This essay, focusing on the age of mercenaries in European history, represents the next installment in a series of writings which covers the concepts of realism and playability in different periods of historical miniature gaming. While the material culture of each period represented is extremely important and will be covered, these writings also focus on the immaterial aspects of army and societal organization which directly impact the conduct of war. Even though these non-material aspects of human society greatly influence the conduct of war, they are seldom covered in traditional military studies and historical simulation. However, it is these ethical and ideological constructs, built upon the dominant weapon systems of the era and required to efficiently field them, which bring about the tension between the concepts of realism and playability in historical miniatures.

If no concern for the "soft cultural attributes" (i.e. the prevailing social norms, expected rules of behavior, concept of man and just government) which lay the ground work for the tactics and operations indigenious to the historical period to be simulated existed then players could follow a rational actor mode of play. Unfortunately, while the rational actor mode of play greatly contributes to playability, it is the antithesis of much of what the historical record at times informs us was really happening.

Fortunately, the historical period which will be covered in this article, unlike that which covers knightly warfare, does not see the near exclusion of realism to facilitate playability. Still, the age of mercenaries, or the dynastic period if one is to come from a political perspective, offers its own unique problems to playability because war was conducted as a form of business by the military entrepenuers who dominated the means of political violence between the emerging nation states of Europe.

Goals

The political and military goals of the great dynastic lords of the period differed greatly from that of their military commanders who considered their economic interests first and foremost. With major competing actors each having their own agendas, little wonder exists that battles did not always go quite as the dynastic lords would have liked. To add more friction to this equation, the mentality of the common mercenary, an aspiring businessman who dreamed of becoming rich by means of plunder, also had an effect on battlefield operations. No one can look at the ill fated Swiss assault at La Bicocca in 1522 lead by the officers, pensioners and double-pay men and not see this. Then, too, there was the master gunnner, the prima donna of the age, who provided his own set of problems. To this quagmire of army operations can be added the dilemma of funding. The older feudal nobility and townspeople fought long and successfully to deny the local prince the right of direct taxation. Because of this, the flow of money from the prince to his commanders was sporadic even though it was desperately required to keep the mercenary troops paid and, hence, obedient to orders.

With these thoughts in mind we can now address mercenary warfare, a form of warfare which originated during the High Middle Ages and continued until the military reforms of Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus (reforms which generally were based on the state resecuring the reins of political violence and exploiting the benefits of the linear formation) firmly took hold on the European battlefield.

The development of new weapon systems, primarily influenced by the harnessing of mechanical energy by Western civilization, represented the anthisesis of knightly warfare. Alterations were required in the army to efficiently field these weapon systems but feudal society, which did not recognize "foot soldiers," was unable to successfully incorporate them. This allowed mercenaries, the military entrepenuers, to exploit these military innovations (shock and missile infantry, siege artillery and dual purpose cavalry) due to the prevailing institutional barriers which existed. This meant that army recruitment patterns changed with military recruits now obtained outside of the borders of the political community -- the border in this instance being not necessarily a geographical boundary but one based upon the prevailing class structure.

Bypassed Feudal Institutions

Military services by-passed traditional feudal administrative institutions based on the knightly fee and were instead based on contracts directly between the dynastic princes and the military entrepreneurs -- still personal contracts but relying on a business rather than lord to vassal basis. The military entrepreneur, with Wallenstein being its epitome, thus replaced the knight as the wielder of the reins of political violence. From the perspective of the political community, this was a very dangerous circumstance since the wielder was non-institutionalized. Interestingly enough, this entrepreneur was most likely a knight, allowing some in this class to retain their military status due now to a business contract rather than through feudal obligation.

The quality of services delivered varied greatly depending primarily on frequency of pay by the employer and level of training among the mercenary soldiers. Since the dynastic princes were involved in a power struggle with the Estates over taxation during this period (which would be settled in favor of the princes in the absolutist period), pay was usually sporadic or non-existent which in turn brought about the catastrophic results of dynastic warfare. "The Spanish Terror" unleashed by long unpaid Spanish troops in Amsterdam in 1576 is but one such example although Spain's financial structure, based heavily on American silver (for all intents and purposes plunder) was far more sophisticated than most of the struggling European nation states.

These military entrepreneurs, usually but not exclusively colonels, were given a lump sum by a dynastic prince to raise a regiment -- in some instances the entrepreneur put up the money and instantly became a creditor of the dynastic prince. Two means were employed to facilitate this raising of a regiment -- 1) that of directly hiring independent contractors who were primarily foot soldiers or 2) using captains as sub-contractors to raise the necessary companies comprising the regiment who, in turn, hired the independent contractors.

Drill became important in mercenary warfare for the proper implementation of schiltron tactics, the caracole, the countermarch and the loading of firearms. These all required precise implementation and were the means to employ the weapon systems that had developed. This training was left to the military entrepreneurs and the independent contractors. All levels of training existed during this period with the vast majority of mercenary soldiers being poorly trained. The Swiss were at one end of the drill spectrum and considered the most professional and highly trained mercenaries, especially after the battle of St. Jacob in 1444. The other end of the spectrum can be seen in a small state such as Brandenburg with its nightmare experience during the Thirty Years' War due to ill trained and undisciplined mercenaries.

Logistics

The logistical requirements of an army are sometimes based on some form of pay (if the agreed-upon compensation so dictates), and always equipment and food. Since soldiers during this period were independent contractors, their principle means of compensation was gained primarily by means of plunder though the military entrepreneur at times gave them an irregular base pay -- a small pittance of the lump sum he was forwarded to raise the mercenary regiment with. Depending on the quality of the soldier and the weapon employed, this pay varied with some troops getting additional base pay such as those specialists who wielded two-handed swords and whose near-suicidal job it was to make an initial breach in the enemy pike formation -- prior to the time when shot was incorporated into these units.

The army was equipped in two different ways. The individual soldier equipped himself with his own weapons, armor and horse if needed -- many times bought from the military entrepreneur who made a profit. Siege artillery was a different matter and required the resources of a dynastic prince to outfit a siege train or a specialized military entrepreneur (a master gunner) to provide a few cannon. The utilization of this artillery was managed by civilian gunners who were very specialized, highly paid, and held specific plunder rights, such as town bells, who could be considered the "prima donnas" of the age. Once in the field, replacement equipment and munitions were needed by an army. These were obtained by the military entrepreneur through outside weapon merchants or by the independent contractors themselves by means of plunder.

Food and fodder were, of course, also needed by the army and were obtained through brokers or by plunder. Thus, it can be seen during this period the logistical needs of an army were based upon a foundation of plundering. This took three forms which did not directly correspond with the three forms of campaigns used to illustrate mercenary warfare. The first form of plundering is the blatant plundering of a town or village. This, in time, turned into the extraction of 'fire money' which was the threat of arson or sacking of a town or village by an army moving by it (protection money). The method was perfected by Wallenstein who came up with the 'contribution system' which was a permanent military tax on communities within a certain radius of an army. A direct variant of this last system was institutionalized by the political community in the upcoming absolutist period -- if a field army could levy a direct tax why couldn't the political community?!

Unique Conditions

Because of this logistical base secured by plunder, dynastic armies operated under certain unique conditions (these conditions were not universal and varied during the period). Until the time of the 'contribution system,' an army had to be constantly mobile to feed itself.

First, this meant that long sieges were out of the question. Second, rivers and waterways became important as means of logistical supply and movement of equipment. Third, when confronted with a hostile army in a sector of operations, this helped to explained why at times these armies moved in torturous paths (easily seen in the campaign maps of the period) dictated more for considerations of logistical needs than for military advantage. Fourth, fortifications under these conditions did not possess a threat to supply which would impede the advance of an army. Fifth, campaigns were not conducted in the Winter because of the scarcity of food and the unfavorable weather which impeded the movement of heavy siege artillery pieces. For this last reason, many mercenary forces were disbanded or had their contracts terminated which resulted in hungry soldiers devastating the countryside. Sixth, the immense baggage train and huge groups of camp followers -- primarily women and children -- attached to these armies added further strain to their logistical needs.

Tactics during the dynastic period go through a number of evolutions as a by-product of the development of weapons systems. The weapon systems themselves represented ever more efficient attempts to work out the new mechanical energy source for military purposes. The maneuver base was primarily a square (Swiss schiltron influenced) or rectangle (Spanish tercio influenced). It was composed for a short time of halberd armed infantry and then, later, was composed predominantly of pike armed infantry supported by halberd armed infantry. This base was then augmented with infantry armed with crossbows and finally augmented with firearms. The fourth form of infantry base developing around 'pike and shot' was by far the most characteristic of this period. The maneuver element was either composed of the infantry base itself -- the pike armed infantry -- or a separate element which early on was composed of the feudal shock cavalry during the High Middle Ages (becoming increasingly ineffective over time) and later of dual purpose cavalry.

Tactical firepower can be seen from the perspective of infantry and cavalry weapon systems. Shock firepower was delivered by the pike and halberd armed infantry which maximized the force of its shock by moving in a dense square or rectangle -- the reason this was the maneuver base of this period. Missile firepower was first delivered by the crossbow armed infantry and later by shot armed infantry. Cavalry initially delivered only shock firepower but with the rise of dual purpose cavalry could deliver both shock and missile firepower, relying more heavily on the latter.

Section 2: Age of Mercenaries