*Based on notes and information from email discussions with Pat Condray, Iain Stanford, David Williams, Robert Hall and Dan Schorr.
Spanish Succession gamers are often attracted to the variety of color in the uniforms and flags of the period. All become intrigued by the tactical evolutions occurring just before or during the war. The day of the caracole was almost, if not completely, over to be replaced by the disordered charge at the trot with pistols drawn. The developing shock charge of the English and Dutch was becoming a force to be reckoned with, the pike was made redundant by the socket bayonet and more nations were becoming trained in the use of platoon fire.
Volley-fire Irish regiments in French service advance on wider platoon-firing battalions of Hanoverians supported by a brigade of Dutch and Swiss. The Irish figures are Old Glory, all other infantry are Foundry. Dragoons supporting the French shows a regiment from Irregular miniatures (front) and Dixon (rear). Flags from “warflag.com”. Figures from the collection of Ian Croxall and Gary Rhay. Photo by the author.
A number of rule sets are specifically designed for this period. Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (Pat Condray), Captain General (Pike and Shot Society) and Gå På (Thomas Årnfelt) all have mechanisms that recommend the use of correct frontages for units, depending on whether they used the platoon firing system or volley fire by rank.
It is not the intention of this short article to go into the mechanisms of platoon fire and it is assumed that readers interested in this topic already have such knowledge. A question that does frequently crop up though, and that is not concisely addressed in what little wargaming information is available on this period, is which countries actually adopted platoon fire and when?
As can be seen in the diagram below, which shows scale representations of the two systems, the difference in frontage is significant. Wargamers typically want to know how to base their units accurately.
There does appear to be some debate as to whether units maintained these frontages in combat as strengths were reduced. There is some hint that units attempted to maintain frontage during a battle as drill manuals give instructions for “filling in” gaps resulting from casualties. The above diagram shows an Anglo/Dutch battalion at full strength of 760 men and a French battalion at 650 men based on David Chandler’s Warfare in the Age of Marlborough. However, for units beginning the battle under-strength, which was the “norm” (for example, Allied platoon fire battalions at Blenheim averaged 500 men while French volley fire by rank battalions averaged 350-400), it must be assumed that frontages were reduced. Looking at contemporary orders of battle, the number of battalions given for a particular location just could not physically fit in the given space at full frontages while in line. However, the size ratio between the two systems seems to remain constant with platoon firers having a 50% greater frontage than rank firers.
There have been numerous discussions on this subject on Internet groups. As I have a collection from this period, I decided early on to make a list of the different nations. This was easy to start, but not so easy to complete. It was mostly completed with information from Materialen zum Spanishen Erbfolgkreig by August Khun, which is published in several booklets in English translated by Pat Condray and Dan Schorr. I was able to fill some gaps utilizing emails from Messrs. Condray, Schorr, Robert Hall and Iain Stanford who were able to provide Prussian regimental information. Dan Schorr was also able to help with the Danish information that was confirmed by an associate of Mr. Stanford’s utilizing the Danish National Archives.
Units, and when they adopted platoon firing in three ranks
Dutch Troops
since the early 1680’s - this also included troops that fought for the Dutch in their pay and included Dutch troops sent to Germany in 1703 in Imperial service. (Kuhn/Hall)
England
1686 (English Drill Manual)
Hanover
1695 (Kuhn/Hall - confirmed by A Schwencke Geschichte der Hannoverschen Truppen im Spanischen Erbfolgekriege – 1862).
Hesse-Kassel
1700 (Kuhn/Hall),
Ansbach-Bayreuth, Holstein, Mecklenburg,and Wurtemburg - 1702-1703.
There is no specific source that cites these states as using platoon fire. What is clear is that the regiments of the major states supplying troops to the Maritime Powers adopted the practices of their employers and it is likely that this practice would have been adopted by the minor states also. It seems probable that it would have been mentioned had this not been the case. Certainly, the evidence of battlefield deployment at several battles (Speyerbach, Blenheim, Ramilles & Oudenarde) show Anglo-Dutch battalions occupying about 50% more frontage than their equivalent French counterparts. Given that these minor German states where included in these formations, it is reasonable to assume that they had adopted the Dutch method of firing.
Prussia (five regiments only)
1703. Five regiments: Anhalt-Zerbst, Erbprinz Hesse-Kassel, Grumbkow, Varenne and Wulffen were organized under the Dutch system. The remainder retained the 4-rank volley fire system until 1720. (Kuhn/Hall). However, for a contradiction by C.W. Hennert, see below.
Denmark
1703 beginning with 11 battalions in Dutch Pay (Guards (2 battalions), 1&2/Prins Carl, 1&2/Sjaelland (Seeland), 1&2/Prins Georg, 1/Fynske (Funen), Oldenburg & Wurttemberg-Oels). They may have adopted this system earlier, but by 1704, all 11 battalions raised from Denmark, except those in Imperial Pay were using platoon fire and the Land Militia raised in 1704 were well trained in platoon fire. Those raised in Norway and not serving abroad may have retained rank fire. (Danish National Archives)
Bavaria
There was some recent discussion on a news group regarding whether Bavaria used platoon fire. This followed a quote by Rothenberg (The Army of Francis Joseph) on the army of Max Emanuel in which he stated “In 1691, following the re-equipment of the infantry with flintlocks and bayonets, Bavaria, first among the German states, introduced the three-deep linear formation. Firing was modified, normally it was by platoon, the first rank kneeling.” He cites Karl Staudinger’s Geschichte des kurbayerischen Heeres unter Kurfurst Max II Emanuel, 1680-1729 Munich, 1904, as a general source in his bibliography. However, there is no reference to Bavarian platoon fire in this work.
M. de la Colonie who commanded French volunteers in the Bavarian Army, the Boismorel’s Grenadiers (Boismorel himself too busy chasing his sweetheart and trotting off to Austria for the King), writes in his memoirs on at least one occasion, of “firing volley of the whole line.” He gives first hand tactical descriptions of fighting with the Bavarian army and nowhere does he mention firing by platoons. After the Bavarian Army collapsed at Schellenberg, De la Colonie swam the Danube and rallied 400 of his Grenadiers and several other units to defend Rain. He describes setting up defenses and later he describes his Grenadiers firing its volley and falling behind the defenses to protect themselves. Were platoon fire used, this would be the perfect place for it - in defense, firing rounds by platoon - to keep the pressure constant against the sappers approaching their positions.
However, we cannot overlook the fact the De la Colonie commanded French volunteers, mostly deserters from the French army. That they may likely have used rank firing tactics does not necessarily imply the rest of the Bavarian army did. It may also be speculated that Rothenberg’s description of the front rank kneeling better describes the mechanism of firing by rank, rather than by platoon.
We can also make the same argument, with respect to relative frontages, for Bavarian units and platoon firing units they opposed, to support that they had a narrower frontage than the platoon firing units. Ultimately there is no conclusive evidence to support, one way or the other, which tactical method was used by the Bavarians. The email group felt that it was not possible to draw definitive conclusions from the presented facts with respect to the Minor German States and Bavaria, but the points considered have been presented for you to draw your own conclusions.
Robert Hall provides some excerpts from Beiträge zur Brandenburgischen Kriegsgeschichte, C. W. Hennert 1790, an early source that possibly contradicts that provided by Khun with regard to the Prussians.
“After the pike had been done away with the Brandenburg infantry remained in 4 ranks for a long time. Herr von Turpin brought in the innovation of platoon firing already under Elector Frederick William the Great; so much is certain that it was in use by the Brandenburg infantry under the rule of Elector Frederick III (1688-1713).
The author of the often-quoted manuscript speaks quite clearly about firing by platoons and divisions. Standing in 4 lines was a very great hindrance to this type of firing since platoon fire necessitated that all ranks should fire simultaneously and the soldiers had been taught on the command “Fire!” to quickly pull the trigger of the musket and, if it misfired, to put the cock into the rest position and not to fire until ordered again. For this type of loading the three rows were good but if they were in four rows the first two had to kneel down. If threatened by cavalry the first rank put the bayonet on the barrel and dropped down and the last two ranks loaded by platoon, half or whole divisions. When advancing against the enemy and so near that you could attack with bayonets, the first rank loaded the musket with one tight-fitting and 4 loose balls, fired a salvo at close range, fixed the bayonet and charged the enemy. When exercising care was taken that the men were quiet and made no noise but listened for the commands. When the soldiers too aim the officers took care that the muskets were pointing in the right direction or they corrected them with their spontoons.”
With respect to the French use of platoon fire, Iain Stanford cites an archive report that Villeroi experimented with platoon fire in 1705 reporting that while it may be useful for defense, that it did not suit the French method of fighting. The French did not formally adopt platoon firing until after the War of the Spanish Succession. He also cites another suggestion in a recent publication (Faulkner) that the French had started to adopt platoon fire in 1706 and where practicing it fully by 1708, however, this is contradicted by Lynn’s Giant of the Grand Siecle.
Another excerpt from Beiträge zur Brandenburgischen Kriegsgeschichte says of the French;
“In 1689 the French had the infantry formed in 5 ranks but later around 1703 only 4 men deep. One may say with certainty that the small fire of the French was not as lively and good as the Brandenburgers’ fire. …. In 1703, they had still 21 commands for loading and only fixed bayonets after they had loaded. (Exercise pour l’Infanterie, de 2. Mai 1705). We have seen that this had already been practiced in a much better way by the Brandenburgers, Dutch and other powers.”
Here, the author tells us that the French are still using the rank firing method and that it was not as effective as the platoon firing conducted by the Prussians. While the notes do not explicitly state that platoon firing was in use by all Brandenburg infantry (as opposed to only those five regiments previously noted as being in the service of the Maritime Powers), the tenet of the article is certainly implicit to this fact.
References
Geschichte des kurbayerischen Heeres unter Kurfurst Max II Emanuel, 1680-1729; Karl Staudinger.
Beiträge zur Brandenburgischen Kriegsgeschichte, C. W. Hennert 1790
Various parts from Materialen zum Spanishen Erbfolgkreig; August Khun (also variously translated by Condray, Condray Schorr and Hall)
Various Publications; C.A. Sapherson
Chronicles of an Old Campaigner; M. de al Colonie
Various Publications; The Pike and Shot Society (Iain Stanford)
Giant of the Grand Siiecle; John Lynn
A Wargamers Introduction to the War of the Spanish Succession; Pat Condray
From Pike to Shot; Charles Stewart Grant
Related:
Amphibious Assault on Fort Rande Spain: October 22, 1702 [TC 91]
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