by Philip Haythornwaite
Every wargamer who embarks upon the so-called "Horse and Musket" period will be familiar with the eccentric propensities of roundshot. Many, if not most, published accounts by contemporary observers mention at some point the "bouncing roundshot" phenomenon, cannon-balls pitching and ricocheting off the ground like footballs or, near the end of their career, rolling along the ground like a cricket-ball (or, for American readers, a baseball), which could still carry away the limb of any unfortunate person foolish enough to attempt to "field" it. Of such stuff are legends made, and many wargamers have attempted to incorporate this "bounce" into their rules in an effort to increase "realism," some by using parti-colored sticks to indicate where the bal I pitches, bounces, pitches again and so on. In truth, though, the business was not at all so clear-cut. The accurate measurment of the flight of a roundshot loomed large on the mathematical horizons of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century artillerymen and, one suspects, still does on those of countless wargamers. Briefly, the bounce (or to use the contemporary technical term, point of "first graze," "second graze," etc.) depended upon three factors, only two of which were controllable. These were, perhaps obviously, the quantity of propellant charge used to fire the projectile, and the elevation of the cannon-barrel. Taking a random example: a nine-pounder fieldpiece at 0 degrees elevation would (with a normal charge) have a "first graze" some 400 yards from the muzzle, a "second graze" about 800 yards away, and a "third graze" 900 yards from the muzzle. At one degree elevation the same gun would have its "first graze" at about 700 yards and its second about 1,000; at two degrees the first (and probably only) graze would be about 900 yards away. Another way of varying the point of "first graze" was to increase or decrease the charge of propellant -- a clear example of this is provided in Ralph Adye's BOMBARDIER AND POCKET GUNNER, the vade mecum of the early nineteenth-century artillerymen. With an eight-ounce charge of powder, a medium twelve-pounder fieldpiece at two degrees elevation would throw its projectile 293 yards before "first graze"; with twelve ounces of powder this would increase to 350 yards, and with a 24-ounce charge "first graze" would be 707 yards away. This fact alone-that the distance from muzzle to "first graze" depended upon the distance of the target at which the gunner was aiming-throws out the "colored stick" method of determining the path of a roundshot, even if the other factors were constant-which they were not. Among these factors was the consistency of the ground upon which the roundshot pitched. Soft or marshy ground would prevent any "ricochet" fire (i.e. bounce of shot), as the ball would immediately sink into the ground. As late as the American Civil War, General Imboden recalled explosive shells sinking so deep into the ground that their bursting merely disturbed the surface of the earth, and no more, so that it "looked as though a drove of hogs had been rooting there for potatoes"; when firing at soft ground, therefore, the artilleryman had to endeavor to hit the target before the "first graze" occurred, if his shot were not to be wasted. Accounts Contemporary accounts contain horrifying stories of whole files of men struck down by a single roundshot; but whilst it is possible that, very occasionally, a dozen or perhaps even twenty men might fall to one shot, the average casualty-rate per shot was very many times less. Muller lists sets of statistics for roundshot fired at a screen six feet high, representing a line of men; with a six-pounder at 520 yards, he gave an optimistic 100% of hits (a theoretical, rather than practical, maximum),- at 950 yards 31%, and at 1,200 yards only 17% of hits. Bearing in mind that these statistics were achieved under ideal conditions, without smoke to obscure the target, which was static and not moving as it would have been on the battlefield, they may not be too wayward if taken as an approximate average for the general effectiveness of roundshot. But the number of casualties which might be inflicted by each hit is much more difficult to assess, as it depended entirely upon the manner in which the target was arrayed. Cannon-fire was never effective against skirmishers due to the very reduced chances of hitting any one man in a widely-space skirmish-line, and after "first graze," from which point the roundshot could usually be followed with the naked eye, the alert skirmisher could (presumably) step out of the way of one coming towards him. (Some witness claimed the ability to watch the flight of a roundshot virtually from muzzle to pitch, at least one of those who did eschewing the chance of stepping aside or ducking a shot which appeared to "have his number on it," as being an unmanly act in the sight of his fellows!) Adye described succinctly how an artilleryman should attempt to f ire upon his target:
In other words, a shot hitting a line of men from front or rear could at most knock over two of three; hitting a column on a line from head to rear it could do the most terrible damage. Extreme examples of formations facing artillery-fire can be quoted, firstly, in the Russian battalion- columns at Borodino, presenting the best target imaginable (and suffering huge numbers of needless casualties as a result); and secondly, the practice of lying down when under artillery fire, so that casualties would only be caused where the shot actually pitched, not on its downward course or upward bounce. Unless, of course, the ground upon which the target stood was very stony, in which case stones would be thrown up like shrapnel and greatly increase the potential of each shot in inflicting casualties. (This explains the predominant use of earthwork, rather than stone, fortifications; a shot would imbed itself in earth but would ricochet off stone, doing further damage itself and striking chips of stone to fly like grapeshot. It was thus usual for even stone-built fortifications to have an earth covering.) How does all this affect the wargamer striving for the maximum "realism"? "Realism"-or the nearest approach to it-would entail the charting of each shot according to the elevation of the gun-barrel and the gunner's accuracy at hitting the target (these two factors virtually one and the same), with an assessment of exactly where the shot pitched, upon what type of terrain, and how the ricochet (bounces succeeding the "first graze") behaved; all this before determining how the formation of the target-unit increased or decreased casualties. Even the most ardent wargamer would admit that this process, even if not exceptionally boring, would slow down the game's progress to an unacceptable degree. Instead, it might appear that a possible solution might be a general simplification: estimate the average number of casualties which might be expected from a battery's salvo, add or subtract according to range and formation of target (i.e. line or column), and dispense completely with measuring rods, etc. and forget the "bouncing roundshot." The first book I ever read on wargaming -at the age of eleven- (Donald Featherstone's Wargames, London 1962) covers artillery-fire with rules only slightly less sophisticated than this. Whilst totally lacking "realism" with regard to the progress of a single cannonshot, in the context of a "general action" the simpler system might appear to have the greater degree of "realism" in the long term. Perhaps the quest for "realism" has gone so far that what results is a mathematical exercise which, in the end, becomes less "realistic" the more it attempts to be realistic? SOURCESR.W. Adye, The Bombardier and Pocket Gunner (London, 1802)
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