The Beaufort slowly banked into position for a torpedo run on the 4,870 ton tanker Proserpina. The crew had watched in frustration as the Blenheims failed to score with their bombs. Unhampered by antiaircraft fire, the plane flew into optimal range. The bombardier released the torpedo, which traveled directly to its target. Multiple explosions roared through the ship after impact, and she was obscured in fire and smoke. The Proserpina would never reach North Africa.

Photo at top: Convoy reaches the safety of Malta's harbor. (Hutchinson's Pictorial History of the War)

It was October 26, 1942. At DAK headquarters, the loss of the desperately needed tanker was taken with equanimity. Yet subconsciously everyone blamed Malta for their plight. Unfortunately, the Blenheims; and Beauforts that sank the Proserpina were from No. 15 squadron South African Air Force and No. 47 squadron Royal Air Force, all stationed in Egypt.

Malta's role has generally been overemphasized, primarily because of the drama of its solitary struggle. The view that Axis failure in North Africa was due to interdiction of Axis supply by Malta has been repeated so often that it has almost become beyond critical evaluation. But other factors led to Axis supply problems, and the Axis battle failures cannot all be blamed on inadequate supply. To assess Malta's real role, a fundamental understanding of supply, as well as Axis strategy in the Mediterranean, is needed.

[The following supply analysis deals in approximations and is taken primarily from The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Volume IV, Chapters 4 and 9, by I.S.O. Playfair (British Official History) and Supplying War, Chapter 6 by Martin Van Creveld.]

First, just what does a combat division need in the way of supply to fight? While daily requirements can fluctuate, depending on the degree of combat a unit is engaged in, 300 tons a day (roughly 10,000 tons a month) is a good low figure for a typical threeregiment division. Supply needs fall basically into three categories: artillery, fuel, and general supply (medical, small arms, food, clothing, etc.).

Artillery

Artillery ammunition dominates the daily tonnage. Take, for example, a unit of 100 rounds for each artillery weapon in a German infantry division (circa 1942): 36x105mm guns firing a 33 lb shell (36x100x33) = 59 tons, 12x150mrn guns firing a 96 lb shell (12x100x96 57 tons), 36x50mm antitank guns firing a 4.5 lb shell (36x100x4.5 = 8 tons), 18x75mm infantry guns firing a 12 lb shell (18x100x12 10 tons), 6x150mm infantry guns firing an 83 lb shell (6x100x83) 24 tons), and 54x81mm mortars firing a 7.5 lb shell (54x100x7.5 = 20 tons). All this totals 178 tons.

Given a rate of fire of two rounds per minute, this supply could be consumed in less than an hour -- hardly an abundant reserve. To supply a tank regiment with 100 PzIIIs, each with a full load of 87 50mm. rounds, would require 19 tons. These figures give a good idea of what is required to maintain an adequate supply of artillery ammunition.

Fuel

Fuel is the next largest part of the daily tonnage. The typical tank in use during 1942 got slightly more than one mile to the gallon and had a fuel capacity of about 100 gallons. A typical truck got about 10 mpg (heavy trucks more like 7.5 mpg) and held 25 gallons. One ton equals 250 gallons. Thus a top-off for 150 tanks and 1000 vehicles would take 160 tons of fuel. This would give a range of about 125 miles for the tanks and 250 miles for the other vehicles. This is a 2-3 day supply at most, or 1 day if the division is advancing (not to mention fighting!)

General supply takes up the balance and is not considerable. So, 300 tons is just adequate for a division, with infantry divisions needing more artillery and motorized divisions needing more fuel. The British Official History gives 400 tons as the daily requirement for an armored division.

During the course of the desert war, Axis forces averaged two German panzer divisions, one German motorized division, five Italian infantry divisions, one Italian armored division, and one Italian motorized division. Italian divisions, being two regiment formations with fewer vehicles and fewer artillery pieces firing smaller shells, needed only 100 tons of supply a day. Being generally understrength, the German divisions probably needed 300 tons a day.

This gives an average requirement of 48,000 tons a month needed for delivery just to the combat units! Factoring in the rear echelon units like antiaircraft, Luftwaffe, and Italian Air Force would probably add an additional 24,000 tons to this figure. So the Axis in North Africa needed about 72,000 tons of supply per month.

Just figuring supply requirements isn't enough. This supply has to reach the units as well. A line of supply can generally be divided into three parts. The first is from the point of production to a port or railhead. This part is covered by shipping or rail and can be of virtually unlimited length. Its capacity was unlimited in Europe where there was rail access to almost any point. However, overseas, the capacity was limited both by shipping tonnage and by the unloading capacity of the port of disembarkation.

The second part of the supply line is from the port or railhead to a supply dump accessible to the supply units of the combat divisions being supplied. This part was covered by motorized transport. In Europe the distance was generally 100 to 200 miles and, depending on the proximity of the railhead, could actually be eliminated.

One or two truck companies per division sufficed to cover this distance. The British Official History, in reference to capacity and limitations of motor transport to move supply, states: "a company with a total lift of 300 tons ran 100 miles a day (a figure which may seem on the low side to a peace-time eye but which takes account of such matters as stops for minimum rest and maintenance, economic speed, road space, and so on)." In capacity, this part of the supply line is obviously limited by the availability of motor transport. Lifting more than 300 tons can only be exceeded by adding more truck companies.

The length of this part of the line can be extended past 100 miles, but again only by adding more trucks. The Allies were in a far superior position than the Germans. The German Army relied on rail transport to within a short distance of the battlefield and, thus, did not produce a great deal of motor transport. Italy simply did not possess the industrial capacity to produce an abundance of trucks.

The third part of the supply line is covered by the combat unit's own supply companies, using either motor or horse drawn transport. The capacity is no more than the unit's daily requirement and the distance must be short. In North Africa, the British tried to keep this distance to no more than 50 miles.

With this supply line in mind, examining the Axis situation in North Africa reveals several limiting factors. First, there were only three ports available: Tripoli (45,000 tons a month maximum capacity), Benghazi (80,000 tons), and Tobruk (45,000 tons). During the 20 month period from 1 April 1941 to 30 November 1942, the Axis only held all three ports for 4 months. For 1 month, they only held Tripoli, also held during February and March 1941. For 15 months, they held Tripoli and Benghazi. However for three of those months, Benghazi was newly captured and relatively worthless as a port. In fact, Benghazi only averaged about half its maximum capacity during this time.

Matching port delivery limitation against the minimum of 72,000 tons of supply for the Axis forces, the real problem with Axis supply shows up. Averaging Axis deliveries to North Africa during the same period indicates that about 70,000 tons were delivered per month.

No Rail

Once the supplies arrived in North Africa, the next problem was immediately encountered - no rail transport. everything had to go by motor transport.

The following distances are illustrative: Tripoli to El Agheila = 480 miles, and to Benghazi = 600 miles; Benghazi to Tobruk = 290 miles; Tobruk to El Alamein = 370 miles. The only route was the coast road, subject to air attack, armored car and Long Range Desert Group raids. Desert conditions were much harder on motor transport than in Europe; generally one third of the transport was out of commission at any given time. Motor transport from Tripoli to El Alamein would require twenty times the transport of a rail-supplied unit of similar size in Europe. Germany just didn't have it. From Benghazi to Tobruk, Tripoli to Benghazi, Tobruk to El Alamein, the requirement was four to six times. Rommel put this together only with long lines of captured British lorries.

OKW in Berlin would have considered a request for adequate transport totally absurd.

The final problem with the lack of rail transport was fuel consumption - 100 trucks each consuming 125 gallons from Tripoli to El Alamein would have required an additional 50 tons of fuel, clearly an unsupportable drain. In short, when considering port capacity, Tripoli must be eliminated from consideration whenever the Axis armies were at or past Tobruk (fully 12 of the 20 months above). The Axis thus never had more than around 40,000 tons a month in supply capacity from a port with conventional supply range, with sporadic supplies arriving from the more distant ports. This was under the minimum requirements and OKW couldn't do anything about it. So, Rommel relied on capturing supply from his enemy.

British Supply

The British situation was completely different. At Suez and Port Sudan, they had ports of almost unlimited capacity. They had rail lines to Alexandria, the Egyptian border, and eventually to Tobruk, which relieved the demand on motor transport. The smaller British Army had a greater degree of motorization and a far more efficient organization of second phase supply delivery with its General Transport Companies.

Even so, every British offensive from Egypt resulted in a reduction in forces past Benghazi because of supply problems. Twice, this allowed the Axis to rebound. Even Montgomery arrived at El Agheila with considerably scaled-down forces from what he started with at El Alamein. If it hadn't been for Operation Torch, Rommel might have stood at El Agheila with fresh forces from Tripoli.

So most of the supply problems faced by the Axis in North Africa were caused by limitations in the supply line itself, not direct enemy interdiction. But did Malta affect the outcome of the desert war at all?

Among the several critical points in the war, only two failures in Axis plans can be arguably traced to Malta's interdiction of supply: Rommel's failure to take Tobruk in September/October 1941 and his defeat at Alarn Halfa in August 1942. Other critical points were attributable more to exhausted troops and over-extended supply lines. For example, in July 1942, Rommel was stopped at El Alamein despite the fact that it was a record month for supply deliveries.

Rommel's offensive to capture Tobruk in 1941 was postponed for lack of supply; sinkings in the Mediterranean did amount to about one month's supply. However, if he had taken Tobruk then, he would have faced British forces of Crusader strength on the Egyptian border. There is no reason to believe he could have defeated them and advanced to Alexandria.

The Desert Fox specifically tied his attack on Alain Halfa to the delivery of promised supply. He was promised 6,000 tons in seven ships and went ahead with his attack. Four of the ships were sunk, mainly by Malta-based forces, and only 2,332 tons arrived. But this in itself didn't cause his defeat -- he was soundly beaten at Alain Halfa. The supplies were projected for further operations, so the sinkings merely confirmed his decision to call off the attack.

Malta's Role

Finally, to assess Malta's role, it is necessary to view it in relation to Axis strategy in the Mediterranean. As has been pointed out in the main article, Mussolini's declaration of war caught Italy's armed forces by surprise and totally unprepared. Given the pending invasion of Russia, it is fair to assume that Germany would have been better off had Italy stayed neutral. Italian neutrality would have sealed off Europe's underbelly with neutral states requiring no German intervention. Yugoslavia and Greece would have probably stayed neutral if Italy had. Given that Italy could not defeat Britain or Yugoslavia - or as events proved, eve Greece - her entry necessarily led to the diversion of German troops into the arena.

Given a fait accompli, Hitler's efforts in North Africa were an attempt to return a level of neutrality to the theater by stabilizing the front at El Agheila. He wanted a stalemate long enough for him to defeat Russia. Hitler got his needed time from Rommel but lost in Russia in 1941. This required a continued stalemate in North Africa in 1942 so he could try again. Again Rommel delivered, but again Russia prevailed.

The Axis goal in the Mediterranean was to divert as little force (troops, air, and supply) as possible. Rommel was denied anything more than adequate supply because everything he got took away from the Eastern Front. Winning in North Africa would not have changed the war which was ultimately lost at Stalingrad.

What was Malta's role?

Hardly critical. In the long term she survived because she wasn't worth the German effort to capture her. Her forces never really reached blockade status; only 16% of Axis supply was lost. Air attacks curbed the successes. Focussing only on the Mediterranean, it would seem that the failure to capture Malta was a key mistake. For Italy it was. For Germany, seen in the context of the struggle in Russia, it is apparent that any diversion of strength was not warranted in view of the lack of war winning objectives in the theater.

Malta's importance has been exaggerated primarily because her role has been assessed from the British and Rommel's point of view. Malta did give England somewhere to strike from, giving the Allies some victories that bolstered morale and resolve.

For the British, Malta was important because the island mirrored England -- an island in solitary, but triumphant struggle. However, victory in the Mediterranean for England was a gift from Mussolini -- not Malta.