"We saddled our horses, and away we did go
O'er rivers of ice and oer mountains of snow,
To the town of Sahagun then our course we did steer
'Twas the Fifteenth Hussars, who had never known fear."
British cavalry exploits during the course of the Napoleonic Wars tended to be notable for their combination of great gallantry, considerable initial success and ultimately near-fatal consequences. One has only to cite the fates of the 20th Light Dragoons at Vimeiro or of the North British Dragoons (later the Scots Greys) at Waterloo to become aware of the sad tendency for the instincts of the hunting field to override the dictates of prudence and discipline - particularly during the exploitation and rallying phases of a successful charge.
As a general rule there is no denying the superiority, man for man, of the British cavalry trooper over his French equivalent. Although the standard British cavalry sabre tended to be inferior to the longer and better-tempered French weapon, British mounts were of better quality in most cases and the physique of the cavalryman somewhat superior to that of his enemy. But when it came to the vital matter of rallying after a successful charge the British cavalry had much to learn, and proved notably stubborn in its unwillingness to reform its ways.
Fortunately for the record there are a number of occasions when British cavalry was handled superbly well. Its notable record at the difficult battle of Fuentes cle Onoro, or General Le Marchant's celebrated charge at Salamanca, are both cases in point - but no incident in the long history of these wars rebounds more to the credit of British cavalry than the celebrated action fought at Sahagun on 21 December 1808, when a small detachment of horsemen under command of Lord Henry Paget (destined, as Marquess of Anglesey, to lose a limb at Waterloo and earn ever afterwards the nickname of "One-Leg" throughout the service) decisively defeated a larger French force under General de brigade Debelle in the early hours of a bitterly cold, snow-bound winter's morning.
To the celebrated historian of the British Army, Sir John Fortescue, this success was ". . . a brilliant little affair and very creditable to Paget." To the great historian of the Peninsular Wars, Sir Charles Oman, Sahagun was ". . . perhaps the most brilliant exploit of the British Cavalry during the whole six years of the war." As will be seen, contemporary opinion was no less effusive. Consequently this incident - it hardly deserves the appelation of action let alone battle - merits some description and investigation.
As the climax of the Campaign of 1808 approached, the army of General Sir John Moore, 33,000 men strong, was advancing from Salamanca in the general direction of Burgos, intent upon surprising and all being well defeating in detail the dispersed forces of Marshal Soult, and thereafter creating a threat to the vital French lines of communication running from Bayonne through Burgos to Madrid, which Napoleon had recently occupied at the head of his Corps d'Armee.
Ahead of Moore's main body moved his screening light cavalry under command of the 40 year-old Henry Paget, Lt. General of Cavalry, who was described at about this time by his younger brother as ". . . always at the head, and in the thick of everything that has been going on. He is, in this respect, quite a boy, and a cornet instead of a Lt General of Cavalry, but in every other he is the right hand of the army."
His present command comprised two cavalry brigades under John Slade, "that damned stupid fellow" as his superior regarded him with some justice, and Charles Stewart respectively. The first brigade, with which we are concerned, comprised the 10th and 15th Hussars and a detachment of horse artillery; the second was made up of the 3rd and 18th Hussars, some excellent Kings German Legion cavalry, and the 7th Hussars, Henry Paget's own regiment.
Clash in the Making
As Moore marched for Mayorga, his questing cavalry moved towards Melgar de Abajo. Unknown to the British command, Soult was in fact already aware of the proximity of an enemy force, but he had no accurate notion of Moore's actual strength (Baird had joined him with 10,000 men on 20 December); nor had he any idea that he was so close at hand. As a sensible general precaution, however, the Duc de Dalmatie had concentrated infantry divisions at Carrion and Saldana, and sent cavalry forces to Sahagun and Mayorga under generaux-de brigade Debelle and Franchsechii. It would be the former force, comprising the French 8th Dragoons and the 1st Provisional Chasseurs (a formation of Hanoverians absorbed into the French Armee d'Espagne) that was destined to have its rest rudely shattered before dawn on the 21st.
Four days earlier the presence of this French formation in the vicinity was established by British patrols - and an estimated strength of between 700 and 800 troopers calculated. Sir John Fortescue doubts that there were more than 400 in fact, but Oman accepts the higher f igu re. Be that as it may, late on the 19th, am idst a storm of driving snow, the 10th and 15th Hussars entered Mayorga after a 30 mile march, to receive further tidings that Debelle's cavalry had moved to Sahagun that same afternoon. That night Paget moved forward to Melegar de Abajo as the main army closed up on Mayorga. The 20th was devoted to a well-earned rest.
That evening, however, Paget issued his orders for a night attack on Sahagun for the early hours of the 21st. Dated from "Morgel de Alazo (sic) 20 December 1808 -9 p.m." these ran as follows:
- "The 10th Hussars with 4 guns will march from Monastero so as
to arrive at the Bridge of Sahagun precisely at half-past six
tomorrow morning. The whole will march as light as possible, leaving
the forage to be brought forward by the country carts with the
baggage, which will march at daybreak under escort of such men
and horses as are not fit for a forced march. The guns will move
without ammunition waggons, the two remaining ones, with
everything belonging to the artillery, will come on the with the
baggage. The object of the movement is to surprise Sahagun. The
picquet at the Bridge will be driven in briskly. If serious opposition is
made, a squadron or more may be dismounted, who, followed by a
mounted squadron, will enter the town, make for the (French)
General's and principal officers' quarters to make them prisoners. It
is only in case of absolute necessity that the guns must be used.
The grand object is to drive the enemy through the town, on the
other side of which Lt Gen Lord Paget will be posted with the 15th
Hussars. The moment this object is in way of being accomplished,
two squadrons of the 10th must be detached to the left of El Burgo
Ranco, where the enemy has a picquet of from 60 to 100 men.
These must be briskly attacked and made prisoner. This done they
will return to Sahagun."
Such was the plan - one cavalry regiment to act as beaters, the other as stops on the further side of the town. But as happens so often in military operations, events were destined to take rather a different form. As von Moltke would remark a century later, no plan survives the first five minutes of battle."
Paget's scheme involved a 12 mile approach march starting at 1 a.m. through snow and ice on a bitterly cold night. Much clearly depended on proper coordination of the moves of the two regiments - but a combination of bad weather and Brigadier-General Slade would prove daunting odds against a full and successful implementation.
The die was cast, however, and shortly after midnight Lt Colonel C. Grant of the 15th began to muster his men. Their number was probably about 400 troopers of the 15th Hussars - we know that of the 700 men and 682 horses that embarked for the Peninsula there remained 527 still present with the regiment on 19 December - as many more of the 10th Hussars, and a dozen of the 7th Hussars, forming the personal escort of Lord paget, not to forget the brigade, four guns strong, of horse artillery. Perhaps 1,200 men in all mustered to the bugle's command that chill early morning of Christmastide 1808. Their gathering was not a little complicated by the inopportune outbreak of a fire in the village of Melegar, and there was some confusion as the church bell rang the alarm. Despite this unlooked for diversion, the march began on time. "Our march was disagreeable, and even dangerous," reminisced Captain Alexander Gordon of the 15th, whose Journal of a Cavalry Officer in the Corunna Campaign, 1808-9 forms one of the major sources for the action of Sahagun, "owing to the slippery state of the roads; there was seldom an interval of many minutes without two or three horses failing, but fortunately few were hurt by these falls. The snow was drifted in many places to a considerable depth, and the frost was extremely keen. We left Melgar (sic) in the midst of a heavy fall of snow . . ."
At first the entire force travelled together, following the road running parallel to the River Cea, but at either Melgar De Amba or Galleguillo de Camp, Slade led off his column (comprising the 10th and the horse Artillery) over the stream by a bridge, and continued independently towards the rendezvous of Sahagun.
Any remaining hope - after the fire - that the enemy would be taken by surprise was dashed when the advance guard of the 15th ran into an alert enemy picquet some little way short of the town at some time after 5 a.m. A sharp, confused encounter resulted in which ". . . the Frenchmen ran away, and in the pursuit both parties fell into a deep ditch filled with snow.
Two of the enemy were killed, and seven or eight made prisoners (other accounts say five); the remainder escaped and gave the alarm to the troops at Sahagun" continues Alexander Gordon. The need to cross a number of narrow and slippery causeways in single or double file at this juncture impeded any attempt at "hot pursuit".
Pressing On
Although aware that the chance of catching the foe unawares was now gone, Paget pressed on for Sahagun with all possible despatch. Within the town the cavalry trumpets were now shrilling as Debelle's 700-or-so chasseurs and dragoons came tumbling out of their billets; but it is significant to note that their horses had been left ready saddled and bridled overnight - clearly the French were aware that something was in the wind.
Of course there was no sign of Brigadier Slade and the 10th Hussars - and the French were able to form up unhindered at the east gate of the town. Exact timings are difficult to determine, but it is more than possible that the time was in advance of the "half-past six" enjoined in Paget's orders already quoted; to that extent, together with the problems of the way, Slade can be absolved at this juncture, although it also appears that he had seen fit to waste invaluable time to treat his shivering men to a lengthy speech which he eventually concluded with ". . . the energetic peroration of "Blood and Slaughter! March!"
Lord Paget nevertheless decided to implement his own part of the plan - and led his Hussars on a detour round the South of Sahagun, keeping them in double column of divisions - or half-troops of about 12 files, each squadron comprising some 280 men at full establishment, subdivided into four "divisions". His aim was to intercept any attempt by the French to evacuate the town. Dawn was now breaking, but visibility was far from clear that wintry morning.
In fact, Debelle and his men were further ahead with their preparations than Paget had anticipated, and the French were already about to ride off to the eastwards towards Carrion. This Paget was determined to forestall, and his column was soon moving along the road in hot pursuit, moving parallel to his quarry who, for some reason chose to move cross-country over an area of vineyards, having a fair-sized ravine between themselves and their pursuers. As a result the French, despite their head start, found themselves slowed by the icy conditions amidst the stumps of the vines, and the British began to make ground.
Thereupon, after failing to cross the head of Paget's column, and realising that he had a fight on his hands, Debelle halted his squadrons and, wheeling right, formed them for action into close columns of regiments, some six ranks deep, using the dyke to cover at least part of his front. At this juncture, misled by the mist, the French apparently believed that they were facing a force of Spanish cavalry, and were not unduly anxious about the outcome.
Their flankers, riding close to the British, continually cried out the challenge "Qui vive?" in an attempt to identify their foes, but received no reply. In the half-light Paget noticed that the French had halted, and after riding on a short distance he, too, ordered a halt, wheeled his half-troops into line to the left, and, without the least delay, ordered the bugles to sound the charge, ". . . just as you have seen us do at Ipswich," as he prosaically recalled in a letter written after the battle. His Hussars gave three fierce cheers, the bugles blared, and with a great shout of "Emsdorf and Victory!" the squadrons charged.
Area of Engagement
The area of the engagement is easily recognisable today - an open area of cultivated ground some five square miles in extent, bounded to the North and East by a bend of the river Valderacluey, a tributary of the Cea, which the Sahagun road crosses by a bridge before dividing towards Saldana and Carrion respectively. A fair rise also lies to the North of the battle area before descending steeply into the valley. The vineyards of 1808 are not in evidence today, nor is the lateral ravine, but several drainage ditches intersect the ground.
The 1st Provisional Chasseurs - Hanoverian allies of France - formed the front three ranks of Debelle's static formation. As Gordon noticed, the men tried to fire their carbines, but in an instant the 15th had swept up and broken them entirely. The Chasseurs were flung back upon the three ranks of the French 8th Dragoons standing in rear, plunging them, too, into sad disorder. (The chasseurs were commanded by Colonel Tascher, a nephew of the Empress Josephine, although there is some doubt as to whether he was himself present.)
The dragoons looked imposing enough in their ". . . brass helmets of the ancient Roman form, and the long black horsehair streaming from their crests," but within a very few minutes the entire French force was in full flight from the field - their commander Debelle being first dismounted and then trampled in the crush of the sauve qui peut.
Within ten minutes the melee was over, and the action became a disjointed series of isolated fights as spurring hussars hotly pursued fragments of their shattered foe over the mile and a half to the banks of the River. "We found them broken and flying in all directions, and so in termixed with our hussars that, in the uncertain twilight of a misty morning, it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe," wrote Gordon.
At this juncture who should appear on the scene from the North-West but Slade and the 10th Hussars, who narrowly avoided being charged by theirvictorious compatriots who at first took them for a further force of Frenchmen. "Nevertheless continues Gordon, "there was a scant firing of pistols, and our lads were making good use of their sabres."
The confusion prevalent at this period is well evidenced by The Captain's brush with an officer he suddenly thought was Lieutenant Hancox of the Regiment from his fur cap and half-glimpsed features, whereupon the hotly pursuing Gordon sloped his sword and rode off - only to find later that Hancox "was not the person I had followed, who, I conclude, was an officer of the grenadiers a cheval or compagnie d'elite . . . and doubtless was much astonished at my sudden appearance and abrupt departure."
Another hussar, to the amusement of his unfeeling fellows, managed to shoot his own horse. A few acts of wanton cruelty were committed by the success-drunk horsemen: one cut down a wounded and dismounted French dragoon, later seeking to explain his action on the grounds that he did not ". . . like to let the day pass without cutting down a Frenchman and could not let such a favourable opportunity to slip."
As the hussars approached the banks of the river the strident bugles sounded the "rally" - a wise precaution as the squadrons were fast becoming sadly disordered. This allowed some 200 Frenchmen to make good their escape in different directions. A force was detached to pursue what was left of the Chasseurs-a-Cheval towards Salclana, where a battered and distracted Debelle, who had somehow survived the aciton, strove to rally them.
The French were fortunate to get so many men away, and would not have done so had not Lord Paget - who fought with the left centre squadron - sent an officer with a handkerchief as flag of truce to offer the enemy the chance to surrender. In fact they only fled all the faster, using the pause to gain both time and distance and so got away.
Nevertheless, the bag was impressive, although once again the details are disputed. The French seem to have had 120 killed and all of 17 officers and 150 men taken prisoner - including both Colonel Dud'Huit of the 8th Dragoons and Colonel Dugens of the Chasseurs - many captives beng severely wounded by sabre strokes.
The French also lost all their regimental baggage, including their records, and "it appeared by the returns found in his (Debelle's) portfolio that the French had about eight hundred men mounted and in the field, whilst we only mustered betwixt three or four hundred, independent of various small detachments, above a hundred men and horses were left at Melgar cle Abaxo." Thus wrote Captain Gordon. The historian Sir John Fortescue, however, claims that Paget had at least 500 sabres in the field to Debelle's 450; but, he conceded, "apart from all question of inferiority in strength, Debelle seems to have been overawed by Paget's quickness in manoeuvre and by the beautiful accuracy of the movements of the Fifteenth." To achieve this much cost the Regiment only two men killed besides three officers and 20 men wounded.
* In 1760 the 15th Light Dragoons, as they then were, had distinguished themselves at Emsdorf shortly after being first raised during the Seven Year's War.
ED NOTE: This article first appeared in HISTORY TODAY in 1978, copyright © D.G. CHANDLER.
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