Blockade Running

Blockade running until 1865 was a very profitable business and at least in the beginning was not extremely dangerous. The Union was plagued by not having enough ships to adequately patrol, much less control the 3,500 mile Southern coast. The chances of being caught by the Union Navy in 1861 were 1 in 9 and in 1862 the odds were only 1 in 7. By 1863, blockade running had developed into a fine art; the main reason being the profit factor: salt which sold for $6.50 a ton was worth $1,700 a ton at Richmond and coffee had jumped from $249 a ton to $5,500.

Thus the Confederate government simply could not control the running of the blockade. In 1863 the Union blockade was beginning to make its presence felt; the odds of being caught were 1 in 4. However, all was not as bleak as it would seem because in 1864 the blockade runners brought in:

8,632,000 pounds of meat
1,507,000 pounds of lead
1,933,000 pounds of saltpeter
546,000 pairs of shoes
316,000 pairs of blankets
520,000 pounds of coffee
69,000 rifles
2,639 packages of medicines
43 cannon

All this had been paid for in part by $5,296,000 of exported cotton. It must be remembered that as the war progressed the blockade runners were forced to settle for lesser known ports in the South because the major ones either were effectively sealed off or they had been captured. All of these factors meant that, in some cases, vital supplies spent long months in warehouses before the necessary transportation could be arranged. Thus, the Confederacy was again penalized because of an inadequate navy.

The threat to the Confederacy's naval power in 1861 came not from the Atlantic Ocean but from the rivers, principally the Mississippi. It was here that the Union Army and naval forces began their Anaconda strategy which was to ultimately prove the complete weakness and disorganization of the Confederate Navy.

To begin with, the Confederate Navy had no policy concerning the defense of the rivers and so the responsibility fell to the Army which assumed that any naval forces in their area of responsibility were then under anny control. The Naval District Commanders were almost always junior in rank to their army counterparts.

Another sore point was coastal defense. While principally the army's responsibility, the Navy organized special batteries to defend certain strategic targets, but the dividing line of command responsibility was never clear.

At right, Confederate mines. Some were converted wooden kegs filled with powder and primed to explode on contact. More elaborate were electrically triggered from shore, like the bottom model. A mine was responsible for sinking the USS Tecumseh in Farragut's assault on Mobile Bay, 1864.

On the question of transportation, the Army had control of most of the major rail lines; the Navy had a very difficult time in transporting armor, armament, supplies, and crews by rail. Making a bad situation worse, the Navy frequently tore up unused stretches of track to be used as makeshift armor on their ironclads.

Neither the Army nor the Navy understood or appreciated the situation that each found itself in. The Army (according to the Navy) had a bad habit of drafting skilled laborers that the Navy and other industries critically needed to keep the war effort alive. There are many accounts of ironclads falling into enemy hands or having to be destroyed simply because of a lack of adequate labor or materials.

In the South there was only one company that had done any prewar construction of armament, machinery, and the necessary gear for warship construction: the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia. This single industry had the ability to consume between 20,000 and 24,000 long tons of pig iron, but it never had as much as 8,000 long tons of pig iron at any time during the war.

The Confederacy possessed more pig iron works. According to the 1860 census there were 39 furnaces in the South producing 26,262 tons of pig iron: 17 in Tennessee, 4 in Alabama, and 2 in Georgia, with the remaining 16 in the other Southern states. All Southern states except Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi had iron deposits of varying quantity and quality, but lost the most important iron producing areas (Kentucky, Tennessee, and western Virginia) early in the war.

Thus, the operations of the Confederate Navy can be summed up in three categories: 1) coastal and harbor defense; 2) blockade breaking and running; and 3) river defense. The first category was what all the ironclads were destined for and usually they proved unsuitable because of the shallowness of the waters and the lack of maneuvenng space.

Also the civilian population placed their faith in these ironclads to such a degree that land defense was relatively sparse. The second category was not the responsibility of the ironclads because of their limited range, mechanical unpredictability, unseaworthiness, and cramped conditions. Occasionally an attack by an ironclad did succeed in lifting the blockade for a short time but never longer than a few days. The responsibility for blockade running was left in the hands of private individuals with the already discussed outcome.

Of course, the commerce raiders had their place but their contribution was of questionable impact. In the third category the Confederate Navy was wholly unprepared. In fact, there are cases of riverboats being used with nothing more than cotton bales as armor. All too often the Confederates were forced to use their ironclads to attempt to stop the Union onslaught on the river, something for which the Southern ironclads were unsuitable.

With the loss of New Orleans in April, 1862, and the fall of Vicksburg in 1863, the Mississippi was effectively opened for the Union and divided the Confederacy. It is realistic to say that the South was doomed to defeat simply because of the inability of Southern leaders to appreciate the necessity of naval planning and construction.

Galant but Unequal

The Confederate Navy, though at times gallantly led, proved to be an unequal opponent for the Union Navy because the South was not able to wage war on their enemy but instead were forced into a constant defense.

At right, the CSS Tennessee. The canvas canopy shielded the ironclad from the fierce sun.

While at times the South had the element of surprise on its side, the North had the overwhelming numbers and the facilities to effectively replace any losses while the Confederate Navy losses were permanent ones.

The South attempted to destroy the ever-growing numbers of Union ships which were blockading her ports and challenging her use of the rivers. In the case of the Southern Navy it can be stated that there were too few ironclads and they were too late to have any lasting effect on naval operations. The South reintroduced many types of naval warfare that had not been used since the Revolutionary War such as the submarine, though its effect at this time was slight.

The Confederate Navy was simply too new for the South. The machinery and technology that it demanded were not available in the South in large enough quantities to build and support the kind of navy that the South needed to win the war.

Confederate Ironclads
Ship	Construction Data	Armament	Armor	Notes
ALBERMARLE	launched 26 May, 1864, at Halifax, N.C.	6 guns (?)	4 in.	sunk Nov., 1864, by Confederates
ARKANSAS	Oct. 1861, to 15 July, 1862, at Fort Pickering, Miss.	2 8" rifles 4 42lbrs	1 in. iron plate covered with T rail backed with wood 24" thick	sunk in attempt to breakout from Vicksburg, 6 Aug 1862, speed: 6 m.p.h.
ATLANTA	converted Winter 1861-1862 in Savannah, Ga. from merchant steamer Fingal, commissioned Atlanta, 22 Nov. 1862	2 - 7 inch, 2 6.4-in. guns, spar torpedo, ram	17 in. oak and 4 in. armor	surrendered to Union forces after ran aground in attempt to break out of Savannah Harbor, 17 June 1863
BALTIC	converted from cotton lighter in Mobile, Ala, Dec. 1861	1 42pdr, 2 32 pdr, 2 12 pdr howitzers, ram	not available	armor used on Nashville
CHARLESTON	Charleston, NC., 1864, money raised through Ladies Gunboat Society	2 9 in. smoothbore, 4 6.4-in. Brooke Rifles	not available	destroyed by Confederates 18 Feb., 1865, Charleston, S.C.; speed 6-9 m.p.h.
CHICORA	launched 23 Aug. 1862, Charleston, NC	2 9-in. Dahlgrens, 2 7-in	not available	destoyed by Confederates, 18 Feb., 1865, Charleston, S.C.; speed: 3 knots
EASTPORT	31 October, 1861, Cerro Gordo on Tenn. River	work was never completed by CSN		captured Feb., 1862, by Union forces; completed as Union ironclad
FLORIDA (formerly SELMA)	name changed Sept., 1862	2 9-in. Dahlgrens, 1 8-in. Columbiad, 2 32pdrs	not available	sunk Mobile Bay, 1865; sidewheeler
FREDERICKSBURG	built in Richmond, Va.; one of Ladies GunBoats	8 guns (?)	not available	burned by Confederates, 2 Apr, 1865, near Richmond, VA., to prevent capture
GEORGIA	private citizens built in Georgia, 20 May, 1862	2 6-in., 2 8-in. Columbiads	2 layers RR iron	destroyed by Confederates in Savannah, Ga, 1864; not self-propelled
HUNTSVILLE	keel laid at Selma, Ala. Fall, 1862	1 Brooks rifle, 1 6-in., 4 - 32 pounder	4-in. iron	sunk by Confederates, April, 1865, Mobile, Ala., speed: 3 knots
JACKSON (also MUSKOGEE)	launched Jan 1864 at Columbus, Ga.	8 guns (?)	not available	sunk by Confederates 1865, in Charleston, Va.
LOUISIANA	launched 6 Feb., 1862, New Orleans	3 9-in. smoothbores, 4 8-in., 2 7-in rifles	2 layers of RR iron	sunk 24 April, 1862, by Union naval forces off New Orleans
MANASSAS	built by private interests in New Orleans; taken over by C.S.N. Oct., 1862	1 9-in. Dahlgren	2-in. iron	run aground April, 1863 in New Orleans area, speed: 6 knots
MISSISSIPPI	launched Apr 8, 1862, at New Orleans; never fully completed	20 guns (?)	2-in. iron plate	burned 24 April, 1862, to prevent capture
MISSOURI	launched Shreveport, Ala 14 April, 1863	1 11-in. Dahlgren, 1 9-in. Dahlgren, 1 32pdr	2 layers of RR iron	surrendered to Union forces, 1865, stern paddle wheel for locomotion, speed: 6 knots
MOBILE	converted to ironclad at Yazoo City, Ala 1862	3 32pdr, 1 32pdr rifled, 1 8-in.	12 in. wood backing 2 layers of RR iron	never completed, destroyed by Confederates, July 1863
NASHVILLE	built Aug.1864, Montgomery, Ala.	2 bow pivots, 1 stern pivot, 4 broadside guns	5 foot wood backing 6" iron plate	sunk 12 April, 1865, to prevent capture; doublesided paddle wheels
NEUSE	constructed on Neuse River, SC, launched 27 Apr., 1864	1 Brooke Rifle, 1 6-in., 4 32pdr	4" RR iron	sunk March 9, 1865 to prevent capture
NORTH CAROLINA	built at Wilmington N C.; launched Spring 1864	6 guns	24-in. wood backing 6-in. iron	sunk at her mooring at Smithville S.C. due to worm-eaten hull, speed 3-5 knots
PALMETTO STATE	built at Wilmington NC.; launched Spring 1862	2 9-in. Dahlgrens, 2 7-in	24 in. timber 12 in. planking, 2 in. iron	18 Feb 1865, blown up to prevent capture, Charleston, SC, speed: 5 knots
RALEIGH	built at Wilmington N C.; launched Spring 1864	6 guns (?)	24 in wood backing 6-in. iron	7 May, 1864, ran aground; broke back attempting to get free
RICHMOND	constructed in Richmond, Va., 1863	4 guns	2 in iron, 24 in. timber, 12-in. planking	burned April 1865, in Richmond, Va to prevent capture
SAVANNAH	built in Savannah, Ga, 1863	2 7-in., 2 6.4-in.	2 in iron, 24 in. timber, 12-in. planking	burned 21 Dec. 1864 to prevent capture in Savannah, Ga., speed: 6 knots
TENNESSEE	completed at Selma, Ala., Feb. 1864	4 10-in. Columbiads, 2 7.5-in Brooke Rifle	9-in. wood backing 6-in. iron	sunk Mobile Bay, 1865, speed: 6-8 knots
TEXAS	work started Richmond, Va., 1864	1 Brooke rifle, 1 6-in., 4 32pdrs	4-in. iron	unfinished; captured by Union forces in Rldunond, Va., 1865
TUSCALOOSA	completed at Selma, Ala., 1864	1 Brooke rifle, 1 6-in., 4 32pdrs	6-in iron	sunk 1865 in Mobile Bay, speed; 6 knots
VIRGINIA	Gosport Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va., from hull of Merrrimac 24 July,1861-20 Feb 1862	6 9-in. Dahlgrens, 2 7-in, 2 6.4-in, ram	24" wood, 4 -in. iron	March 1861, two battles with Union naval forces in Norfolk Harbor, sunk by Confederates May 1862 to prevent capture, speed: 6-8 knots
VIRGINIA II	Richmond Va.; launched June 1863	6 7-in.	18-in. wood, 4-in. iron	destroyed by Union naval forces in Richmond, 1865

Confederate Navy 1861-1865: Part 1