It was a battle often overlooked in the Civil War, and even so today. Though given the nickname of "the Gettysburg of the West" the site was not picked as a Civil War Battlefield Park until 1956, long after the others of the National Park Service bad been established. Whereas one can dozens of books on Gettysburg and Shiloh, Leetown / Elkhorn Tavern or collectively Pea Ridge has a overlooked for the most part, with a very limited number of books having been written on the battle. While the eyes of the North and South in early 1862 were concerned with the events east of the Mississippi River, a campaign for the control of Missouri was being fought out in the southwest corner of that state, and the northwest corner of Arkansas. In 1861 Brigadier General Lyon had driven the Missouri State Guard under Major General Stirling Price back from St Louis southwest across the entire state. After capturing Springfield, and keeping Missouri in the Union he was attacked in turn by Price. Reinforced by a Confederate army under Ben McCulloch from Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, Price attempted to drive Lyons back in turn. In an attempt to stop Price, Lyons attacked Price's and McCulloch's Joint Army, losing both a battle and his life at Wilson's Creek on August 10, 1861. McCulloch was unwilling to use his army to "liberate" Missouri as that state had not as of yet joined the Confederacy. Do to that and other disputes with Price, McCulloch fell back into northern Arkansas. Price took his forces northward into Missouri, winning a battle at Lexington, but returned to Springfield in order to take up winter quarters. Command of the Union forces in Missouri now fell on Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis, an ex West Pointer and Mexican War veteran who had moved to Iowa in the 1850's. Curtis assembled his tiny "Army of the Southwest" , and set out in mid January of 1862 in a winter campaign intended to drive Price out of Missouri. It should be noted that Curtis's army was made up of two different elements and so had problems of his own in terms of command and control. There were two small divisions of German-Americans from Missouri and Illinois who were used to being commanded by Franz Siegel, and two small divisions of Midwesterners from Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa. There were times when the Army of the Southwest had two masters. Faced by what he believed to be overwhelming numbers, Price fell back into northern Arkansas to link up once again with McCulloch while Curtis followed. The joint command continued to fall back into Arkansas, reaching Strickler's Station on February 22nd. There the forces halted and went though a period of reorganization. As Missouri had now formally joined the Confederacy, the Missouri State Guard needed to be disbanded and reorganized as an element of the Confederate Army. Curtis, at the end of a long and badly stretched supply line, could advance no further. While awaiting some improvement in his situation, he took up positions in northwest Arkansas 20 to 30 miles from the Confederate encampments. In an attempt to ease the load on his supply lines, Curtis spread his troops out so as to allow them to live off the land, and awaited the next move of the Confederate forces. With Missouri now officially in the Confederacy, and learning of the disputes between Price and McCulloch, fate in the form of Jefferson Davis now took a hand. Davis, after considering Harry Heth and Braxton Bragg for the post, appointed Major General Earl van Dorn to command of the Trans-Mississippi Department. A graduate of West Point, ex-major in the famed prewar 2nd Cavalry and veteran of campaigns against the Comanche, Van Dorn was to unify his army and liberate Missouri. Arriving at Stricker's Station on March 3rd, Van Dorn wasted no time in ordering his army , now christened the Army of the West forward against the foe. Unfortunately for the troops under his command, Van Dorn wasted no time on questions of supply, but rather planned an attack based on what the soldiers could carry with them. To increase his manpower, Van Dorn ordered Brigadier General Albert Pike to bring his command out of the Indian Territory and link up with the main body as it moved north. Pike's command was made up of Indian's from the Five Civilized Tribes. Though willing to enlist to defend their territory, the terms of their enlistment did not call upon them to leave the Indian Territory. Pike attempted to talk his Indians into joining up with Van Dom, but with very limited success. In the end two regiments of Indian Mounted Rifles would march east with him, while three others remained behind. Curtis was not aware of the stirrings in the Confederate camp, and even as Van Dorn issued orders to move forward, Curtis was falling back on Little Sugar Creek, a position just south of the Arkansas / Missouri border. There, an imposing line of bluffs and other suitable terrain presented the Army of the Southwest with a perfect defensive position, though it could be outflanked. Curtis planned to await the Confederate forces there while still awaiting an improvement in his supply situation. From March 4th to March 6th the two armies maneuvered against each other. Van Dorn attempted to cut off elements of the Union forces before they could reach the safety of Little Sugar Creek, while Curtis attempted to bring in his outlying detachment before they could be bagged by the Confederates. By nightfall on the 6th both armies were in position along Little Sugar Creek, with the Union forces entrenched and awaiting a Confederate attack in the morning. The Confederates named their encampment Camp Douglas, in honor of the Vice President of the Confederacy, and settles in to see what would happen next. To both commanders, the solution to the problem at hand was fairly obvious - turn the Union right flank. The means to carry out this task was the Bentonville Detour, a road that ran around the Federal right and Pea Ridge itself, and which would carry the Confederates into the Union rear just north of Elkhorn Tavern. Van Dorn decided to follow this path, using Prices Division, (the old Missouri State Guard ) to circle around to the Union rear. At the same time McCulloch's Division, with the troops from McCulloch's old command , would follow part of the route, but would turn off at Twelve Corner Church to fall upon the Union right flank from its rear. As both units advanced they would make contact in the Federal rear, and drive the Union forces before them. In one of Van Dorn's major errors, the Confederate supply train, which had mainly ammunition and ordnance stores, was not ordered to follow either of the attacking columns, but was to remain at Camp Douglas with a rear guard until further orders were given. As Van Dorn was sorting his army out to make the march up the Bentonville Detour, one of Curtis's brigade commanders, Colonel Grenville Dodge took a column of Union cavalry up the road, felling trees as they went to block the road. Dodge ended up following the intended Confederate path to the rear of the Union Army, and while he failed to leave any pickets to cover the road, did succeed in ensuring that any attempt to march down the road would be subject to delay. Curtis did not wish to fall back from his chosen position until he knew what the Confederates were up to, and so his army remained in position throughout the night of the 6th/7th. Early on the morning of the 7th, while Van Dorn's Army slowly advanced around the Union flank, Curtis became convinced that something was happening on his right flank and rear. One of his four small divisions was ordered to march to Elkhorn Tavern, while another was to move towards Twelve Corner Church in an attempt to find out what the Confederates were up to. The remaining two divisions would stand fast, and remain covering Little Sugar Creek, as it was noted that Confederate troops still remained around Camp Douglas. Colonel Peter Osterhaus' 1st Division was given the task of advancing towards the church. Van Dorn's march was not at the speed that he had counted on in his planning. The Confederate scouts had not known about Dodge's roadblocks until they encountered them, bring the column to a standstill until the obstructions could be moved. Van Dorn ignored the fact that his army had been marching for the last three days, and called upon them to make a night march without giving them a chance to rest. As this was the third day of the campaign, the food that his men had brought north with them was now running low, and so the men of the Army of the West found themselves both tired and hungry as they attempted to carry out Van Dorn's plan. The first part of the battle opened as Osterhaus' men, moving north from Leetown, encountered McCulloch's Division moving east along the Ford Road towards Elkhorn Tavern. The game starts at 11:00 AM and ends at 17:00 pm when darkness falls. The Orders of Battle and arrival times for both armies are as follows: UNION FORCES Arrives Leetown Road, 11:00 Colonel Peter Osterhaus, 1st Infantry Division, +2 benefit CONVERGED CAVALRY BRIGADE, 1st DIVISION Colonel Cyrus Bussey, +1 benefit 3rd Iowa/5th Missouri Cavalry 15 Av C 1st/3rd Missouri Cavalry 15 Av C 1st Missouri Flying Battery Av 1 x 12# James Rifle Arrives Leetown Road, 11: 15 2nd BRIGADE, 1st DIVISION Colonel Nicholas Greusel, +1 benefit 36th Illinois Infantry 40 Av RM 12th Missouri Infantry 20 Av RM 4th Ohio Battery 2 x 12# James Rifles, 1 x 12# Howitzer Av Welfreys Independent Missouri Battery 2 x 12# howitzers Av 1st BRIGADE, 3rd DIVISION 22nd Indiana Infantry 20 Av RM Arrives Leetown Road, 13:00 Colonel Jefferson Davis, 3rd Infantry Division, +2 benefit 2nd BRIGADE, 3rd DIVISION Colonel Julius White, +1 benefit 37th Illinois Infantry@ 16/4Av RM/RC 59th Missouri Infantry 25 Av RM-i Battery A, 2nd Illinois Light Artillery 1 x 12# James Rifle, 1 x 12# Howitzer lx6# gun Av 1st BRIGADE, 3rd DIVISION Colonel Thomas Pattison, +1 benefit 18th Indiana Infantry 20 Av RM-1 Arrives Leetown Road, 15:00 CONVERGED CAVALRY BRIGADE, 1st DIVISION 4th Missouri Cavalry 15 Av C 1st Missouri Flying Battery 1 x 12 # Howitzer Av NOTES 1. All Union troops enter in march column along the Leetown Road. Order of appearance must be decided on two turns before they enter the board. The Converged Cavalry needs to plot a path by road from its entrance point to the road exit to Twelve Corner Church. It may not deviate from this path until Rebel Units are sighted. All other Union units are free to move once they have entered the board. 2. Special Notes:* Bussey's Cavalry force was made up of elements from four different regiments. For ease of play they have been organized into two converged regiments.@ The 37th Illinois has one stand with Colt Revolving Rifles - treat as Repeating Carbines for purposes of fire and cover. RM : unit armed with Rifle Musket RM-1: unit armed with substandard rifle Musket, drop one line on the firing chart C : Unit armed with muzzle loading carbine 3. The Union Cavalry may dismount and fight on foot. 4. Neither Davis nor Osterhaus may give a morale modifier to units not of their division. 5. The Union forces are considered to be determined, therefore they will cease offensive operations when their losses read 25 Pts, and must retreat when their losses reach 35 points. CONFEDERATE FORCES Arrives 12 CORNER CHURCH ROAD, 11:00 Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch, McCulloch's Division, +2 benefit CAVALRY BRIGADE, McCULLOUGH'S DIVISION Brigadier General James McIntosh, +1 benefit 3rd Texas Cavalry 930 Tr Sh 6th Texas Cavalry 30 Tr Sh 9th Texas Cavalry 30 Tr RM-1 11th Texas Cavalry 30 Tr Sh 1st Arkansas Cavalry Battalion 20 Tr RM-1 1st Texas Cavalry Battalion 20 Tr Sh INFANTRY BRIGADE, McCULLOUGH'S DIVISION Colonel Louis Herbert, +1 benefit 3rd Louisiana Infantry 20 Av RM 4th Arkansas Infantry 15 Tr RM-1 14th Arkansas Infantry 25 Pr RM-1 15th Arkansas Infantry 25 Pr M 16th Arkansas Infantry 25 Pr M 17th Arkansas Infantry 25 Pr M 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles* 20 Tr RM-1 2nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles* 20 Tr RM-1 4th Texas Cavalry Battalion * 10 Tr Sh ARTILLERY, McCULLOUGH'S DIVISION Hart's Arkansas Battery 2 x 6# guns Tr Provence's Arkansas Battery 1 x 6# gun, 1 x 12# howitzer Tr Gaines's Arkansas Battery 1 x 12# James Rifle, 1 x 12# howitzer Good's Texas Battery 2 x 12# guns, 1 x 12# howitzers Av PIKES INDIAN BRIGADE Brigadier General Albert Pike, +1 benefit 1st Cherokee Mounted Rifles 20 Pr Sh 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles 20 Pr Sh Welch's Texas Cavalry Squadron 10 Tr C NOTES 1. The Confederate commanders must put together an order of march for their commands. The Infantry and artillery must enter in road column at the entry point of the road from 12 Corner Church. Units must enter in Road Column one after another unless Union units are visible. If Union units are visible, then up to 2 units may enter the board in any formation wished within 4" of the road . Players will note that it will take some time to bring the Confederate Infantry and artillery on to the board. The Confederate columns will march east along the road until Union forces are encountered. The Confederate Cavalry may enter in march column south of the road and moving parallel to it, as long as the column is within 6" of the road. Like the infantry and artillery, the cavalry must move east in march column until Union troops are sighted. Pike's Brigade must bring up the rear of the Confederate line. 2. Special Notes: * These cavalry units had been dismounted and were serving as infantry. RM : unit armed with Rifle Musket RM-1: unit armed with substandard rifle musket, drop one line on the firing chart M : unit armed with Musket Sh: unit armed with shotgun C: Unit armed with muzzle loading carbine 3. The Confederate units may not be resupplied with ammunition if they run out. 4. The Confederate Cavalry may dismount and fight on foot. 5. The Confederate forces are considered to be normal, therefore they will cease offensive operations when their losses read 26pts, and must retreat when their losses reach 37 points.. MAP AND GAME Most of the terrain is covered with woods, which should be treated as rough terrain. Contours have no effect on the terrain due to the fact that most of the game terrain is rough. Fences are treated as broken terrain. Visibility in the woods needs to be rolled for each turn with 2 d6 determining the actual distance that may be sighted. Fences and buildings do not block line of sight. (The reason for having a higher visibility than the terrain normally allows is due to the time of the year and consequent lack of foliage.) Units may not build hasty works as its too early in the war. The referee may wish to use hidden movement at the start of the game for those units east of the Leetown road. The Confederate troop values are designed to reflect the conditions under which they fought the battle. The Confederates win a victory by reducing the Union effectiveness to below 30%, or by driving the Union forces off the south edge of the table. The Union win if they can reduce the Confederate effectiveness to less than 60%, or by driving the Confederate forces off the table. ACTUAL BATTLE The Confederate forces outnumbered the Union by a 2:1 margin in terms of infantry and cavalry, but were unable to make their advantages pay off. The battle started with the Confederates moving east along the road to Elkhorn Tavern, while Osterhaus sent Bussey's cavalry up the Leetown Road, and then by way of the lane past the Foster House. When the cavalry reached the Foster House, the head of the Confederate column was past the Sturdy Farmhouse. A cavalry battle between the Foster / Sturdy farms resulted in the Union Cavalry being driven back. Meanwhile, Osterhaus had placed his infantry and artillery on the south side of Oberson's fields. While carrying our separate recormaissances of Union lines, both McCulloch and McIntosh were killed. As Herbert had taken part of his brigade into the woods east of the Leetown Road in an effort to turn the Federal flank, the Confederates were left leaderless. Herberts attack was driven back when Jefferson Davis's 3rd Division arrived on the field, with Herbert being captured. Most of the Confederate units never saw action. When night fell, the Confederate forces retreated back to Twelve Corner Church. Some units turned north and marched to join Van Dorn at Elkhorn Tavern, while other fell back on Camp Douglas. The Union forces were marched to Elkhorn Tavern, and helped win the battle their on the following day. The key to the Union victory, and the problem for the Confederate player is that is army is worn out before it starts the battle. If Van Dorn had rested his troops and fed them better, the non Indian Confederate units would have been rated one level higher then they are. And for the record, this is the same Earl Van Dorn who, after being transferred to a Tennessee, will make a successful pass at a young lady in Spring Hill, Tennessee, and will be shot by the outraged husband once he finds out about the affair! (ED NOTE.) This article appeared in Vanguard and is reprinted with their kind permission. 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