Mr. Bunkers article in #60, "The Knight in Miniature Warfare" has generated more mail than any other subject in quite some time. While I would like to print every letter, space does not allow it. I have selected those which seem representative of most of the letters received - ED.
Mr. Bunker's reasoning begins with several inaccurate premises. First, that knights represented only a mounted weapon. There are a number of examples in history where knights were deployed dismounted. In fact, through the middle and latter parts of the 14th Century, English and French knights commonly fought on foot Crecy, Poitiers, and Navarette are examples. And as early as 1106, Henry, the son of William the Conqueror, dismounted a portion of his knights at the battle of Tinchebrai.
Second, that a feudal army consisted solely of knights. Any cursory reading of history proves otherwise. Knight typically were in the minority of the medieval battlefield; the remainder of the force would comprise archers, longbowman, spearmen, assorted peasants, etc. The feudal system was structured to allow the lord, whether he was an earl controlling vast tracts of land or a poorer land-holding knight, to demand his vassals perform military service in his retinue. In fact, the banners and battles to which Mr. Bunker refers were build from such retinues, often called lances and usually comprising 1 knight, several men-at-arms, archers and other soldiers.
Third, that no rank structure, and hence no command structure existed, is feudal armies. Far from it. The feudal system was essentially a stratified vertical organization in which each person held a virtually immutable position. This was centered on the individual's pledge of service to his liege lord - a pledge binding as long as both persons lived. (Imagine a modern soldier pledging to serve his officer personally in battle to the death.) This has some interesting gaming implications for the morale effects of a lord's death on the members of his retinue, but that's another story entirely.
In the typical feudal society, a peasant or soldier would place himself in the service of a land-holding knight, who himself was granted his real estate in fief to a baron, earl or other knight of higher wealth and position. A person would pledge vassalage because he would have no land to farm, home to live in, or protection if he attempted to remain outside this structure.
The king, albeit tenuously, functioned as liege lord over the nobility which held possessions within his realm. (This is how the Hundred Years War started - the Kind of France was attempting to assert that all territories in France were held by the nobility only in fief to the king. The King of England, a holder of some French lands, refused to comply since this would make him a vassal to the King of France. Clearly the King of England recognized that a rank structure existed, even among the nobility.) Granted, the Middle Ages were fraught with cross-allegiances, but the fact that they existed implies a hierarchical structure.
Just a few other comments on Mr. Bunker's assumptions: feudal armies did possess the capacity for siege warfare (witness the medieval treatises of the subject and the development of catapults, trebuchets and other engines of war); the 40 days of service was not strictly adhered to; the possibility of ransom did not stop the slaughter of knights (see Henry V's ordered execution of captured French knights during the battle of Agincourt or the thousands of French knights listed among the battle's casualties); peasants and other nonnobles were not killed because they violated God's will by being present on the battlefield (their vassalage meant that failure to appear with their lord on the battlefield was a violation of God's will); feudal commanders, as often as not, were stationed with the reserve - not the vanguard - a position better suited for commanding an army; frontal charges were not the only tactic (see for example, the flank maneuver by Count Aelias at Tincbebrai or Captal de Buch's flanking assault at Poitiers - both of which were ordered by the army commanders involved).
One last set of assumptions stem partially from truth. While feudal morals and laws ostensibly prohibited certain things - use of the crossbow, use of knightly weapons by non-knights, ambushes and feigned retreats (also tournaments, by the way) - they did not prevent their use.
There was no effective mechanism for enforcement, and the exigencies of war usually leg combatants to ignore such proscriptions. The crossbow was used throughout the Middle Ages; by the 14th Century most soldiers carried a sword (the knightly weapon par excellence and fraught with religious chivalric symbolism); the French Constable Bertrand du Guesclin built his career on ambushes, and William the Conqueror used feigned retreat (successfully) at Hastings. These toothless prohibitions are akin to those made by the ill-fated League of Nations in our own century.
(Let us now consider Mr. Bunker's conclusion.) He suggests that it, "is impossible for a commander in a real or simulated setting, to give orders to a banner or battle of knights in a feudal army in the field." This is argued from the premise that no rank, and hence no command, structure existed. We've seen the premise, based as it is in a misreading of feudal societal structure, is false. Logic dictates that the conclusion is invalid, though it does not dictate that the conclusion is false.
However, history itself shows the conclusion to be false. A quick survey of feudal battles show us that with few exceptions the commander of a feudal army performed several command functions. He selected the battlefield (see virtually any English battle). He organized his forces into battles and assigned commanders (often based on politics and social factors more than military skill, but then, has it ever been otherwise?). He arranged their deployment on the battlefield. He determined the basic plan of attack. Lastly, he controlled the reserves. Mr. Bunker's assertion that feudal generalship consisted of proper timing of attacks is somewhat true, but that has been one of the key elements of generalship in other ages (see Napoleon at Austerlitz).
The article also argues that feudal armies suffered the "ever- present danger of a willful act by some subordinate commander" which could lead to an ill-considered attack or break a formation. True, since as we have seen there were such things as subordinate commanders. The French at Poitiers provide us with examples of both. The knights of the vanguard wished to attack the English immediately, while King Jean preferred not to. In an insubordinate act, the vanguard - as a unit under the command of two marshals advanced anyway, and the king's hand was forced. Later in the same battle, the Duc d'Orleans commanding th second battle (ie. division) proved both insubordinate and treacherous. He refused to advance against the English and instead marched his battle (nearly a third of the French army) off the field.
Now, if no command structure existed, Orleans could have marched himself off the field, but the remainder of his battle would not necessarily have followed. That it did so demonstrates that he held command control of his unit.
Thus, we can see that command structure (so vital to most types of military simulation) did exist on the feudal battlefield. Feudal battles were not affairs of consensus-driven attacks, individual combat (solely) and leaderless mobs.
But it remains to make one final point. Mr. Bunker succumbs to the a prior position of most gaming and simulation aficionados I've encountered that playability and realism are mutually exclusive or at least sit at opposite ends of the design spectrum. (For playability also real simple and game and for realism read complex and simulation.)
This has been so ingrained in the industry that it is virtually unquestioned. But it too is untrue. I suggest that realism and playability are entirely compatible, and that the whole argument misses the crux of the issue.
Take for example a Napoleonic (game or simulation according to your preference) in which the player functions as a corps commander. I pick this example because it is a situation with which most historical gamers are at least somewhat familiar. The rules allow the player to arrange his divisions, to determine lines of attack or positions of defense, and to commit reserves.
They also allow the players to determine whether his batteries fire canister, round shot or shell (if howitzer armed), pick individual targets for figures in his skirmish screen, decide whether battalion X will form square against cavalry, determine whether battalion Y deploys in column of divisions or column of platoons, etc. Provision also is made for the player to select different types of musket fire volley by platoons, volleys by rank, volleys by files. Further, the rules allow the player to determine whether or not his cavalry will opportunity charge and whether an isolated battalion in good morale status will remain in front of the enemy or retire with its comrades, and in what formation it will do so.
Detailed, yes, Complex, yes. Realistic, no. No Napoleonic corp commander had nearly so many decision points. That's why armies had battalion, regimental, battery and other subordinate commanders. (Ney might present an exception, but he would only attempt to control events in his immediate vicinity.) The rules may simulate the Napoleonic battlefield, but they do not simulate Napoleonic battle command. Why not? Because they lack the third essential element of design - perspective.
Perspective, as a design element, forces players to act within the environment of their historical counterparts. The bulk of the rules then regulate the activities of this individual, not the activities of the harried unit commanders or frightened soldiers in the firing line. Obviously, the actions of the latter must be accounted for, but they should not be made decision points for the player. Otherwise the player is not the commander, but is instead some hybrid of commander, staff officers, the moral will of his soldiers, the "hidden voice" in his subordinate commanders' ears and divine will.
Instead, perspective creates three categories of events on the battlefield; those the player/commander can control, those he can influence and those he cannot affect. A realistic game is one that accurately reflects these three types of events. For example, to simulate Medieval battle, from the perspective of its commander, rules should focus on the limitations of command and control over subordinates, personal risk, social morays and other issues that affect what a Medieval commander could do, rather than on whether an extra-heavily armored man (or unit) armed with two-handed swords has a 20% or 25% better chance of winning against a heavily armored man (or unit) with a mace.
Our medieval skirmish rules severely limit a player's control outside the voice range of the figure which represents him. It's very important that the player realize he is one individual on the battlefield, and his actions will be limited to what that individual could do. That is why a figure representing the player/commander is essential, not merely ornamental or a handy device for measuring command spans. (Of course, if a player/commander gets himself killed, then he can't control anything and, for him, the game is over.)
By incorporating perspective, realism can be achieved without sacrificing playability. By limiting decision points, a simulation may actually become more playable. Realistic simulations then are more than the compilation of minute historical detail of weaponry, armor, formations, etc. Rather they transport a player into the "shoes" of a historical commander with the decisions, limitations, and frustrations of the original. Who could ask for a more realistic "game"?
- -- PHIL JOHNSTON, FAIRPORT, NY
ON KNIGHTLY WARFARE
This letter to the editor is a follow-up to my controversial article concerning the knight in historical miniatures. (Issue #60 - Yes, this article generated more mail than any other.-Ed) I would like to clear up a couple of misperceptions that the article may have generated and suggest a way of potentially simulating feudal warfare.
It was mentioned in the article that the knight was a dominant fixture on the battlefields of Europe until the funeral oratory given by Cervantes in 1605.
In actuality, the knight became a battlefield relic with the introduction of the Spanish heavy musket around 1530. The high penetrative ability of its two-ounce ball resulted in an infantry weapon that once-and-for-all made plate armor, and hence the mounted knight, obsolete on the battlefield. Prior to the development of this weapon, upgrades had been made to the knight's armor as a defensive reaction to such weapons as the crossbow. The knight had no defense against this weapon because armor could not be made heavy enough to stop the musket ball and still allow the knight to function on the battlefield.
The knight did not disappear on the battlefield overnight. It took years for the Spanish heavy musket to diffuse throughout the mercenary companies of Europe. Cervantes' final burial of the knight in a literary shroud of ridicule marks an extinction from the battlefields of Europe which had happened decades earlier. Still, some themes of knighthood such as the wearing of plate armor continued for centuries. It was not until Frederick the Great started the tradition of being portrayed in uniform rather than in armor that the portraits of the Great Captains took on their more modern appearance.
In the article, I am specifically addressing the simulation of feudal warfare which I equate with an army which was composed solely of knights. This perception draws upon the insights of C.W.C. Oman whose age of "the supremacy of feudal cavalry" spanned the years 1066-1346.
Infantry, acting as soft auxiliaries, did exist throughout this period but were basically insignificant. I agree with Clifford J. Rogers in his recent article in The journal of Military History that during the period of the High Middle Ages infantry again began to play a significant role on the battlefield. This era though, dominated by mercenaries, represents the start of what I called in my article 'the dynasty period'. Warfare in this period can be simulated if the non-material structure it is based on is properly understood as can the era which existed prior to the advent of feudal warfare.
The problem with simulating feudal warfare is an ethical ideological one. To attempt to solve this problem I suggest that another form of gaming, fantasy role playing, be partially drawn upon. This may strike despair into a lot of readers but if the gaming mediums of fantasy role playing and historical miniatures ever had an intersection, then simulating feudal warfare would likely be it. I would suggest that the term "fantasy" be immediately replaced with the term "historical" since what I suggest represents a far different genre of game play.
The incorporation of "historical role playing" characteristics into miniature gaming rules would, in my mind, be the most useful mechanism in attempting to overcome the "realities of History" which I outlined in the article. An example of representing the problem of noble status, for instance, could result in a player attempting to set up his forces while realizing that the social rank of the feudal lords precludes placing the most militarily valuable knights in the critical areas of the battle line. Such rule modifications may represent the ultimate "knightmare" for historical miniature gamers from a command and control perspective but then nobody said feudal commanders didn't have their own unique set of problems.
- --Dr. ROBERT J. BUNKER, CLAREMONT, CA
AS TO NON-HISTORICAL MATCHES IN ANCIENT WARGAMING
It has been my experience that the vast majority of ancients gamers are tournament gamers. Every convention I've ever been to has had a WRG (or DBA) tournament.
A tournament games does not ask himself "How did Alexander beat Darius?" but rather "How can I beat my opponent?". Now, given that your objective is to beat your opponent, rather than learn something about history, the tournament ancients gamer takes the best army allowable. As does his opponent. The result is a battle such as Imperial Rome vs. Aztecs.
Now this sort of game can be very enjoyable as a past time but it doesn't matter if a unit of RA LHI Htw., Jls., D. Sh., is classified as Roman, Aztec or Elf then why would anyone waste his time boning up on history when instead he could be refining his gaming skills. It has been my experience that this is often the case. I have known a number of gamers who pick their armies from the lists alone. After the most casual glance, if that, at a history book, they're ready to go. By contrast, gamers from the other periods seem to have an almost fanatical seal for its history. As an experiment, try this: find two WWII gamers and bring up the use of PZIVs in the invasion of France.
The question then is why is tournament play so strong a factor in ancients and is it such a bad thing? Well, if all you want to do is take your 1250 pt. army against mine and bash heads, then it doesn't matter if you have Romans or Orcs. Troops are troops.
But if we want to learn something from history, about why armies fought and against whom, when we have to loose ourselves from the tournament mentality.
In this we are not well served by the gaming industry. Until the advent of DBA and Tactica, rules themselves would not offer a clue to historical opponents. Magazines invariably feature "How To Win With This Army" types of articles instead of a detailed overview of a specific period.
- --WILLIAM LITVAK, CLEVELAND, OH
DBM COMMENTS
Let me begin with my compliments to Phil Barker and his crew for developing a most enjoyable set of rules for ancient players, De Belles Multitudinous (DBM). The rules might appear, on the surface, to be somewhat overwhelming with factors, contingencies, and so forth, when in fact the rules are quite playable with a firm feeling that one is engaged in ancient warfare. This rule set has to be played several times and all sections read carefully before appreciating the subtle play of DBA and WRG 7th edition.
However, I have noticed what might be a minor situation with the WARBAND combat factor versus foot. The basic WARBAND combat factor is DBA & DBM (+3) with an additional +1 for rear support in DBM. Formed foot factors (BLADES, SPEARS, PIKE) are unchanged. This results in a combat factor of +4 WARBAND versus a +5 BLADE, with all other factors being equal. Rolling 6D there are 36 probable outcomes and from these factors the results are as follows:
- BLADE + 5, destroyed if beaten by 1.
WARBAND +4, destroyed if doubled.
The BLADE will perish 27.8 % of the time, (10 out of 36)
There will be 13.9 % ties, (5 out of 36)
The WARBAND will recoil 52.8 % of the time, (19 out of 36)
The WARBAND, will perish 5.6 % of the time, (2 out of 36).
Considering the value of 7 points for a BLADE and 6 points for a WARBAND in two ranks (3 points each), there appears to be some weight given to the wild food. Maybe this is intended?
Even with the fatigue factor for FAST WARBANDS (-1 if less than opponents total) during the opponents bound, the factors are as follows:
- BLADE + 5, destroyed if beaten by 1.
WARBAND +4 (-1 if less than), destroyed if doubled.
The Blade will perish 27.8 % of the time, (10 out of 36)
There will be 13.9 % ties, (5 our of 36)
The WARBAND will recoil 41.7% of the time, (15 out of 36)
The WARBAND, will perish 16.7% of the time, (6 out of 36).
Now consider that the WARBAND recoils, then comes back spontaneously to crush the enemy again and again. Yet, recoiling can favor either side depending on the circumstances and is difficult to judge as to which side benefits due to the endless possibilities. Overlapping changes the odds considerably, and favors the tactically superior player, or does it? With a single overlap against the WARBAND, the factors are:
- BLADES + 5, destroyed if beaten by 1.
WARBAND +3, destroyed if doubled.
The BLADE will perish 16.7% of the time, (6 out of 36)
There will be 11.1 % ties, (4 out of 36)
The WARBAND will recoil 55.6 % of the time, (20 out of 36)
The WARBAND, will perish 16.7 % of the time, (6 out of 36)
I have not found the method for "drawing out" the WARBAND before the main battleline impact, which might improve the situation for the BLADE. The desired result of spontaneity, breaking up the WARBAND barttleline, seems to work sometimes against the BLADE in that the wild foot is always moving, thus reducing the bad effect of low PIP die rolls.
Obviously, I have incorrectly implemented or executed the process of spontaneous movement which is intended to balance the point differences. Having played several games, I (we) have not found the equalizer.
My comments should not be interpreted negatively, quite the contrary, I salute Phil for his work, efforts and ability to put ideas to print for others to judge, Editing is easy, authoring is not.
- -- SAM MAXWELL, AURORA, OH
With all respect Sam, the dissection of a set of rules in this manner appalls me. It is one more example of the innate difference in the way ancient gamers approach the game from other gamers. Eg., to most of those I have gamed with, occupying a hill is a tactical advantage because of its elevation and commanding view; to most ancient gamers of my acquaintance, it is a tactical advantage because its a +1 Dick Bryant
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