"We could not stand against the fire and had to retreat, the two regiments forming the horns were quite exhausted and useless, and we could not properly surround the position."

INTRODUCTION

The Impi which had briefly taken part in the action at Hlobane, was out on its way to Khambula. The King rightly decided that Wood's column now presented the most threat and that it would have to be stopped.

The local chiefs in the area had been doing their best to harass Wood, but they did not possess a large enough force to hinder its advance, and some local tribes had even started to go over to the British. The King had given orders to the Impi not to attack the fortified camp, but to attempt to draw the British into the open by harassing their supply route and threatening to attack Utrecht which was a supply fort/settlement.

Col. Wood was well aware of the Impis presence, having been informed of its location and strength by a friendly Zulu who had mistakenly found himself amongst its ranks and had managed to escape back to Khambula.

FORCES ENGAGED

British Commander Brevet-Col. E. Wood
Lieutenant-Colonel Buller's Party -- Captain Gardner, Staff Officer
CORPS OR DEPARTMENT	OFFICERS AND MEN	OFFICER IN COMMAND
Royal Artillery	110	Maj. Tremlett
Royal Engineers	11	-
1/13th Regiment	527	Lt-Col. Gilbert
90th Regiment	711	Maj. Rogers
Mounted Infantry	99	-
Frontier Light Horse	165	-
Transvaal Rangers	135	-
Baker's Horse	99	-
Kaffrarian Rifles	40	-
Dutch Burghers	41	-
Border Horse	16	-
Mounted Basutos	74	-
Wood's Irregulars	58	Maj. Leet
Total 2,086 Including 88 sick in hospital
The whole of the mounted troops acted together under the orders of Lt-Col. Buller

Zulu

Induna - Mnyamana - Ntshingnayo

Majority of regiments from Isandlwana supported by local irregulars.
Total Regts. 17,000, irregulars 3,000.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS

The main battle text comes from Col. Evelyn Wood's official report. We have three Zulu accounts providing us with their reasons as to why they failed to take a camp.

FROM COLONEL EVELYN WOOD, COMMANDING COLUMN No.4 TO THE DEPUTY ADJUTANT GENERAL: -- CAMP KHAMBULA, March 30th, 1879.

"Sir, -- I have the honour to report that the camp was vigorously attacked by Zulu regiments from 1.30 to 5.30 pm. The chief command was exercised by Nymani, who did not came under fire, and Syingwayo. The army left Ulundi on the 24th inst., with orders to repeat the attack of the 22nd of January, near Rorke's Drift. On the 24th inst., four regiments were left near Etshowi, and four at Ulundi. Early in the aftenoon, Captain Raaff, who was out reconnoitring, sent in one of Oham's men; he told me that he was behind with the captured cattle; he put his head-badge into his pocket, and was recognised by a friend, who was ignorant of his having joined us; he marched with the Zulu army to the Umvolosi." At daylight he went out drinking, and persuaded his companions that they were recalled, ran away to Raaff's men and told them how the attack would be made at dinner-time. About 11 a.m. we saw approaching dense masses in five bodies to the Zungani range of mountains, near the Umvolosi. Two companies which were out wood-cutting were called in, the cattle brought into laager, with the exception of about 200 which had strayed away in the direction of the natives from the two whose duty it was to herd them.

At half-past one o'clock the action commenced. The Mounted Riflemen, under Colonels Buller and Russell, engaged an enormous crowd of men on the north side of the camp; being unable to check them the men retired inside the laager, and were followed by the Zulus until they were within 300 yards, when their advance was checked by the accurate firing of the 90th L.l., and the Zulus spread out to the front and rear of the camp. The attack on our left had slackened, when at 2.15 p.m. heavy masses attacked our right front and our right rear. The enemy, well supplied with Martini-Henry rifles and ammunition, occupied a hill not seen from the laager, and opened so accurate an enfilade fire, though at long ranges, that I was obliged to withdraw a company of the 13th posted at the right rear of the laager.

The front, however, of the cattle laager was stoutly held by a company of the 13th; they could not, however, see the right rear, and, the Zulus coming on boldly, I ordered Major Hackett of the 90th L.l., with two companies, to advance over the slope, the companies moving down to the rear of the cattle laager guided by Captain Woodgate, and well led by Major Hackett, who, with Captain Woodgate standing erect in the open under a heavy fire, showed a fine example to the men, as did Lieutenant Strom, who, sword in hand, ran well in front of his company. The Zulus retired from their immediate front, but the companies being heavily flanked, I ordered them back; whilst bringing them in Major Hackett was dangerously, and, I fear, mortally wounded. In any case I doubt his being able to serve again, and he will be a heavy loss to the regiment. The two mule guns were admirably worked by Lieutenant Nicolson, R.A., in the redoubt, until he was mortally wounded.

Major Vaughan, R.A., director of transport, replaced him and did good service. The horses of the other four guns, under Lieutenants Biggs and Herde, were sent under the laager until they came within one hundred yards of them, but these officers with their men, and Major Tremlett, R.A., to all of whom great credit is due, remained in the open the whole of the engagement. In Major Hackett's counter attack, Lieutenant Bright, 90th Light Infantry, an accomplished draughtsman, and most promising officer, was wounded, and he died during the night. At 5.30 p.m., seeing the attack slackening, I ordered out a company of the 1-13th to the right rear of the cattle laager to attack some Zulus who had crept into the laager, but who had been unable to remove the cattle. I took Captain Ley's company of the 90th Light Infantry to the edge of the Krantz on the right front of the cattle laager, and they did great execution among the mass of retreating Zulus.

Commander Raaff, at the same time, ran on with some of the men on the right rear of the camp, and did similar execution. I ordered out the mounted men who, under Colonel Buller, pursued for seven miles the flying Zulus retreating on our left front, chiefly companies of the Maqalusini Kafirs, under Umsirayo, killing great numbers, the enemy being too exhausted to fire in their own defence. From prisoners we have taken it appears that the column which attacked our left, and then being repulsed, moved round to our front rear, and right rear were composed of the Nokenki, the Umbonambi, and Nampumino Regiments. The Maqalusini under Umponyo attacked the front, the Undi the right front, and the Ikobamakosi the right. I append a list (not enclosed) of our casualties, and we are still burying Zulus, of whom there are five-hundred lying close to the camp. I cannot yet estimate their entire loss, which is, however, very heavy.

Three-hundred firearms have already been picked up close to camp, several M.H. rifles being amongst them. I received every assistance from the officers commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, Colonel Buller, Major Tremlett, and Major Rogers, and from the following officers of my staff: -- Captain Woodgate (who evinced great courage, for which I in vain recommended him for promotion after the Ashantee expedition) Captain Maude (who, while replacing temporarily the late Captain the Hon. R. Campbell, rendered me very great assistance), Lieutenants Smith and Lysons, orderly officers, who, with Captain Woodgate, carried in a wounded soldier of the 13th, who was lying under fire. In doing so Lieutenant Smith was himself wounded. The wounded were cared for most promptly by Surgeons O'Reilly, Brown, and staff, generally under fire.

"The following remarks, written by my colleague upon his arrival at Kambula, two days after the fight, are most interesting, and need no preface. After giving a short description of the fight at the Zlobani Mountain, he continues: -- " If the Inzhlobane affair stood by itself, people both in the colony and in England would begin to think the campaign was fated to be disastrous; but happily it was followed by the Zulu attack on this camp, and by so decided a repulse of the enemy that it must have the effect of raising every one's spirits, and of showing that the redoubtable warriors of Cetywayo are not invincible. The action was fought with several advantages in favour of the defenders. First, the presence of the enemy was perfectly well known, and his approach was seen in the form of long black lines, like dense cloud shadows creeping down the sides of the Zuinguin Neck two hours before the first shot was fired. There was, therefore, ample time to fetch the woodcutting parties that were out, and to drive in and laager all the cattle and horses that were out feeding on the veldt.

Everyone, from the gallant Colonel Wood downwards, felt perfect confidence in being able to beat off the attack, formidable as the Zulu host undoubtedly was in point of numbers; and, every man, knowing his duty, did it with a coolness and devotion which were sure auguries of success. All the points round the camp had been carefully measured, and, as a consequence, from the moment the enemy reached these points and fire was opened, the artillery and infantry shot with the certainty that they were not wasting their ammunition. Admirable judgment was shown also in precipitating the Zulu right attack by sending out all the mounted men to engage them the moment they came up. These fine fellows did their work well, bullying the Zulus so effectually that they lost their temper, and in driving in the swarm of wasps who were stinging them so sharply, they advanced almost unconsciously under the fire of the camp. Once engaged there was no retreating, and they pushed home their attack vigorously.

A sharp half hour's fighting, however, showed that they were not going to be successful from the north. They lost enormously, and at their nearest point, being under the fire of men who were resting their rifles, and were so cool that many of them were smoking their pipes, scarcely a shot failed to take effect. Decidedly sickened by their first essay, the fighting line took ground to their own left, and sought the cover of out cropping rocks to the east, to join the masses that were now gathering along the front, the right, and the right rear of the camp. These seemed to rest for a short time before attacking, as if to take food, and then swarming down the slope opposite in successive waves, they dipped into the deep hollow sluit bed which covers the right of the camp, and practically disappeared, hiding themselves in a marvellous way.

From here successive lines of skirmishers poured up the steep ascent to the ridge on which the camp is situated, and a furious fire was poured into the fort and the exposed faces of the cattle and the main laagers. It was well replied to both by artillery and rifle fire, again with immense loss to the assailants, and though they fought with a pluck and a determination that is the admiration of all military men here, they never succeeded farther than to effect a lodgment for a brief period in the cattle laager, which was only garrisoned by one company 1-13th, and was never considered tenable. Our loss would have been much less severe than it was but for the fact of many of the Zulus being armed with the Martini-Henry rifles which were captured at Isandwhlana and the Intombi River. Portions of the enemy armed with these splendid weapons finding cover under the rocks to the east and in a fold in the ground to the west kept up an enfilading fire from 600 to 1,000 yards, which inflicted all the serious damage of the day.

Major Hackett, when gallantly leading a couple of companies of the 90th over to the reverse slope, where a more than usually severe attack was developing, was struck by one of these bullets, which cut out both eyes. The brief hold of the cattle laager was the one Zulu success of the day, but the murderous fire by which it was immediately swept from the fort and from four guns under Major Tremlett, which worked in the open during the best part of the day, made the place untenable. The Zulus, however, stuck to it like men, and one of them charged out when the company of the 18th, which had been defending it, retired, and assegaied a fine fellow who was the last to leave, and who had just before saved the life of his own sergeant.

From the waggons of the laager they kept up a good fight for some time with the whole camp, including Colonel Wood and his Staff, who posted in the ditch of the fort, set the men an example not merely of cool courage, but of good shooting. Colonel Wood himself shot three running Zulus in successive shots, stopping a rush from the laager to cut off his staff, who went to the rescue of a wounded man who would otherwise have inevitably been assagaied. The gros of the Zulus lay in the body of the spruit, waiting evidently to make a rush in force directly their men got into the fort and main laager. Their chance, however, never came, and when, after repeated attacks, all most bloodily repulsed, they gave up the business and began to retreat in the most orderly and leisurely style, such a cheer rose from the beleaguered garrison as has never before been heard in South Africa.

They did not waste much time, however, in rejoicing. Infantry and artillery fell to again, plying the retreating masses with shells and storms of bullets, while the bugles sounded to horse, and every mounted man, except the mounted Basutos, who had remained out the whole day annoying the rear of the, enemy, saddled in hot haste and started in pursuit. The flying horsemen turned the retreat into a rout, slaying without resistance the flying savages, until darkness put an end to the pursuit. Many were shot, but many also fell stabbed with their own assegais, the horsemen arming themselves with these weapons, and using them as if giving point with a sabre. Many of the Zulus simulated death, others tried to hide in ant bear holes, and one or two prayed for mercy, but as a rule they met their fate silently and with the stoicism of the valiant savages that they are. Some 800 bodies were buried round about the camp, and the most modest estimate is 800 killed in the pursuit, but the dead are lying about all over the country in the line of the retreat, and I have no doubt if the kloofs and spruits were searched the bodies of many a mortally stricken man, who had crawled there to die, would be discovered. I think that to say 1,200 were killed would be quite within the, mark, and if we assume the usual proportion of wounded it will be seen that the Zulus have received a lesson which may not be without its effect on the issue of the campaign."

ZULU ACCOUNTS

Mehlokazulu, Warrior, Ingobamakhosi Regt.

"About Zlobani and Kambula I commence at Zlobani. The English forces went up the mountain and did not see us; we came round the mountain. Those who were on the side of the mountain where the sun sets succeeded in getting out quickly; those who were on the side where the sun rises were driven the other way, and thrown over the krantzes. There was a row of white men thrown over the krantzes, their ammunition was done, they did not fire, and we killed them without their killing any of our men; a great many were also killed on the top; they were killed by the people on the mountain. We did not go up the mountain, but the men whom the English forces had attacked followed them up. They had beaten the Maqulusi, and succeeded in getting all the cattle of the whole neighbourhood which were there, and would have taken away the whole had we not rescued them. We encamped for the night, and then in the morning we went to attack the Kambula camp.

When we were a long way from the camp we saw it, and it appeared as if an entrenchment had been made. When we got as near to the camp as the Victoria bridge is from this Courthouse the white people came towards us on horseback. They commenced firing first, we did not commence there. We fired and they fired; they retired, and we followed them. That was the Ngobamakosi regiment. We thought the Zulu army was not far off, but it appears that at this time the main body had not got up, I mean that portion of the army which subsequently rose in the rear of the laager. The horsemen galloped back as hard as they could to camp; we followed and discovered ourselves almost close to the camp, into which we made the greatest possible efforts to enter.

The English fired their cannon and rockets, and we were fighting and attacking them for about one hour. I mean the Ngobamakosi regiment. Before the main body of the Zulu army came up, we when the Zulu army did come up, were Lying prostrate -- we were beaten, we could do no good. So many were killed that the few who were not killed were lying between dead bodies, so thick were the dead. The main body of the Zulu army attacked the camp from the rear, and tried for a long time to get in. The Nkenke regiment succeeded in getting into the cattle kraal. The Umbonambi regiment suffered much loss; indeed, the last two-named regiments were almost annihilated. It was unfortunate for the Zulus that the Ngobamakosi regiment should have marched quicker than was expected; we had no intention of attacking the camp, but were drawn on to do .so by the mounted men before the main body of the Zulu army came up. The regiments were anxious to attack, but we went there cross, our hearts were full, and we intended to do the same as at Isandwhlana. At the Ondine battle (Ulundi), the last, we did not fight with the same spirit, because we were then frightened. We had had a severe lesson, and did not fight with the same zeal. At Kambula the Ngobamakosi suffered the most. At the conclusion of the fight we were chased by the English forces over three ridges, and were only saved from entire destruction by the darkness I myself only just managed to escape.

Night came on, and they left off following us. Had we all come up and attacked the Kambula camp at the same time we should have entered the camp on that day; it is at any rate probable if the attack had not been spoiled as I have said. Umnyanian was the chief in command; Tshingwayo also commanded under him. The Zulu plan was determined on by Cetywayo, whose orders were not to attack the entrenchments, but pass them by. If they attacked us we were to attack them, if they remained in their laager, then we were to pass on into the Transvaal territory, and that would bring the English forces out. But as it happened, we found ourselves by accident in action with the English forces.

Cetywayo was very angry with us, and said we had no right to attack the laager. He blamed, and said he would kill the officer in command, but he did not. We acted contrary to instructions at Isandwhlana, and were successful; and then we acted contrary to instructions at Kambula. The attack at Rorke's Drift was led by Dabulamanzi and Vumangwana. Dabulamanzi is not a good general; he is too hasty. He commanded the lower column at Ginginlovo. Gwelegwele and Umbulwana commanded at Inyezane. We do not know how it is the Coast Zulus did not fight better. We looked down upon them, and complained that they fought so badly."

Mehlokazulu, a junior officer with the Ngobamakosi, recalled:

"Our regiment, the Ngobamakosi, was so anxious to distinguish itself that we disobeyed the King's orders, and went on too fast, without waiting for our supports. When we got to the camp we were so tired that we could do nothing, and by the time our supports came up we were beaten back. Had we waited properly for our supports, we should have attacked the camp on three sides at once, and we should have taken it."

A warrior named Sihlahla, who had fought at Victory Hill on January 22, was with the umXhapo regiment, which was part of the right horn.

"Everyone in the Ngobamakhosi lay down as the safest for the bullets from the white men were like hail falling about us. It was fearful, no one could face them without being struck.... I found myself near a large white stone placed there by the white people [a range marker?] behind this I got, and there remained until the force gave way and fled. We were then pursued by the horsemen from the camp, who rode after our retreating army and turned them about like cattle. We were completely beaten.... Not one of our force doubted our being beaten and openly said that they had had enough and would go home. Mnyamana, the induna in command, tried to collect the force and march it back to the King, but he could not."

CASUALTIES: British
CORPS OR DPT	KILLED		WOUNDED
	OFFICERS	NCO & MEN	OFFICERS	NCO & MEN
Royal Artillery	-	-	Lt. Nicholson*	1
1/13th Regt.	-	6	Capt. Cox Capt. Persse	19 (2 of these died of their wounds)
90th Regt.	-	8	Maj. Hackett Lt. Smith Lt. Bright*	26 (5 of these died of their wounds)
Frontier Light Horse	-	2	-	2
Mounted Infantry	-	1	Capt. Gardner	4
Transvaal Rangers	-	-	Lt. White*	-
Baker's Horse	-	-	-	1
Kaffrarian Rifles	-	-	-	1
Dutch Burghers	-	-	-	1
Mounted Basutos	-	1	-	-
Contractor's Agent (civilian)	-	1	-	-
Total	-	18	8	57
* Died of wounds

Zulus: 1,000 killed: Umbonambi - Nokenke - Ingobamakhosi all lost heavily, as did the local irregulars. Many Zulu chiefs and officials were killed.

BATTLE PROFILE

The Zulu account of the battle indicates that they could of taken the camp had the attack gone in as planned. Regrettable for the Zulu the young unmarried warriors of the Ingobamakhosi raced ahead of the main Impi having been provoked by some mounted units, they no doubt had visions of Isandlwana, it was these warriors who had persuaded the Induna's to attack the camp disobeying Kings instructions.

The British were to learn from this goading of the Zulu regiments into attacking, when they were prepared to receive them, one that was especially successful against the young unmarried warriors. During the battle the British did come under some rather accurate rifle fire from the Zulus this appears to have been the only battle where this happened, possibly the fact that the Zulu were having to fire upwards to the camp this may have been a factor towards this accuracy.

WARGAMING KHAMBULA (See also Ginginhlovu)

Terrain - For the redoubt use stone kraal walling; cattle kraal - earth bank and odd waggon; main laager - earth bank and waggons. For attacks on defensive sites it is important that the Zulu player has a give-it-up point. To add to the uncertainty for the Zulu player a dice should be rolled after, say, 6 turns to see is impi routs.

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