These are inaccurate statements. The only fair criticism Chelmsford makes is: had not a defensive position been taken up by the garrison, with their backs to the Isandlwana hill, they may have beaten off the attack. The point about not utilising the camp's materials and not constructing a laager is totally unjust, as Chelmsford had given no orders to do so when he had been in the camp, this being totally contrary to his own guidelines on camp sites.

The Zulu attack had developed within one hour or so and their certainly was no time to form a defensive laager, which would take at least the best part of a day for such a large force, there was certainly not the three hours warning that Chelmsford hints at. Only the parts of the Report relevant here have been given.

Pietermaritzburg, Natal,
January 27, 1879.

SIR,

THE Telegram I sent you to-day will have conveyed the sad intelligence of the misfortune which has occurred to a portion of the force under my command.

The Court of Inquiry which is about to assemble will, I trust, be able to collect sufficient evidence to explain what at present appears to me almost incomprehensible; but, from the account of the few who escaped, I am able to give you a narrative which, though perhaps not absolutely accurate as to facts, will convey to you a fair idea of the events of that melancholy day.

On reaching Rorke's Drift, I, for the first time, heard some particulars of the attack upon the Insalwana Camp, and am thus able to furnish the following narrative, the absolute accuracy of which, however, I cannot vouch for: --

Shortly before the arrival of Lieutenant -Colonel Dumford in camp with his 450 natives, information had reached Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine from the left picquets that a number of Zulus had been seen on that flank.

On receiving this information, Lieutenant-Colonel Dumford asked Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of British Infantry, in order that he might move up the heights on the left and attack them. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine at once stated that his orders were to defend the camp, and that without a positive order he could not allow the companies to leave.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dumford then took his 450 natives up the heights, and went, so far as I can learn, about five miles from camp, when he found himself in front of a very large army of Zulus.

He at once sent back word to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, and with his Mounted Basutos retired slowly before the Zulus, who advanced to attack him. The Mounted Basutos, I hear from many quarters, behaved remarkably well, and delayed the advance of the enemy for a considerable time. Their ammunition, however, began to run short, and they were, at last, obliged to retire quickly on the camp.

Being unable to find a fresh supply of ammunition, it appears they disbanded themselves and made the best of their way to the Buffalo, where they swam to the river and recrossed into Natal, assisting, however, as far as they could, many of our fugitives from the camp to escape.

As regards the proceedings of the six companies of British Infantry, two guns, and two rocket tubes, the garrison of the camp, I can obtain but little information.

One company went off the extreme left and has never been heard of since, and the other five, I understand, engaged the enemy about a mile to the left front of the camp, and made there a most stubborn and gallant resistance.

So long as they kept their faces to the enemy the Zulus were, I am told, quite unable to drive them back, and fell in heaps before the deadly fire poured into them. An officer who visited this part of the field of battle on the following morning reported that the loss of the Zulus in killed could not be less than 2,000.

When, however, the Zulus got round the left flank of these brave men they appear to have lost their presence of mind, and to have retired hastily through the tents which had never been struck.

Immediately the whole Zulu force surrounded them, they were overpowered by numbers, and the camp was lost. Those who were mounted, ran the gauntlet and some small portion managed to reach the river, which, however, at the point of crossing was deep and rapid. Many were shot or assegaied, and many were swept away by the current, and it is presumed have been drowned.

Had the force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp itself, and utilized there the materials for a hasty entrenchment which lay near to hand, I feel absolutely confident, that the whole Zulu ammy would not have been able to dislodge them. It appears that the oxen were yoked to the wagons three hours before the attack took place, so that there was ample time to construct that wagon which the Dutch in former days understood so well. Had, however, even the tents been struck and the British troops placed with their backs to the precipitous Insalwana Hill, I feel sure that they could have made a successful resistance.

Rumours reached me, however, that the troops were deceived by a simulated retreat, and in their eagerness to close with the enemy allowed themselves to be drawn away from their line of defence.

Our actual loss cannot as yet be correctly ascertained, but I fear that it cannot be less than 30 officers and about 500 non commissioned officers, rank and file, belonging to the Imperial troops, and 21 officers and 70 non commissioned officers, rank and file of the Colonial forces. The effect of this disaster throughout the Colony has already shown itself, and the European colonists generally are in great alarm.

The result of this has been to produce a similar effect upon the native mind, and our Native Contingents are beginning to lose heavily by desertion. This will, I trust, be checked with a firm hand by the Natal Govemment, as the natives were ordered out by their supreme chief, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, and have no right to leave their corps until released by his order. The fact remains, however, that the Natal native allies are no longer to be depended upon, and additional British reinforcements must be sent out if the operations against the Zulus are to be carried to a successful issue.

Private BOB HEAD, 'B' Company 2/24th Rorke's Drift

"I now send you these few lines to inform you of what I dare say you will have seen in the paper before you receive this we under Lieut Chard and Broomhead had a nice night of it at Rorke's Drift I call it I never shall forget the same place about as long as I live. I dare say the old fool in command will make a great fuss over two officers commanding our company in keeping the Zulu buck back with the Private soldier what will he get nothing only he may get the praise of the public. Now I shall if God spares me live and see dear old England again. I shall find what I say to be true so now as I had to give a shilling for this bit of paper you will only be able to know I am ready and willing to lose my life to win back for our sister battalion 1-/24 renown so kindest love to all I am jolly only short of a pipe and bacca. Your loving brother Bob Head."

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