The term "Command and Control" is often used by wargamers to describe how orders are issued and car ried out in their tabletop simulations. This article hopes to show that by examining the functions of "command" and "control", we may discover that they are not synonymous, and to discuss how that might be simulated in our games.
An army sets up a chain of command to help its com mander carry out his wishes and orders more efficiently. Since he is unable to tell every soldier what to do all by himself, various layers of commanders exist. Every officer on this chain of command has both a superior officer (to whom he is accountable) and one or more subordinates. Even the army commander is often the subordinate of some higher rank ing officer or politician. Every subordinate is there, in theory, to act as proxy for his superior. The function of orders is to tell the subordinate what the superior wants done.
One test of well-written orders is that they tell a sub ordinate what to get done, but not how to do it. If a superior officer gets into great detail about how the subordinate is to do something, he has defeated the purpose of the chain of command. After all, why pay the subordinate's salary to do his job of handling his own subordinates if his superior officer is going to do it himself? It is also less inefficient since it takes time and energy away from subjects more properly the superior's concern. This concept is certainly not re stricted to the military; most large corporations work the same way.
With that in mind, we need to label the distinction be tween giving someone a task, and then leaving him free to carry it out properly at his own level. We'll use the term "control" for telling someone what to do, and "command" for carrying out what someone has told you to do. Thus, a "Controller" is one who tells his subordinates what to do by setting them an objective or a task; a "commander" is one who decides how to do it, using his "command" (his men, forces or resources) to do it with.
Accepting that definition means that all field officers (i.e., those with a body of troops at their disposal) actually perform the functions of command and control simultaneously. However, they do not exercise those functions on the same force or level on the chain of command. Instead, an officer commands troops at his level, but controls troops one level down on the chain of command. He controls those troops by controlling their commanders, who are his subordinates. Table 1 shows how this might look on a Napoleonic chain of command.
There were times when a controller's orders could be carried out in only one way. For example, if a Divisional General were to order the entire Division to march straight forward from their present positions and formations, he has left little for his subordinates to do and has in effect taken control not only of his immediate subordinates, but of all command levels below his. Or, a force may have been drilled to take certain actions, with each component unit going to a pre-designated spot, upon the orders of a General. Thus, a Brigadier might give the order that his Brigade is to change front to the right. This order is carried out in a specific way, which the men have practiced, in response to the controller's order.
| Commander of: | Controller of: |
|---|---|
| Army | Corps of the army & army artillery reserve. |
| Corps | Division of the corps & corps artillery reserve. |
| Division | Brigades of the division & divisional artillery. |
| Brigade | Regiments of the brigade (or battalions, if no regimental structure is present - eg much of the British infantry, where only 1 Bn was fielded). |
| Regiment | Battalions/squadrons of the regiment. |
| Bn/Sqn | Companies/troops of the Bn/Sqn. |
| Company/Troop | Sections of the company/troop. |
| Section | The soldiers of the section. |
Sometimes an existing chain of command might not be adequate for a special circumstance. It could be modified by transferring control functions to another commander. For example, a Napoleonic Grand Battery was not a military formation like a battalion or squad ron. Instead it was formed by taking batteries that normally each had their own separate controller, then assigning a new, temporary controller. At Waterloo, divisional batteries were removed from d'Erlon's Corps and combined with army reserve batteries under the control of a senior artillery General. To form or dis band such a group required letting everyone involved know about the change.
Vertical Nature of Communications
However, this points out an important feature of the chain of command, which is the vertical nature of communications in the system. The controller can receive information from one of his subordinate branches and send it down another.
In the example of the Grand Battery, controllers of the divisional batteries, the divi sion commanders would only give up that control if told to do so by THEIR controllers, and so on up the line. To form the Grand Battery would require someone who controlled not only d'Erlon's corps, but also the reserve artillery. This could only be done by Napoleon, not only because his authority was greater than those he controlled, but also because it was at his position on the chain of command that communications could go both to the artillery reserve and to d'Erlon.
If one of d'Erlon's divisional generals had wanted to form that battery, he could only have communicated with the artillery reserve via the controller higher than him who also had direct access with the reserve artillery; again, Napoleon. In setting up the system this way, controllers ensure such a message doesn't get through unless they want it too, thus protecting their own authority. Had our divisional general sent a courier direct to the artillery reserve proposing they get together to form a Grand Battery, he would probably have received a rude reply that the reserve artillery speaks only with the Emperor!
Temporary Control
Control can also be temporarily transferred even if not done formally by creating a new level in the chain of command as was done with a senior artillery general in a Grand Battery. This is approximately what occurs when one commander is told to "support" another. This is an informal way that a controller tells a subordinate commander that he will now have a new controller until his original controller wants him back again. By being told to support someone else, a commander is subordinating himself to the objectives of the supported formation. Oftentimes in wargames the order to "support" another unit is actually a way of subverting the chain of command.
Players use a "support" order to gain CONTROL over a unit so it can react immediately to the situation, without account ability to superiors on the chain of command or prior orders. In reality, the "support" order merely traded one controller for another, causing the "supporter" to ride up and ask the "supported" commander what he needed done, since he best knows where and when the support is required. The practical effect was simi lar to a "controller-commander" relationship, even if not formally stated as such.
By separating command from control, we find we need to take a new look at other related concepts. For example, wargamers often use the word "initiative" in relation to a commander's ability. A lot of initiative is considered a good thing, a sign of a superior com mander, and is interpreted to mean one who creates and takes independent modes of action. Often this implies that the good commander uses initiative to rise above faulty instructions, assess the situation and save the battle; even if that meant disobeying orders.
However, initiative can apply differently to command than to control. To show great initiative in the com mand function is to be creative and aggressively successful in FULFILLING the orders of one's controller. This was the road to promotion and glory -- taking a difficult or impossible task from a controller and succeeding. Being creative in devising independent modes of action is an example of initiative in the control function. The amount of initiative one could show depended in large part on the amount of latitude allowed by one's controller.
For example, one commander told by his controller to "protect the right" has been given much more latitude for interrogation of how he will carry that order out (and therefore more chance to "show initiative"), than another commander told to "occupy and hold that village". Told to "take Berlin" by Napoleon, Marshal Ney has a chance to demonstrate initiative in the planning and control functions of independent command; though that "independence" must still be judged within the controlling framework of "take Berlin". Ney might also take three other cities since he deems that necessary to help him take Berlin. That may show great initiative if he also took Berlin.
If, however, he had those three towns but failed to take Berlin, he most likely would be judged as not having showed enough initiative in getting the job (given him by his controller) done. If a controller gives a subordinate unclear or apparently nonsensical orders, he has not freed the subordinate from the chain of com mand. He has, instead, merely made the subordinate's job more difficult by forcing him to interpret what the controller wanted, or trying to act in a manner he thinks the controller would want. Even though there may not appear to be an explicit controller in operation, the subordinate's actions will reflect an implicit acceptance of accountability for actions that are taken, and any such actions might have to be justified later by relating them to the control orders in effect at the time.
No Conflict
If everything is going smoothly, command and control should not conflict, even though each is a different function. A controller tells a commander what to do by setting an objective. Within those parameters, the commander commands by giving control orders to his subordinates. Thus commanding really means ac cepting control from a superior, then controlling a subordinate. Given an objective by a superior, one gives objectives to subordinates that will fulfill the objective assigned by the superior.
However, things don't always function on the battle field in the same way as on the parade ground. If they did, controllers would only need to issue orders once all the way down the chain of command. Without any contrary force all orders would be successfully carried out and the battle would be over and won. Rather, controllers needed to keep careful watch on their sub ordinate formations (the next level down on the chain of command), in case they needed to give new controlling orders in order to achieve the orders their controllers had given them. In effect, we have an officer at one command level responsible (since he controls its move ments and actions) for the next level down. His level is being carefully monitored by HIS controlling officer, who is one level higher on the chain of command.
Unfortunately, such monitoring, even with modern communications, is not always efficient. A time lag will inevitably occur as someone at a higher command level (and therefore often in a different location!) tries to cope with a rapidly changing situation. One officer's force, his "command", might suffer greatly before the man responsible for it being there in that location or formation, his controller, can institute the necessary change in orders. This is the point where command and control are in conflict, and where the chain of com mand system if continued will damage itself. Some times events move rapidly and before either com mander or controller can do anything effective, the force in question has been destroyed. Or, as is more likely, the troops themselves take things into their own hands and run away.
After all, the whole chain of command was set up to enable officers to keep the men in a position where they might get killed and control them while they are doing so. A breakdown in the command and control system leaves the men as their own controllers, with the likely result that they will set themselves the ob jective of getting away in one piece as fast as possible. As their own commanders they would then try to carry out that task as quickly as possible!
In such a situation, a commander is faced with a dif ficult task. He must either continue following the controller's orders, risking destruction or loss of his command, or he must suspend carrying out those orders, and thus take on the control of his force in addition to the command of the force he is already exercising. Such a step was not taken lightly. What looks terrible at a local level might actually be part of the controller's master plan. Usurping control functions could lead to courtmartial or worse. So a commander would not do this unless he could see no other way out.
At Waterloo, British forces pounded by French artillery did not take control of themselves and move to different locations from where their controller had put them. After all, one should expect to take casualties on the battlefield. They did send requests back up the chain of command to their controller asking him to move them, but the decision to move the commanded was still the province of the controller. The decision of a commander to take on his own control was decided basically in terms of available time.
An enemy force 1,000 yards away has the potential of destroying a commander's force, but at that range he might not assume control because he might judge that his con troller still has time to do something (if, indeed, he hasn't already foreseen it -- the commander has no way of knowing). At some point, the commander will have to make the decision to assume control based on the perceived threat and its proximity both in time and space. At that point, if he must usurp his controller's function, he'll have an acceptable excuse of self-defense. If he doesn't make that choice, or makes it too late, his force may disappear. If he makes the choice incorrectly, he risks promotion, career and future. If he takes the chance, correctly, he will revert back to the normal chain of command as soon as the threat is removed, stopping his suspension of orders and resume carrying out his controller's wishes, thus once again separating command from control.
Simulation Effects
How can a separation of command from control affect our games? The basic difference means that decision-making levels will be one level higher than the force being affected. This, in turn, leads to more lag time and inefficiency in responding to battlefield events, with all concurrent "fog of war" difficulties being made even greater. For example, battalion formations and locations on the field will be determined by the next level up, not by the battalion commander. Should a new situation arise requiring new formations or locations, the battalion commanders themselves would not be able to march immediately to react. Instead, a lag would occur until their controller was able to recognize the new situation and get the battalions new orders.
Such a separation will help to restrict the latitude for interpretation as orders pass down the chain of command. If Corps is told to take the ridges, First Division to take the left hill, 2nd Brigade to take the village on the slope and 4th Battalion the Mayor's house, we should find that the lower down the chain of command, the less chance for argument and interpretation on the table.
This could also reduce the number of orders required in a game. Control orders could stay in effect a long time without requiring a change, while players deal with trying to carry out the control orders.
Finally, it might help give a different emphasis to our current tabletop battles. With command and control functions vested in one level of command, we find many games where 30 individual units are on one side, each free to move to its most advantageous location, assured of the support of other units close by on the table.
By instituting layers of controllers on a chain of command, decision-making is moved away from immediate reaction. Instead of seeing an entire table of units that each control their own movements as the rule, that would become the exception. Players would have to focus more on planning ahead instead of reacting immediately since there are sure to be lead figures within one move of any point on the table.
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