The classic confrontation of the Seven Years War was the conflict of the Austrian Empire with the emerging Prussian state. The brilliant and opportunist Frederick, beset by enemies, manages to preserve his Prussian domains through years of unyielding pressure. The determined Maria Theresa pushes Frederick to the limits of his resources and personal genius. Adroitly she forged alliances and fielded Austrian armies against the Prussian sovereign. It is a duel of titans.
Since this historical period has become more popular among war- gamers across the United States, I believe that some research is warranted concerning the forces at the disposal of the two respective monarchs. Presently, the majority of rule systems incorporate a points system in order to organize our miniature armies. 1 feel a personal aversion to these systems of mathematically organizing forces often with no provision for historical accuracy.
It must be admitted that only the most complex of methods can present a valid barometer of the changing quality of troops during the course of any conflict. How can we reflect the deterioration of Prussian Infantry? How can we simulate the steady increase in combat effectiveness of Prussian Cavalry? Simply, we must forego the use of a points system and base our concepts on historical data.
As a starting point, we must examine the typical order of battle of each of the antagonists. An analysis of known orders of battle will give us an average size of the forces available to each of the combatants. It should be remembered that the following figures are averages, and do not necessarily reflect any specific battle.
Regardless of the size of the force, the Prussians would field 33% cavalry, 67% infantry, one gun for each 293 men of all arms. The above figures include the two light regimental guns habitually deployed with the infantry.
The Austrian's typically fielded 26% cavalry, 74% infantry, and one gun for each 293 men of A arms. As with the Prussian figures, the Battalion pieces have been accounted for in the calculation.
Now that we have some guidelines for the proportions within the respective armies, we may begin a game. Well, no. If we deployed one Prussian for one Austrian, there would be a great advantage for the Prussian player. This would be especially true if we were using a rules system which reflects the greater firepower and flexibility of the Prussian infantry, the high grade of their cavalry, and the superior generalship of Frederick.
No, first we must realize the disparity in size between the opposing forces. Again, the examination of known data is indispensable. The results of my examination revealed that usually the Prussian Army was approximately 70% the size of the Austrian, or conversely, the Austrian force is 43% larger than its Prussian counterpart. This is a sobering fact for all the potential Fredrick's among us. Now the Prussian player must rely on his pualitative superiority and begin to think like Frederick. The frontal attack will not treat the Prussians kindly.
To continue, let us look at the internal proportions of each army. What troops were available for operations?
THE PRUSSIANS
Within the Prussian Army there was a great emphasis on cavalry. This was obviously Fredrick's favorite arm of service. As I have stated previously, approximately one third of the total force would be composed of mounted troops. Cuirassiers would compose 40% of this total, Dragoons 27%, and Hussars 33% on most occasions. Again, I remind the reader that these figures are averages, and that I am well aware that in various actions the ratio would be considerably different. As an example, we need only scrutinize the order of battle for Lobositz; only three squadrons of hussars took part in this action.
The proportions for the various types of infantry deployed would vary slightly more than their brothers in the cavalry. Line infantry, both musketeers and fusillers, would constitute 72-80%, grenadiers (both converged and standing) 20-25%, guard infantry 4-6%, Freikorps 3-6%, and Jagers 1-2%.
Unfortunately, I cannot give adequate proportions regarding the various caiibers of ordinance deployed by the Prussians. However, I would like to extend a few words of advice and caution. First (for all the 'artillerie volante' worshippers), the horse artillery was not organized until Kunersdorf, and no more than two batteries were in existence at any time during the conflict.
Second, Frederick did deploy heavy 12# and 24# pieces on various occasions, notably Leuthen, but the proportion was small. Also, these monsters were not used after Leuthen.
Third, the use of Howitzers increased throughout the reign and this should be reflected in our deployments.
Before moving on to an examination of the Austrian Army of the period, let us construct a typical Fredrickan force. Let us assume that we are going to field a force of some thirty thousand men. Approximately ten thousand cavalry will be deployed, as will twenty-thousand infantry, and we will have one hundred twentyone guns. If we take the liberty of rounding off our percentages to conform more readily to the size of various formations, we would deploy five regiments of Cuirassiers, four regiments of Dragoons, and two Hussar regiments. If such unusual units as the Garde du Corps, Beyreuth Dragoons, or the Pocelin Dragoons were to take part in the action, then the number of regiments would be adjusted, but not the number of castings.
The infantry arm would consist of twenty-four line battalions, seven grenadier battalions, and the remainder could consist of either guard and/or Freikorps. Only 200 Jagers would be available, although I admit that the entire Jager battalion could be deployed in the middle years of the war.
The artillery would consist of fifty-two light battalion pieces, with the remainder being composed of light pieces, howitzers, and heavy cannon. These pieces would be formed into independent batteries, some under the control of the brigadiers and wing commander. It is my opinion that some of the light pieces would be sold off for service with the grenadiers.
It must be remembered that the previous figures are only suggestions, and are subject to great variation. If we were attempting to re-fight a specific action, then all the pertinent data regarding the action should be accumulated, and the army organized on applicable parameters.
THE AUSTRIANS
The Austrian Army of the period presents greater difficulties in reconstructing accurately. I have not found the wealth of detail regarding their organizations, yet I have attempted to arrive at a solution as satisfying as possible.
There seems to be a dreadful lack of information on the deployment of the Converged Grenadiers and the Croatian Infantry. I can arrive at no better procedure than to deploy one Grenadier battalion for every six line battalions. Unfortunately, these ad hoc formations were not formally organized until after the Seven Years War.
The Croatian Infantry presents quite the same problem. Most sources do not quote specific regimental names or numbers for the units involved in an action, but rather refer to them en masse as a corps. Instead of the meticulous Prussian records, we are confronted with a cavalier attitude regarding the presence of these light infantry men.
In my best estimation the following ratios are valid: line infantry 88-100% (of which 14% are Grenadiers), and Croatian Infantry 1-12%. Further I would suggest that a more exacting set of figures would be: Croats 4%, Grenadiers 14%, Hungarian Netherlandish and Italian infantry 16%, and German infantry 66%. As usual, specific actions would produce extremes in these figures. At Hochkirth, the Croatian element formed 12% of the entire infantry force.
The cavalry forces were composed of the three basic types of trooper: Cuirassier, Dragoon, and Hussar. Also, the Austrian's formed elite units of converged horse Grenadiers and Carabiniers.
Surprisingly, the Austrian's did not field a great number of Hussars in open battle. They seem to have preferred to retain their light cavalry in the role they were originally intended to perform. I believe that this was much to their advantage, for it allowed them superior intelligence on many occasions, and often forced strategic reappraisals when the Prussian supply system was threatened.
In formal battle, the Cuirassier regiments dominated in numbers, prestige, and position. More than half the cavalry would consist of Cuirassiers, a full 51%! The Dragoons would be 32%, Hussars 14%, and Converged Elites 3%. Occasionally, the horse Grenadiers/Carabineir units would be absent, and the difference should be made up by including more Hussars or Dragoons.
To digress further, it should be noted that the Austrian Cavalry rarely achieved the success of their Prussian counterparts. An isolated regiment might achieve spectacular results. In the main, however, the Austrian's were incapable of the mass, battlewinning maneuvers the Prussians executed at Rossbach, Leuthen, Zomdorf, and even at Kunersdorf.
Obviously, this indicates a lack of command control and shortsightedness at the grand tactical level. It may also indicate a general inferiority in horsemanship, elan, and tactical level flexibility. I believe that both these points are valid and warrant further investigation and argument.
Returning to the problem of balanced historical forces, we should now construct a model of the typical Austrian Army. If in the previous example we constructed a Prussian force of some 30,000 men, then the Austrian force should number approximately 43,000 men. This would allow us to deploy some 32,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry, and 147 guns. We will have, therefore, 14 cavalry regiments, 26 German infantry, and 18 other infantry battalions.
The cavalry would be organized as follows: 7 Cuirassier, 4-5 Dragoon, 2 Hussar, and 1 Elite regiment. An additional Dragoon regiment could substitute for the Elite regiment.
The infantry would consist of 26 German battalions, 8-9 Hungarian battalions, 7-8 Grenadier battalions, and 2 Croatian units would fluctuate, depending on availability and terrain.
The artillery would consist of 68-70 battalion pieces, with the remaining 79-81 pieces being light, heavy, and howitzers organized into independent batteries. I must state again that I feel that some light pieces would be delegated to the independent Grenadier formations. Also, I do not believe that the Austrian's deployed a greater number of heavy pieces and howitzers than the Prussians. However, regardless of the calibre of their ordinance, the Austrian artillerists served their guns with great accuracy and elan.
Rhe use of Freikorps and Allied Auxiliary units in the Austrian Army presents several perplexing and yet interesting problems. There seems to be no consistent pattern followed in the incorporation of Freikorps units whatsoever. At Kunersdorf, the Austrian contingent contained 4 Freikorps battalions, and there were only 17 battalions present at the battle!
The allied formations: Saxons, Bavarians, Wurttembergers, and Reichsarmee units were present on many occasions. At the Battle of Leuthen, the allied contingent comprised 24% of the infantry force available. Yet habitually the allied units performed miserably. The only exceptions to this general appraisal were the Mainz and Wurzburg units, both of which served the Austrian's admirably.
In closing, let me add that my conclusions are not the last word on this subject. Each individual has the prerogative to disagree with my personal views, and I actively encourage any dissenting opinions. However, I have endeavored to present as unbiased a view as I could, and I hope the reader will find some merit in my presentation. Finally, to secure my flanks, let me add that I do not own either of these armies. Both armies hold a certain fascination for me, but I own a collection of French soldiers!
Bibliography
Duffy, C. J., The Armies of Maria Theresa, Hippocrene, N.Y., 1977.
Duffy, C. J., The Armies of Frederick the Great, Hippocrene, N.Y., 1974.
Luvaas, J., Frederick the Great on the Art of War, The Free Press, N.Y., 1966.
Mollo, J., Uniforms of the Seven Years War, Hippocrene, N.Y., 1977.
Riehn, R.K., Linear Tactics, The Courier, Vol. II, nos. 4-6.
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