It has been something like 25 years since I wrote a short article for THE COURIER about musketry fire in Napoleonic wargames based upon some ideas found in Clausewitz. Those ideas formed the basis of the musketry section used in my Vive L'Empereur! rules, published in 1981. I always had it in the back of my mind to get the perspective of some interested German speakers to help me evaluate the English translation of Clausewitz that I was using -- but it wasn't practical for me to do so at the time. Today, though, we have the Internet! I was recently introduced to a few sites where I found more information and could discuss the subject. The first is the "Clausewitz Homepage" [1] which contains all kinds of information about, and by, that Prussian military theorist. The other is a discussion board about the Napoleonic Wars, which can be found either via "The Napoleon Series" [2] or through "The Napoleon Series.Org" [3]. The former is moderated discussion forum while the latter is unmoderated and complete with flame wars! These discussion boards, where I posted Clausewitz material for discussion, have over 12,000 messages on them (including some interminable flame wars) from contributors who hail from all over the world. They include discussions of button colors, Josephine's underwear, tactics, strategy, politics, poetry, personalities, and some amazing detail on uniforms, orders of battle, drill and tactics of Napoleonic units and almost anything else relating to the era. One may have to scroll through a lot of minimal personal interest, but the range, amount, and quality of interesting information still to be found within is quite good. Rob Hamper, The Courier's Napoleonic Editor, thought that adapting the postings into a new article about these musketry ideas might be of interest to the current readership. Though the conclusions are mine alone, I'd like to thank Hans-Karl Weiss for his observations on aimed and oblique fire, wheeling flank companies, and more. (For you old-timers, let's just pretend this is a "Best of The Old Courier" article - which is a lot easier than making me think of something new to say!) In tabletop Napoleonic games there always comes a moment when one has to calculate the effects of fire combat or musketry fire. Depending upon the level and type of the game, this calculation might be described as a "volley". In other games, it might try to model the cumulative effect of one game turn's worth of firing, representing, perhaps, anything from 6 to 60 minutes. It may be based upon the number of men firing, length of frontage, or some abstract number representing a combat or firing value. It might occur after one unit moves, after simultaneous movement, or as a reaction to someone else's fire or movement. Whichever path one takes to get to the moment of calculation, in most cases that calculation is handled in the same way. The higher the number or value that one is using for the firing unit, the higher the amount of casualties or combat loss suffered by the target. Loss is a function of the number firing. If Side A has 7 firing simultaneously against the return fire of 5 from Side B, all else being equal, one would expect to see a loss result of 7:5 in A's favor. If A were firing unopposed into B, one would expect to see greater loss inflicted than if B were firing unopposed into A. There might be some random variables tossed in to vary results, but they would probably still originate from or be based upon the original values of 7 and 5. If 500 men in Side B exchanged fire against the 1000 men in Side A, you would expect Side B to receive twice as many casualties as Side A. While historical battle accounts indicated that commanders kept back reserves, any wargamer who had 7 units against 5 would be silly to keep 4 of his units back in reserve. It would be more advantageous to put all 7 in the front line to blast away at the 5 enemy units, expecting that losses would be inflicted, on average, at a 7 to 5 ratio. This method of calculating losses did nothing to encourage keeping reserves; in fact, just the opposite. It is more advantageous to get everyone into the fight. Given even sides, massing troops to gain a local superiority while allowing the enemy local superiority elsewhere still didn't reward reserves. Thus, when using a combat results system where greater losses are inflicted on the target in direct relationship to the greater numbers of firing troops, both sides had reason to engage everyone, somewhere, as quickly as possible. For the attacker, this is to get maximum men involved and to inflict maximum casualties. For the defender, this is to avoid being defeated even worse in detail. However, when I read Clausewitz's On War, I found that he was saying that fire combat should be calculated in a different fashion. He used the terms "mutual effect" and "economy of force", which led to reasons for keeping reserves, in a presentation that I found compelling and adaptable to combat results tables. Clausewitz is a fairly notorious, and sometimes controversial, figure in military theorist history. Many people know of him, some people quote him, and a few have actually read his Vom Kreig. Another handful has read some of his other writings. The controversies, though, usually swirl around the interpretations of his strategic and political assertions and the relationships and definitions that relate to those. The tactical sections of his writings, though, are removed from these debates, since he uses examples from his experience during the 1792-1815 period that are considered by most commentators to be obsolete and of no value in discussions today about the nature of war. In fact, some editions of On War delete some of his tactical chapters for just those reasons. So there are no assertions that his historical tactical writings are incorrect in some way -- only that they are not relevant to today's military theory. In fact, Clausewitz had a lot of practical, combat, and theoretical tactical experience. He was a 12 year old lance corporal in 1793, saw combat at age 13, graduated from the War College in Berlin 1803 at the head of his class, and was part of a grenadier battalion taken prisoner in 1806 with Prince August. He tutored the Crown Prince in, among other things, tactics 1810-1812, campaigned with the Russians in 1812. He was active in 1813-1814, and in 1815 he was chief of staff for the III Corps and fought at Wavre. His friend and patron Scharnhorst thought highly of him and he worked with Gneisenau. Therefore, instead of using his writings for high-level military theory and tossing out the low-level information, I think there is reliable information to be mined by doing the reverse -- examining his contemporary tactical opinions and putting aside the more well-known and problematical theoretical assertions. In Book Three, Chapter Twelve of On War (this is from the 1993 'Everyman's Library' edition, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), Clausewitz states: "We have come to a concept that is likely to be misleading when applied to real life. A clear definition and development seems necessary, and we hope we may be forgiven another short analysis. War is the impact of opposing forces. It follows that the stronger force not only destroys the weaker, but that its impetus carries the weaker force along with it. This would seem not to allow a protracted, consecutive, employment of force: instead, the simultaneous use of all means intended for a given action appears as an elementary law of war. In practice this is true, but only when war really resembles a mechanical thrust. When it consists of a lengthy interaction of mutually destructive forces, the successive employment of force certainly becomes feasible. That is the case in tactics, primarily because tactics are chiefly based on firepower; and there are other reasons as well. If in a fire-fight a thousand men face five hundred, the sum of their losses may be calculated from the total forces involved on both sides. A thousand men fire twice as many rounds as five hundred, but of the thousand, more will be hit than of the five hundred, for it must be assumed that the thousand will be deployed more closely. If we suppose that they suffer twice as many hits, the losses on each side would be equal. The five hundred, for example, would suffer two hundred casualties, as would the thousand. Now, if the force of five hundred had kept an equal number of men in reserve, out of range, eight hundred able-bodied men would be available to each opponent. But on one side five hundred men would be fresh and fully supplied with ammunition, while all of the eight hundred facing them would be to some extent disorganized, tired and short of ammunition. To be sure, it is not correct to assume that because of their greater number the thousand would lose twice as many men as the five hundred would have lost in their place. The greater loss sustained by the side that held half of its strength in reserve must be counted as a disadvantage. It must also be admitted that as a general rule the thousand may initially have an opportunity of driving the enemy from his position and forcing him to withdraw. Whether these two advantages balance the disadvantage of opposing, with eight hundred somewhat battle-weary men, an enemy not appreciably weaker and who has five hundred completely fresh men, cannot be decided by further analysis. We must rely on experience; and few officers who have seen action would not grant superiority to the side with fresh troops. It becomes clear why the deployment of too great a force is detrimental: no matter how great the advantage which superiority offers in the first moment of the engagement, we may have to pay for it in the next. The danger, however, applies only to the phase of confusion, the condition of disarray and weakness -- in brief, the crisis that occurs in every engagement, even on the victorious side. In the context of such a weakened condition, the appearance of relatively fresh troops will be decisive." My interpretation of Clausewitz's above remarks for game purposes are as follows: Simultaneous use of troops is usually better than successive (in other words, get them all into action) In the lengthy interaction of tactics (which is based upon firepower), successive use is feasible In firefights "the sum of their losses may be calculated from the total forces involved on both sides." Rather than inflicting twice the casualties, 1000 firing against 500 will give equal losses to both sides. Experience shows small fresh reserves then defeat larger numbers of fatigued troops in close combat So outnumbering the enemy in fire combat gains little, which promotes successive use of reserves. There is one English edition of On War that gives us more detail on this topic. It uses the Colonel J. J. Graham late Victorian translation, with introduction by Colonel F.N. Maude. This is the London, 1966 publication by Routledge and Kegan Paul in three red-colored volumes. In the appendix of Volume III, there are included some additional writings by Clausewitz. These writings are not normally found in modern copies of On War, having been removed during the abridgement in preference to the more popular strategic principles. It is in this Appendix that Clausewitz discusses the tactical level principles that would be of interest to the wargame designers and players such as Principles for the Use of Troops and Principles for the Use of Ground. Christopher Bassford, at http://www.clausewitz.com/, writes: "Before he left for Russia, however, he prepared an essay on war to leave with the sixteen year-old Prussian Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm (later King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, r.1840-1858), whose military tutor he had become in 1810. This essay was called "The most important principles of the art of war to complete my course of instruction for his Royal Highness the Crown Prince" (usually referred to as the Principles of War). Die wichtigsten Grundsatze des Kriegfuhrens zur Erganzung meines Unterrichts bei Sr. Koniglichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen, often published as an appendix to On War. It is available in two English translations: J.J. Graham's (1873) and Hans Gatzke's (1942). It is generally referred to as Principles of War or Instruction for the Crown Prince. This essay represented Clausewitz's theoretical development up to that point, but was only a rather primitive precursor to his later magnum opus, On War. Its subject matter was largely tactical." Of most interest to me in the appendix was the Guide to Tactics, or the Theory of the Combat, which runs from pages 243-337. Here Clausewitz lays out a series of what I term propositions; 604 of them to be exact, each one following upon the previous one. In it, he went into more detail about the "mutual effect" and "economy of force" ideas that were summarized in Book Three of On War. In what follows I will present relevant sections from the "Guide to Tactics", with my own comments included within. On page 250 Clausewitz had a section titled Two Modes of Fighting - Close Combat and Fire Combat, propositions #46-72. Page 254 has Relation of the two forms of combat in regard to attack and defence, propositions #73-85. Page 255, the s ection Advantageous Conditions in both Forms of Combat, propositions #86-96b. It begins: 86. We must now examine more closely the nature of both combats, in order to ascertain the points which give the preponderance in the same. 87. The fire combat: a. superiority in the use of arms (this depends on the organisation and the quality of the troops) b. superiority in the formation (tactical organisation) and the elementary tactics as established dispositions. (See Methodicism, p. 63, vol. i.) In a question of the employment of regularly disciplined troops in the combat, these things do not come into consideration, because they are supposed to belong to the idea of troops. But, as a subject of the theory of the combat in its widest sense, they may and should be considered. c. The number d. The form of the line of battle so far as it is not already contained in b. e. The ground 88. As we are only now treating of the employment of disciplined troops, we have nothing to do with a and b, they are only to be taken into consideration as given quantities. In propositions 87-88 above, Clausewitz lists all of the different factors one needs to account for in the theory of fire combat, which he has listed above as a-e. Since he is going to use "regularly disciplined troops" as a norm and in his examples, he does not need to address "a" or "b" as they will be assumed hereafter to be "typical" troops in "typical" close-order formations (as opposed to irregulars, or peasant levies, etc.) That means he still needs to account for c-e, and will begin with a discussion of c, the "number" of troops in fire combat, for the moment assuming that "d" and "e" are equal for both sides in his examination. His he begins in (89a), as follows: 89a. Superiority of numbers. If two unequal bodies of infantry or artillery are drawn up opposite to each other on parallel lines of the same extent, then if every shot fired is directed like a target shot against a separate individual, the number of hits will be in proportion to the number of men firing. The proportion of hits would bear just the same relation if the shots were directed against a full target--therefore if the mark was no longer a single man, but a battalion, a line, etc. This is, indeed, also the way in which the shots fired by skirmishers in War may for the most part be estimated. Clausewitz starts with two important points, First, he is speaking of regularly disciplined troops in close-order, whose fire here takes place in parallel lines. Second, he states that calculating hits as a proportion to the number of men firing is only a valid method for aimed fire such as that practiced by skirmishers. In a wargame, therefore, the method currently used for all calculations should be used for skirmishing only. But here the target is not full; instead of that it is a line of men with intervals between them. The intervals decrease as the number of men increases in a given space; consequently, the effect of a fire combat between bodies of troops of unequal number will be a sum made out of the number of those firing, and the number of the enemy's troops they are firing against; that is, in other words, the superiority in number in a fire combat produces no preponderating effect, because that which is gained through the number of shots is lost again through a greater number of the enemy's taking effect. Suppose that 50 men place themselves upon the same extent of ground as 500 opposite to them. Let 30 shots out of 50 be supposed to strike the target, that is, the quadrilateral occupied by the enemy's battalion; then, out of the enemy's 500 shots 300 will strike the quadrilateral occupied by our fifty men. But the 500 men stand ten times as close as the 50, therefore our balls hit ten times as many as the enemy's, and thus, by our 50 shots, exactly as many of the enemy are hit as are hit on our side by his 500. Here it is clear that fire from parallel close-order units is unaimed fire. Troops were basically firing straight ahead into an area. It is fair to assume that smoke, noise, fear, kick, misfires, friendly muzzles near the ear, and many other variables conspired to prevent the same type of "aiming" that individual skirmishers achieved. This was even more difficult with "oblique fire". Though it was in the regulations, it was near impossible to do effectively in action. Clausewitz's "quadrilateral" example emphasizes the firing to the front nature of this type of combat. Although this result does not exactly correspond with the reality, and there is a small advantage in general on the side of the superior numbers, still there is no doubt that it is essentially correct; and that the efficacy on either side, that is, the result in a combat with fire-arms, far from keeping exact pace with the superiority in numbers, is scarcely increased at all by that superiority. This result is of the utmost importance, for it constitutes the basis of that economy of forces in the preparatory destructive act which may be regarded as one of the surest means to victory. (89b) Let it not be thought that this result may lead to an absurdity; and that, for example, two men (the smallest number who can take up the line of our supposed target) must do just as much execution as 2000, provided that the two men are placed at a distance apart equal to the front of the 2000. If the 2000 always fired directly to their front, that might be the case. But if the number of the weaker side is so small that the stronger directs his concentrated fire upon individuals, then naturally there must follow a great difference in the effect, for, in such a case, our supposition of simple target-firing is set aside. Likewise, a very weak line of fire would never oblige the enemy to engage in a fire-combat: instead of that, such a line would be driven from the field by him at once. We see, therefore, that the foregoing result is not to be carried to an extreme in application, but yet it is of great importance for the reasons given. Hundreds of times a line of fire has maintained its own against one of twice its strength, and it is easy to see what consequences may result from that in the economy of force. This is an important section, because it shows that Clausewitz is aware of the difference between "theory" and "practice" -- in other words, he has the common sense and experience to know how to avoid "absurdity", which makes his ideas harder to dismiss by the modern reader. Since there are numerical absurdities, and cases where troops would only need to resort to an advance to drive away inferior numbers, it is helpful to come up with some sort of approximation of when numerical superiority will not be effective. So, keeping in mind that we are speaking of parallel lines of regularly disciplined troops who are not engaging in skirmish fire, when Clausewitz states that the result "is not to be carried to an extreme", and then says "Hundreds of times a line of fire has maintained its own against one of twice its strength", I take this to mean that when there are odds of 1-1 up to 2-1, "the superiority in numbers, is scarcely increased at all by that superiority." The "consequences ... [that] ... result from that in the economy of force" means that if two sides have 6 units, and one can withstand 6 with 3 of his own, he now has 3 fresh units. Even if his 3 engaged eventually lose in the firefight, his 3 fresh units should be able to overthrow the enemy's 6 worn out units. 89c. We may, therefore, say that either of the opposing sides has it in his power to increase or reduce the mutual, that is, the total effect of the fire, according as he brings or does not bring more combat ants into the line which is firing. Clausewitz's conclusion, then, is that if either side (or both) add troops into the firing line, mutual casualties increase, and if either or both reduce the numbers, mutual losses decrease. In game terms, that would indicate counting the total number of troops from both sides to create a sum. 750 firing against 750 would give a sum of 1500, as would 1000 versus 500. As the sum increases, so does the mutual effect, as it decreases, the mutual effect drops. If three battalions were exchanging fire with four, the addition of a battalion by either side would cost both sides more men in an equal amount. If one side pulled a unit out of the line to rest and resupply, casualties on both sides would drop equally. Next, Clausewitz describes the effect of "the form" of the line of battle, and ground: 90. The form of the line of battle may be a. With parallel fronts of equal length; then it is the same for both sides. b. With parallel front, but outflanking the enemy; then it is advantageous (but, as we may easily conceive, the advantage is small, on account of the limited range of fire-arms). c. Enveloping. This is advantageous on account of the double effect of the shots, and because the greater extent of front follows of itself from that form. Forms the reverse of b and c are obviously disadvantageous 91. Ground is advantageous in combat with fire-arms a. By affording cover like a breastwork. b. By intercepting the view of the enemy, thus forming an obstacle to his taking aim. c. As an obstacle to approach, by which the enemy is kept long under our fire, and impeded in the delivery of his own fire. 92. In close combat the advantages afforded by ground are the same as in fire combat... In 90a and 90b above we have the "mutual effect" previously described. In 90b he says that outflanking by having a longer parallel line has a "small advantage", but obviously not enough to invalidate "mutu al effect". This would entail oblique fire, and troops who extend well beyond the end of an enemy's line will suffer the negative effects of increasing range on their unaimed fire. 90c refers to enveloping fire, which has a "double effect of the shots", and is obtained, presumably, from a new unit approaching the flank of a firing line, or by the parallel firing line oblique-wheeling in companies from the end of their own firing lines. The advantages of ground are self-explanatory; in a game I would suggest that once the mutual effect has been determined, only part of that effect would then be applied to the side with the superior ground as described above. 122. The destruction of the enemy's combatant force is made up  a. Of all that are put physically hors de combat-killed, wounded, and prisoners. b. Of whatever part is spent physically and morally. 123. After a fire combat of several hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe loss, for instance, a quarter or onethird of its numbers, the debris may, for the time, be looked upon as a heap of burnt-out cinders, for a. The men are physically exhausted. b. They have spent their ammunition. c. Their arms want cleaning. d. Many have left the field with the wounded, although not themselves wounded. e. The rest think they have done their part for the day, and if once they get beyond the sphere of danger do not willingly return to it. f. The feeling of courage with which they started has had the edge taken off, the longing for the fight is satisfied. g. The original Organisation and formation are partly destroyed, or thrown into disorder. 124. The consequences, e and f, make their appearance, more or less, according as the combat has been successful or the reverse. A body of troops which has gained ground, or successfully main tained the original position assigned to if, can be made further use of more easily than one that has been repulsed. Propositions 122-123 illustrate that Clausewitz is well aware of the psychological effects of fire combat, and gives the modem reader a good understanding of the many different intangibles that can affect the troops. He also shows that this is a cumulative effect over a period of time. He also gives us some insight as to what a contemporary officer would consider "severe loss" of "physically hors de combat-killed, wounded, prisoners", when he uses the figures "a quarter or one-third of its numbers". It appears that losing 25-33% in manpower can reasonably be said to cause the rest of the unit to be considered "a heap of burnt-out cinders". It goes without saying that there may have been some Napoleonic units who ran at the first shot, while some may have lost half or two-thirds of their men in some actions, but I think it is likely that we hear about those because they are the exceptions. Clausewitz's statements probably reflect a range of "typical" results. In 123 Clausewitz implies that it would take "several hours" of fire combat to reach this state. I take this to mean that there may have been some periods during the fight when heavier losses were taken than at other times. If, after several hours, ammunition is spent, or arms need cleaning, it is likely that more hits were scored and losses taken in the first hour than than in the last. It is possible that a "first fire" was more effective than later shots amid clouds of smoke and loss of organization. I am going to digress for a moment and examine something in proposition 123 above. Clausewitz does not give any numbers to show how effective he thought musketry was. He does not state that one could expect a certain number of hits in an exchange of fire. It may be for the very good reason that such numbers could vary so widely, or depend so much upon circumstances that to state a number would be misleading, or for some other reason. The only statement he makes that I could find of any kind about fire effectiveness was "Artillery fire is much more effective than that of infantry. A battery of eight six-pounders takes up less than one-third of the front taken up by an infantry battalion; it has less than one- eighth the men of a battalion, and yet its fire is two to three times as effective." Obviously, this is not very specific. Also, in the example from Book Three, Chapter 12 of On War quoted earlier in this article, he does use an example of 1000 men exchanging fire with 500 with 200 casualties accruing to each side. It is likely that an author would try to use plausible numbers for examples, but there is no law that says he must. The famous British soldier and historian Napier said only 1 in 300 shots fired by line troops hit the enemy in action, while Surtees of the Rifle Brigade thought it was 1 in 200, and 1 in 20 for rifles (the I in 20 figure I take as meaning fired in aimed skirmish fire). Since Clausewitz did not give a figure, I am going to examine proposition 123 above to speculate about what kind of losses we might infer could be expected to result from fire combat. I emphasize that the following points are some of my guesses; they are not something the author of the "Guide to Tactics" is asserting. In 123 he uses the term "several hours". Let's assume that equals three hours, and that when a body of troops reaches the stage of having "severe loss", Clausewitz means it is "in crisis" and ready to break if the enemy can send fresh troops to assault it in close combat. The range for "severe loss" here that Clausewitz uses is 25%-33% "of its numbers", at which point he says other psychological or physical effects will effectively disable the rest of the unit. Since this example is "after a fire combat", I will assume that to mean the "mutual effect" musketry described earlier in the "Guide" against an opponent of equal or up to twice its size. If we take take the 25% - 33% and spread that out over 3 hours, we average about 8% - 11 % per hour of fire combat to reach the crisis stage. If we were speaking of a battalion with an original strength of 720 men, that would mean a range of loss from 180 - 240 men over the 180 minutes. This would mean a loss-per-minute in the range of 1.0 - 1.333 men a minute for three hours, or, on average, a little more than a man a minute for our purposes. This could be refined to account for more casualties in the opening minutes, and fewer and fewer as time went on. Depending on the situation, it would also be possible for one volley under the right circumstances to inflict a big chunk of these casualties at one time and perhaps bring that unit to a "crisis" stage immediately. This speculation would work well if we were to assume the sum of the number of firing troops at about 1,500; either 750 vs 750, or 1000 vs 500 as in Clausewitz's example where each side lost 200. Note that if a body of troops of 1000 lost 200, that would be a 20% loss, approaching "severe loss", while 200 from 500 would be 40% and well into a "severe loss" for the smaller side. 125a. There are two deductions from No. 123 which we must bring under notice. The first is the economy of force, which is made by the use of a smaller number of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs. For, if the dilapidation of forces in the fire combat consists not only in the loss of those placed hors de combat, but further in this, that all who have fought are lowered in their powers; then, naturally, this lowering of powers will be less on that side which brings the fewest troops into action. If 500 men * (* This passage should read thus: If" out of a body of 1000 men, 500 have been placed in reserve, and the remaining 500 men," etc.EDITOR.) have been able to maintain their ground against 1000, if the losses are equal on each side, say 200 men, then on the one side there will remain Boo men who are fatigued, while the other side will have 800, of whom 300 are fatigued, but 500 are fresh. This is the same example he later used (quoted at the beginning of this article) in On War. 125b. The second deduction is that the weakening of the enemy, consequently the dilapidation of the enemy's combative power, is of much greater extent than the mere number of killed, wounded, and prisoners would seem to represent. This number amounts to, perhaps, only one-sixth of the whole; there should, therefore, remain five-sixths. But out of that five-sixths, in all probability only the untouched reserve, and some troops, which, although they have been in action, have suffered very little, are, in reality, to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder (perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a caput mortuum... In (123) Clausewitz defined "severe loss" as 25 -33 % loss, where the entire unit could be considered a "heap of burnt-out cinders" and ripe for defeat. Here in (125b) he goes into a little more detail, illustrating a sort of intermediate stage before reaching the "severe loss" stage. He says that with one-sixth loss, about 17%, one could not count on still having the remaining 83% as being battleworthy. Rather, with a 17% loss, one might only be able to count on a remaining 17%, with 66% "for the present" unserviceable. Presumably that 66%, if allowed to rest and recover away from the fire combat for some period of time, would again become serviceable. For game purposes, this could suggest when units should be relieved or replaced in the firing line. 294. But a much more important limitation of numbers lies in the nature of the fire combat. We have seen (No. 89c) that in it, within certain limits, the increase of number has only the effect of raising the strength of the fire combat on both sides; that is, its total effects. Now this increased effect, when it brings no advantage in itself for one side, ceases then to be of service to that side; it therefore easily reaches a maximum in that case. 295. This maximum determines itself entirely by the individual case, by the ground, the moral relations between the opposing troops, and the more immediate object of the fire combat. Here it is enough to say that there is such a thing. 296. The number of troops to be employed simultaneously has, therefore, a maximum, beyond which a waste takes place. 297. In the same way the use of one and the same body of troops has its limits. We have seen (in No. 123) how troops under fire gradually become unserviceable; but there is likewise a deterioration in close combat. The exhaustion of physical force is less there than in fire combat, but the moral effect produced by an unsuccessful issue is infinitely greater. 298. Through this deterioration, which forces used in action suffer, including as well those not actually engaged, a new principle comes into the combat, which is the inherent superiority of fresh troops opposed to those already used. 299. There is still a second subject for consideration, which consists in a temporary deterioration of forces that have been engaged in the crisis which occurs in every action. 300. The close combat in practice may be said to have no duration. In the moment that the shock takes place between two cavalry regiments the thing is decided, and the few seconds of actual swordfight are of no consequence as regards time: it is very much the same with infantry and with large masses. But the affair is not then finished on that account; the state of crisis which has burst out with the decision is not yet quite over ; the victorious Regiment pursuing the vanquished at full speed is not the same Regiment lately drawn up on the field of battle in perfect order ; its moral force is certainly intensified, but, as a rule, its physical force, as well as that resulting from military order in its ranks, has suffered. It is only by the loss which his adversary has suffered in moral strength, and by the circumstance that he is just as much disordered, that the con queror retains his superiority, therefore, if a new adversary makes his appearance with his moral force intact, and his ranks in perfect order, there can be no question that, supposing the troops equally good, he will beat the conqueror. 301. A similar crisis also takes place in the fire combat, to such a degree that the side which has just been victorious by its fire, and has driven back its enemy, still finds itself, for the moment, in a decidedly weakened condition as respects order in its ranks, and physical and moral force, a condition which lasts until all that has been, thrown into disorder is once more restored to its normal relations... To return to the example that Clausewitz gave of the 1000 men vs 500 men; if each lost 200 men, the smaller unit would have suffered a "severe loss" of 40% and be a "heap of burnt-out cinders" and "be driven back", perhaps breaking and running. However, that 1000 man unit losing 20% of its strength has passed the one-sixth losses alluded to in proposition 125b, where its usable strength is probably less than one-sixth now, and would fit the description in (301) of being "for the moment in a decidedly weakened condition". It would therefore be vulnerable if brought to close combat before it has time to be "once more restored to its normal relations" by the untouched 500 men the enemy still has in reserve. I would think that this would require good timing and an experienced battlefield eye to judge when to do this amidst the smoke and confusion that would be everywhere present. We now also have a reason in a game for keeping reserves and not just throwing everyone into an immediate attack. DEPTH OF THE ORDER OF BATTLE 313. All battles which are to be fought by bodies of troops in succession require from their very nature that fresh troops should be forthcoming. These may either be quite fresh, that is, troops which have not been engaged at all, or such as have been in action, but by rest have recovered more or less from their exhaustion. It is easy to see that this gives room for many shades of difference. 314. Both the use of quite fresh troops as well as the use of such as have refreshed themselves supposes that they have been in rearthat is, in a position beyond the region of destruction. 315. This also has its degrees. for the region of destruction does not end at once, but decreases gradually until at last it ends entirely. 316. The range of small arms and of grape are well-defined gradations. 317. The further a body of troops is posted in rear, the fresher they will be when brought into action. 318. But no body of troops which has been within reach of an effective fire of small arms, or of case, can be considered fresh. In (313)- (318) we have useful definitions of fresh troops and learn that troops who have been engaged can recover. We also gain some idea of much space to the rear we need to keep for reserves, or for troops to rally. 319. We have, therefore, three reasons for keeping a certain number of troops in rear... 324. Only those forces which are brought into efficient activity at the same time can be regarded as applied simultaneously. When the fronts are equal, such application is therefore limited by the possibility of acting effectively. For instance, in fire combat, three ranks might perhaps fire at the same time, but six cannot. 325. We have shown (in No. 89) that two lines of fire of unequal strength as regards numbers may be a match for each other, and that a diminution (of numbers) on one side, if it does not exceed certain limits, has only the result of reducing the mutual effect. 326. But the more the destructive effect of the fire combat is diminished, the more time is required to produce the necessary effect. Therefore, that side which desires chiefly to gain time (commonly the defensive side) is interested in modifying, as much as possible, the total destructive effect of the fire (that is, the sum of the mutual fire). 327. Further, this must also be an object with the side which is much the weaker in point of numbers, because, when the losses are equal, his are always relatively greatest. The above propositions indicate two things: first, that it takes time for things to happen in a battle. Secondly, that the defense wishes to gain time and reduce the mutual effect of casualties by engaging the most enemy troops with the fewest friendly troops as possible, consistent with safety. 328. When the conditions are reversed, the interests will be reversed also. 329. When no special interest for hastening the action predominates, it will be the interest of both sides to do with as few troops as possible, that is, as already said (No. 89b), only to employ so many that the enemy will not be induced to come to close quarters at once, owing to the smallness of our numbers. 330. In this manner, therefore, the simultaneous employment of forces in fire combat is limited by the want of any advantage, and both sides have to fall back upon the successive use of the spare forces. 331. In close combat the superiority in numbers is above all things decisive, and the simultaneous employment of troops is on that account so much to be preferred to the successive, that the latter in mere theory is almost completely excluded, and only becomes possible through accessory circumstances. Here then is the contrast between fire combat and close combat. While superiority of numbers is of limited use in fire combat, it is decisive in close combat (all else being equal). Thus a primary consideration in close combat calculations in a game will be superiority of numbers. 332. Close combat is in fact a decision, and one which lasts hardly any time; this excludes the successive use of forces 333.But we have already said that the crisis of the close combat affords favourable scope for the successive use of forces. 334. Further, the decisions in partial close combats belonging to a greater whole are not absolute decisions; therefore the application of our force to the further combats which are possible must also be taken into consideration. 335. This leads then also to not using at one time more troops in close combat than appear to be just necessary to make certain of the result. 336. As regards this point there is - no other general rule, except that circumstances which obstruct execution (such as a very courageous enemy, difficult ground, etc.) occasion a necessity for a greater number of troops. 337. But for the general theory, it is of consequence to observe that the employment of more troops than is necessary in close combat is never so disadvantageous as in fire combat, because in the first, the troops only become unserviceable at the time of the crisis, not for a continuance. 338. The simultaneous employment of forces in the close combat is therefore subject to this rule, that it must in all cases be sufficient to produce the result, and that the successive use can in no way make up for insufficiency, for the results cannot be added together as in fire combat; and further, that when once the point of sufficiency is reached, any greater simultaneous application of force becomes a waste of power... This is a reason for keeping reserves and for using them judiciously. They will be needed several times in the future, so don't throw them all into one attack. There is a point of diminishing returns for their involvement in any one attack. In a later section, propositions (372)-(377), Clausewitz was finishing a section about extension and enveloping that I include here for context as preparation for his examination of envelopment in musketry combat. 372. reserves, etc., occupy more space, but, besides that also, in order to afford greater security; for, in the first place, the effect of stray shots would be more serious amongst large masses of troops and military trains than amongst a few Battalions; secondly, the combats of large masses last much longer, and, through that, the losses are much greater amongst the troops behind the front who are not actually engaged in the combat. 373. If, therefore, a certain length is fixed for the necessary extent of front, then it must increase with the size of the masses. 374. The other advantage of the enveloping form (the superiority in the number acting simultaneously) leads to no determinate quantity for the front of a line; we must therefore confine ourselves to saying that it diminishes with the extension of front. 375. Further, we must point out that the simultaneous action of superior numbers here spoken of chiefly relates to musketry fire; for as long as artillery alone is in action, space will never be wanting, even for the enveloped on his smaller curve to plant as many pieces as the enemy can on the greater curve; because there never is enough artillery with an Army to cover the whole front of a continuous line. 376. It cannot be objected that the enemy has still always an advantage in the greater space, because his guns need not stand so close, and therefore are less liable to be struck; for Batteries cannot be thus evenly distributed by single guns at equal intervals over a great space. 377. In a combat of artillery alone, or in one in which the artillery plays the principal part, the greater extent of the enveloping front gives an advantage, and a great one too, through the great range of artillery, because that makes a great difference -in the extent of the two fronts. This case occurs, for example, with single redoubts. But with Armies in which the other arms of the service take the most prominent part, and artillery only a secondary part, there is not this advantage, because, as already said, there is never any want of space even for the side enveloped. 378. It is, therefore, principally in infantry combats that the advantage which the greater front affords of bringing greater numbers into action simultaneously must show itself. The difference of the two fronts in such a case amounts to three times the range of the musket (if the envelopment reaches an angle of 180 degrees), that is, about 600 paces. Before a front of 600 paces in length, the enveloping line will then be double, which will be sensibly felt; but before a front of 3000 paces the additional length would only be one-fifth, which is no advantage of any importance. 379. We may say, therefore, respecting this point, that the length of front is sufficient as soon as the difference resulting from the range of a musket shot ceases to give the enveloping line any very marked superiority. In (378) we see that Clausewitz considers musket range to be about 200 paces. He points out that that range limits the effect to be had when one parallel line is longer than another. He also states that if an enemy line of up to 600 paces in length can be enveloped (which I think would be accomplished by wheeling in companies at the end of the longer line, or by bringing in a new unit to envelop the enemy flank) with an opposing front that adds up to double that 600 paces, it "will be sensibly felt." On the other hand, to envelop the ends of a long enemy line (Clausewitz uses 3000 paces as his example), "is no advantage of any importance." To me that indicates that in such exchanges of "mutual effect" fire, Clausewitz is not so interested in an individual company or battalion in these fire combats. It may be that the end battalion who was enveloped suffered more than one in the middle of the line, for example. He is instead analyzing the effect of two masses exchanging unaimed fire. His advice for deployment would be (379) to put in enough troops to avoid being vulnerable to an envelopment of any "very marked superiority", which per (378) I would interpret as being double one's own frontage. This doesn't mean one must prevent any envelopment - it may not be possible to avoid. I interpret his remarks to give a sort of accept able range. That is, one would like to engage as many enemy troops with the least number of friendly troops as possible (to enable one to keep reserves) with the limit being to try to avoid having envelopment that allows the enemy a firing frontage of double or more one's own. 380. From what has just been said of the two advantages of enveloping, it follows that small masses have a difficulty in obtaining the requisite development of front ; this is so true that we know for a fact that they are in most cases obliged to give up their regular order of formation and to extend much more. It rarely happens that a single Battalion, if left to depend on itself, will engage in a combat without extending its front beyond the ordinary length 150 and 200 paces) ; instead of keeping to that formation it will divide into companies with intervals between them, then again will extend into skirmishers, and after a part is placed in reserve it will take up with the rest, altogether twice, three or four times as much room as it should do normally. Proposition (380) is for me the most intriguing of his statements, and one I have the most trouble getting used to. Here he states that small masses will extend their fronts against longer opponents to avoid envelopment. Larger masses do not share that imperative because enveloping has less effect against them. Clausewitz uses words like "this is so true that we know for a fact", and "it rarely happens... [it] will engage ... without extending its front", so we can assume this is the voice of experience for these are definite assertions, not some ambiguous wording. My difficulty here is that I don't know of any drill regulations for accomplishing this, nor of any memoir accounts describing it. If it were just skirmishing, it would make more sense, but it is not. This is part of his discussion of "development of front" in the context of mutual effect and economy of force, plus he does state that at some point the unit might have to convert into skirmish action. Therefore, it could not have begun with skirmish fire. I am willing to trust to his experience here, and therefore interpret this section to mean that a single battalion will extend its front and be able to hold its own in the mutual effect exchange of fire. This matches his earlier propositions, because by dividing his companies with intervals between them, equal frontage will be achieved and the enemy will have more gaps to his front that he would be firing into. This is also consistent with an earlier statement in (89b) "Hundreds of times a line of fire has maintained its own against one of twice its strength". Finally, it does indicate that at some point the battalion might have to transform into skirmish order. When that occurs, the mutual effect fire would end, and calculations would be made as for aimed skirmish fire. At that point, there would be a lot less firing (since skirmishers worked in pairs with reserves), and the unit would have such a weak line that it would be vulnerable to being driven away by superior numbers in the same way as any other skirmish line. How can this translate into a "combat results table"? For the sake of having some numbers to use, I will go back to my earlier speculation and assume that a body of about 750 troops exchanging fire with another 750 (thus 1500 men exchanging fire) over a period of time will inflict and suffer about a man a minute loss for each side. I'll also assume that Clausewitz is correct when he uses the sum of the men engaged for calculation purposes, and that therefore since 1000 men firing against 500 totals up to 1500 men, a man a minute loss rate would be valid there, too. First, let's look at a traditional game interpretation, saying that the more men there are firing, the more casualties inflicted on that unit's opponent. A 1000 man would be unit killing/wounding 60 men an hour, while the 500 man unit inflicts 30 men per hour. In this case casualties would be inflicted at a rate of 2-1, and the effect would be: So we have the large unit suffering a 90 man, 9% loss, and the small unit losing 180 men, a 36% "severe" loss. Even if a reserve 500 man unit were brought in to continue the fight, the larger unit would inflict casualties at a 9.1 to 3.2 rate and would defeat the side that had kept a reserve. It would make more sense to have skipped the reserve and begun with a straight-up 1000 vs. 1000 fight and hope for better dice rolls. Let's compare that with my Clausewitzian "mutual-effect" interpretation, assume that both sides lose an equal 60 men an hour each: Now the large unit has also lost 180 men, an 18% loss, while the smaller mass still lost his 180 men, a 36% "severe loss". Therefore, the damage to the smaller side remains the same, but the larger guy has doubled his loss. In fact, his 18% loss corresponds to proposition (125b) in the "Guide" where Clausewitz said that losing onesixth of one's men doesn't leave an effective force of five-sixths, but more like an effective force of one-sixth! The 500 man unit has been brought to his "break point", but if his reserve 500 can be brought in against the 820 "fatigued" men, Clausewitz would claim that experience shows the 500 would have the advantage. In this scenario, both sides would need to consider if or when there was a need to relieve the units in the firing line before the three hours had expired. For the 500 man side, could he time it so as to bring the unit out before it became a "heap of burnt-out cinders" and ran away or was made useless? Would the side with 820 men have time to make it through the "crisis" and to rest and regain their strength before 500 fresh enemy troops loomed up in the smoke? A combat results table would then be constructed by finding the sum of the men firing on both sides, and then assigning equal losses to each. Since Clausewitz said that units had held their own against twice their strength "hundreds of times, one would only have to modify for superior numbers if the odds were, say, more than 2-1. Thus 1500 vs. 1500 = 3000 "sum of firing troops". 2000 vs. 1000 would also = 3000, and in both cases equal losses would be inflicted on each side. If that 2-1 ratio were exceeded, as for example if 2200 were engaged with 800, then the 2200 could be given an additional bonus. For example, below is an outline of a table based upon the idea that a sum of 500 men firing with mutual effect would inflict "x" casualties to each side. To finish this table, one would have to decide what number to use for "x' and then how many different firing sums one wants to account for in the game. One could just as easily build a table to account for every 50 men in the firing line, or just for every 1000 men thus: To sum up, this system encourages reserves, and matches Clausewitz's notions of engaging superior numbers with the idea of wearing them out so that one's own fresh reserves can be brought up to overthrow the now worn-down enemy line. I hope these ideas give you food for thought. Footnotes Clausewitz Homepage: http://www.clausewitz.com/ The Napoleon-Series: http://www.napoleonseries.org Back to Table of Contents -- Courier # 90 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com