Letters replying to "Beating the Frogs", formed vs. unformed, manufacturers' moral obligations, defending Sam Gill, and a company kudo to Freikorps.
THIS IS NOT THE WAY THE FROGS WERE BEATEN
Phil Barker was kind enough to send me a copy of his article The Other Way to Beat the Frogs (COURIER IV/1) some months ago and I wrote to him shortly after to point out a number of errors of fact in this otherwise informative piece and assumed that Phil would correct his work before publication. I was therefore surprised to see an uncorrected version in print. Hopefully, it will be of interest to readers of this magazine if I were to outline what I feel are the errors in this article.
Unfortunately I find myself in complete disagreement with Phil's first sentence where he states that: "The primary tactical problem for Napoleon's enemies lay in how to counter the forward impulse of French infantry in columns of attack screened by skirmishers." True, this is one of the Napoleonic wargamers' favorite misapprehensions. There is, however, very little truth in that hackneyed cliche. Surely the primary tactical problem faced by Napoleon's enemies lay in how to coordinate the components of battle- the artillery preparation, the skirmish fight, the close-order troops and the cavalry-with the same skill and flexibility that the French showed throughout the wars in question. I am, of course, here referring to the warfare in Central Europe. The conditions of the Iberian Peninsula and North America are not familiar to me and I cannot comment on the problems faced there.
I believe that it would have helped Phil if he had had all three parts of my article on Prussian infantry tactics to hand before submitting this contribution. He could then have avoided a number of the errors he makes. For instance, he states: "But why should a thin British line counter-attack aggressively, while a thick Prussian or Austrian line did not?" The fact of the matter is that on occasions, including at Jena and Auerstadt, French columns were halted and even thrown back by Prussian lines, but thanks to the better co-ordination of reserves on the French side and a lack of co-ordination of the attack on the Prussian side, little was gained from such local victories.
When it comes to discussing the evolution of the two rank formations in the Austrian and Prussian armies, Phil makes a number of errors of fact, including:
- 1. The date that the Austrians started to use a two rank formation. Phil says it was
1807. The first regulation published by the Austrians on the use of the third rank as
skirmishers was in 1800 and there is evidence to suggest that such formations were in
use before then.
2. The date that the Prussians started to use a two rank formation. Phil says it was 1807. The fusilier battalions started to use it in 1788-before anybody had ever thought of the "new" French tactics. The first officially published regulations on the use of the third rank as skirmishers was in 1803. There is evidence to show that in some cases, the third rank was used as such a decade before that.
Phil's argument that the adoption of this use of the third rank was to counter the "new" French tactics is certainly flimsy although not entirely without foundation.
The next error Phil makes is on the numbers of men deployed from the skirmish platoons formed from the third rank. Part 3 of my essay on Prussian infantry tactics shows by reference to the 1812 regulations and from other accounts that usually only a few men from these platoons fought in open order at any one time. Admittedly, Paret, in his "Yorck & the Era of Prussian Reform" gives the impression that the 1813 Prussians used hordes of skirmishers, but that view is based on a misunderstanding of what skirmishing consisted of in the days of the muzzle-loading flintlock musket and a failure to grasp the meaning of the relevent section of the 1812 Regulations. Of course, one cannot hold Phil responsible for the errors that a noteworthy historian has made. One just has to be careful when following other people's lines of argument.
Phil's next error is to think that the Prussians used a two company wide column. They did not. The 1812-style "Angriffskolonne" was two half companies wide and with the skirmish platoons deployed, this formation was eight ranks deep and not four.
Again, Phil is wrong to say that "usually about half and sometimes all" of a Prussian light infantry formation would deploy as skirmishers. The proportion, as Part 3 of my essay makes clear, was far, far smaller.
Moreover, Phil is quite wrong to say that: ". . . the allies used the skirmishers as its (the attack's) main agent and the column in a secondary support role . . ." Again, Paret may give that impression, but the 1812 Regulations-and common sense-make it clear that the decisive factor in infantry combat at this time was the advance with the bayonet by close order troops. There was therefore no "essential difference" between the French and the Prussian tactics.
I hope I am not presenting too negative a look at Phil's article, I did find it most informative and thought-provoking. However, the attempts by some wargamers to see warfare in terms of "rules" and fixed patterns leads to inaccurate generalisations and cliches which should best be avoided if one wants to examine human conflict objectively.
If I had read any of Peter's articles at the time that mine was written, it most probably would have altered my views in some respects. Peter has the unfair advantage ofreading German, and so has access to sources that the rest of us must take second-hand! My article was submitted long before he saw the copy, and I was under the impression that it was too late to alter it after he had commented on it.
Coming to the substance of the letter, I take most of his points, but wouldpoint out that a cliche is not necessarily untrue. However, I still argue that the new Prussian system's prime agent lay in the skirmishers rather than the column.
I found in my own research into English tactics and drill that the current drill book, written by Dundas in 1791, was not a goodauthority foractual practice from 1810 onwards. On going to the next edition, produced in 1823, I found from the author's introduction that it was regarded as a codification of unofficial practices adopted during the war, and therefore presented a truer picture. I suggest that the same might well apply to the Prussians.
In the wake of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, many technical critiques of its tactics appeared, and were avidly translated into English by professional soldiers. I now have a large collection of these, and must report that their Prussian authors not only considered a thick skirmisher swarm to be the prime agent, but apparently assumed that this had been so since the 1812 reforms. I suggest that Prussian military writings of the 1820's and 30's might repay Peter's study, and might help him throw further light on the tactical developments of the later Napoleonic period. - PHIL BARKER
MORE ON BEATING THE "FROGS"
I am writing in regard to Phil Barker's article "The Other Way to Beat the Frogs," in Vol. IV, No. 1. My feelings on this article are rather mixed, to say the least. First, I must note that Phil makes an attempt to provide the reader with a bibliography. This is an excellent practice that The Courier and its contributors are to be commended for. However, Phil's bibliography is evidently not complete, since I see no sign in it of the reference for the work of Shelford Bidwell refered to in col. 2 of p. 37.
Worse yet, in col. I of p. 38 we are given in very flat and definite terms a description of the difference between the "French system" of fighting with columns and skirmishers, and the Prussian/Austrian/ Russian system, and the source of this insight is nowhere indicated. In fact, since none of the sources listed in the bibliography present this view, so far as I know, we may easily conclude that Phil himself is the source. However, if this is the case, then he should have clearly stated this, and he should have used far less definite language, since he is stating not ironclad facts, but his own hypotheses. Moreover, he should have given us some indication of why he believes it fair to draw the distinctions that he does. There is nothing wrong with hypotheses as long as they are not presented as facts, and as long as they can be supported in some degree.
As it is, Phil is asking his readership to accept his views on the strength of his name, without asking for any justification or support. This is particularly regretable, since, in one ofthe few areas where I am able to check his data conveniently, I believe that he is incorrect. This is in his description of Prussian/Austrian/ Russian columns as being two companies wide and two deep (col. 1, p. 38). As far as I know this is wrong. I believe I see how he came to the conclusion, and it might be interesting another time to go into this, but for the moment it seems best to confine myselfto saying that it looks like a judicious but failed attempt to read between the lines, in order to make up for a gap in his documentary evidence. If he has guessed wrong here, could his account of the differences between the systems of the French and their opponents also be a bad guess?
The correct account of the usual columns of the Eastern European powers is as follows. During the period in question, roughly 1807-1815, both the Prussian and the Russian armies were using battalions divided administratively into four companies. This is sufficiently common knowledge that it does not seem necessary to support it here. While in the armies of France, Britain, and Austria the basic administrative subdivision, the company, was also the basic tactical subdivision, this was not the case in the Prussian and Russian armies, which instead divided their companies into two tactical subdivisions each, yielding a total of 8 in a battalion. These tactical subdivisions may be called platoons, in translation. The actual terms were, in German, Zug (plural: Zuege), and in Russian, vzvod (plural: vzvodi). The French term platoon had also been used to some extent in German, but was out of favor, for obvious reasons. Two platoots constituted a division in the Russian terminology (div 'izionld 'iv'izioni). The Prussian army does not seem to have had any special term for a pair of Zuege. (Other than Kompanie, when both Zuege were from a single company.)
For maneuvering on the battlefield, the normal form ofcolumn in both services was what is called a "column behind the middle." In such a column the order of the platoons in line is related to their arrangement in column by the following rule: the two center platoons (4 and 5, numbering from the right) stand fast; behind the rightward of these (no. 4) are arranged the platoons of the right of the line, in column, with the order front to back being 4, 3, 2, 1; behind the leftward (no. 5) stand the platoons of the left of the line, in the order 5, 6, 7, 8. The column consists essentially of four pairs of platoons, one behind another. The center of the (former) line leads; the flanks bring up the rear. Such columns are usually termed "columns of attack" after the term used for them in the French Reglement de 1791: colonnes d'attaque. While they are far from the only form of column, they seem to have been fairly popular with the Prussian and Russian armies in this period. The Prussians called them Angriffskolonnen (German for "attack columns"); the Russians called them kolonni k atak'e (singular: kolonna k atak'e), or "columns for attacking."
The situation in the Austrian army was somewhat different. Most Austrian battalions had six companies. These companies were, as in the French or British services, co-extensive with an equal number of platoons; however, the Austrians simply called them Kompanien (companies). A fourth of a company was termed a Zug (a rather difficult usage than that obtaining in the Prussian army). Two companies constituted a Division (plural: Divisionen). The preferred Austrian battlefield column was a (close) column of companies, termed a Bataillonsmasse (literally "close column of battalion"). The Austrians also employed a column behind the middle, known as Kolonne nach der Mitte. I do not know the details of this formation, but would guess that it was of Division wi4th (i.e., two companies wide and three deep).
My sources for the above have been:
- 1. Anon. Reglement concernant ... Finfanterie du ler aout 1791. Magimel, Paris, 1812.
2. Colin, J.L. La tactique et la discipline ... Chapelot, Paris, 1902.
3. Decker, Georg. Exerzir-Reglement fuer die Infanterie der Koeniglich PreussischenArmee. Berlin, 1812.
4. Durand, R.G. "Austrian Infantry Tactics." To appear, Empire, Eagles and Lions, c. No. 68.
5. Grosser Generalstab. Das Preussische Heer im Jahre 1812. Mittler, Berlin, 1912.
6. Kochetkov, A.N. "Tactics of the Russian Army in the Period of the War of the Fatherland, 1812" in Sketches ofthe Tactics of the Russian Army in the 18th Early 20th Centuries. Military Press of the Ministry of Defense, Moscow, 1957. (Citation translated.)
7. Von Valentini. Versuch enier Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1809 an der Donau. Berlin, 1818.
8. Weiss, Hans-Karl. "The Austrian Massen" in Empires. Eagles and Lions, No. 67.
While I have been rather critical of several elements of Phil's article, those who have read it will know that I have not even touched on most of it. It is always easier to indulge in nay-saying than to catalog virtues. It should be pointed out, however anticlimatically, that Phil does areal service in drawing reader attention to some of the intriguing new ideas of Paddy Grriffith in Forward into Battle, and in trying to integrate them with events outside the Peninsula. His interest in Eastern European armies, a subject intensely neglected in English military historiography for the Napoleonic Wars, is a refreshing suggestion that better things are yet to come.
FORMED VS. UNFORMED
I am pleased that Chris Johnson (see Dispatches From the Field, Vol. IV, No. 1) found my article on morale interesting and thought-provoking but I think that he misunderstood my point about units that are 'formed' or 'unformed'.
The real basis of our disagreement is the definition of 'formed'. I would suggesi that it simply means that a body of troops is deployed in its natural (or normal fashion for fighting. By this definition, therefore, skirmishers, whose natura formation is dispersed order (from which they can support one another as a result oi their training-thus achieving cohesion of effort) would not consider themselve! 'unformed'. On the other hand, troops whose natural fashion of fighting is to do sc in close order (and who would, as a consequence, not be trained to fight in loose order) would feel 'unformed' if asked to deploy as skirmishers.
I feel that wargamers have erred in the past in applying too narrow a definition tc 'formed' (and I speak primarily for my own period although the consequence is the same), using it to mean 'in close order', with the result that anyone not in close order has to be labelled 'unformed'. This is, of course, untrue-something which i~ supported by the evidence led by Chris (Marshall's 'Men Against Fire') where the primary subject is relatively modern infantry-whose morale would have plum meted if they had been asked to fight their opponents in close-order lines or col. umns.
Chris, in fact, answers his own comment about my point that dispersed troops normally fighting that way-I never said anything about disorganized troops: would not be morally reduced by that fact when he comments that it is not where the men are standing that counts but 'that they are sufficiently under command and control to be in a recognizable formation in the first place'. By that definition skirmishers are OK, since they and their opponents would recognize a 'real' skir. mish line when they saw one, and they have their own methods of command and control (even if they differ from those employed with close-order troops).
In reply to Chris' comment about cohesion I can only invite him to define 'formed' By my own definition, given above, it is perfectly possible for dispersed troop~ to act in cohesion (as Marshall showed for instance) because what we are talking about is cohesion of effort-which is not a function of the distance between the troops. Indeed, it can be argued, and proved, that too close a proximity between the men involved can lead to confusion and a lack of cohesion.
I hope this clears up the intention of my comment, which was not designed to prove that skirmishers necessarily felt as confident as good close order troops but merely to show that 'being in formation' was not a natural 'maker' of good morale,
MANUFACTURERS HAVE MORAL OBLIGATION
When a wargamer first makes a purchase, he is making a long term commitment to that manufacturer. Few of us can afford to buy armies en toto, especially with today's high prices. Rather, we scrape together enough to buy a couple of battalions, maybe a regiment of cavalry and a gun or two. We do this with the idea that as time progresses we will increase our investment in this line and from this manufacturer. Implicit in this arrangement is the commitment the manufacturer must make that the figures will be available when the wargamer needs to expand his holdings.
This unstated bilateral agreement is absolutely necessary for this industry to exist. If the customer cannot reasonably be assured of the availability of figures he has no incentive to invest with that manufacturer. There would also be fewer people willing to enter the hobby.
In the last few years at least two major figure manufacturers have violated this basic bilateral agreement: Heritage and Minifigs U.S.A. Heritage is a classic example of why manufacturers violate this agreement. When I first became aware of this company it manufactured a nice line of 25mm Napoleonic and American Civil War figures. It then expanded into figures for the American Revolution. It came out with its 15mm Napoleonic line. It merged with Hincliffe of Texas. It came out with a 15mm Ancient's line, a 15mm Civil War line, a fantasy line, a line of paints and brushes, aline of scenic aid, etc.
It seems to me that Heritage was launching a frontal attack on the American wargaming market. By sheer size, it was trying to capture this market. But, like most frontal attacks, it failed. Gone was the connection with Hinchliffe. Gone were the 25mm figures except for the fantasy line. The scenic aids are not seen much anymore and the company has never really expanded its initial line of 15mm ancients (one wonders how long they will last?). I write this as an outside observer. I do not know what went on that led to this reorganization. Nevertheless, what there is to see leads me to believe that Heritage had no real market strategy other than to overwhelm the market through sheer size. Such a strategy is as poor in the market place as it is on the battlefield.
Something similar seems to have happened to Minifigs U.S.A. This line of figures covered more periods of warfare than any other manufacturer. In its heyday, it manufactured 25mm figures for almost every conceivable period of war. It also had an extensive fantasy and science fiction selection. It was one of the pioneers of 15mm figures. The size and range was truly enormous. It seemed as though they were turning out a new line of figures monthly.
But no longer! Those of you who wargame in 25mm know what I mean. A friend of mine tried to increase his English Civil War and Thirty Years War collections but no luck. I have been informed that the Seven Years War line is no longer in production. The fact is, Minifig has drastically cut back the number of selections in their 25mm category. It seems to me that this is indicative of a more basic problem than just a decline of interest. It shows a lack of market research and therefore the lack of a sound market strategy.
The real tragedy is that with a little foresight and business ense the whole situation could have been avoided. If you have a line whose demand no longer justifies its cost, sub-contract it out. The part-time manufacturer does not have your overhead so he can produce at a smaller volume and still make a profit. You cut down on expenses and retain your market share. In this way you can continue to read the pulse of the market. Should there suddenly be an increase of interest in say the Seven Years War you are in a position to shift production schedules and go quickly into full production of that line. Your sub-contractor can be given another less demanded line.
There is another option open to manufacturers who have more than one production site. Rather than having both production sites duplicating each other's total production, duplicate only those figures that can be supported by the market. Have the low-volume figures produced at only one site. (For instance), have Minifig U.S.A. produce say American Revolution figures and ship them to England. Have Minifig of England manufacture Seven Years War figures and ship them to the U.S. That way each production site has two markets from which to justify production of these less popular lines and not just one.
Of course. the whole problem could have been avoided in the beginning if proper marketing research had been conducted prior to commitment to these now dropped lines. All wargaming manufacturers, not just the ones named here, need to learn more about production dispersion, production differentiation, market differentiation, market strategy, market targeting, etc. Let's not have anymore manufacturing by wargamers for wargamers but rather by businessmen for wargamers.
ED NOTE: MiniFig U.S.A. is bringing back quite a few of their old. previouslv dropped lines. MiniFig also has released their old 30mm Napoleonic line to FUSILIER (see advt in this issue).
Reply: letter to Editor (v4n6)
SIDES WITH SAM GILL
Terry Griner, in his attack on Sam Gill, has what I feel are some valid complaints, although in general I tend to side with Mr. Gill, In his letter, Mr. Griner laments that "there must be a more humble and less obnoxious way of getting his point across than by abusing those who will not accept his ideas."
Mr. Criner then goes on to show us his own brand of humble dissent by creating the "Jeering Elitist Repulsive Know-it-alls" and nominating Mr. Gill as "head JERK."
Although his final comments pretty much speak for themselves, I do not see why I, as a reader of The Courier, need to be subjected to this kind of waste of space when I could be reading about gaming with historical miniatures. Is it not possible for the editor to edit out personal attacks and leave whatever substance remains in a letter? And is it not possible for readers to disagree with each other without feeling the need to ridicule and excoriate each other?
I would remind you gentlemen, if I may, that when you come right down to it, that all we are talking about is playing with toy soldiers. Let us try to keep things in their proper perspective.
KUDOS FOR FREIKORPS
Last April, I decided to purchase some FreiKorps 15 turn figures for a Seven Year War Army. FreiKorps had informed me that not only could I order directly from them, but that by including an additional SOP to the amount of my check, I could send a personal check drawn on my local bank for the amount of purchase.
Since then I have had four shipments from their firm. Orders have been sent ail mail and usually take 3-5 weeks to arrive. In the course of these shipments, as was greatly pleased with the quality of their Seven Year War range, a friend and decided that we would like to try their American Civil War range. We sent off a order, with a note that said that since the SYW range were so well done, that w would like to order some ACW figures.
Two weeks later, a letter from FreiKorps arrived stating that the ACW range were some of the earliest figures ever produced by the firm, and not up to the quality of the Seven Years War range. Hence, the company would not ship any figures, and would hold our check and allow us to change our minds if we wished. [ We went ahead with the order, and while we found the figures were not up to the standards of the SYW line, they were not that bad.]
In addition to filling orders quickly, FreiKorps has two other policies that are excellent. All shipments are followed by an Air Mail letter, which includes the difference between the 40% of order that FreiKorps requests for Air Mail and the actual cost of shipping. In most cases the package has arrived before the packing slip.
Second, FreiKorps has been more than generous in sending samples of their line without charge. With a recent order of Austrians, 2 French and 2 British figures showed up, and in reply to a request on some more information on a proposed lit covering the Mexican/ American Wars, a package of 4 foot figures and thin: mounted figures was sent, as the company had not yet put a list together of figures.
Having had lines dropped or discontinued without warning, and other problem occur with manufacturers, it's been a wonderful experience to do business will FreiKorps. On top of everything else, their figures are extremely reasonable Their Seven Years War line, the equal of any other line of 15mm figures, cost including airmail from Northern Ireland 80p for a bag of 10 foot or 5 horse figure and £ 1 for 5 foot command figures (no flags) or 3 mounted command figure Please add them to your list of historical figures.
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