Do figure makers ever listen? Do wargamers who buy their figures really care? I recently saw a list of Mikes models' latest release of "Figures for Omdurman (The Battle that Avenged Gordon).- For a battle that was fought mostly by Egyptian and Sudanese troops there are only four Egyptian army figures, as opposed to eighteen British figures (including two British Camel Corps who did not fight at Omdurman). There is an impressive list of sixteen Mahdists (identified as "Dervishes", which would be like listing WWI Germans as "Huns"), but what do I see? Mahdists in fezes, cavalrymen with "muskets" and even (by now the inevitable) "Dervish Armoured Noble Cav with Sword and Shield."
For some years now I have been writing articles on Mahdist uniforms and army organization, but no figure maker seems to have taken note. First: the Mahdists never (NEVER) wore fezes; that was an item of Egyptian clothing which was strictly forbidden. Second: firearms were generally restricted to a trained group of rifle-bearing infantry, they were only occasionally given to horsemen on reconnaissance or special patrols.
Sometimes an amir might arm himself with a rifle, but there were no units of cavalry regularly armed with rifles or muskets. There wasn't really a separate cavalry arm in any case, but that's another matter. Third: chainmail was not worn in battle, when it was worn it was not worn with a shield, and there was no Mahdist "nobility," so there can be no such thing as "Dervish Armoured Noble Cavalry."
Figure makers still treat the Mahdist army with a casualness which would be unacceptable in any other wargaming line (would any wargamer accept a figure of an Old Guard Grenadier in a tri-corn hat armed with a matchlock?), and wargamers seem willing to allow figure makers to dictate for them how to organize their colonial armies.
It is time wargamers reversed the process and forced figure makers to fill their real needs ' I must hasten to add here that what follows is not intended as a critique of the Mike's Models line. In fact I have no gigantic quarrel with them; I rather approve than otherwise the extent of their range of figures. But what I would prefer to see from them and all other wargame manufacturers who produce Sudan War lines is an attention to the historic balance within the Mahdist army, and a reproduction of actual troop types rather than the fanciful characters who leap from the pages of R. Caton Woodville prints.
I will not give here a detailed outline of Mahdist army organization or uniforms. Savage and Soldier has already issued a pamphlet on the Sudan Wars in which this information can be found, and more can also be obtained in recent back issues of S&S (i.e. "Making do: How to Make your Mahdist Figures look like Mahdists" in XII/1). All I wish to do here is give some general guidelines that will be useful to wargamer! when organizing a Mahdist army for different types o battles or campaigns.
Uniforms:
The Mahdist uniform is simple but is easily misrepresented. Figure makers and wargamers who use the Tradition articles or the Osprey book have beer misled on nearly every feature. The uniform was in patched jibba (which reached to about the knees) trousers (loose, but not baggy), a skull cap and immi (turban). The imma was wound in such a way that that folds made an inverted -V" in the front, and a tai hung down behind the left ear. Imma, jibba and trousers were plain undyed cotton which were white wher new, but gradually turned a grayish-beige with long wear. The patches on the jibba were arranged in syrn metrical patterns, with the same pattern on the front and back, and the most common colors were black blue, red, occasionally brown, tan, green, etc.
Solid colored patches were often trimmed in another color black trimmed in yellow, red trimmed in blue. The skull-cap (white or beige) was worn occasionally by itself. Sometimes the head (shaved was left bare.
The Beja ("Fuzzy-Wuzzies") went to war in 1883-5 dressed in their normal costume, which was not a jibba. This costume is correctly portrayed in most figures but in painting it is important to remember that patches were worn on the jibba only, not on other types of clothing. In the early days of their adherence to the Mahd some Beja sewed one or two red or blue patches or their clothes, but the extravagant patches in the Tradition and Osprey illustrations are inaccurate. Wher the Beja donned the jibba (as they did in increasing numbers from 1885 on), they gave up their usual costume, shaved their heads and wore a skull-cap.
Fezes were never worn. The Khalifa's bodyguard (Mulazimiyya) and some important amirs wore red turbans.
Weapons:
Most Mahdists were armed with spears an swords. The sword was straight, double-edged with cross hilt, usually in a scabbard of red leather. Th scabbard was hung from the left shoulder, being wor close to the body underneath the left armpit. Shields were seldom used, except by the Beja. When shields were used by other troops they were generally the Baggara type, which was eliptical with a raised central boss.
The most common firearm was the Remington rifle but some percussion muzzle-loaders were also used a few Martini-Henrys and other more modern rifle also made their way into the Sudan. Riflemen wore one or two bandoliers, either around the waist or over one shoulder. Some were captured Egyptian army issue, but most were locally made in stamped and colored leather.
The Mahdists were also well equipped with brass mountain howitzers (a good example of which is produced by Minifigs in their Napoleonic line), Krupp guns, and multi-barrelled Nordenfelt machine guns.
Organization
The Mahdist army went through three phases of organization. At first it was organized regionally as the Mahdi sent out agents to raise revolts in different parts of the country. Thus the forces that fought around Suakin and the Red Sea, opposed the Egyptian government on the Blue Nile around Sennar, defeated Hicks in Kordofan or opposed the advance of the Nile Column at Kirbekan were very much regional commands and differed from each other not only in army organization but in uniforms.
Up until after the fall of Khartoum in 1885 the core of the army was centered around the Mahdi's headquarters, first in Kordofan, then around Khartoum. His three main Khalifas each had a standard and raised troops around those standards, drawing recruits from the regions they represented. The Khalifa Abdallahi recruited the Baggara Arabs and other tribes from the West around the Black Flag (al-Rayya al-Zarqa'). The Khalifa al-Sharif's Red Flag (al-Rayya al-Hamra') contained warriors from the riverain peoples north of Khartoum, including ja'aliyin and the Mahdi's own Danaqla. The Green Flag (al-Rayya al- Khadra') of the Khalifa Ali wad Hilu was drawn from the Dighaym, Kianan and al-Lahiwiyin Arabs of the Gezira region between the Blue and White Niles.
Wherever the main army gathered, as at the seige of El Obeid, the battle of Shaykan, or the fall of Khartoum, all warriors were attached under their owm amirs to one of these three flags. It would also happen that very senior amirs would take contingents of these flags on expeditions in other regions, as Wad al-Nujumi (an amir of the Red Flag) did when he took Sennar after the fall of Khartoum, or as Harridan Aby Anja, commander of the riflemen of the Black Flag, did when he put down revolts in Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains. At the time of the Mahdi's death in June 1885 the Red Flag was the largest division, though most widely dispersed. The Black Flag was militarily the strongest as it controlled the riflemen and artillery of the entire army.
With the accession of the Khalifa Abdallahi to power, and the final withdrawal of British troops, the division of the army around the three main divisions declined as it became necessary to organize both the state and the army around regional administration. The Black Flag, under the Khalifa's brother Ya'qub, became more powerful as the other two flags dwindled in numbers.
Central recruiting could still be done in Omdurman through the three flags, but the army soon was organized around provincial garrisons which contained locally raised troops and reinforcements or special troops sent from Omdurman. The country was divided into administrative districts (imala) under administrators (amil) who were appointed from Omdurman. Sometimes the amil was a local leader, such as Uthman Diqna, amir of the Red Sea coast. Other times they were prominent amirs sent straight from Omdurman. They were the military commanders as well as principle administrators of their districts, and commanded the local permanent garrison and could also raise levies for specific campaigns. The permanent garrison contained trained riflemen (jihadiyya), a few artillery, and spearmen. The amil himself would also have a private guard of a few hundred men.
The jihadiyya were all technically part of the Black Flag, wherever they were stationed. They were black Africans from the South and West who had either served as regulars in the Egyptian army, or as trained riflemen in the private armies of ivory and slave traders. They were armed mostly with Remington single-shot breechloaders, and they were trained to use their rifles. The artillerymen, too, were former Egyptian army artillerists, armed mostly with brass muzzle-loading howitzers, though there were some Krupps as well as Nordenfelt machine guns in the Omdurman arsenal. Artillery, too, was part of the Black Flag.
The commander of the jihadiyya was Harridan Abu Anja, and he was a most able commander indeed. He died in 1888 and was replaced by al-Zaki Taml. AlZaki was imprisoned and died in 1892, and between 1885-92 various units of the jihadiyya were involved in mutinies and revolts. The Mahdi's family became restless as its own power declined, and finally in 1892 the Red Flag was disbanded and the jihadiyya superceded as the main rifle force in the army by the Mulazimiyya (body guard). The jihadiyya was never entirely replaced, but it ceased to be as important as it once had been.
The Mulazimiyya was recruited from former jihadiyya, Western Arabs, and new recruits from the Nuba Mountains and the South. They numbered about 10- 12,000, most armed with breech-loading rifles. Eventually they were placed under the command of the Khalifa's son, Uthman Shaykh al-Din. Ya'qub became the commander of the entire army, and the Black Flag lost its original character and became the recruiting center for the army. It was armed almost entirely with spears, being regarded strictly as an assault force.
From 1892-98 the regular army was oragnized around the Mulazimiyya and the Black Flag. The amil's appointed as regional commanders were increasingly Ta'aishi Baggara (the Khalifa's own tribe) and they brought with them troops sent from Omdurman rather than levies raised locally. Recruitment was still national, but the Baggara played a dominant role in garrisoning most of the outposts.
In theory the regular units of the army were organized in rub's (literally "quarters"). The rub' was of no standard size, ranging from several hundred to a few thousand, usually falling somewhere between 800 and 1200. The rub's themselves were supposed to be divided into three combat units and one administrative unit. The first combat unit was the spearmen, divided into standards along tribal and sub-tribal lines under their own amirs. Then there were the riflemen, in standards of about 100 men each. Then the cavalry, usually Baggara, frequently used on reconnaissance and frontier raids. Units were subdivided into "hundreds" under a ra's mi'a, "head of a hundred" or centurions, and the "hundreds" were divided into muqaddamiyyas of 20 to 25 men under a muqaddam.
Tactics
Tactics depended on surprise and shock. The riflemen were used to screen the sword and spearmen, sometimes being placed very close to the enemy to soften them up before the final charge. Speed was relied on, and the footmen were able to make effective use of cover to get close to the enemy before launching the attack. Large numbers of men were able to remain undetected in the bush both at Shaykan (the defeat of Hicks) and in the Eastern Sudan, so when riflemen were not used to any great extent (as in the Eastern Sudan) the final charge was frequently the first indication of the Mahdists' presence. They generally tried to overwhelm the enemy with superior numbers, but some of the Mahdi's and Uthman Diqna's earliest victories were won against larger forces than their own.
Cavalry, except for lancers, were of little use against the Mahdists, and very frequently the Mahdists withstood determined cavalry charges.
Despite the fact that the Mahdist army had an impressive number of cannons (some quite modern) and machine guns, as well as trained to use them, they made very little effective use of artillery. It was used defensively in forts or on steamers. Some machine guns were placed in small forts or redoubts in the battles of the Eastern Sudan. Cannons placed in forts along the Nile were very effectively used against steamers in 1885 and again in 1896-7.
Weakenesses
The Mahdist army was at its peak in 1885, but gradually declined until its final defeat in 1898. It's weakenesses were: a lack of an effective supply system, which made it difficult to campaign over a long period of time; a steady deterioration of the quality of firearms and ammunition; a decline in the numbers of trained riflemen and artillerists; the disaffection of important sections of the population during the 1890's; the loss of some of their most gifted and experienced commanders (Hamdan Abu Ania, Wad al-Nujumi, al-Zaki Taml) and their replacement by less experienced, and in some cases plainly stupid men (Mahmud, Uthman Shaykh al-Din); the inability in some of the later battles to withdraw in good order after a defeat; and a consistent underestimation of the strength and ability of the Egyptian army.
It was for all that one of the most powerful African armies at the end of the nineteenth century. in 1888-9 it defeated the Ethiopians, who themselves defeated the Italians in 1896. Any experienced wargamer could do much worse than to have the full range of the Mahdist army's resources to draw on when selecting an army for a wargame.
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