In your reconstruction of the battle of Austerlitz, Kienmayer's Austrian guard is approaching Tellnitz. Deployed outside of the village, the Tirailleurs du Po hold their fire waiting for Kienmayer's 1st Szekler to draw closer. At 50 yards range the fourteen figure regiment representing 700 defenders fires and inflicts 150 casualties on the twelve figure 1st Szekler. The Szeklers, staggered by this volley, fall back; the initial attack is repulsed. But could it happen this way? What is the historical justification for this result? The example is taken from a battle reconstruction using the GENERALSHIP NAPOLEONICS rule system. These rules claim to satisfy the dual requirements of being historically realistic and entertaining. The battle report from Origins on Rodigen, published in Vol. II, No. 1, sought to demonstrate the fun aspects of the rules. This article intends to document some of the specific rules in GENERALSHIP showing the link between historical research and rule crafting using tactical illustrations from the Napoleonic period. CAVALRY COMBAT A glimpse at one portion of the Battle of Wurzburg, fought between the French and Austrians along the Rhine in 1796, illustrates the nature of Napoleonic Period cavalry encounters. Advancing near the farm of Rottenhof, Austrian heavy cavalry attacked a deploying brigade of French cuirassiers. Simulataneously, the Austrian Prince Lichenstein brought the light cavalry against the French flank. Twelve squadrons of Austrian cuirassiers remained in reserve. Caught as they formed up, the French failed to countercharge and were easily routed. A second body of French heavy cavalry led by General Bonnaud arrived, and seeing the disorder the Austrian cavalry had fallen into as a result of its success, counterattacked. The Austrians attempted to evade contact but became ensnarled between some supporting infantry and a small woods. A few French squadrons took advantage of this confusion to charge an exposed flank and the French counterattack succeeded. At this point all of the French cavalry were engaged while the Austrians retained the twelve reserve squadrons. The reserve charged the now disordered French and swept the field leading the way to a larger Austrian victory. This engagement highlights several important aspects of cavalry battles: first, the tremendous advantage that fresh, ordered troops had over those who had already charged; second, the impact relatively small units could exert when launched upon an exposed flank; third the ebb and flow nature of cavalry battles as reserves were committed; and fourth, the advantage to the side holding the final reserve. GENERALSHIP recreates these characteristics using a two phase cavalry sequence, the initial charge followed by an exploitation/counterattack phase. To illustrate, let us apply the rules to the action described above from the standpoint of a hypothetical gamer playing the French cavalry general, Bonnaud. As you deploy the first of your three regiments of dragoons you see the first line of French cavalry routing with the Austrians in pursuit. Your first decision is: how many regiments to commit in the initial charge? Following the cavalier's maxim, you hold one in reserve while attacking with the other two. If these units meet morale you next decide whether to commit the personality figure representing Bonnaud to the action. If Bonnaud leads the charge the attacking units' morale and fighting ability are enhanced. However, Bonnaud risks being killed by this action and more importantly you, the gamer, lose the ability to rally any troops who are defeated in the initial encounter as well as the option to commit the third, reserve regiment. Thus your first phase move involves intercepting the pursing Austrians with two regiments and keeping a third in reserve under your direct control. In the rules, the strength of a cavalry unit making its first charge is doubled to reflect the tremendous advantage possessed by a fresh unit, so well demonstrated by the action at Wurzburg. As Wood says in Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign: "yet the lessened vigour generally of the second attack is one more proof of the adage that cavalry should not be asked to undertake desperate attacks twice during the same day." With the doubling effect you overthrow the disordered Austrians during the first phase. Now, before the second phase you must decide whether to rein in your victorious units and/or to commit your reserve regiment. You order the attacking regiments to rein in and commit the reserve regiment against an exposed Austrian flank. The flank attack forces the Austrian unit to make a very difficult morale check which it fails and consequently routes. The regiments ordered to rein in must pass a special morale check indicative of the difficulty of controlling victorious cavalry. They display uncontrollable zeal, fail the check, and pursue the defeated Austrians. Thus, as General Bonnaud, you triumph having overthrown the previously victorious Austrian first wave during the move. But now you are without reserves and face the fresh Austrian reserve! Perhaps you shouldn't have fallen for that tempting Austrian flank! CAVALRY VS. INFANTRY Napoleonic cavalry versus infantry encounters present one of the most dramatic events in wargaming. I recall participating in a reconstruction of the battle of Ligny. We, as the Prussians, were well on the way to a decisive victory when the French heavy cavalry assaulted our line of communications. All we had to resist them was a regiment of landwehr. Cooly these troops formed square as the cuirassiers and dragoons bore down on them. The four hour battle hinged on the solidity of the square and this battle, if won, would ensure our first place standing! Would the landwehr's morale hold? One morale check, one die roll . . . the landwehr repulsed the charge and Blucher swept the field. The ability of a square to resist cavalry is profusely documented. For example, at Krasnoi in 1812, 6,000 Russian infantry were set upon by 18,000 French cavalry. In spite of the odds, the Russians retired across a plain losing only 1,100 infantry and five guns. In our rules, infantry can either be formed into square at the beginning of a move or can form square in reaction to an opponent's action during the course of a move. This latter type of square, termed a 'hasty square', requires a difficult morale check. National modifiers influence the degree of difficulty, with the British/KGL performing the maneauver relatively easily while the Russians have the greatest difficulty. Clauswitz, in describing his experiences in the 1812 campaign, provides an account of the typical cavalry versus square engagement. He served as an aide to the Russian cavalry general Uvarov as this general received orders to threaten the French flank near Borodino during the early afternoon of that epic battle. As the Russian cavalry advanced, some opposing Italian infantry formed square: "The Hussars of the Guard were therefore advanced . . . and made three ineffectual attacks; the infantry lost neither their composure nor their ranks, and returned a steady fire. The Hussars retired, as usually happens in such cases, some 30 paces, and withdrew out of fire." This 'usual' result is indeed the likely outcome in GENERALSHIP when cavalry attacks a steady square. To break a square, roll d20: 75% of teh time, the cavalry is repulsed after absorbing casualties. Other possible results include cavalry rout (10% chance) and break the square (15% chance). Lancers and charges receiving fire support are more likely to break the square. Cavalry successfully breaking the square destroys the infantry unit requiring the remainder of the move to do so. The helplessness of unformed or broken infantry against cavalry is illustrated by the famous charge of the Polish lancers at Albuera. The lancers virtually destroyed Colborne's British infantry brigade in three minutes. Weller estimates the percentage losses of the three British battalions as 85.3, 75.9, and 61.6. In our rules, once cavalry phsically contact infantry out of square the infantry is destroyed without further ado. This rule is an example of a simplifying assumption, based on good historical evidence, that speeds up the course of play allowing a large battle to be resolved in about three hours. Squares could be broken, which is why Generalship contains a 15% chance for this event. For example, in 1809 the Baden dragoons broke an Austrian square during the Ratisbon campaign (although it is unclear whether this square was wavering because of other factors). Generally, breaking a well formed square was a matter of luck . Probably the most famous success involved the KGL heavy draggons who broke French infantry squares at Garcia Hernandez during the pursuit following Salamancat These intrepid cavalry charged the French who received them in good order emptying many saddles with their fire. However, apparently they reserved their fire too long, because one of the German's horses fell onto the bayonets of the French creating a gap in the square which was exploited by the dragoons. By wedging themselves into this gap the heavy cavalry were able to unravel the square. Moments later another square, shaken by the destruction of their sister battalion, also broke when the KGL charged. INFANTRY FIRE Different armies of the Napoleonic era conducted tests to evaluate the effectiveness of musketry. Fortunately for the gamer some of these test results, particularly those conducted by the Prussians, Hanoverians, and British, have been preserved providing fascinating insights into the performance of Napoleonic musketry. Essentially these tests entailed setting up a cloth target, or screen, simulating the dimensions of an infantry company or cavalry squadron; having soldiers advance to prescribed ranges; firing a certain number of volleys; and counting the holes in the screen. While some rule systems use these results to model fire effect, this is clearly faulty. An infantry company, even standing shoulder to shoulder, has many spaces between human targets and to account for this factor is pure guesswork. In addition, the tests were conducted in ideal conditions, with calm troops under no danger, firing at targets they could see perfectly. Thus screen test results, in terms of number of number of casualties inflicted, are at best a general guide to fire effect. They do provide one essential piece of data they reveal the relative effectiveness of musketry at various ranges. For example, Prussian tests indicated that at 225 yards 25% of the shots hit; at 150 yards 40%; and at 75 yards 60%. If, for rules purposes, one breaks distances into three ranges, short-mediumlong, the above figures tell you that a short range infantry will hit 50% more often than at medium range and about two and one half times as often as at long range. The GENERALSHIP Fire Table used such calculations, repeated for test data from many nations, and then averaged together, to derive relative musketry effects for various ranges. Additionally, screen tests indicated the relative accuracy of rifle versus musket fire and trained versus untained marksmen. Having assessed the effect of range upon musketry performance, the actual number of casualties inflicted by battalion volleys had to be researched. Three pieces of information are needed: the number of men firing, the range at which a volley was fired; and the number of men hit. While this calculation entailed a tremendous search through diaries, memoirs, letters, and other source descriptions, eventually enough data was found to construct a fire table. On September 27, 1810, the 36th Ligne led Merle's division up the steep slopes of Bussaco ridge. As they toiled to the crest, the British 88th Regiment advanced and fired three volleys at the 36th inflicting 483 casualties - the 36th broke and retreated. As the Imperial Guard penetrated the Prussian line at Ligny in 1815, Blucher desperately gathered his cavalry to counterattack. Lutzow's Uhlans charged the 4th Grenadiers who formed square and fired a volley at 20 yards hitting 83 Prussian cavalry. At Salamanca in 1812 the Portuguese 4th Cacadore valiantly tried to storm a hilltop position defended by the French 120th Ligne. The French fired a volley at 40 yards causing about 300 casualties. In perhaps the clearest illustration of British firepower, the British Light Battalion at Maida fired three volleys at long, medium, and short ranges into the 1st Legere who lost 176 killed and 254 wounded. Historical examples such as those given where combined to yield average results for battalion volleys. In the rules a six-sided die is used to determine results of infantry fire. Deviations from average results are accounted for by high or low die rolls reflecting unusually accurate or poor volleys. A few modifications to the die rolls distinguish such factors as the superiority of elite troops or the marksmanship of the British. The British were virtually the only troops to routinely practice musketry being allowed 30 rounds of ball for this purpose annually. Even as late as the 1840's, Russian regulations permitted only 10 rounds per man per year and suggested that those troops who would operate in close order receive only three rounds! GENERALSHIP uses a second fire table for untrained troops. Such forces as the Prussian landwehr of 1813 who were hastily mobilizied and poorly armed fire at reduced effect using this second fire table. Many Russians also use the less effective rate as the Russian musket was distinctly inferior to other nation's firearms and Russian tactical doctrine emphasized the so called 'school of the bayonet.' This philosophy was not conducive to the development of trained marksmen. ARTILLERY FIRE Several characteristics of GENERALSHIP's artillery rules are innovative in particular those regarding grand batteries and counterbattery fire. A grand battery comprises three or more batteries massed together firing at the same or adjacent target. The morale effects of such massed fire are greater than would be the case if each fired individually. To illustrate: a Prussian infantry brigade comprising three regiments, two line with morale rating of 15 and one fusilier with rating of 16, is fired upon by three 81b French batteries. If the artillery scattered its fire, each Prussian unit would make a regular morale check, meaning they would have to roll a twenty-sided die and equal or be below their morale rating. In other words, the Prussian line units would have a 75% chance of meeting morale. However, when fired at by the same three batteries massed in a grand battery, each unit would add six to its die roll thus reducing the line unit's chance from 75% to 45%. Is this realistic? Historical battlefield evidence suggests massed artillery fire had a potent, additive effect. At Wagram in 1809, at the climax of the battle, Napoleon massed his artillery to create a large hole in the Austrian line between Aderklaa and Breitenlee. Into this gap marched Macdonald's famous column to clinch the victory. An even better known example of massed artillery was the grand battery at Waterloo. Here Napoleon massed about 74 guns on a low ridge 600 to 800 yards from the British line. Only the Dutch-Belgian 1st Brigade was exposed to the fire of the grand battery. This five battalion unit lost in excess of 900 men during the bombardment and was so demoralized it broke and ran when the French infantry advanced. The grand battery rule offers the gamer the option of massing his artillery in this manner. The impact of the rule is that in one turn a grand battery can punch a hole in an opponent's line. Only the French, Russian, and Austrian players are permitted to form grand batteries. The other major powers, England and Prussia, historically followed a tactical doctrine of dispersing their batteries and are thus prohibited. Counterbattery fire in the Napoleonic era was not particularly effective. Wellington recognized this when he expressly forbid his guns to engage in it at Waterloo. The purpose of such fire was to destroy or drive off the enemy's artillery, a very difficult feat. The more common result was that the battery under fire was distracted from its main business, frequently to the point of shooting back at the guns firing at it. To reflect counterbattery fire, we sequence it before other artillery fire during a move. A battery assigned to counterbattery work tries to register a hit in the normal manner. If it hits the opposing battery the target must make a morale check. Failure to pass morale forces the target to return fire. In other words, the target has been distracted, or in human terms the battery commander has fallen prey to the urge to strike back in self-defense. In addition, the original firer rolls en 'effect die'. A roll of a twelve on a 12- sided die destroys the enemy battery (the previously mentioned 'very difficult feat'); a roll of an eleven forces the target to temporarily withdraw (to reflect repairable equipment damage. Thus an attacker has the tactical choices of trying to blast a gap in the enemy's line using a grand battery or trying to silence the defender's artillery so it can't play upon the massed attackers during the approach march. COLUMN ATTACKS Many Napoleonic rule systems reward the use of attack columns giving them some form of impetus or column bonus when they contact opposing lines. Thus one sees in many Napoleonic simulations heavy columns routineV bowling over defending lines. The wargamer has been led to believe such occurances were common. Knowledge about column attack formations most frequently comes from British historians, Oman and Fortescue particularly, who analyized French versus British encounters in terms of columns versus lines. Contemporary gamers tend to believe column attacks were prescribed by French doctrine and copied by other continental powers. This is a serious misconconception. The manner in which Generalship treats column attacks reflects the historical evidence regarding the tactical employment of attack columns. Two quotes from French Napoleonic officers are illustrative on the employment of columns: Colonel Bugeaud, writing after the Napoleonic era about infantry tactics during the wars, begins his section on columns with the sentence "the column is an order of march and maneuver, rarely an order for combat"; similarly, Chambray wrote "deploy infantry in lines in order to utilize their firepower, and it is firepower that is the principle factor in both the attack and the defense." There can be no doubt many French officers understood the superiority of the line over the column for utilizing musketry. Napoleon himself told General Foy that even in a plain, columns could not overthrow lines unless supported by overwhelming artillery. Why then did the French apparently attack in column in the Peninsula? Two causative factors were the number of French conscripts serving in Spain and Wellington's reverse slope tactics. The conscripts didn't have the level of training the veterans of the Grande Armee possessed and thus their officers lacked confidence in their ability to maneuver except in close column formations. Wellington's deployments on the reverse slopes of the rugged Peninsula terrain, out of sight of the French, led the French to misjudge the location of his main battle line. The French would approach the British position in column (remember column is a maneuver formation) and either be caught in the act of deploying into line or while still in column, as the British advanced over the crest; fired a few volleys, and charged. I must say these explanations only partially account for the Peninsula battles, the conflicts were a great deal more complicated. GENERALSHIP deals with columns in a unique manner. A column advancing upon a non-British defender forces the defender to make a morale check adversely modified to reflect the psychological terror an advancing column imparted upon a waiting line. Should the line hold, it fires upon the column unless the column's flanks are shielded by skirmishers. An unshielded, or 'naked', column that takes three casualties from a volley in one move comes to a halt. This halt represents the disorganization a column experienced when the head of the column was shot apart. The rule encourages a gamer to use attack columns in their proper role: the assault of villages and defiles and the exploitation of a gap in the opponent's line. A column with skirmishers on both flanks (representing skirmishers actually deployed across the front of the column and on both flanks) can be escorted to close range where it receives the defender's fire. Unlike the 'naked' column, it doesn't automatically halt if it takes three casualties. Rather it tries to meet morale and close to point blank combat. Just as columns impart a morale edge to the troops formed in column, non-British troops in line have a morale disadvantage if they have unsecured flanks. Secured flanks refer to protection from potential enemy cavalry charges. This condition is accomplished by anchoring the flanks on a natural obstacle impassible to cavalry or guarding the flanks with units in column or square. I believe, this rule is unique in providing a realistic incentive for using the famous French mixed order; troops deployed in line with their flanks secured by columns fight with their morale unimpaired. In addition, the gamer who has poorly trained troops with low morale faces a realistic, tough decision whether to deploy his troops in line knowing they might break if he does so. CONCLUSION The GENERALSHIP rules are not cast in concrete forever unchanging. While the basic mechanics have been intact for several years, ongoing research have and will modify the rules. For example, currently our group is developing some information indicating the Russian army used mounted cossacks to skirmish in open areas in front of their main battle line while the jager regiments and other light infantry were used to skirmish in closed terrain. While this thesis is not ready for publication, our group having seen the data, is persuaded and is at this moment furiously painting and mounting cossack skirmisher stands and the rules will be modified to incorporate the skirmish role of cossacks. This article has had two purposes: to show the links between historical research and game rules in GENERALSHIP; and to simulate some dialogue about the nature of Napoleonic tactics. In the interest of space I have not included a bibliography. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. 2 #4 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1981 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com