ED NOTE: General Huges has graciously given us permission to print this article which is in reality a Chapter of a new book he is writing. ROYAL ARTILLERY and 95th RIFLES. Photo by John Eagle. Courtesy of the Napoleonic Recreation Association. Waterloo is a battle about which a great deal has been written and about which a great deal is known; but, as so often happens, the action of the artillery is usually described only in the most general terms in a mixture of admiration of endurance and heroism combined with an awe of vague cannonades. Fortunately we have two excellent and detailed accounts of the movements of much of the Allied artillery. Sir Augustus Frazer, who was commanding the British Horse Artillery during the battle, wrote a detailed professional account of its doings immediately after the battle; and Capt W Siborne carried out a comprehensive investigation into the doings of every formation and unit shortly after the battle in order to construct the large relief model which was eventually set up in the museum of the Royal United Services Institution. Lesser accounts which can be drawn upon are Mercer's Waterloo Diary, though that was written some years later, and Duncan's, not always very reliable, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. It is, however, most annoying to find that, though at least four artillery units of the King's German Legion were present were part of the Allied artillery, there are only incomplete references to them in these accounts, and Siborne'! map of the disposition of the artillery omits them altogether. It will be realised that the battle was a conflict between French offensive, and Allied defensive, action. The offensive role was conducted by a master of artillery with ample resources at his command, and the French tactics were those that he had taught them and practised in many campaigns. Three guns to every thou sand men was his yardstick, and at Waterloo the ratio was 3.5, that of the Allies being 2.6. The core of the French artillery deployment was the grande batteries was no less than 80 guns, mostly the 12 pounders for which Napoleon had a confident affection. Those equipment were brought into action on a low ridge a bare 800 yard from the Allied line-- a range at which the French gun were operating at maximum efficiency. Furthermore the slope between the French guns and the ridge of Mont St Jean on which the Allied army was drawn upon was concave so that fire could be delivered over the heads of the advancing French columns. In all these ways it would be impossible to envisage a more favourable gun position for the artillery of the park. The only thing that can be said against it is that targets on the top of a ridge above the level of a gun position were not the easiest to hit. Errors in elevation would have caused a round shot either to pass harmlessly over the target or, equally harmlessly, to strike the ground below it. Nevertheless it was a gun position from which such a large number of guns could be expected to give a good account of themselves. Their task was to crush the will to resist on a frontage chosen first to assist d'Erlon's and Reille's attacks, and later to do the same for the subsequent assaults. First Task The first task in this study is to assess the achievements of this French artillery of the park, acting, in some respects at least, under unusually favourable conditions. On the credit side one must first note the effect that the bombardment had on Bijlandt's Dutch Brigade which was in an exposed position on the ridge. Admittedly they were inexperienced troops, but their ordeal is generally admitted to have been well-nigh intolerable even to seasoned soldiers. The bombardment was certainly successful there, and the brigade was so broken that it ceased to exist as a fighting force. As regards the rest of the line, however, Wellington had withdrawn his infantry behind the crest as had become his normal custom, and as the position he had chosen to hold was particularly well designed to allow. As a result the French preliminary bombardment achieved little against the defending infantry. But the artillery could not be withdrawn and must therefore have received the full weight of the French fire but for the fact that the sunken lane along which the guns were placed gave some useful protection. Nevertheless the casualties suffered by the Allied artillery were unusually heavy, reaching as they did a figure of 15% of its strength - a higher rate than in any other battle i n this period. The casualties to horses were also very high, and some units, for example Mercer's Troop, could not have moved after the battle. The loss of troop and brigade commanders was also grievous. Admittedly not all of these casualties were due to counter-battery fire, but the greater part must have been. But while the fire of the French artillery of the park cannot be said to have been ineffective, it failed in one important, and perhaps the most important, respect. Casualties there may have been, and were, among the men of the Allied artillery, but that artillery was never neutralised. There was no time when the Royal and KGL guns were not able to deliver their defensive fire when the French assaults came in. One must conclude that this particular counter-battery fire was damaging but not decisive. Several reasons can be given to explain this disappointing result. The protection given to many of the Allied batteries by the sunken lane in which they were in action has already been mentioned. Credit for this must of course go to the genius who chose the position with this small merit to reinforce all the other factors that he took into account. But perhaps the troop and brigade commanders of the artillery units should also be commended in the choice of their gun positions. Beyond that, however, it does seem that, in this particular time, the frontal engagement of gun positions, even when they were unprotected, was not a very profitable operation. Round shot which missed the small target presented by a single gun and its gun detachment would have done no damage whatever, and the chances of a direct hit under the best "trials conditions" were no more than 1 in 4 or 5. Enfilade fire was another matter, as Mercer was to find when his troop was fired at in error by a Prussian battery on its flank later in the battle; but it does seem here that the complete neutralisation of a hostile battery by frontal fire was unlikely to be achieved. Another factor which must certainly have degraded the effect of the French fire was the state of the ground. Very wet ground, such as the field of Waterloo at the time of the battle, prevented round shot from ricocheting after first graze. The shot became embedded in the mud, and thus a great deal of its usual lethal zone was cut out. Direction and Control Yet one more reason for the partial success of the grande battery can be put forward. It is one which has already been suggested in accounts of other battles, and it is particularly relevant to any study of the direction of artillery. It seems possible that these large concentrations of guns presented problems in the direction and control of guns which had not then been solved. Without a complete chain of command, which we do not know existed, and which would inevitably have been clumsy and awkward to operate if it did, the efficient direction of fire would have presented great difficulties. It must be remembered that the position was entirely different from that of the present day when, using good communications and the principle of control from a central point, virtually any number of guns can be accurately directed on to any target within their range. In 1815 both the selection of the target and the laying of each separate gun on it were carried out independently by the Number One of the gun detachment. Though the troop or brigade was the tactical fire unit, the technical fire unit was the single gun. So, and especially in the confusion of battle, there were clearly great difficulties in the direction of a large number of guns; and they must have increased in direct proportion to the size of the battery. It would have been difficult to ensure that the distribution of fire was effective, and to avoid the overhitting of part of the target at the expense of neglect of other parts. Furthermore this problem of fire control would have been made even harder by the difficulty, or impossibility, of observing the fall of shot when many guns were firing simultaneously. That would have made the correction of the lay, on which the effectiveness of subsequent fire depended, impossible. For these technical reasons, therefore, it seems that the control and direction of large concentrations of guns presented problems which had not then been satisfactorily solved; and that artillery fire in general was not effective in frontal counter-battery fire. THE ALLIED TACTICS AT WATERLOO The Allies' tactics in the use of artillery in defense show an interesting development of those which had been tried in the Peninsula. It is true that at Waterloo there was no artillery of the park on the Allied side, but the third echelon of artillery, as described in the British training manuals-the horse artillery-was available on a large scale, and was used as a mobile reserve most actively both to move and to fight. There was no doubt whatever as regards the targets which the guns were required to engage. Not only were they prescribed in "the book", but the choice was reinforced on the battlefield by the clear orders of the Commander-in-Chief. Those orders prohibited any engagement of the French artillery, and called for all fire to be concentrated on the assaulting French cavalry or infantry. The command structure of the Allied artillery was rather more complicated than has been noted earlier. There was a commander of all the Royal and KGL artillery in the person of Sir George Wood, and commanders of the foot artillery (Adam Wood) and of the horse artillery (Sir Augustus Frazer). There was also an artillery commander or adviser with each division. Furthermore Frazer delegated the command of some of his horse artillery troops to Major Macdonald. It has been suggested that this multiplicity of commanders was a mistake which probably led to confusion; but the gap which existed previously between the senior artillery commanders and the fire units has already been mentioned, and this may well have been an attempt to close it. The battle was a stationary one for the defending infantry until the last stages, and most of the field brigades were not called upon to move to any great extent. The action of the horse artillery, on the other hand, involved a great deal of movement which is fully described in the letter which Frazer wrote immediately after the battle. It is not very difficult, therefore, to work out the movements of all the guns with some accuracy. The Allied artillery consisted of eight brigades of foot (or, as it is more informative to call them, "field") artillery, and eight troops of horse artillery. Seven of the eight brigades were placed in support of the four infantry divisions as follows: 1st Div (Cooke) Sandham's and Kuhlman's (KGL) 2nd Div (Clinton) Bolton's and Sympher's (KGL) 3rd Div (Alten) Lloyd's and Cleeve's (KGl) 5th Div (Picton) Rogers' There is little doubt as to whether Braun's KGL battery was in support of 6 Div on the left, this doubt arising from the reluctance to mention KGL units which has already been mentioned. It seems most unlikely that only one battery was placed in support of the whole infantry Iine east of the Charleroi road. The eighth field brigade, Sinclair's, was initially in reserve. As may be expected, these brigades of field artillery came into action from the start in front of the formations they were supporting. The positions occupied initially are shown on the sketch map. Bolton and Sympher were initially in action behind the first line (Bolton 600-700 yards from Hougoumont" according to Siborne) but seem to have been able to provide fire support of some value. In general the field brigades remained in those positions throughout the battle, but the following moves are recorded: Sinclair's from reserve, first to a position in the right rear of La Haye Sainte from which the French cavalry was engaged at about 3:00 pm; and later to the right opposite Hougoumont. Bolton's initially as shown above till 4:00 prn when moved into a position on the right flank of the Guards Brigade to engage the last French attacks. It is likely that Sympher (KGL) accompanied Bolton. Rogers' first supported 5 Div in meeting d'ErIon's attacks, then moved to the west of the Charleroi road, to engage the cavalry charges. Finally moved to a position well to the right between the Guards and Adam's brigades. Thus, while the field brigades were moved to a limited extent during the battle, there is little doubt that a higher echelon of command from that of the battery commander intervened to move some of those artillery units when the situation called for it. This is a good example of the way in which, when successive attacks were delivered on different parts of a defended position, it was often necessary to move short ranged artillery in order that the maximum amount of fire could be applied at the threatened point. Bolder Moves A much bolder movement, or series of moves will be found, however, when the handling of the Horse Artillery is examined. It will be remembered that Frazer had eight troops of Horse Artillery under his command. As Vivian's and Vandeleur's cavalry brigades were deployed in a holding position far away on the left flank, he decided to place one troop (Gardiner's) in their support; and, very usefully as it turned out , he sent Whinyate's Rocket Troop to support Ponsonby's and Somerset's Cavalry brigades. This left six troops of horse artillery, five of which, according to conventional thought, could have been earmarked to support the remaining cavalry brigadesand would thus have been completely wasted. That was not Frazer's idea, and there he was abetted by Uxbridge himself who 'offered him all of the horse artillery to use as he wished.' There was Frazer's highly mobile reserve of which he wrote: 'I placed and maneuvered the horse artillery as I chose.' Furthermore that reserve contained the four rearmed 9 pdr troops, and Bull's which had been exceptionally armed with six heavy 51/2 inch howitzers. The rest of this story will show how he handled that reserve in ways which are shown on the accompanying map. FRAZER'S ACTION First, at a time which Frazer put at about 10 am, that is to say before the battle began, he rode along the whole line from east to west, and took two action s on the way. The more important of the two concerned the initial deployment. The reader will have noticed from the sketch map that the center of gravity of the initial layout of the artillery was well over to the west of the Charleroi road. This was no doubt a result of Wellington's well known anxiety about his right flank, but it had in fact resulted in a marked absence of artillery support in the center around the cross roads north of La Haye Sainte. Frazer therefore, very properly consulting Wood first, brought up Sinclair's Brigade and Ross's and Bean's Troops and put them into action as is shown on the map. In the event Frazer could hardly have devised a better scheme. Those reinforcements were ideally place to take in enfilade, firstly d'Erlon's infantry attack east of the Charleroi road, and after that the cavalry charges which were delivered west of it. Those reinforcements therefore not only eliminated a weakness in the initial layout but also established an artillery bastion which could help to defeat attacks delivered anywhere on the front. Riding westwards Frazer then found that for some unknown reason Orange had ordered Lloyd to move. That would have left Alten's Brigade of 3 Division without support, so Frazer brought Lloyd back into action not without some difficulty in finding and returning his ammunition wagons. The whole of this incident is a little obscure. Mercer related that, while he was still in reserve, Lloyd came back to him and asked for help as his brigade had been much knocked about. That cannot have been the reason for the move which Frazer rectified as the French bombardment had not then begun. THE RIGHT FLANK Continuing his ride, Frazer arrived at the right flank as the battle for Hougoumont was brewing up. So, of course, did the Duke, and between them they called forward Bull's and Webber-Smith's Troops. The special armament of the former has already been mentioned ' and the famous dialogue between the Duke and Frazer is well known. It seems that the Duke was naturally a little skeptical of the performance of Bull's heavy howitzer's, but events proved that they (and their owners) were well suited to the task. Frazer then moved to the extreme right flank where, he wrote 'seeing its weakness', he ordered Mercer's and Ramsay's Troops into action on the right of Clinton's 2 Division. That again must have been a result of anxiety as regards the right flank. THE CAVALRY CHARGES By that time the first series of infantry attacks had come to an end and the great cavalry charges west of the Charleroi road were imminent. Frazer rode back towards the center of the line, putting Webber-Smith to fire down the Nivelles road on the way. He found that Bull's Troop had been considerably knocked about before Hougoumont and had to be brought out of action to refit. His place was taken by Ramsay from the extreme right. Frazer then met the Duke again and was ordered to bring up all his remaining reserves to meet the attacks by the French cavalry. Mercer was brought in from the right flank; Bull's Troop (refitted) was redeployed; and Bolton's Brigade was moved nearer to the center. During the last phase of the battle Gardiner's Troop, which was virtually unemployed on the left flank, was brought over to the center, and Whinyate's was pushed forward to help in the retaking of La Haye Sainte. CONCLUSION It will be seen that Frazer's counter to the French use of a powerful artillery of the park was initially to deploy a modest allotment of close support artillery, and to hold the largest possible force of horse artillery in reserve. This incidentally was Frederick the Great's original conception of the use of horse artillery. Its mobility could of course enable it to support cavalry, but in Frederick's view its more useful purpose was to use it! mobility on the battlefield in accordance with a centrally directed plan as the battle developed. During the battle of Waterloo Frazer will be seen to have used his reserve, troop by troop, to reinforce weak spots with fresh or refitted units. No less than thirteen recorded moves of the artillery took place, and the conception of a stationary line of guns is completely false. Frazer's rapier tactics in the face of the ponderous and rigid French system enabled the Allied artillery to compensate for inferior numbers by more skillful operation. Note: There is good evidence for all the moves of artillery which have been described above, Frazer and Siborne being in agreement, but with one exception. Siborne records Bean's first gun position, after his move from reserve, as that shown on his (Siborne's) sketch of the final positions of the artillery. Frazer, on the other hand, included Bean in his first move to strengthen the center behind La Haye Sainte. Bean himself was killed and three of his officer wounded, so that the reply to Siborne's questionnaire was written by a junior officer who may not even have been on the gun position early in the battle. Credence has therefore been given to Frazer, and Bean's Troop has been shown in action firstly near La Haye Sainte, and later further to the west when Siborne shows him. Large Map of Artillery Positions at Waterloo (slow: 124K) Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. IV #3 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1982 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com