The concepts of playability and realism are attributes of all forms of gaming. This relationship generally sees realism sacrificed in the interest of playability in commercial gaming because entertainment value holds the position of primacy. In academic and military gamin& this relationship is altered because realism is a prime consideration. Under this circumstance the educational value of gaming as a learning tool, and potentially as a forecasting tool, is paramount.
One such historical instance is found in feudal Europe and is based on the knight which represents a shock cavalry weapon system. The knight was a dominant fixture on the battlefields of Europe for centuries from its initial development under Charles Martel in the early 8th century to the funeral oratory given by Cervantes in Don Quixote in 1605. The technologic advancement of this weapon system, its life cycle and socio-political impact, especially when combined with the development of the castle, is a fascinating process. But, it is its application on the European Battlefield that holds our interest because the reality of its deployment excludes the capacity for any form of playability to be built into a set of historical miniature game rules. This makes the knight a zero-sum proposition when realism and playability are taken into consideration.
The conflict generated by the knight has nothing to do with the material artifacts that surround the weapon system. Instead, the conflict arises over the ethical and ideological structure that supported it. This non-material structure provides the conception of the soldier, the rationalization, and the acceptable tactics, the rules of behavior, that the knight operated under. Such a structure also provides the parameters in which a feudal army operates under. The rationalization of what this soldier represents and his rules of behavior and the operations conducted by a feudal army at utterly alien to our modern concepts of warfare and for this reason makes playability based on realistic deployment unattainable in historical miniatures.
Ethical Structure of the Feudal Army
With this in mind, let us now review the ethical structure of a feudal army - an army which was composed solely of knights. This structure can be defined by its tactics, operations and conception of the soldier. The tactics of this army are characterized by the interrelationship between the maneuver and firepower aspects of its weapon systems. Only one mobile weapon system existed during the feudal period - shock cavalry. This cavalry derived its firepower from the shock effect of the lance and long sword. Tactics were elementary during this era for groupings of such cavalry would simply form in a ragged line and charge forward. When
shock cavalry did not conduct operations in the field, castles provided a safe refuge for it. The castle, after all, proved to be invulnerable against feudal armies which had no capacity for siege warfare.
The operations of such an army are seen in the campaigns that were waged and how the command structure functioned. Campaigns can be differentiated by their duration, level of magnitude and goals. Battles were hardly, if ever, fought in the winter. They were mostly fought in the spring making campaigns a seasonal activity because that is when the typical 40 days of knight service took place. It must be remembered that no standing army existed during this period. The level of magnitude of these campaigns were at best frontal charges because of the command and the discipline problems that existed: Most feudal armies, when assembled, were characterized by a general lack of discipline, insubordination, and the ever-present danger of a willful act by some subordinate commander, which could precipitate a general engagement at an inopportune time or break a formation at a critical moment. The hierarchy of command was based on social status, not on professional capability or experience. Under these circumstances skillful tactics were superseded by shock action, usually without reconnaissance and with no effort to conduct enveloping or flanking maneuvers. [1]
With this reliance on frontal combat the proper timing of such attacks was considered generalship taken to its highest degree. The goals of feudal campaigns varied such as the punishment of a disloyal vassal, vengeance against a slight to one's honor or the reconquest of a fief seized by another feudal lord. Such campaign goals reflected the small private wars which were rampant between knights. Killing the opponent was not as important as the ransomtaking of another knight and under such circumstances losses in battle were kept to a minimum. Given this scenario, private war was full of excitement and could even be considered fun
This army's command structure can be defined by its rank structure, placement of the commander, communication devices and formations. No rank structure existed other than knight or knight in training such as an esquire, and sergeant which was a household knight. Since all knights were considered equals, no rank structure existed. The entire army was composed of individuals who could neither give nor would accept orders from their equals. At best a great lord could order the initial cavalry charge but after that no means existed within the rank structure to give orders.
The commander's position in such an army was naturally then for morale, not command, enhancement. Each lord in this feudal array would see that his followers were gathered under his banner. Usually the overall army commander's banner which was larger than the rest was in the center of the cavalry line to bring danger upon himself and in the process bolster the morale of his vassals.
Concerning communication devices, banners and trumpets carried over from earlier military periods. Two trends in communication devices, both visual, then developed as a means of warrior differentiation. The first trend was iconbased and started with the pennon. In the Bayeux Tapestry of the late I I th century pennons, long narrow ribbon like flags attached to a lance, were used as a means of distinguishing individual knights. This practice was soon enlarged upon. In the first half of the 12th century hereditary arms on the shields of the knights of France, Germany and England and also armorial devices were coming into use to allow distinction between these now fully armored soldiers on the battlefield.
The other trend that developed was color-based. In the Rules of the Knights Templar published in 1130, soldiers were designated by the color of their dress. Sergeants of the Order were dressed in brown and knights in white. Another basis of this trend was the house colors that distinguished the feudal lords and their retainers.
Formations for this army were based on a primitive unit articulation. Groups of knights, referred to as banners, or groups of banners, referred to as a battle, would form in an uneven fine. If many knights existed, sometimes two or three battle lines would form. Since all knights were considered equals, no recognized command structure existed.
For the exercise of command to be possible there must be somebody to obey orders; medieval armies, however, were made up purely of officers, of perhaps one should say that their most salient characteristic was precisely that the distinction between officers whose function is to lead or direct and men whose job is to
kill and be killed was not recognized. [2]
This resulted in the inability of the shock cavalry fine to coordinate their actions. When battle was met after a frontal cavalry charge. the conflict would thus break down into individual melees which could be described no better than as heroic combat on horseback.
The conception of the soldier during the feudal period was fully influenced by the Church. This soldier is an avatar of God
who wages a spiritual as well as a physical battle against his opponents. For this reason, prayer before battle was as important to a
knight as reconnaissance is to a modern commander. He can be a member of a political community such as France or Germany or
belong to a military order such as the Teutonic Knights. In either case, such a soldier has entered the guild representing the soldiers
of God. This guild structure, which was used to train the knight, taken along with the institution of vassalage based on fief holding
and participation in the tournament highlights the core institutions of knightly culture which existed in the Feudal era.
Rules of Behaviour
The rules of behavior that the knight operated under are also very alien to our modern viewpoint concerning ethics in warfare. The ethical responsibilities of this soldier are based on a double standard - chivalry among equals, between the knights, and contempt for the lower class initially represented by peasants and later expanded to include mercenary infantry.
The ethical standard of chivalry among equals is for "those of society" which revolves around the use of the horse in combat. It is represented by three primary characteristics. The first concept was based on fair play. Ambushes and deceit which form the basis of oriental, and now modern, warfare and are the antithesis of this tradition. An attack upon an enemy army while fording a river or feigning retreat on the battlefield to drawn an enemy force into an ambush were not considered ethical acts in war.
The second concept was based on ransom taking. Battle was an appeal to the judgement of God, not just a vindication of one's own physical, prowess but also one of spiritual vindication. Once this judgement had been rendered to the victor, it was far better to ransom off a captured knight than to put one to death. In the future the next knight might be more spiritually pure and hence the victor and a ransom was an agreeable bounty which further symbolized God's judgement of favor between his two chosen avatars. The third concept was based on cowardice as sin. In representing God's will on earth the knight was expected to behave at all times with honor and in no way bring disgrace upon the institution of knighthood or the Church. In battle this resulted in the lords exposing themselves to great danger by placing their banner in the center of the cavalry fine and leading cavalry charges to show their bravery.
The ethical standard of contempt for the lower class, "those not of society", can be represented by five historical instances in which it occurred. First, peasants were banned from the use of knightly weapons as seen by an ordinance of the German Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. Second, various bans were placed on the use of non-knightly weapons that were coming into use. These bans included Pope Innocent Il's ban on the crossbow in 1139 and the wheel lock bans in the Holy Roman Empire in the early 16th century.
Third, the execution of captured infantry after a battle was commonplace since their presence was in direct violation of the social structure of society - a challenge to the will of God reflected in the Estates of Man. Fourth, allied infantry was readily expendable. French knights riding down the allied Genoese crossbow men who blocked their path at Crecy is an excellent example of this concept. Fifth, the mutilation of captured arquebusicers by Godfrey de Boullion and Gian paolo Vitelli shows disdain for and a measure of revenge against the vile users of the new gunpowder technology. Many considered that whoever used such technology was in league with the devil, a view little doubt influenced by the teachings of the Church which fully supported the institution of knighthood.
The outcome of this ethical structure which dictated the conception of the soldier and rules of behavior surrounding the knight and the tactics and operations of the feudal army is readily apparent. Such a historical reality overtly undercuts the potential for playability in historical miniatures. It is impossible for a commander, in a real or simulated setting, to give orders to a banner or battle of knights in a feudal army in the field. Feudal knights have a world view based on their ethical superiority not only as fief holding nobility but also as the chosen soldiers of God. Since all knights were considered equal no command structure existed for the transmission -of orders and since knight service was only 40 days long an army could not be fielded long enough to siege an obstinate lord in his castle even if the logistical network to keep a feudal army in the field longer existed which it didn't. Other major problems were apparent such as the fact that ransom taking in warfare was preferred as was the status quo because knighthood was an old boy's dub which delivered to its members huge benefits such as status, wealth and entertainment in the form of private war and the tournament.
Taken together these components comprising the ethical and ideological structure which was built upon the material culture of the knight provide an impenetrable barrier to playability. This unfortunately is a dismal but accurate reality and explains why the Feudal period in European history lasted as long as it did because warfare based on the modern conception of the term did not exist. It is best to view the Feudal knight as one who would view a Zulu warrior before the advent of Shaka. From such a perspective we can say that he engaged in a ritualized form of warfare and can classify him as belonging to an exotic culture whose world view is utterly alien to our own.
All is not lost though because there is no questions that the realities of warfare concerning the pre-and post-feudal periods (the military system of Charlemagne and the mercenary-based armies of the dynastic period respectively) when the knight did not represent the sole mobile weapon system on the European battlefield can be made playable for historical miniatures. Also the reality of warfare during the Crusades can be made playable because it is far different than the wars in Europe with a whole new set of ethical constraints and directives in force concerning knightly behavior and army tactics and operations. That a far different form of warfare existed outside of Europe than was waged within it during the feudal period has remained an enigma for centuries. The reasoning behind this duality is quite dear though for such warfare if imported to Europe would threaten the ethical and ideological structures of the institution of knighthood. A military institution we have seen that when deployed on the European battlefield in the form of a feudal army is utterly playable for the medium of historical miniatures.
[1]Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. (New York. Da Capo Press, 1984), p. 47.
Bernard and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H Bomb. Revised and Enlarged Ed. (Bloomington: Indiana Uniersity Press, 1973).
The author is a doctoral candidate in political science at the Center for Politics and Policy at the Claremont Graduate School. Areas of interest include gaming and simulation, weapons systems, and strategy. Material concerning the knight used in this article was taken from a chapter of his dissertation concerning feudal weapon systems. (c) 1992 Robert J. Bunker
ED NOTE: While the author perceives that it is impossible to simulate Knightly warfare on the tabletop because of the "realities of History", I believe that it
only requires an inventive gamer to come up with mechanism that will work. Perhaps the readers would like to explore this with me. Dick Bryant
With these thoughts in hand, we can now view historical miniatures which resides in a unique position. It has the distinction of being one medium of commercial gaming that relies heavily upon realism while at the same time fulfilling its traditional role of providing entertainment for the partipants. This duality causes great challenges in the design and modeling process because neither playability or realism can be stressed to the exclusion of the other. While this requirement can be fulfilled for most genres of historical miniatures such as Napoleonics, the American Civil War and the World Wars it can not be fulfilled in specific historical instances because realism and playability are mutually exclusive.
END NOTES
[2] Martin Van Creveld, Command in War. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 50.
SELECTED REFERENCES
Phillipe Containe, War in the Middle Ages. Translated by Michael Jones. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1984).
George T. Denison. A History of Calvry from the Earliest Times with Lessons for the Future. 2nd Ed. (London: MacMillan and Co., 1913).
Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. (New York. Da Capo Press, 1984).
J. F. C. Fuller, Armament in History. A Study of the Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945).
Michael Howard, War in European History. (London: Oxford University Press, 1976).
Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
A. Vesey B. Norman, The Medieval Soldier. (New York: Thomas C. Crowell Company, 1971).
Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society. 4th Ed. (New York, Holt, Rhinehard and Winston, 1979).
Martin Van Creveld, Command in War. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War from 2000 B.C. to the Present. (New York: Free Press, 1989).
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