To those of you who agree with the need to introduce the Fog of War to tabletop battles, as suggested by Getz and Jones in their wargame analysis series (a series of discussions in the early Courier between Bob Jones and Jim Getz - ED), I commend the "hesitation rule. I devised the rule some time ago to introduce the fog and frustration of war as it might affect the commanding general in the areas of speed, precision of maneuver and coordination of command elements. I will explain the rule as I use it in my N-gauge Civil War battles, where whole armies of tiny miniatures clash. I am sure that the reader can adjust its use to other periods and scales.
Each side has a commanding general (who is represented by the player) and at least two Corps commanders. There are two or three Divisions per Corps, each with its own Division commander. Three Brigades make up a Division, with six to nine stands of Infantry per Brigade.
At the start of each battle, each side secretly rolls for the competency rating of each of its Corps and Division commanders. Three points are added to the die roll, thus making the possible ratings 4 to 9. Once each Army commander knows the basic rating of each of his subordinates, he can formulate his battle plan and make initial dispositions.
Just before the actual start of the battle and after all troops have been placed on the table, another die is rolled to determine each subordinate commander's ACTUAL rating for that particular battle. A roll of '1' means subtract two from the basic rating '2' means subtract one; '3' and '4' indicate no change in the ratings, while '5' adds one and '6' adds two.
During the game, a pack of cards is used with one card turned up each turn. Each commander is assigned one suit for the game. If a card in his suit is turned up and the number on the card is higher than his competency rating for that game, the commander will HESITATE. (For this purpose, aces count as '1' and face cards as '11'.)
If a Division commander hesitates, the brigades under his command can do any of the following, BUT MAY DO NOTHING ELSE: 1. Fire, 2. Retire, 3. Halt, 4. Change formation or face to meet an enemy threat.
A Division commander may become 'un-hesitated' by being brought into base to base contact with his Corps Commander or the CinC, or will automatically un-hesitate if any card is turned up on a subsequent turn whose number is less than or equal to his competency rating. This latter statement means, however, that any card higher than his number, regardless of whether it is in his designated suit, will continue his hesitation. Thus, the odds of continued hesitation are four times those of originally becoming hesitated.
If a Corps commander hesitates, his Corps is not directly affected. However, he loses the ability to "un-hesitate" Division commanders. Also, any unit that he might be personally leading at the time WILL hesitate. (In my game, Corps commanders often personally lead units to battle, because doing so increases the unit's morale and melee performance.) Only a higher card on a subsequent turn, or a personal visit from the CinC can un-hesitate a Corps commander.
The CinC and Corps commanders are free to roam the field of battle in whatever manner they think best. However, the Division commanders are pretty much tied to their troops because any Brigade that is not within six inches of either its Division commander, its Corps commander, or the CinC at the start of a turn will automatically hesitate and will remain so until one of these commanders is within six inches of it at the start of a subsequent turn.
The result of these rules is that the army commander must initially plan his dispositions to cater to the ability of his various subordinates, putting those most likely to lose their nerve in defensive or non-crucial positions. The actual performance of the Generals will not be known until the modifying rolls are made AFTER troop placement on the table. The commander of the army must then spend a good deal of the battle riding about to check on his Generals and prod the hesitating ones back into action.
This concept of varying competency of one's subordinates seems to tend itself best to the Civil War period, I suspect because we are more familiar with the all too human characteristics and failings of most of its leaders. I am sure that incompetency in command was not the exclusive property of Civil War armies, but probably transcends all history. In like manner, the Army-Corps level game possible with N-gauge troops seems a more likely place to find the problems of command than the Division - Battalion level action.
Again, I feel that the same problem of having to worry about the quality and capability of one's subordinates must surely plague any soldier who has an independent command, no matter what his rank or what size unit he commands.
War games can be divided into two categories: The competition wargame and simulation. In the competition wargame winning is equated with being the better player. In such a contest, the participant surely wants to exercise his skill and judgement in each and every phase of the battle, leaving as little to be determined by chance as possible. The benefits of introduction of the fog of war are lost on players involved in this type of contest because these factors can cause the issue of the winner being the better player to be obscured by introducing results that the players did not control.
The type of gaming based on simulating the command problems that would face the commander whose place the player decides to assume has a pace that is less competitive, and factors beyond the player's control can and should be introduced to destroy some of the God-like powers of observation and command than anyone who leans over a tabletop enjoys, powers beyond the real life commander, who had to work from the actual battlefield.
The above rules can cause attacks not to be delivered, pursuits to be improperly carried out, or reserves to arrive late or not at all. The CinC must constantly judge where the presence of himself and his Corps commander is most needed - hoping that those very Corps commanders will not fail him at a crucial time.
The battle will still be in your hands, but you might feel it begin to slip away from time to time. Will your friends believe you when you say that the day was lost by the timidity of one of your subordinates? Did you believe all that nasty talk about Longstreet letting Lee down at Gettysburg? Did you believe Hood's protestations that his campaign in the West were foiled by his own subordinates rather than by Sherman or Thomas? Try these rules and watch your sympathy for such wailing grow.
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