Once again, the Army of the Potomac had been turned away. Hooker's attempt to turn the Confederate position at Fredericksburg had been smashed by the devastating flank attack of Stonewall Jackson's corps. Unhinged by the counterblow, Hooker retreated the Union army back across the Rappahannock. The Southern victory came with a price it could ill afford, however the loss of Jackson himself to friendly fire.

Photo: Gettysburg, July 1863, looking east along the Chambersburg Pike. Tree in right background marks the Bloody Angle. (Library of Congress)

Despite the celebration of yet another victory over the Union army, the general situation for the Confederacy was becoming increasingly perilous. The most serious crisis was developing on the Mississippi with General Ulysses Grant threatening Vicksburg and General Banks closing in on Port Hudson. If both places fell, the Trans- Mississippi states would be cut off from the Confederacy and the whole length of the river opened to Northern commerce.

The Southern leadership decided that a strategic initiative of some sort was necessary to redeem the situation. One plan, proposed by Longstreet was a concentration against the Union forces in Tennessee, led by General William Rosecrans. Longstreet, backed by Secretary of War James A. Seddon and General Beauregard, argued that reinforcing Bragg's forces in Tennessee would allow them to defeat Rosecrans decisively and open the way to Ohio and Kentucky. Grant would be forced to respond to this threat and lift the siege at Vicksburg.

Lee, on the other hand, saw the answer in another invasion north of the Potomac with the Army of Northern Virginia. He reasoned that Grant might ignore the concentration against Rosecrans and hold on to Vicksburg. The possibility of a victory over the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil had to be powerfully attractive to the Southern commander. It was, as he argued, the most direct way the Confederacy could receive the foreign recognition that President Davis had long made a cornerstone of Confederate policy. Such was Lee's influence with the the government at Richmond that his plan was adopted by the cabinet by a vote of five to one on 16 May, with only Postmaster General John Reagan opposing.

Preparation

On the 18 May, Lee returned to his army to prepare. Chancellorsville had cost him nearly 13,000 men, about half being permanent losses. Lee couldn't conceive of replacing a leader like Jackson, so he reorganized his army instead. He disposed of the two corps groupings of four divisions and changed to three corps of three divisions each. He made up the ninth division by detaching two brigades from his largest division (Hill's) and combining them with two brigades from Richmond and North Carolina. Hill's senior brigadier, Henry Heth, received the command.

Longstreet retained command of the First Corps, composed of the divisions of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood. Ewell received the Second Corps with Early's, Johnson's, and Rodes's divisions. The new Third Corps went to A. P. Hill, with Anderson's and Pender's divisions, along with Heth's new unit.

Lee also dispersed the reserve artillery, giving each corps a total of five battalions. Stuart was given three more cavalry brigades to add to the three he already had.

With the replacements and conscripts gathered from all over the South, Lee shortly had nearly 75,000 men in hand. This was it, however, and he knew it. His army was as strong as it ever would be. On 3 June, barely four days after announcing the reorganization, Lee began his move with McLaws' men breaking camp and starting for Culpepper.

Across the Rappahannock, the Army of the Potomac spent the month shaking itself out of the drubbing it had suffered and awaited its next move. The army was far from demoralized by its defeat; the rank and file were by and large ready for another try at the Grey Fox. The greatest loss suffered was a loss of confidence in its leader by the men in Washington. Hooker had indeed been put in awe of Lee, and his actions displayed a fear of being beaten rather than an anticipation of victory. His actions at Chancellorsville, where he surrendered the initiative at almost the first contact, and his misuse of both his cavalry and artillery also injured him in the eyes of many of his subordinates. The decision was made to replace Hooker in the near future, but he stayed in command for the moment.

The army had lost almost 17,000 men in the recent battle. Worse yet was the expiration of enlistments for about 20% of the Army. This loss represented some of the army's best veterans. These losses were the result of poor recruitment policy and came at a particularly bad time. By the middle of May, the effective force numbered about 80,000 men, down from the 111,000 at the end of April. The cavalry was in even worse shape. From something more than 11,000 on 30 April, their numbers stood at less than 5,000 by the end of May.

Ostensibly as a result of reductions in number, Hooker ordered a reorganization of the artillery. Attrition and mustering out had presented the Union army with a net reduction of eleven batteries. In a move opposite his Southern counterpart, he concentrated more of his batteries in the Artillery Reserve, which now held five brigades out of the fourteen total. Ammunition trains were put under the direct control of the corps chief of artillery, instead of being parcelled out to the divisions. Under the control of General Hunt, the Union artillery was now in a favorable condition as compared to its opponents.

One other area held a decided edge for the Union, although it was not quick to use it. The North seemed able to acquire more hard military intelligence information than its opponents. Hooker was given a report on 27 May that clearly predicted an invasion by Lee. Throughout the coming campaign, the Union cavalry performed the role of reconnaissance well, while the Southern horse would leave Lee nearly blind.

As Lee prepared to move, it became clear he had little idea of Hooker's intentions. Because of this he ordered Stuart's cavalry to Culpepper at the end of May as a defensive move should Hooker anticipate him. Hooker's own cavalry, now commanded by Brigadier Alfred Pleasonton, also fanned out to give warning should Lee attempt to cross the river against the Union right flank.

By 3 June, the tempo of war had begun to accelerate.

Following McLaws out of camp was Hood's division. The next day saw Ewell's full corps move out. Early and Johnson's divisions followed. By Friday night Lee had transferred his headquarters to Culpepper, leaving Hill to watch Fredericksburg.

Hooker Counters

Hooker learned of the enemy activity on 4 June, but he was unsure of its meaning. He alerted three of his corps and ordered Buford's cavalry division and Sedgewick's VI Corps to reconnoiter. Hooker informed Washington of the enemy moves and offered to make an attack against the Confederate rear. A lack of faith in Hooker and a fear for the safety of the Capital made Washington turndown the request. Hooker was ordered to refrain from attacking Hill and to concentrate on Lee.

The same day, 7 June, Buford informed Hooker that the head of Lee's column, composed of Stuart and virtually all the rebel cavalry were at Culpepper. Hooker ordered Pleasonton to take all the Union horse, as well as 3,000 infantry, to attack Stuart., In all, 11,000 men would make the attack, with General Barnes at Kelly's Ford alerted for additional assistance.

Meanwhile, Stuart was exercising his penchant for spectacle. On the 5 June he staged a grand review of his cavalry force. Three days later, he restaged the event for the arriving Lee, even as the Union was moving toward him. The rebels settled into their positions after the parade, preparing to move out the next day.

They were rudely awakened the next day by Buford's troopers, and a wild fracas lasting most of the day ensued around Brandy Station. Pleasonton's force was not strong enough to dislocate or defeat Stuart, but he did handle him roughly, as well as embarrass him with the surprise attack. The Union made an orderly withdrawal from the field after the engagement had run its course. Stuart claimed victory, but he had been bruised. Criticism, subtle inside the army but more blunt outside, rankled Lee's cavalry chief and probably colored his judgment as the campaign progressed.

The battle had little real effect on the subsequent campaign, but it did prove that Union cavalry had reached a par with its Confederate counterparts, and this situation would only continue to improve with time.

Following the action at Brandy Station on 9 June, Lee continued his advance. Ewell entered the Valley through Chester Gap the following day, with Winchester as his immediate objective.

J.E.B. Stuart (Library of Congress)

Jenkins's cavalry brigade rode ahead of Ewell. On 12 June he sent Rodes and Jenkins toward Berryville and continued toward Winchester with his remaining divisions. The 1800 man detachment at Berryville escaped, but the 5100 men at Winchester, under Major General Robert Milroy, held their position. Milroy had been warned to evacuate, but he felt his men could hold the town and stayed in place.

On 14 June, Ewell split his force again, sending Johnson around Milroy's rear while attacking late in the day with Early. Milroy began having second thoughts about his decision to hold and withdrew as night fell. At dawn, on the road to Harpers Ferry, he ran into Johnson and his command dissolved. He managed to escape with a few hundred men, but over 4,000 men, 23 guns and three hundred supply- laden wagons were lost. Ewell suffered less than 300 casualties.

During this time, Longstreet was moved from Culpepper to the Valley. His units were positioned to cover the mountain gaps while Hill made his march. Hill reported from Fredericksburg that the Union camps were empty on 15 June, even as Ewell was mopping up Milroy. With Longstreet in position, Hill marched for the Valley. Lee planned to have Ewell in the lead with Hill crossing the Potomac next, followed by Longstreet.

Jenkins pushed up to the river the next day, with Rodes following. Ewell brought the rest of his divisions behind. By 17 June, the lead units were across the neck of Maryland and into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg.

As Hooker learned of Lee's movements, he reacted by trying to keep his army between the Confederates and Washington. As Hill moved from Fredericksburg to Culpepper, Hooker shifted his right up the Rappahannock, moving Pleasonton's cavalry into the area of the Bull Run Mountains. For the next five days, this region saw a series of cavalry encounters between Stuart and Pleasonton, as each sought information about the enemy and screened its own forces. The Union fought with gusto, often taking the field of battle, but they were able to learn little of Lee's movements at this time.

What Hooker did know, combined with his orders from Washington, was enough to get him moving north as well. By 13 June, he had XI Corps on the road to Manassas, with the rest of the army following in succeeding days. The Army of the Potomac was in a rough concentration north of Manassas by 17 June. Hooker spent the next several days moving closer to the Potomac, but he was still unsure of Lee's intentions or whereabouts. Part of this time was spent sparring with Washington. It was clear he was aware that his days in command were numbered.

During this period, Jeb Stuart hatched his scheme for another ride around the Union Army. He suggested leaving the brigades of Jones and Robertson to watch Hooker and the Blue Ridge gaps, then taking three brigades around the right of the Union to do as much damage as they could. Longstreet wanted Stuart to remain on First Corps' right as a screen. But Stuart got the go ahead from Lee, provided he cross the Potomac ahead of the Union army and link up with Ewell. Unfortunately, Jones and Robertson allowed Hooker to get away from them and stayed in position until long after the Northern troops had crossed the Potomac.

Stuart left on 25 June, only to find that Hooker had begun his shift north, placing a full Union corps in his path. He was thus obliged to ride a greater circuit south and east of his original route. That placed him far behind Hooker and completely out of touch with Lee. Added to his late start, the added miles and days meant that Lee was left with virtually no cavalry "eyes" for a full week. Stuart finally crossed the Potomac on 28 June, as the Confederate advance was cresting on the Susquehanna and Meade was leaving Frederick for his march into Pennsylvania. He never did find Ewell's flank in Pennsylvania, missing him by a day at York and later at Carlisle. The Confederate cavalry finally arrived in Gettysburg on the afternoon of 2 July.

The loss of his cavalry's services placed Lee at a big disadvantage. He was late in discovering that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac and was blind to its movements afterward. Conversely, the Union cavalry, particularly Buford's division, kept its commanders supplied with good information.

From 24 June on, Lee extended the scope of his invasion. Both Hill and Longstreet had crossed the Potomac, and Ewell was pushing on for Carlisle and the Susquehanna. Ewell detached Early and sent him through Gettysburg and York, with Harrisburg as an objective. The Confederates sent foraging teams across the rich Pennsylvania countryside to gather as much supply as possible. Lee ordered the foraging to be handled in a strictly legal fashion, paying for what they took (in Confederate money). By and large, the Southern troops acquitted themselves well in this regard, leaving as little resentment among the population than most invading armies would, before or since.

By 28 June, most of Lee's army was at Chambersburg, with the exception of Ewell and Stuart. Hooker had completed his concentration around Frederick, with an eye to striking west across Lee's lines of communications. It was this night, however, that Hooker had his final row with Washington. A major battle was brewing and Lincoln still had no confidence in Hooker, so General Meade was given the command.

Lee learned of the change the following night, at the same time discovering that the Union army was at Frederick. Stuart was still missing, though. With the Union closer than he had thought, Lee began concentrating his army, vehemently inquiring after his missing cavalry. Meade, already concentrated, initiated movement to bring his new command into contact with Lee on favorable ground.

The invasion campaign was now over, since the objective on both sides was battle, rather than maneuver.

Comparing the 1862 and 1863 Invasions

Lee made two invasions of the Northern states during the Civil War, apparently contradicting the purely defensive policy espoused by the Confederate President, Jefferson Davis. In reality, both offensives were attempts to support that policy. Taking his cue from the fact that the French assistance in the War for Independence was a major contributing factor in the American victory, his chief aim was the recognition and assistance by Britain and France. By fostering a defensive stance, Davis hoped to make the South appear the injured party, but as the war progressed, it became clear that a demonstration of the Confederacy's ability to carry the war to its opponent, and to beat them, was necessary.

After the twin victories over McClellan's army on the Peninsula and Pope's at Second Manassas, the first invasion was carried out ' almost on impulse. Although the Army of Northern Virginia was worn from the summer fighting, it appeared the North was in much worse shape. With the territory of Virginia virtually stripped by the intense campaigns, offering little in the way of supplies or forage, Lee concluded that he would have to retreat or go forward to the unravaged lands of the North.

Lee did not intend to seek a decisive battle in the early invasion, given the condition of his troops. As he marched, attrition and straggling worsened this condition, cutting into the 50,000 troops he started with. His opponents, on the other hand, recovered with remarkable speed. McClellan was again in charge and his administrative abilities showed through. He got his beaten army on its feet and marching much sooner than Lee had anticipated. This recovery and the fabled "Lost Dispatch" put Lee's first invasion in jeopardy nearly from the outset.

In 1863, the invasion was again a response to a Confederate defensive victory, but it was more premeditated and planned. The main goal, foreign recognition, remained the same; but the events in the Mississippi Valley lent a strategic importance to the plan. Lee was in command of an army more powerful and fit than in 1862; he was confident of his ability to meet and defeat his opponent. In 1863, Lee undoubtedly sought a decisive battle.

The primary objective of the Union in both instances was the destruction of Lee's army. This would hasten the downfall of the Confederacy faster than any other event. In addition, there was a real need for a victory in 1862 for political reasons (i.e., the release of the Emancipation Proclamation).

This objective explains the dismay in Washington at McClellan's procrastination in 1862 and Meade's inability to follow up after Gettysburg in 1863. Secondly, the safety of Washington had to be maintained. Its fall to Confederate arms would have seriously damaged, if not destroyed, the North's ability to carry on. It would also have had a major effect on the European nations. Many feel that paranoia about Washington hampered Union army operations in the field, keeping troops from the front line. But it did deny the South an easy victory, given the superior abilities of the early Southern commanders.

In both invasions, the North sought a decisive battle, especially in 1862. The Union leaders knew that Lee's army was not in good shape and the numbers were in their favor. McClellan was also out to salvage his reputation after the fiasco in front of Richmond. The "Lost Dispatch" whetted his appetite, even if it failed to improve his common sense. Meade displayed a better ability to handle a battle, but, like McClellan, he lacked the killer instinct to follow up a defeated enemy and grind him down.

Both invasions also allowed Lee to avail himself of the enemy's resources. The 1863 invasion was far more organized in this respect and was a prime reason for the campaign. In 1862, his needs were more immediate; in 1863, he intended to gather enough plunder to keep his army going for a long time. In this he was largely successful, stripping a wide swath of Northern countryside from Hagerstown to Carlisle. Only the swift march of the Union army north halted his foraging.

Both invasions were climaxed by superlative battles. Sharpsburg has the record of the bloodiest single day in the history of the war, and Gettysburg was the longest, sustained full-scale battle. The battle at Sharpsburg occurred because of McClellan's pressure on Lee's divided army and because Lee was able to choose the ground, thanks to the spirited Southern defense at South Mountain. McClellan's past timorous handling of his army contributed to Lee's accepting battle. The battle at Gettysburg was partially the result of Lee's orders to concentrate for battle. He had chosen Cashtown as his site, but confidence in his army let him accept battle elsewhere.

The failure of both invasions ensured that the South would be unable to achieve a dictated peace, and denied Davis his foreign recognition. A victory in either case would not have ensured either of these ends, but their chances would have been better with a Southern victory. The 1862 campaign changed the political complexion of the war with Lincoln's issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, while the 1863 campaign changed the South's outlook on the war from one of believing it would win, to one of hoping it could hold out until the North got tired of fighting.