"They came on with ardent yells; their shooting was terribly galling and well aimed, closing in, they yet offered no mark to our riflemen". "The suppleness of their sinewy bodies enabled them to find cover everywhere, occasional gleams of white clothing, head-dress or banners were alone to be seen, even those were rare".

INTRODUCTION

Word came to Major Robertson about further negotiations between Umra Khan and Sher-Afzul, with the likelihood of Sher-Afzul soon marching on the fort, already rumours put his advance guard within 3 miles. A more worrying report and probably true came in that a dozen or so of his men had already arrived at the Chitral Bazaar (see map) a mere 750 yards from the fort. With the fort as yet not fit for defence (with buildings all-round able to offer cover to an attacker and with the possibility of the local Chitralis being stirred up) a reconnaissance was ordered to clear away any bodies of men in the surrounding area.

Major Robertson had been taken ill due to dysentery and now spent much of his time in bed. Because of this he ordered Capt. Campbell to take command of the troops, stating that he was to take 'a sufficiently strong party for safety and make a reconnaissances across the Chitral plain, to see if it were true that Sher-Afzul was there with an armed force'.

CHITRAL from the village of DANIN. This photo shows clearly the height of the surrounding mountains, and the advantageous position of the village of DANIN, which was used by the Chitralis to fire down on the fort.
Large Chitral Fort photo (63K)
Jumbo Chitral Fort photo (slow: 131K)

By 4.15pm two hundred Kashmir rifles (more than half the garrison) marched out, Captains Townshend and Baird commanding the men. Campbell was in overall command and was accompanied by Lt. Gurdon as political officer should any meeting take place with Sher-Afzul. Major Robertson himself was determined to see the success of the task and rose from his bed, put a horseman's cloak over his night-clothes and rode after the advancing column as a observer.

THE RECONNAISSANCES SETS FORTH

A detachment of fifty Sepoys were left to hold Serai-Bazaar as the rear guard. Capt. Baird with one section was sent off to investigate a party of tribesmen around 150 strong on some slopes to right, about a mile from the fort. Townshend took up position around the old mission station with a section of men slightly in advance giving support to Baird.

With nothing untoward discovered as yet, time was given over to interrogating some locals. Evidence soon suggested that Sher-Afzul was indeed in the area, accompanied by a force of around 200-400 men, camped by a nearby hamlet (see map) overlooked by Baird's section.

With this new intelligence it was decided to advance further to verify. The possibility that the various groups of tribesmen could well be neutral local Chitralis made the task all the more difficult.

Capt. Campbell ordered Townshend forward with a 100 men in extended double line towards the house where Sher-Afzul was reported to be camped. Unfortunately this advance meant descending down onto level ground of the lower plateau, putting him at a disadvantage. An order was sent by Campbell for the force to move back up the slope put this did not reach the unit.

"WHEN YOU MEET AN ASIATIC - GO FOR HIM":
--BAIRD

Lt. Gurdon was now acting as a military officer and was ordered to take a message to Baird from Maj. Robertson, - he was to first fire over the heads of the opposing tribesmen on the far side of river, if they proved to be the enemy and not simply villages, they were to be volleyed at and driven back.

This note, seems clear to us, reading it on our comfy sofa, but Baird who was regarded as one of the more dashing and bravest officers in the army and no doubt somewhat bored with the lack of action, some how misread the order. He fired only a single shot, causing the tribesmen across the ravine to return fire en masse.

Forgetting this new order, he remembered Lt. Campbell's initial instructions which were - that the enemy were to be 'turned out' of their position if they proved hostile. So Baird ordered the advance, ignoring Gurdon's advice of bringing up the support section which was still stationed someway to the rear. The decent down their side of the ravine, the crossing of the stream and the ascent up the enemy occupied side was going to be tough and no sooner had they started the difficult climb, did they come under heavy fire, causing most of the Sepoys to take cover and refuse to advance. This left 13 men including 3 officers to carry on the advance.

The Chitralis now withdrew backup the slope, with some starting to outflank Baird's ~roup and even moving back down into the Ravine, occupying Baird's initial position.

MEANWHILE .......BACK WITH CAPT. TOWNSHEND

Capt. Townshend's unit was advancing towards the house, likely to be occupied by SherAfzul. The house was found to be empty, but a hamlet close by, a little to his right, surrounded by a wall, was noted to occupied by tribesmen and with heavy firing coming from Baird's section, they were obviously the enemy.

Accordingly the advance was continued, with volley fire by sections ordered, two sections being kept back as supports. The return fire from the hamlet was lively but due to the distance as yet not effective. With around 250 yards to go the Sepoys were ordered to take cover behind a low stone walled bank.

The plan was that Baird's group would take the hamlet from above, with Townshend himself cutting the enemy down whilst in flight.

Very soon it became obvious that no such plan would take place. His unit now was beginning to suffer casualties and the enemy were starting to outflank him on the left and right - all this and the on set of nightfall.

Campbell rode up and ordered the advance on the hamlet, but Townshend explained he was waiting for his supports to move up. With this Capt. Campbell went back to bring them up personally. On bringing up the supports, he was shot in the knee (he was standing on top of a wall, briefly usin& his field glasses at the time, somewhat of a gift for the Chitral marksmen). The advance got underway, but the Sepoys were less than enthusiastic, and took cover wherever and whenever possible. The advance ground to a halt with the loss of two brave Kashmir officers and three men. Capt. Townshend withdraw the men back to their initial position.

Campbell with Townshend stressing the need to withdraw due to the falling light, ordered the retreat. Townshend was to be the rear guard and was to hold for a short while, then withdraw.

"GROWN BOLD NOW, WHITE ROBED CHITRALIS WERE RUNNING IN LIKE WILD DOGS ROUND A FAILING DEER"

A is usual practice for all hill tribesmen, the ssite of any withdrawal on the part of enemy, is regarded as a sign of weakness. This is usually exploited by way of a general advance, or more commonly a fanatical charge, with the intention of cutting to pieces that enemy.

Campbell and Townshend started to withdraw with the former hobbling along with the use of a sword as a rest. He had managed to send word back to the fort for the Sikhs to be brought out to cover the retreat. They retreated as best they could over the many ridges and walls, with the Sepoys loosing all order and Campbell himself using his revolver to fight off charging groups of tribesmen, eager to cut him down as he stumbled along.

MEANWHILE......BACK WITH BAIRD

The advance up the slope had faulted with only three soldiers, a Gurkha officer and Baird and Gurdon left alive out of their advancing thirteen, the remainder of the section were still huddled at the foot of the slope.

Baird himself had been mortally wounded and the retreat was ordered with the two remaining officers covering it themselves. Baird was carried off by the Doctor Whitchurch in a doolie along the road back to the fort, this being quite an adventure (a mini wargame in itself). Having descended the slope Gurdon and the Gurkha officer began to rally the men. Regrettable for them a large enemy force started to mass on the far slope and immediately charged them, splitting the Sepoys, half managing to withdraw back along the road to the fort and the remaining half under Gurdon being pushed back up the slope and surrounded.

"THE ENEMY'S FIRE WAS WONDERFULLY HOT, THE EARTH BEING THUDDED INTO AS AT THE BEGINNING OF A MIGHTY HAILSTORM"

Campbell's ragtag force were still withdrawing back towards the fort, in no real military order, the Sepoys in odd groups.

CHITRAL FORT from the upstream SANGAR The Chitralis could use the sandy beach to attack the foil from this position thus threatening the water supply.

Major Robertson with a form of escort of around twelve men including some loyal Chitralis was positioned in a small orchard surround by a low wall. They had been receiving some rather unwanted attention by a large number of enemy riflemen. The rifle fire described as 'a machine gun at work'. The Major was still suffering badly with his illness, but with Sepoys from the Capt. Campbell's unit beginning to appear, withdrawing back to the fort, he decided to go over and rally them. He ran out completely in the open and fell to the floor, doubled over in pain due to his stomach illness. Calling for his horse, which was brought (no mean task of coolness, with the air alive with bullets) he mounted and galloped after the retreating men, managed to rally most and got them into a small enclosure where the majority recovered their composure and started to return fire. His small escort was also brought into the enclosure.

A few Sepoys who had managed to slip passed the Major, started to come back from the direction of the fort, indicating that the enemy had cut the road and that they were obviously now surrounded. With the Chitralis all around and advancing forward in small groups, Robertson decided to stand and wait to see if more men could make it back from Campbell's and Townshend's group, least of all the officers themselves.

Thankfully, they both suddenly appeared with the remainder of their men, Campbell dismissing his badly wounded knee as a mere trifle. Campbell was ordered to mount a horse along with the Major who had decided to ride back to the fort (alone) to bring out Harley (the one remaining British Officer in the fort) and the Sikhs to cover the withdrawal. Robertson was unaware that an order had already sent. Townshend was to follow on with the remainder of the men aided by Campbell.

The Major made it back to the fort, aided by two loyal Chitralis horsemen with lancers, who he met on the way. Luckily most of the enemy they encountered were armed with old matchlocks muskets, which proved hopeless at hitting the galloping horsemen, but did look rather spectacular. Riding through the many groups of buildings and over the walls and ridges it must have been some ride. Coming up to the fort he found Harley at the head of the sikhs already advancing, he ordered them up to the Bazaar to cover the withdrawal.

Campbell and Townshend had made good progress and had kept the men in reasonable order, unfortunately upon entering the bazaar the men lost formation and were almost volleyed by Harley and his Sikhs, who mistook the disordered mass of men as the enemy. The Sikhs allowed the Sepoys to pass through them, then fired a few volleys into the advancing Chitralis and then withdrew back to the fort in perfect order.

Gurdon and his men came in just as the Major made to it the fort, the only group missing was Whitchurch and the wounded Baird with a few men assisting them. Remarkably this group, no more than ten arrived some hours later, banging on the fort gates to be let in.

Recon: Battle Profile, Analysis, and Wargaming the Battle

This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com