ED NOTE: This article appeared in EMPIRE, EAGLES AND LIONS and is reprinted with the kind permission of the Editor and Author of the article, Mr. Jean A. Lochet.
The task of coming up with average field strengths for the French Army, has been taken up by a number of authors and one would think it should be a fairly simple task because of the relatively more accessible and well kept French Archives. Yet, because most of the data coming from books that are simply a rehash of often uncomplete and erroneous information, this is not the case.
I intend to show how wrong conclusions can be reached by the use of incomplete data. THE COURIER, in issues #2 & #3, published a fine series of articles called CLS Napoleonic Armv Organization Revisited, in which Mr. Bloom shows the difficulties in arriving at average field strengths for wargame armies. In part II of his articles, Mr. Bloom investigates the average field strengths of the French Army in 1812, then from 1809 to1814.
Mr. Bloom's key point in challenging the CLS French Napoleonic organization is Emir Bukhari's French Napoleonic Line Infantry, 1793-1815, which contains mini- histories of all French line regiments for the period 1793- 1815. Very pertinently, Mr. Bloom tells us: "A study of these histories indicates that, in 1812, the French Army had 111 line regiments in existence. Of this 111 regiments, 63 (or 57% of the total) are listed as being in Spain in 1812, while 41 (or 37% of the total) are listed as being in the Grand Army on the Russian front."
Several Reasons
I am afraid that this does not tell the whole story for several reasons:
1. It is quite true that the French Army included some 111 line regiments but, there were also a multitude of other units such as the light infantry regiments, some temporary regiments (regiments provisoires) and some "Corps Hors Ligne", that are too numerous to be ignored. Furthermore, the number of "war" battalions could range anywhere between 1 to 7 in all the above units, making the number of bat1alions, and not the number of regiments, the only possible and significant units to evaluate the true ratio of the French troops involved in the different war zones.
2. Bukhari's mini-histories of the line regiments are unfortunately incomplete and are a source of confusion since they can lead to the wrong conclusions. Examples include the 29th of the line which is listed by Bukhari as part of the Grande Armee in Russia. It is not quite so, since the 1st and 2nd battalions were in Spain and only the 3rd and 4th battalions were in Russia with the Xl Corps. Also the 44th of the line which is listed by that author as part of the Army of Spain. Only the 1st and 2nd battalions were in Spain and the 3rd and 4th battalions were in Russia with the IX Corps.
To be complete, another significant point should be explained. In January 1811, Napoleon decreed an increase in strength to 3 "war" battalions plus a depot battalion for the 28 vacant light and line regiments which had disappeared during the Directoire and the Consulat. The colonels were nominated, the locations for their depots given, etc. when the Emperor (certainly for "Public Relations" reasons) decided to add quietly a 6th battalion to some already existing regiments. Only the 29th and 11th light regiments were reactivated in 1811.
My data on the paper strength of the French Army as of 1st January 1812 is from Belhomme's "Histoire de l'Infanterie en France". The series of 5 volumes was published in Paris between 1893 and 1902, from documents available in the official French archives. We find:
| Portugal | 83 battalions |
| Spain: Spain | 100 |
| Aragon | 39 |
| Navarre and Biscaye | 32 |
| Catalonia | 41 |
| Spain Total | 212 |
| Naples | 15 |
| Corfou | 16 |
| Illyria | 22 |
| Kingdom of Italy | 41 |
| Roma | 9 |
| Elba | 7 |
| Corsica | 6 |
| Toscany | 17 |
| Liguria | 10 |
| Piedmont | 10 |
| Italy Total | 153 |
| Germany: Stettin | 9 |
| Kustrin | 5 |
| Magdeburg | 13 |
| Rostock | 17 |
| Luneburg | 5 |
| Hanover | 5 |
| Ratzburg | 5 |
| Germany Total | 59 |
| Hanseatic Cities | 50 |
| Holland | 33 |
| Belgium | 38 |
| Annexed Provinces of Rhenanie | 25 |
| Total | 146 |
| France: French border of | |
| Spain | 54 |
| Mediterranean coast | 31 |
| French East border | 53 |
| Paris | 59 |
| Meuse to Boulogne | 25 |
| Camp of Boulogne | 25 |
| France Total | 247 |
NOTE: The above list includes the regiments that were part of the Navy like the 4 regiments of the Navy artillery, etc.
The total of the above list is 817 "war" battalions. The grand total, including depot battalions, as of 1st January 1812, is 955 battalions for the French Army. Since we had 295 battalions involved in Spain, the percentage is 36% of the war battalions in that war zone or, to be complete 30.89% of the total 955 war and depot battalions.
Modified by Events
In 1812, the figure of 295 battalions involved in Spain was significantly modified by several events such as:
1. The withdrawal of part of the Guard, of the Polish battalions in the Vistula Legion (technically part of the French Army), some Swiss battalions, one battalion of the Paris guard, etc.
2. The disappearance of some "war" battalions from the French Army. Some of these units were: The second battalion of the 113th of the line became prisoner of war on 19 January 1812 when Ciudad-Rodrigo surrendered. (The battalion was raised again in 1812, at its depot in Orleans.); the battalions of the garrison of Badajoz also became prisoner of war on 6 April 1812. They were the 1st of the 28th light, the 4th of the 9th light, the 3rds of the 58th 88th and 103rd of the line.
All those battalions were raised again in 1812 at their respective depot; the 4th of the 65th of the line became prisoner of war on 27 June 1812. It was the garrison of one of the forts at Salamanca. The battalion was raised again at the depot in Gand at the end of 1812; the battalion of Westphalia was disbanded in 1812 and the troops distributed in other units like the Hanoverian Legion, etc. The above list is not exhaustive and tries to present the complexity of the problem as well as its magnitude.
It has been written that the Peninsula War was costing the French Army an average of 100 casualties a day! Under those conditions, in full agreement with the French practice of the time mentioned by Fred Vietmeyer in NAO, deficient battalions were broken up and the troops distributed (usually) among the other battalions of the regiment. Then the cadres of the disbanded units were sent back to their depot for recruiting.
Among such battalions we find during the month of March, for instance, 3rd battalions of the 70th, 14th, 67th, 34th of the line; and 4th battalions of the 3rd light, 79th, 62nd and 101st of the line; and the 3rd and 4th battalions of the 34th light (also the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 7th and the 3rd battalion of the 6th Italian line regiments). The list is not exhaustive either.
During 1812, some fresh French battalions were also moved to Spain to compensate for losses. We find the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 29th of the line until then stationed on the Mediterranean coast, the 3rd battalion of the 79th of the line which was transferred from Perpigan to Catalonia, etc. The list is not exhaustive.
Thus one can understand the complexity of the problem of trying to determine the exact number of battalions in Spain. The problem of finding the average strength of such units at any given time is almost impossible to solve since the official returns were very often uncomplete or several weeks old. It is not unreasonable to assume that the figures given by Mr. Bloom in THE COURIER were acceptable - but only for 36% of the French Army in the Peninsula in January of 1812. Furthermore it is not unreasonable to assume that some of the battalions were very weak and that other freshly reinforced or new units were at full strength at least for a certain time depending on the magnitude of their involvement in active operations.
Further Complications
To further complicate things, some 4 "provisoire regiments" (temporary regiments) were organized at 2 battalions each (Decree of 1st April 1812). One of them, the 4th, was raised from 3 companies each of the 3rd battalions of the 27th, 39th, 59th, 65th, 69th and 76th line regiments.
The National Guard, in preparation for the Russian
Campaign, was also mobilized by a decree of 14 March
1812. Some 88 cohortes from the so-called "first ban"
were raised for the defense of the coasts of the Empire.
The National Guard had a paper strength of some 89,408
men (this is a subject by itself that we would like to cover
in a future issue). In addition, to assist the National Guard
cohortes in the defense of the Empire and to occupy
Germany or to reinforce the Armies in Spain, a decree of 9
April 1812, organized some 17 "demi-brigades" (temporary
half-brigades) to be raised from the 3rd and 4th battalions
of the line regiments serving in Spain.
Each and every one of these battalions was completed to 840 men each, a total of 46,200 men. An order of 18 May 1812 designated the first five "demi- brigade provisoires" to be a reserve for Spain. Another order of 27 May 1812, sent the 5th "provisoire" to Navaree to replace the 2nd Tirailleurs and the 2nd Voltigeurs of the Guard called back to France.
Some 4 "demi-brigades de marche" were created by an order of 9 April 1812. Each was 3 battalions strong to be raised from the 32 depot companies from 32 different light and line regiments. They were organized as the 1st reserve division commanded by General Heudelet which was assembled in Magdeburg on 15 May 1812, with a strength of 16,284 men. Each company was 166 men strong which is 26 men above the theoretical full strength of a French infantry company.
Official decrees were issued to bring up the strength of the infantry units to be a part of the army of invasion above theoretical strength. One of them is the decree of 29 February 1812, which give the order to assemble in Verona (Italy) the necessary effectives to complete all the departed battalions of the so-called "Corps of Italy" to 840 men per battalion. That decree was implemented and the reinforcements organized into a "Corps de Marche" commanded by General Buyon. It included 4,000 French and 970 Italian infantrymen and departed on 1 April 1812 to reinforce Eugene in Silesia. It is of interest to mention that the "Corps of Italy" had departed for Silesia with a battalion average of only 650 men.
We should mention that, most of the effectives necessary to bring to strength the existing battalions and the new units came mostly from the levy of 120,000 conscripts ordered by the decree of 12 January 1812. The first conscripts from that levy had already reached the depots by 20 February.
The transfer of such a large number of soldiers in organized units through Germany and Poland to reach the Grande Army on the Niemen raised enormous problems because of the large distance to be covered on foot. A very complex and complete system of relays and depots on the chosen routes were organized to take care of the tired and sick men which were to be sent forward after they rested. The small detachment of "refreshed" men were then directed to the small depots of the different Corps kept for that purpose on the Vistula.
A Decree of 3 March 1812 organized the Grande Armee for the invasion of Russia, which initially included some 392 battalions of which 231 were French and 161 were foreign contingents, etc. Many modifications of the initial organization took place including the creation of the Xl Corps from Temporary Regiments and Penal Regiments, etc. Some of the changes also include the increase of the IX Corps to 4 divisions, etc.
More Than Just Line Regiments
Thus, we see that the Grand Army included a multitude of units besides the line regiments. It is wrong to ignore these other units in trying to evaluate the average strength of the French Grand Army prior to the invasion of Russia.
One can argue that Mr. Bloom considers only the line regiments, while I am taking into account all the other units of the French Army. Some of them of doubtful! value, and some being Light Regiments which are not strictly "Line". That is true, but some entire brigades of the Grande Army were made of a single Light Regimentl We find in the I Army Corps (Davout) alone, several such brigades:
-
1st Division, Bde d'Alton: 13th Light Regiment (5 btns)
1st Division, Bde Cratien: 17th Light Regiment (5 btns)
2nd Division, Bde Dufour: 15th Light Regiment (5 btns)
3rd Division, Bde Gerard: 7th Light Regiment (5 btns)
4th Division, Bde Barbanegre: 33rd Light Regiment (5 btns)
6th Division, Bde Albert:26th Light Regiment (4 btns)
So, we find a total of 6 brigades in the 1st Corps entirely composed of light Regiments, with a total 29 battalions, a significant number much too large indeed to be ignored, especially when one considers that most of the line regiments in Spain included an average of only 2 to 3 "war" battalions.
When we closely examine the effectives of the Xl Corps, we find that the Corps is composed of some 10 Provisional Regiments (1st, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 17th) and 5 so-called Penal Regiments (Belle-isle, Walcheren, Rhe, 1st and 2nd of the Mediterranee) with a total of 54 battalions of the total of 91 for the Corps. Also a figure much too large to be ignored.
Other non-line units (i.e. defined as non-line regiment per se, but still fighting units on the same basis as the line or light regiments) were units such as the infantry regiments of the Vistula Legion, marching with the Guard, the Neuchatel battalion, also "a la suite de la Guarde", the Regiment Joseph Napoleon, (perhaps a very poor unit but organized as a line regiment! the Provisional Croatian regiments, the Illyrian regiment, the 4 Swiss regiments and the Portuguese Legion. These units are not French, not truly line in some cases, but still technically a full part of the French Army.
Now we are in a position to quantify the number of French Regiments, and battalions, that entered Russia.
| Unit | Regiments | Battalions |
|---|---|---|
| Guard | 18 | 34 |
| Line and Light Regits | 44 | 193 |
| Provisional Regts | 11 | 39 |
| Penal Regts | 5 | 15 |
| Swiss Regts | 4 | 11 |
| Neuchatel Btns | - | 1 |
| Illyrian Regiment | 1 | 4 |
| Provisional Croatians | 2 | 4 |
| Vistula Legion | 4 | 12 |
| Portuguese Legion | 3 | 6 |
| Regt Joseph Napoleon | 1 | 4 |
| Total | 93 | 323 |
Thus, we have a total of 93 Regiments and more significantly 323 "war" battalions, technically French, part of the French Army entering Russia, versus the 295 battalions involved in the Peninsula (return of January 1812).
In the light of the above, I don't see how we can take 545 men per battalion as a acceptable figure for the whole French Army. Figures pertinent for the Peninsula can not be used for the Grande Army of the invasion of Russia, or for the multitude of other battalions kept in secondary, but nevertheless, important theaters.
A final significant point to keep in mind if one desires to be realistic, is to consider the basic difference between a regiment in Spain and one with the Grand Army in Russia. The typical regiment in Spain consisted of two battalions, for the most part, while one in the Grand Army was typically (with some exceptions of course) made up of 4 to 6 battalions.
SOURCES
General Jean Regnault, L'Aigles Imperiales, 1804-
1805 I. Peyronnet, Paris, 1967.
Lieutenant-Colonel Belhomme, Histoire de l'Infanterie en France Henri-Charles-Lavauzelle, 5 volumes, Paris, 1908-1911.
Haythornthwaite & Chappell, Uniforms of the Retreat from Moscow Hippocrene Books, Inc., New York, 1976.
Chandler The Campaigns of Napoleon, MacMillan Co., New York, 1966.
Emir Bukhari, French Napoleonic line Infantry, 1796-1815. Almark Publications 1971.
Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. 2 #2
To Courier List of Issues
To MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1980 by The Courier Publishing Company.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com