The December-January issue of THE COURIER reached me just after I had finalised the movement instruction part of WRG 6th edition ancients to go with the action instruction part, a version of which modified for use with 5th edition has already appeared in THE COURIER, so I may have been more susceptible than most to the ideas in Bill Protz' THE FOG OF WAR RETURNS and Ned Zuparko's GRAND TACTICAL ORDERS -- AN UNNECESSARY EVIL? It immediately struck me that those two writers' suggestions rather neatly dovetailed with each other and that by comparing their methods with those we adopted for essentially similar reasons it might be possible to take art a little further along than we all have individually. One of the best arguments for Bill's variable move system comes from the battle of Maida, one of the earliest examples of French column versus British line. A number of French columns set out together to deliver a co-ordinated attack over a similar distance and similar terrain, but instead of arriving together, arrived at considerable intervals and were beaten individually in detail. What accounts for their different movement rates? Well, to some extent it may have been a slightly better choice of route or varying energy among the column commanders. However, I think the main factor may have been the terrain. Looking at a map or at a wargames table, we are apt to think of all those areas not occupied by woods, hills, villages and so on as open and unobstructed. In real life, there are probably enough folds in the ground to conceal a battalion part of the time and the surface can be shoulder high corn, clay plough or sheep-nibbled short turf. I can quote three examples of how this works out in practice. The first two, which had to be taken into account in our modern rules, are first that very few hits on tanks at other than point blank range are at a height of less than 3 feet, and second that recent trials showed that an M.60 tank was unavailable as a gun target for something like 60% of the time spent in moving tactically over open terrain. Missile operators were worse off, because they needed a longer "in view" segment for their slower projectile to have a chance of striking before the target disappeared. My third example is a personal one. I have a favourite walk across open moorland from a farm I stay at to a rocky outcrop about two miles away. If I go on foot, I don't see the outcrop until within 100 yards. If I ride a horse, I can see it for the whole trip. First Conclusion The first conclusion from all this is that rule writers have to take into account that apparently identical stretches of flat open ground can have very different movement and visibility characteristics. Three approaches are possible. The first is to have much more detailed table top terrain so that even minor features are represented and incorporate elaborate tables in the rules to cover their effect on movement and visibility. I have often played with such rules -- once! The second is to take average values or even ignore the whole problem. The third is to have the length of the move partly controlled by dice and possibly dice for target location. Instituting partly die-controlled movement accounts for half the fog of war by making the general uncertain when his troops will arrive where he sent them. The other half of the fog is that he should not know into what he is sending them. This uncertainty should be greater in eras where the battle extends over a wide area, when troops take cover and when smoke from black-powder or deliberate screens obscures vision. The problem is that the player sees things that the general figure on the table cannot so that the rules must hamper him from taking advantage of this. This is the main function of written orders, as discussed by Ned in his article. The original WRG method was to write orders for each unit at the start of a game, then make it follow these until they were changed by a signal or messenger or the troops themselves decided by a reaction test that the orders were stupid. This disposed of the old telepathic super-heros, but had two potential faults. The first was that the system did not recognise that in real life a unit might have a range of optional actions. These had to be provided by the standing order system later introduced, which intensified the other fault, which was that a player was dependent upon his opponent's honesty. Well, we are all honest men I hope, and most of us did not diverge too far from the spirit of our orders even under the stress of battle. However, I admit that at times I have found it something of a struggle and have unkindly suspected that my opponent was not struggling as hard as he might. I differ from our kindly editor in putting the onus on the rule writer rather than on the player, after all, you don't make a furnace out of wood and then complain that it wasn't fire-proof wood. Our next approach was to go to far more general orders and alternate movement. This was such a success in our WW.2 and modern rules that we used it for the new horse and musket set. Again it worked, so we tried it for the new ancients. It didn't work too well, which led us to go back and start again from scratch. Innovations The first innovation was the action instruction system that appeared in THE COURIER. This allowed the player to pick from a range of optional actions when in close proximity to an enemy, so solved the problem of allowing local initiative. The next innovation solved the problem of the interactions that arise when opposing units' moves intersect other than in a charge. This was childlishly simple, but only after we thought of it. Half of the solution had already featured in the rules for five years, this being that both sides must halt units part way through their moves if they came within a certain critical distance of an enemy. The other half was to say that the most mobile of two opposing units separated by that critical distance could use any remaining move to move back further away. In practise, this was as good a solution as alternate moving. The rule writer that issues a set in which the moves are variable will have to expect a torrent of complaint from a large body of wargamers who believe that dice are nasty and evil, that troops should always do as they are told, and that line should always beat column (assuming they have a British army) or column always beat line (assuming they are French). Personally, I follow Clausewitz in the belief that chance plays a greater part in war than in any other human activity. I think a general should try to maximise his probability of success rather than expect certainty to be handed him on a plate. Having said that, I have to admit that while our modern rules incorporate dicing for target acquisition, the only variable moves we use are the evade moves in the Rennaissance and 6th edition Ancient sets. These have a fixed part plus the score of a die, and make close range skirmishing a little more risky than it used to be. Arguments Against There are three valid arguments against making all moves variable. The first is that it does add an extra element to slow down the game. This is a matter of personal choice as to whether you think the improvement worth it. The second argument is that when one unit follows exactly in another's track, it looks strange if they cover the ground at different speeds. My answer to this is that it is unlikely to follow exactly in the same track except along a road, in which case the "convoy concertina" effect supplies an excuse. The third argument is that you should also take into account the possibility of an unauthorised speed up by a rash commander. Since there is no point adding to the possible length of a move if the player chooses not to use it, this implies that moving full distance less or plus the dice variation should be compulsory. This in turn brings complications when you arrive in the vicinity of the enemy, though nothing insuperable. The problem of restraining players' initiative and penalising bad initial dispositions and plans without getting bogged down in arguments over the meaning of orders was solved by a system of two-letter movement codes to add to the one letter action codes S for skirmish, A for attack and H for hold. These could be RF and LF for off-table flank marches, otherwise the first letter had to be R, C or L and the second B or C. The first letter stood for the right, centre or left of three equal sized table sectors. Units had to stay in their own sector except in a range of circumstances designed to stop enemy coming up to the boundary and acting provocatively with immunity. The second letter stood for the rate of movement, bold or cautious. Bold units had to advance at least half a move each period and could not halt until they reached a place they were ordered to hold or until they were within an enemy's charge reach. Cautious units could not advance more than half a move each period, but could halt at any time. The final touch was that all movement codes became obsolete after the 3rd period of the game and troops could then be moved exactly as the player wished, though the action codes remained in force until changed by a messenger or signal. Generals were also allocated sectors at the start of the game and continued to control the troops initially allocated to that sector throughout the game. Their main function is to maintain morale among troops allocated to their command who are within a critical radius of them, or to join a unit to heighten its resolve in specially difficult circumstances. I think this system may produce a rather better effect than Ned's when, as in our ancient rules, the moves of some types of troops are an appreciable part of the table width. His may well be better when move lengths and table sizes militate against successful transfers from one wing to the other, and is logically superior in that his generals have a primarily command rather than morale function. Since I may adopt his method for a future rule set covering 1845 to 1885, I would like to repay the debt with two suggestions. The first is that instead of halting units that had escaped control for a turn, he should let them move half distance in open terrain or on roads and possibly quarter distance crossing difficult terrain or passing a defile. The other is that the general's influence should be limited to that area within his command radius that is within his line of sight. The radius might also shrink in the vicinity of firing troops, to allow for the smoke as well as the fog of war. Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. 2 #1 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1980 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com