius found himself and six men cut off behind enemy lines. As luck would have it, Alexius spotted Bryennius' spare horse close by. The horse had already been fitted with the trappings and regalia of an Emperor's mount, and Alexius and his companions immediately attacked the horse's groom and two guards. They captured the animal along with the guards' swords (the scythe-like two-handed rhomphaia). Alexius returned to his own lines and gave the horse and swords to a herald with orders to go among the troops proclaiming the death of Nikephorus Bryennius. Alexius was successful in rallying his men through this ruse. A body of fresh Seljuk reinforcements arrived on the scene, and Alexius was hopeful of salvaging the battle. He rode to a nearby hill to survey the field. He must have been amazed when he saw that the rebel army was in chaos. Still locked in combat with some of Alexius' troops and entwined with their own servants, Bryennius' force was in complete disarray. THE COUNTERATTACK Alexius rapidly devised a new plan. He marshalled his remaining available troops, divided them into three groups, and posted two of them in concealed flanking positions. He then led some of the Turks and Immortals in an attack on Bryennius' disordered army. The attack quickly reversed into a feigned flight as Bryennius and his men rode after Alexius in hot pursuit. When the rebels were lured into the waiting ambush, Alexius about-turned and charged his pursuers. The hidden Turkish troops simultaneously charged into the rebel flank. Despite heroic efforts to rally their forces, John and Nikephorus Bryennius failed to rally their army. Nikephorus Bryennius was compelled to surrender soon thereafter. CONCLUSION It is difficult to critique either commander very much in reviewing the battle of Kalaura. While Bryennius was too overconfident of victory, he also took the precaution to strengthen his right wing against an anticipated flanking move by Alexius. Furthermore, he placed his brother John in command of that wing. John's personal courage and ability was instrumental in preserving the rebel army's order against Alexius' initial assault. Alexius demonstrated not only great ability, but an unexpected tenacity and resilience as well. Many other generals would have considered the battle lost even after the arrival of reinforcements. A most fascinating aspect of Kalaura is the manner in which it foreshadowed Alexius' future reign as Emperor. Alexius ascended the throne in 1081 and inherited a state on the verge of collapse. Not since the early seventh century had the Empire been so close to disintegration. Thje treasury was depleted, the army only a shadow of its former greatness, and the nation was torn by internal dissension and beset by a host of external foes. The Seljuks raided as far as the Bosporus; the Normans under Robert (the Weasel) Guiscard and his son Bohemund had driven the Byzantines from Italy and were moving on Constantinople through Epirus and Thessaly; Pechenegs and Cumans raided far south of the Danube; Bulgaria was in revolt. Yet, despite the Empire's meager resources in the face of these formidable problems Alexius restored the Empire's European borders to nearly their pre-Manzikert limits and recovered more than a third of Anatolia (including the entire coastline) from the Turks by the time of his death in 1118. REFERENCES The Alexiad of Anna Comnena translated by E.R.A. Sewter, Penguin Books 1969 The Encyclopedia of Military History R Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, Harper and Row 1977 "Some Aspects of Byzantine Military Technology from the Sixth to the Tenth Centuries" J.F. Halclon, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies v. 1 1975 Armies and Enemies of the Crusades Ian Heath, Wargames Research Group 1978 Armies of the Dark Ages Ian Heath, Wargames Research Group 1980 "The Tactics and Strategy of Alexius Comnenus at Calavrytae, 1078" Norman Tobias, Byzantine Studies 1980 v.6 Map A. 1,000 Heteira HC (Ech?), 1,000 Frankish HC, 3,000 Thessallian HC under John Bryennius B. 3,000 Thracian and Macedonian Hc - Nikephorus Bryennius C. 3,000 Thracian and Macedonian Hc - Constantine Tarachoniotes D. 1,000 Pecheneg LC 1. 1,500 Turkish LC 2. 2,000 Immortals HC 3. 2,000 Frankish HC (1,2,3 under Alexius Comnenus) 4. 1,000 Chomatenoi HC - Constantine Catacalon 5. 500 Turkish LC Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. IV #6 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1983 by The Courier Publishing Company. 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