Organization and Maneuver
in Armati

By Arty Conliffe


All wargaming is necessarily just a mimicry of real battle. The difference between ARMATI and other rules sets is that I choose to mimic, and emphasize, certain historical patterns that to me are more important than other factors. I decided that command, army system differentiation and maneuver potential were of paramount importance. All other game mechanics being details by comparison.

My first "ancients" attempt, TACTICA, was like a big football fullback who gets the %&@! beat out of him but opens a crack in the line for other players to run through. TACTICA was the first widely distributed ruleset to make major deviations from the prevailing norms. One of the biggest deviations is the way in which it restricts the maneuver capability of formations, particularly the heavy infantry "battleline" units. While ARMATI is less restrictive than TACTICA, it is further developed with reference to its command system and maneuver parameters. This article is a guide to understanding ARMATI's maneuver and command structures and should help players develop tactics that work within those structures. But first, some background as to why I made the design decisions I did.

My study of ancient/medieval military history has led me to form these assumptions: Battleplans, which were often created the night before an engagement, were of the utmost importance since they could not easily be changed during battle. Depending upon the army, unit formations were comparatively inflexible; heavy formations were often incapable of little more than straight-forward movements (note: even light troops required control and were bound to a tactical focus during battle).

Therefore, all troops, especially the heavies, were deployed to fight to their immediate front facing (Tactics, like echelon attacks, are simply straight-ahead movements, delivered at an angle to the enemy line). The difficulties of wheeling a battleline" if possible at all"increased proportionately to its length. And these were just the inherent factors; i.e. limitations present even before the enemy advanced within striking distance! Once actual fighting began, these restrictions were magnified greatly. Though there were exceptions, (eg. feigned retreats, special enveloping maneuvers, timed facing changes, etc.), especially when superior training and on-the-spot leadership came into play, I would argue that the basic battlefield considerations generally held sway.

To permit the exceptional instances in history to determine the general precepts for all game units is not prudent since the result is usually a ruleset in which tactical norms are eclipsed by special events" events which are better represented in tailor-made battle scenarios.

DESIGN CHALLENGES

Much has been said about the 1000-foot general with his helicopter view of the tabletop. Gamers maneuver units as if they were controlled at all times by a single hand, perfectly seeing every event on both sides, moving and stopping each unit in precise harmony. Some players want perfect control of all events, and if they began playing with a set of rules that contained few movement restrictions, they may be loathe to surrender that freedom. While each player must decide for himself the game that suits him, as both a designer and player, I find such games unsatisfying. Based upon historical evidence, even the most restrictive rules sets (including TACTICA), are actually far too liberal in their simulation! ARMATI is a bit of a compromise in that it may be either more liberal or more restrictive than other games depending upon army organization and the tactical battle situation as it shifts during play. But I do recognize that players may be confused moving from one rules set to another. I hope the following sections will shepherd players past their concerns so that they may discover the rich tactical possibilities that ARMATI provides.

DIVISIONAL ORGANIZATION

In ARMATI, a Division is a convenient term that describes a number of contiguous units arrayed in wings, battles, lines, etc. By manipulating the number of Heavy and Light Divisions allocated to each army, ARMATI represents the flexibility and tactical potential of various fighting systems. Advanced battle systems are allocated more Divisions than more primitive ones and may therefore sub-divide into a greater number of parts. For example, Caesar's Romans are more flexible than the earlier Greek armies not simply because they are equipped differently, but because their command system was clearly more evolved. This differentiation of army systems was an essential ingredient in ARMATI's design.

Divisional size and organization in ARMATI are critically important details just as they were for the great captains. Divisions may be Controlled or Uncontrolled at Deployment. This determination is made by the player-general and is binding throughout the battle. Control points representing command efficiency and focus are used to indicate Controlled Divisions. The allotment of control points, coupled with an army's Divisional allocations, represents the players implied battleplan without bookkeeping or writing orders. One Controlled Division may maneuver and requires one control point. An Uncontrolled Division may not maneuver except to charge an enemy that comes within reach, but does not cost a control point. Large, clumsy Divisions require the same control cost as small, flexible ones. In essence, you pay for flexibility providing your army system can afford it.

ARMATI's command/movement system is not determined by luck your army's fate is placed squarely in your hands. If you can anticipate where you most need command control, then you will know when and if some of your Divisions can be Uncontrolled, thereby freeing-up control points for smaller Divisions. You can obtain flexibility where you think you'll need it most. But you need to plan for that; you can't transfer command control from turn to turn. While most wargames require players to anticipate opponent responses, ARMATI requires that you begin that process at deployment and during play.

WHEELING AND MANEUVER

In ARMATI, maneuver is determined by troop type and the geometry of the Divisions. The shorter the Divisional frontage, the more flexible the Divisional maneuvering base, the wider the Division, the less flexible. It is usually not a good idea to attempt wide flanking maneuvers with heavy units. This is because such movements, even if successful, may draw heavies away from subsequent battle action. Unless you're setting a trap, use light troops for these purposes, since they are intrinsically faster, more maneuverable and organized in smaller Divisions. Of course, good players (like good generals) can bend and break the norms. ARMATI allows a player enough tactical rope to demonstrate his brilliance or shortcomings.

The modest wheel (2") permitted in ARMATI achieves several goals:

  • It motivates the player to create a more effective initial plan in which the focus of his units will be to their immediate front. Since changes of direction are time consuming, the player who has anticipated better will have an advantage.

  • It represents the time necessary to re-dress the ranks when performing this complex maneuver.

  • It cuts down the 1000-ft general a tad.

    I should mention that one of ARMATI's advanced rules (Reserves) permits uncommitted reserve units to perform a greater wheel so as to facilitate a more rapid commitment. But this maneuver may occur only when the enemy is not closeby.

    In ARMATI, wheels are prohibited when the enemy is close (6") and in front of the wheeling unit. This is because at such proximity to the enemy I believe complex unit maneuvers (like wheeling), were dangerous since they required additional time to redress ranks and were therefore not viable options. I explained this mechanic to a lot of players at Historicon '94.

    By far, most seemed to agree with the concept regardless of the rules they played. One player, however, argued that "because even a drum and bugle corps of 14-year olds could be trained to perform intricate maneuvers at half-time games, then certainly soldiers with commanders who are not 'idiots' can perform maneuvers (i.e. the maneuver he wanted to do at the moment)." When I pointed out to him the reasons that the field conditions at the Rose Bowl and at the Battle of the Indus (or any battle) may not be comparable, he remained unconvinced. We agreed to disagree.

    At another demo, a player attempted to outflank Macedonian light cavalry and peltasts with slower moving Indian elephants and cavalry, complaining bitterly when the Indian heavy forces were hopelessly cut-off from the fight - an event that would not have occured in another rules set. Of course, in any demo game under convention conditions, tactics can easily go wrong and it is not likely he would have maneuvered thus had he time to read the rules before the game. It didn't help that he was opposed by a very experienced ancient's player. Still, I get the impression that many gamers form their opinions on tactical possibilities based upon what a particular rules set tells them is historical, rather than from undertaking their own research.

    TACTICAL ADVICE

    After a player creates his battleplan in ARMATI, winning a battle largely depends upon an understanding of tactical striking distance, the timing of blows and the modest maneuver capability of the heavy units. The following advice assumes a basic army deployment of one center and two wings. Not surprisingly, some of these suggestions coincide with time-honored methodology found in tactical works (like Clausewitz and Jomini) and will therefore work for other rules where complete freedom of maneuver is not a given luxury.

    Combining pinning attacks and wing attacks: This is a fundamental tactical concept. Most heavy units in ARMATI (especially Heavy Infantry) are durable and will "hold the line" for quite a while before breaking - 4 turns minimum for non-warbands, assuming they have not been shot-up prior to contact.

    Large Diagram

    This permits a player to "fix" an enemy's center while his flank troops (mounted units, lights, etc.) attempt to defeat the enemy's flanks. If the distance between your victorious flank troops and the enemy's center is short - the shorter the better - you stand a good chance of rolling up his line and winning the day.

    This is because in ARMATI, heavy units cannot simply turn to face a threat just because the player sees it coming. (Note: If such precise responses were easily managed, there would have been little need for support troops to protect flanks. Further, the breaching of a battleline would have held little importance, since adjacent units could simply turn to face the threat. The Greeks held such importance on initially breaking the enemy line, that after a victory, they erected monuments on the spot where the breach was created. ARMATI's victory conditions reflect this concern, in that armies like the Greeks are tough to break, but fall apart more rapidly when gaps appear in their lines).

    If the enemy center is not fixed when you threaten one or (especially both) wings, the enemy general will move it forward - thus increasing the distance between your hopefully victorious flank troops and the rear/flank of his center. If this movement goes unchecked, you probably will not have enough time to return to the battle with your heavy flank forces before his center hits yours. Although this is dreadful to watch when it happens to you, history is full of battles where flanking units returned to the field too late, either due to pursuit or poor anticipatory positioning. Light troops, however, which can about face in ARMATI, stand a better chance of returning to the battle, albeit with less impact than their heavier brethren. Another factor in ARMATI's design is that it strikes a timing balance between the flank actions and the center actions.

    If, for example, flank actions were resolved and exploited too quickly then the center combat would not be given its proper role. This is a less obvious way by which the movement rules aid in the overall simulation.

    Echelon (wave) Tactics: By placing Divisions in back of one another (or by using ARMATI's Echelon Tactics advanced rule) you can potentially defeat an opponent's wing with the lead Divisions and exploit the gap with the follow-up troops. Just remember that when reducing your Divisional frontage, you may leave yourself open to flank attacks. This is where support troops and refused flank attacks are helpful in trading space to buy time.

    Attack angles: Given ARMATI's maneuver limitations it is advisable to get your units moving in the desired direction as soon as possible. Sometimes, it pays to strike an enemy formation at such an angle so that when enemy units break you don't have to wheel your victorious units too far to get to the next attack point. If you can defeat a hinge unit - one that links the enemy's center with his wings - it can pay fast dividends.

    These are just a few basic guidelines to help the beginning player work within the maneuvering limitations in ARMATI. There are many additional factors and levels of game execution. And even though I'm ARMATI's designer and I understand the tactical and game theories, there are many players who play better than I do! Hopefully, one of these geniuses will do a complete battle report in a later issue of The Courier.

    SOME THOUGHTS

    Since TACTICA was released in 1989, many subsequent ancients rules have developed similar game philosophies that in varying ways inhibit the "free-wheeling" mentality that formerly dominated play. Battlelines are now becoming more important than individual units. There is also a deep emphasis on weapons/armor-oriented games giving way instead to troop-type driven systems. It is rewarding for me to see that these ideas have subsequently taken hold in various forms. It also permits me to enjoy games other than my own. And now that ARMATI is finished, I look forward to being just a player again - at least for a while! Long Life & Victory!

    NEW ADVANCED RULES

    The advanced rules in ARMATI permit battle conditions that extend beyond those covered in the basic rules. Having said what I did about maneuver, I am aware that historical exceptions did exist and also that many players want the maximum number of tactical options possible. The following new advanced rules are OFFICIAL additions and permit players who otherwise like ARMATI, but disagree with my maneuver restrictions, some added flexibility. In the future we plan to release official new army lists and maybe additional advanced rules. The goal is to keep ARMATI progressive without having to create a new edition. as always, advanced rules may be used only when both sides agree beforehand, or when a tournament director mandates their use.

    12. Wheeling and Enemy Proximity

    Any Division, or line of Divisions may now wheel greater than 2". But A wheeling Division may not exceed either its maximum movement allowance (of the slowest unit in the Division) or a 90 degree wheel. The following restrictions apply to this extended wheel. All other ARMATI wheeling mechanics apply.

    • A wheel greater than 2" is permitted only when enemy units capable of engaging any of the units in Melee are beyond 15" before the wheel occurs. Use ARMATI section 6.10 to determine the wheeling prohibition rules and mechanics.(i.e. Flank Line intersection, etc.) The only difference here is that the usual 6" wheeling prohibition is extended to 15" because the wheel is greater than 2".
    • If the unit wheels greater than 2" it may not perform any other movement(s) nor may it initiate Melee contact. However, light units may be Dispersed by units wheeling greater than 2" as per the usual Dispersion rules in section 7.11
    • When enemy are 6+" to 15" away, units may wheel 2" and move normally as per the standard ARMATI rules.
    • Wheeling potential inside 6" is governed by the standard prohibitions in section 6.10.

    12a. About Face: All units not normally permitted to About Face (i.e. heavies) may About Face providing enemy are not within 6" of their current facing as per the Movement Prohibitions in sec. 6.10. This About Face move must be performed by ALL units of a division or none at all. No additional movement is permitted if this About face rule is used by such troops(heavies). This rule (12a) replaces Advanced rule #11 only if 12a is used. When using the about face rule, friendly heavy units may not enter their own 6 in/4in base line zone until after any enemy unit has entered it. Thereafter, any friendly heavy units may maneuver wthin their baseline zone even if enemy units are no longer there. This qualifier protects against unrealistic battleline retreats to the baseline table edge. Friendly light units may enter their baseline zone after deployment

    Notes: Either one of these rules (12 and 12a) may be used independant of the other. While mechanics generally permit units a greater degree of flexibility than I believe they had historically, units maneuver still remains restricted by the greatest limiating factor of all - enemy proximity. players will be encouraged to "pin" enemy units/divisions by placing units directly to their front, while attempting to maneuver with outflanking forces. This practice seems consistent with pinning tactics as demonstrated throughout the periods covered by ARMATI.

    REFERENCES

    This article is not a scholarly piece. It's about playing a game. Still, the following secondary sources (in English) are a few references which inspired me and helped to form some of my impressions on ancient warfare, especially in regards towestern-style battle methods. Hopefully, others will find value here.

    Adcock, F.E., The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, 1957).
    Anderson, J.K., Ancient Greek Horsemanship (Berkeley, 1961);
    Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenephon (Berkeley, 1970).
    Burn, A.R., Persia and The Greeks (New York 1962).
    Delbruck, Hans., History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History; (4 volumes; English language translation by W. J Renfroe; Wesport Conn., 1975).
    Ferrill, Arther., The Origins of War (London, 1985).
    Judson, Harry Pratt., Caesar's Army: A Study of the Military Art of the Romans in the Last Days of the Republic (New York).
    Marsden, E.W., The Campaign of Gaugemela (Liverpool, 1964).
    Pritchett, W. Kendrick., The Greek State at War ( 4 parts; Berkeley, 1971-74).
    Warry, John., Warfare in the Classical World (London 1980).
    Webster, Graham., The Roman Imperial Army (3rd ed. New Jersey, 1985).
    Van Creveld, Martin., Command in War (Cambridge, 1984).


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