Burrows ordered Brigadier Nuttall to seize Mundahad. Nuttall sent forward Major G. R. Blackwood the battery commander, with Fowell's two guns and Captain Mayne's squadron of the 3rd Light Cavalry; Maclaine's guns were left awaiting further orders. Blackwood soon reported that Mundadad was unoccupied and orders were given for the baggage train to be quartered in and around the village. Blackwood and Fowell then crossed the dig nullah and advanced on to the plain. As they did so Nuttall suddenly noticed that Maclaine had, without orders(?) advanced at a gallop far out to the left flank, unlimbered und opened fire on the Afghan cavalry at a range of ahout 1,700 yards. Nuttall immediately ordered Fowell's guns into action at a point some 1,400 yards north of Mundabad, sent a trooper to recall Maclaine and summoned up Osborne's guns from the rearguard to a position on Fowell's right. Slade's smoothbore battery also came forward and went into action from a position to the left rear of the Horse Artillery. Mayne's squadron remained for the moment on the right flank while other c avalry troops took post to protect the left flank and rear of the artillery. The infantry meanwhile had advanced on to the plain and just before 11 am were lying down some 500 yards behind the guns which were now all engaging the enemy.

At right, Afghan warrior infantry. Illustration from The Colonial Wars Sourcebook.

As these initial dispositions were being made, the mist suddenly cleared and Ayub's army came clearly into view, wheeling off its line of march and deploying into battle formation. On its left were swarms of tribesmen, many of them religious fanatics known as Ghazis, supported by some cavalry; in the centre were the regular Afghan infantry, seven battalions with three in reserve; on the right the cavalry, already beginning to feel round the British left flank; deployed at intervals along the line was the artillery. At last Burrows realised what appalling odds his small force of 2,600 was facing; his own estimate of the Afghan army was 4,100 cavalry, 5,900 infantry and about 15,000 tribesmen against his 12 guns the Afghans mustered 30, which now began to come into action and open fire at a range of about 2,000 yards.

As the great host of Afghans began to tramp southwards towards Burrows' position, his three battalions marched forward and took up a post on either side of the guns. On the extreme right the 66th, 15 officers and 364 men; on their left four companies of the 30th NI, Osborne's two nine-pounders, two more companies of the 30th and Fowell's guns; to the left of these guns was the Sapper company, 45 men commanded by Lieutenant Henn with one native officer and two British NCOs; next came Maclaine's guns with on their left the smoothbore battery and finally, on the extreme left two more companies of the 30th with only one British officer, Lieutenant D. Cole. The cavalry were already busy on the left flank demonstrating against the Afghan horse who were edging further and further round to the rear and the baggage, where Major Ready had disposed his small force to protect it. The baggage was also threatened on the other flank as parties of tribesmen began to creep down through the villages but accurate long-range rifle fire of Quarry's G. Company 66th kept them off.

By now the hot July sun was beating down on the battlefield. In the centre the Afghans were content to push steadily forward covered by their artillery whose well-directed fire increased in intensity. To avoid casualties the British infantry were ordered to lie down but the more exposed cavalry and gunners began to suffer. To counter the threats on the flanks, two guns of the smoothbore battery were sent to either wing at about 12.15.

At right, Afghan cavalrymen. Illustration from The Colonial Wars Sourcebook.

On the right, opposite the 66th, some enemy cavalry suddenly charged. Lieutenant Hyacinth Lynch later described this attack;

"M'Math (his company commander) held his fire until they were quite near, within one hundred yards I should say. Then he let them have a volley. Several fell, horses and riders mixed up in great confusion. Many closed with us but they had lost their formation and there was no shock. They came on and when within striking distance the horses refused to face our bayonets and turning to their left, rode along our front pushing our bayonets to one side. The men on the knee and standing stuck at the men and horses as they brushed by. When they passed away to the flank we opened fire at the riders and horses on the ground in front of us and very soon disposed of them."

By one o'clock no Afghan infantry had attacked but while the pressure on the British flanks and rear continued the Afghan artillery was being pushed forward even closer to the line firing continuously. The British gunners fought their guns manfully but the artillery duel was hopelessly one-sided. The smoothhore guns on the flanks were brought back to the centre put between 1.30 and 2 pm they ran out of ammunition and Slade ordered them to the rear. Slade himself now had to take over E Battery as Blackwood was seriously wounded as was Fowell.

Coinciding with the withdrawal of the smoothbores, the Afghan artillery was pushed forward again, first to within 700 yards of the line, then 500. Now Ayub signalled his hordes forward. A mass of Ghazis erupted from the smaller nullah and charged headlong at the 66th. Springing to their feet the thin khaki line poured volley after volley into the onrushing host. Hundreds fell and though the attack was pressed with great courage, it melted away in the face of British musketry. To the right of the Ghazis, the regular Afghan infantry advanced against the fire of the two Indian battalions. To begin with the rifle fire did great execution and Colonel Mainwaring commanding the 30th, afterwards reported: "I was thrice enabled to give the order to cease firing consequent on the enemy having been driven back".

Although the initial assault had been held Ayub's men came on again. On the extreme left, the two companies of the 30th were in grave danger. They had lost the support of the smoothbores, Lieutenant Cole had been killed and their three Indian officers gravely wounded. As a fresh swarm of Ghazis bore down the sight of their yard-long knives and the sound of their terrifying yells proved too much for the sepoys of the 30th. Seized by panic, they hurled themselves, as if for shelter, amongst their fellow sepoys of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers. That Regiment, which had hitherto behaved admirably, was thrown into confusion. Major Leach, VC, Burrows' staff officer, saw what happened;

"Although every endeavour was made hy LieutenantColonel Anderson and his officers to rally the men and to form a square, they were by this time in a great measure out of hand and the officers could only get the sepoys to form a sort of V ... at this juncture Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson was hit in six places and ... the infantry continued retreating without formation."

The gunners of E Battery fought their guns to the last possible moment; Maclaine's division, somewhat in advance of the remainder, was overrun, cut down and lost their guns, but Slade managed to limber up the other four when the Ghazis were within fifteen yards of the muzzles and gallop off to a safer position (see right) in the rear where he again opened fire. The small detachment of Sappers kept their heads and, as the guns galloped off, they fired three volleys and marched steadily off in formation towards Mundabad. As the triumphant Afghans hurtled forward slaughtering the fleeing Grenadiers, the rest of the 30th panicked and crowded down towards the right, falling upon the left and rear of the 66th. When the line started to collapse, Captain Beresford Pierse of the 66th had turned the rear rank of his company about and commenced volley firing at the Afghans swarming round the captured guns; this fire was now masked by the panic-stricken sepoys of the 30th, who cannoned into the rear centre of the 66th, forcing the British soldiers forwards towards the mass of Ghazis attacking in front. Their formation disrupted, the 66th retired to the right, still preserving its cohesion and holding off the Afghans at ahout 25 yards range. Burrows galloped up to Nuttall and told him it was essential for the cavalry to charge. Nuttall and the British officers succeeded in forming up about 130 sabres but though they charged forward, the Indian troopers veered to the right hefore the moment of impact and retired off the field.

The infantry which had been to the left of the guns were making for Mundabad, whilst those on the right headed for Khig. Burrows personally tried to turn the latter towards Mundabad, but only succeeded with some of the 30th and part of the 66th. Most of the latter in small rallying squares made for the deep nullah to the left of Khig. The sight of their wounded was terrible; fighting for their lives, the 66th were unable to carry them off and those that could not walk had to he left to be butchered by the Ghazis.

End of the 66th

At the nullah, the Commanding Officer of the 66th, Colonel James Galbraith, 47 years old and 29 of them in the Regiment, seized the Queen's Colour, rallied his remaining men and made a determined stand. The afghans held off and opened a devastating fire, causing a further 60-70 casualties. The Colonel decided on a further withdrawal to the houses and walled gardens of Khig. As the men retired, firing as they went, the Colonel fell, still grasping the Colour. Lieutenant and Adjutant Rayner was badly wounded and Private Darby, who in peacetime had been the Regiment's bass drummer stood over him firing and using his bayonet until he too was cut down.

About 100 men of the 66th reached Khig and there they stayed, firing what was left of their ammunition. The Afghans were content to pour in a heavy fire and gradually the remnants of the Regiment died. Major Blackwood who had stayed with the 66th though suffering from his wound, was killed here. 2nd Lieutenants Olivey and Honeywood died in succession holding up the Regimental Colour to rally the men. Finally it was taken up by the senior non-commissioned officer, Sergeant-Major Cuppage; he stood firmly for some time but eventually he and the Colour went down and neither rose again.

At last the end came. Only two officers, Lieutenants R.T. Chute of the 66th and C.W. Hinde of the Bombay Grenadiers, and nine men of the 66th remained standing. This little band formed up and charged out of the gardens to the south-east. But wounds, thirst and exhaustion brought them to a halt; they stood back to back and fired their last rounds until they were all killed. Only when the last man fell, did the Afghans close in.

All that remained of the 66th was a party retreating from Mundabad, where they had held out for some time under the direct command of Burrows, and Major Ready and the baggage guard. Throughout the day Ready had beaten off repeated attacks until 3 pm, when the retreat became general. He then attempted to withdraw the baggage covered by G Company but as all the men were greatly exhausted by heat and thirst he was compelled to abandon the stores and to retreat carrying the wounded on the baggage animals.

"Quarry retired slowly, firing on the enemy as they pressed on. I saw many (enemy) killed by good, steady shooting at 400 yards ... I remained in rear and urged Quarry to come back and form up by the guns. He was so done and sad that he said he would retire not any more and wanted to go back to the gardens ... At about 5.30 I think the enemy fired several round shot at us and I don't think they pressed further".

The men of E Battery who joined up with Ready had conducted a fighting withdrawal. Firing case shot at the enemy infantry, they held their ground until the Afghan artillery got their range, when they limbered up and moved off again. Of their conduct on this day, Burrows wrote afterwards in his despatch: "Their behaviour was admirable, exposed to a heavy fire they served their guns cooly and steadily as if on parade and when the guns were rushed they fought the Ghazis with hand-spikes and sponge-rods."

Acts of Gallentry

Individual acts of gallantry were later suitably rewarded. Trumpeter Jones received the Distinguished Conduct Medal and Sergeant Patrick Mullane the Victoria Cross. As Mullane's gun was being hooked in, Driver Istead was struck from his horse. Looking back, Mullane saw the man was still alive. Though the enemy were only a few yards off, the Sergeant ran back, lifted the wounded driver onto the limber and, mounting Istead's horse, brought the gun out of action. Later on, during the retreat, Mullane volunteered to enter a hostile village alone and under fire to bring out water for the wounded.

Other wounded men owed their lives to Gunner James Collis, who was awarded the VC for engaging a party of Afghans single-handed, thus allowing his gun team with its load of wounded men to escape.

Retreat

Throughout the retreat the guns served as a rallying point for the survivors. There were 40 miles to cover back to Kandahar, 16 of them across a waterless desert. Along the route the news of Ayub's approach encouraged the villagers to attack the almost defenceless column. The horrors of the march were later described by Slade: "The guns and carriages are crowded with helpless officers and men suffering the tortures of the damned; horses are limping along with ugly wounds and men are pressing eagerly to the rear in the hope of finding water ... The cries of 'Water! Water!' become more frequent and louder and louder ... the wounded open their mouths and showed a dried, parched tongue."

All through the night and the next morning they staggered on until at about 2.15 pm the leading elements reached Kandahar after 33 hours of marching and fighting on little food, a scant supply of water, and in a temperature of 110 degrees in the shade.

Burrows was utterly crushed. In the words of an eyewitness, the defeated General, "worn out with anxiety, suffering and fatigue and voiceless with the strain of trying to keep his troops together, was, for the moment, a broken man". Out of his force of 2,600, 971 had been killed or were missing, 168 were wounded; 786 followers were dead; 269 horses were killed and wounded and thousands of baggage animals lost; seven guns had been captured with quantities of stores and ammunition. At the time Maiwand was held to be the worst disaster to British arms in Asaia since Chillianwallah in 1849. Only the gallantry of the 66th and the Royal Horse Artillery saved it from being a disgrace.

The repercussions were serious. General Primrose became besieged in Kandahar and the whole military situation in Afghanistan once again hung in the balance. Swift and decisive action was vital. On 9th August Roberts, with a force of 10,000, started on his epic march from Kabul to Kandahar. Reaching the latter on the 31st, he relieved Primrose and the next day decisively defeated Ayub Khan outside the city. This victory ended the Afghan War but many problems on the North-West Frontier remained to be solved.

Postscript

One postscript to the story of Maiwand remains to be told. Among the survivors was the small white mongrel, shown in Feller's painting. This dog, Bobby, was the pet of Sergeant Kelly of the 66th. Although wounded in the battle, Bobby survived and rejoined his comrades in Kandahar. Returning to England with the Regiment in February 1881, he was decorated with the Afghan medal by Queen Victoria at Osborne in July of that year. It is sad to relate that, having survived the perils of Afghanistan, he was run over by a hansom cab in the streets of Gosport on 13th October 1882. His stuffed corpse can be seen to this day at the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment Museum in Salisbury.

Sources