ED NOTE: Reprinted from The Journal of the Seven Years War Society The Russians followed the common European practice during the Seven Years War of assigning light artillery directly to infantry regiments (which in Russian service consisted of two field battalions). Each regiment received two 3-pder cannon. Infantry regiments also had 6-pder mortars. Sources vary as to how many. Some say they began the war with four which were soon reduced to two, and some say eight which were soon reduced to four. In any event, the complement of artillerymen for a Russian infantry regiment was 31 men. The reason for the reduction in the number of mortars after the war began is the fact that the unit's regimental artillery was dispersed up and down the front. This meant that the commander who wore an infantry uniform but was assigned from the artillery service could not personally supervise the major portion of the guns. Mention is made that after May 1758, infantry regiments received four small-caliber unicorns, and also that some infantry regiments has Shuvalov Howitzers instead of mortars. Personally, I would question whether the 6-pder mortars regularly accompanied the infantry regiments in the field. Johann Tielcke, a Saxon artillery officer in Russian service from whose observations much of the information in this article is drawn, mentions only 3- pder cannon as regimental artillery during the campaign of 1758. With apparently no reluctance to campaign in the dead of winter, a Russian army under General Fermor invaded East Prussia in January 1758. This province was conquered with almost no resistance, the East Prussians thus earning Frederick's undying contempt. Eventually, trailing an immense supply train behind it, the Russian army moved through East Pomerania and approached the banks of the Oder River. There, in camp, on August 14, 1758, the Russian army was attacked by the Prussians in the exceedingly bloody battle of Zorndorf. The regular infantry and cavalry of Fermor's army would have numbered some 89,000 men had the units been up to full complement which was not nearly the case. About 60,000 regulars in Fermor's army is apparently a far more realistic actual figure. In addition, the army began with about 16,000 Cossacks and Kalmucks, but many of these were apparently soon sent home by Fermor for indiscipline. Not counting the light regimental artillery, the artillery train of Fermor's army consisted of the following: 12-pder cannon 20 8-pder cannon 26 6-pder cannon 10 Mortars 6 Shuvalov Howitzers 50 Common Howitzers 20 96-pder Unicorns 2 48-pder Unicorns 12 24-pder Unicorns 30 12-pder Unicorns 20 3 & 6-pder Unicorns 20 3-pder Unicorns for the Dragoons 18 Total: 242 It should be noted that the above list included the field artillery of the Corps of Observation, a separate infantry establishment, some twenty musketeer battalions and thirty-two grenadier companies of which accompanied Fermor. Also, not all of the above artillery would be concentrated at one time, some of it being detailed to detached forces. From 1709, artillery carriages had been painted green. Before that date they were red. Shortly after the conclusion of the Seven Years War (1763) they would be painted red again until the year 1796, when it would revert again to green. Russian Artillery Uniqueness What should be obvious from the list of Russian field artillery for the 1758 campaign is that it was absolutely unique among the artilleries of Europe in that fully 75% of it was howitzer rather than cannon in type. The common howitzers were short-barreled pieces like those found in other European armies. I have to date been unable to determine their exact calibers, but Tielcke stated that the Russians favored those of large caliber. The unicorns had sub-diameter chambers at the end of the bore for accepting the powder-charge (in the case of the unicorns, the chamber was conical in shape). And the principal projectile of the unicorn was the explosive shell. Thus, by definition, unicorns were howitzers. However, they had a very special feature not found in common howitzers. They were long-barreled. For those whose artillery terminology is rusty, "caliber" is defined as the diameter of the bore of the gun or howitzer. The barrel-lengths of common howitzers varied, but generally, they fell within 2 times the caliber of the howitzer in British service, or 1% times the caliber in French service. The barrel-lengths of unicorns were, however, 10 times their calibers. The following barrel-lengths are approximately correct for the various calibers of unicorns (I say approximately because I have had to use equivalent measurements out of Muller, but the variation would be slight): 3-pder unicorn, 2'6"; 6-pder unicorn, 3'0"; 12-pder unicorn, 3'9"; 24-pder unicorn, 4'9"; 48-pder unicorn, 6'0"; 96 pder unicorn, 8'4". In theory, the unicorn combined the best offensive qualities of gun and howitzer. Increasing the barrellength of the weapon increased its point-blank range. The point-blank range refers to how far the projectile could be thrown on a flat trajectory (below manheight) to its first bounce. This is important to cannon firing solid-shot as the lethal effect of the shot is mainly derived from the fact that it will theoretically kill everything in its path for the extent of its pointblank range. By increasing the point-blank range of the unicorn, its shell could act just like a solid shot until it caused additional damage by exploding. Unfortunately for the unicorn, what sounds like terrific theory sometimes works far less well in actual practice. The problem derived mainly from the subdiameter chamber for seating the powder-charge. It is not difficult to seat the charge in the chamber of a common howitzer with its short barrel. However, seating the powder-charge properly in the chamber becomes more and more difficult and time- consuming as the length of the barrel increases. As the residue of previous discharges builds up, the problem gets worse and worse. Thus the unicorn tended to be slow-loading weapons and much of their utility was negated by a poor rate-of-fire. The larger calibers were also extremely ponderous in weight and maneuvered only with difficulty. Russian Calibers This is probably a good place to clear up some of the confusion which surrounded the calibers of Russian artillery. Statements about very powerful Russian artillery of 1, 1 1/2, & 2-pder caliber are often encountered. At first glance, this sounds preposterous. During the period, complaints among artillerymen that 3- & 4-pder battalion guns were too light to be really effective were not uncommon. The confusion about Russian artillery is due to the special nature of the unicorns. Guns or cannon are named after the weight of the iron roundshot they throw. Thus, a 3-pder gun can throw an iron shot weighing three pounds. Its bore is large enough to accomodate an iron shot that size plus a little extra for windage. Howitzers, however, were not named for the weight of iron shot they could throw but instead for the weight of stone roundshot they could throw. Of course, how howitzers didn't actually throw stone shot. This was an archaic hold-over from old-fashioned mortar measurement, the howitzer being an adaptation of the mortar differing mainly in its type of carriage and position of its trunnions. The English very sensibly named their howitzers after their calibers. Thus, the English 5.5" howitzers which accompanied the two British "Light Brigades" at Minden. The French Valliere system made no provision for howitzers. However, the French recognized their utility and employed them on an ad hoc basis, also calling them after the measurement of their calibers. Reference is made to French use of 6" and 8- howitzers during the period in question. The Germans and the Russians, however, persisted in calling howitzers after the weight of stone-shots. Thus, for example, the 7-pder howitzers in Prussian and Austrian service could theoretically throw a stone roundshot weighing seven pounds. The problem with the unicorns was, simply, what system of measurement to use. True enough, the unicorn was a howitzer. But like a gun, it had a long barrel. What happened was that both systems were used, and this created a great deal of confusion, at least for the modern student of the period. In the list of the Russian artillery train for 1758 given above and drawn from Tielcke, the iron- shot system is used, and the unicorns are rated in the same fashion as cannon. Stone is far less dense than iron. A stone roundshot weighing on lb. had a diameter of about three inches; a one lb. iron roundshot had a diameter of only about two inches. The Saxon artillery which had both a cannon and a howitzer rated as 8-pders effectively illustrates the difference in bore-diameters (calibers) when the stone and iron system are used. The Saxon 8-pder cannon had a caliber of about four-inches. The caliber of the Saxon 8-pder howitzer was, however, about 6.4- inches. As stated, a howitzer throwing a 1 lb. stone shot would be throwing a projectile of about three- inches in diameter. An iron roundshot of about three- inch diameter would weigh, however, about three Ibs. Thus the same unicorn, according to whether the stone-shot or iron-shot measurement was used would be, respectively, a 1-pder or a 3-pder. Tielcke states that when it was desired to fire unicorns at extreme ranges, the tubes were placed on special carriages that resembled ship-carriages without the trucks. They were not very accurate when employed in this fashion, however. Another very interesting type of unicorn was the little 3-pder especially employed with the dragoons and horse grenadiers. Placed on the axle-tree of this piece on either side of the unicorn tube was a little coehorn mortar of 6-pas caliber (iron measure, not stone). Horse Artillery A word should probably be said about so-called Russian horse artillery, however. Russian cavalry was very poorly trained. In fact, it was not until the Russians entered Germany were they able to procure decent mounts for their cavalry, as the homeland did not have suitable mounts. Thus, these little unicorns were to support poor cavalry and probably had an adverse effect on what little mobility the cavalry did have in formed bodies. This artillery is not to be equated with the horsed artillery or artillerie volante of Frederick which was a new innovation in mobile artillery, able to be quickly employed at critical points on the battlef ield. If the Russian unicorns with their mixture of cannon and howitzer attributes strained contemporary artillery terminology in terms of rating their calibers, then another type of Russian artillery fractured the artillery terminology altogether. This was the Shuvalov, the so-called "secret" howitzer. It was very much the Russian national secret weapon and acquired an awesome reputation for destructiveness, which as practical battlefield experience was to demonstrate, it was by no means capable of living up to. The Shuvalov was named for Piotr Shavalov, the Russian master-general of the ordnance. It was very much his baby, and he wasn't at all interested in hearing criticism of it. The Shuvalov was unique in that it had an oval rather than round bore configuration -- see illustration. On the vertical plane, it had a diameter of a 3-pder (about 3-inches). On the horizontal plane, it had the diameter of a 24-pder (about 7-inches). The Shuvalov was designed mainly as a cannisterfiring weapon. The theory behind the oval bore is apparent. By compressing the vertical diameter, less of the cannister-pattern will be expended over the head of the target or into the ground before it. Similarly, by expanding the horizontal diameter, the cannister will be able to hit targets over a greater lateral spread. Rating the Shuvalov in terms of caliber is quite a trick. As far as I have been able to determine there was only one caliber of Shuvalov. Tielcke calls it a 3- pder after its vertical diameter. I suppose one could just as easily call it a 24-pder after its horizontal diameter. Christopher Duffy pictures a Shuvalov in his Maria Theresa's Army as a battery of these were presented to the Austrians in 1759. Duffy calls it a 12-pder, using a source which to date I have been unable to obtain. I would speculate however, that it is certainly the same gun, as Tielcke refers to, the 3-pder he describes as the same piece sent to Austria. Probably calling it a 12-pder was a compromise between the 3 and 24-pder calibers of the single Shuvalov. Given the oval bore, as I stated earlier, artillery terminology is quite fractured, and there is no one suitable way to rate this howitzer The accompanying illustration from Tielcke shows the Shuvalov with a thoroughly modern for-the-period elevating screw which worked directly on the barrel. Interestingly, Duffy's illustration shows the Shuvalov with what appears to be a simple elevating wedge. I do have a speculation to explain this seemingly contradictory information. Sometime later, when the English finally introduced the modern elevating screw which acted directly on the barrel (after first trying out a less satisfactory screw which ran through the cascabel button) they didn't include the new screw on larger caliber guns because the tubes were simply too heavy for the screw to work effectively. For reasons which will be explained, the Shuvalov was an extremely heavy piece. I would guess that the modern elevating screw formed part of its original equippage, but in practical usage, the gun-tube was found too heavy for it, and it was dispensed with in favor of the simple wedge. Secret Weapon As previously stated, the Shuvalov was considered by the Russians to be a secret weapon of devastating potential. The "Secret Howitzer Corps" was a separate formation in the artillery. Officers of the regular artillery were not allowed to even approach the Shuvalovs much less inspect them. Whenever the howitzers were not in actual use, caps were kept locked over their muzzles to disguise their oval interior construction, and this step had unfortunate results in terms of reducing the effectiveness of the Shuvalov. Obviously, if the bore is oval in shape, to make the gun as light as possible, the exterior shape of the barrel should be oval also. It was not. The exterior was round like any other gun or howitzer. Thus it gave no hint of the oval bore, but at the cost of adding a tremendous amount of superflous metal to the weight of the tube. The Shuvalov barrel was about 4'2" long with the outside barrel dimension of a 24-pder, but with much more metal than a 24-pder of the same barrel-length. It was an extremely heavy piece, ponderous and difficult in the extreme to maneuver. In addition, it suffered from the problem of having, as a howitzer, a sub-diameter chamber combined with a long barrel. Thus, it was very slow-loading as well as being tremendously awkward to move. At Zorndorf, the Shuvalovs managed to get off only one round of fire before they were over-run by Prussian cavalry. Of the 50 in Fermor's army, 17 were lost at that battle alone. The limber for the Shuvalov carried forty cartridges and forty loads. As previously mentioned, the preferred ammunition was cannister. There were two types of cannister. The first carried 168 2-oz lead balls and was rated effective up to 300 paces. A heavier case-shot was also employed. A single load carried 48 7-oz lead balls, and it was rated effective up to 600 paces. The Shuvalov could also fire grape-shot which consisted of seven 3-pder iron roundshot with a claimed effectiveness up to 1200 paces. An explosive shell could also be fired, but because the oval configuration of the barrel necessitated that it be flaskshaped rather than round, it was neither long-ranged nor very accurate. Finally an incendiary shell or carcass also flask-shaped could be fired. Anyone who looks into the question of Russian artillery in the Seven Years War soon discovers a wide variation in estimates as to its effectiveness among various sources. We read for example statements that the Austrians "begged" for some of the new Russian artillery. As Duffy demonstrates, this was hardly the case. The Austrians weren't at all impressed, but didn't want to offend their allies. The French were also offered some Shuvalovs and unicorns but turned them down. The Russians, at least the head of the artillery department, was very impressed with the quality of Russian artillery. It seems, unrealistically so. I think what has happened is that some writers have taken the Russian propaganda about the quality of their guns uncritically. They have also taken statements by the Austrians which were politically motivated compliments rather than true opinions. The Russian artillery was apparently not nearly as good as it has sometimes been represented. In fact, it appears that it was rather ineffectual compared to that of the Austrians or Prussians. The particular problems with the unicorns and Shuvalovs which made up the bulk of the Russian artillery have been touched upon in this article. And there are contemporary observances by officers who had occasion to observe it as to the unweildiness of Russian artillery. Bravery There was another factor which mitigated against artillery-effectiveness in the Russian army. The gunners themselves were apparently exceptionally brave. We read accounts of gunners staying by their guns long enough to be over-run not only by Prussian cavalry but even by Prussian infantry. However, the Russians apparently never learned how to mass their artillery and deliver concentrated fire on vulnerable parts of the enemy line. Rather, Russian artillery was dispersed up and down the front which severely dispersed its lethal effect. Finally, there is the question of Howitzers. As Gen. Hughes asks rhetorically in his provocative FirePower, why, if howitzers were as effective as cannon were they not found in far larger proportion to cannon in European armies (Russians excepted). In effectiveness, howitzers are much more vulnerable to irregularities of terrain than are cannon. The latter can make good use of ricochet effect -- given experienced gunners. The ricochet effect of cannister is severely limited, and howitzers being lower-velocity weapons are shorter ranged to begin with than cannon. We can appreciate that the great reliance on howitzers in Russian service, as did the Russian custom of deploying infantry in massive squares, was the heritage of interminable wars against the Turks on essentially level steppe terrain. The main offensive Turkish arm was masses of irregular horse on which cannister could be used to good effect. The pyrotechnic effect of shell bursts was also undoubtedly of great psychological value. Much has been written about the vulnerability of the Russian square to European armies well-equipped with artillery. At Zorndorf, a single Prussian ball rendered 42 men in a Russian grenadier battalion hors de combat. And this, I think, was the essential fault of the Russian artillery in the Seven Years War. The Russians were forced to fight with types of guns and types of tactics (dispersal of fire) against a type of enemy that neither the artillery or its tactics had been designed for. NOTE ON SOURCES As mentioned in the article, the main source used is: An Account of some of the most Remarkable Events of THE WAR between the PRUSSIANS, AUSTRIANS, and RUSSIANS, from 1756 to 1763, by Johann Tielcke. Translated from the second German edition. London 1787. Two Volumes. The illustration, however, is taken from the German edition. In addition, I have used W. Zweguintzov's L'Armee Russe, Paris 1967. This is an excellent distillation of the massive 30 volume work on the weapons and uniforms of the Russian army by A.V. Viskovatov, published in St. Petersburg, 1844-1856. The Slavonic Division of the New York Public Library has a complete set. However, being in Russian, it is not linguistically accessible to me. Any reader with a working knowledge of that language and access to this work could undoubtedly turn up much useful information. In addition, I have used Volume II of Lilane and Fred Funcken's L'Uniforme et Les Armes Des Soldats de l' Guerre en Dentelle. They seem, however, to rely completely on Zweguintzov. Also used was Russian Infantry Uniforms of the Seven Years War, the excellent pamphlet by R. D. Pengel & G. R. Hurt. They use Zweguintzov but also the Die Herre der Kriegfahren den Staaten 1756-1763 series by Friedrich Schirmer and articles from Das Sponton magazine by Gunther Ellfeldt. Christopher Duffy's Maria Theresa's Army and Thomas Carlyle's History of Frederick the Great have provided useful background information (the latter introducing me to Tielcke and suggesting what a worthwhile source he would prove). Finally, three books have proved very helpful on the general subject of artillery, and as they are available in recent reprints are recommended as excellent additions to the library of any student of 18th Century warfare. They are: A Treatise of Artillery 1780 by John Muller, 3rd edition of the work first published in 1757 (Museum Restoration Service, Bloomfield, Ontario, Canada 1977); A Treatise of Artillery by Guillaume LeBlond, 1746 English translation of a standard French work (museum Restoration Service 1970); and An Universal Military Dictionary by Capt. George Smith, 1779 (Museum Restoration Service 1969). The latter is especially useful in gaining an understanding of contemporary usage of 18th Century technical terms. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. 2 #2 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1980 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. 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