by Paul Darnell
INTRODUCTIONOn the 12th January, No.1 column (right column) started to cross the Tugela River, starting their advance into Zululand. The next five days were spent in constructing Fort Tenedos on the Zulu bank and bringing across the waggons and supplied by way of the poets. Their destination was Eshowe, a disused Norwegian mission station, the site chosen for the first major fortified stage post. On 6 a.m. on the 18th January, Col. Pearson's section of the column set off with Col. Welmano following on with the remainder of the column on the 19th. The following days up to the 22nd were spent crossing successive rivers with the advance being taken in easy stages. Col. Pearson started the advance once again, setting off with his section at 5 a.m. on th 22nd to cover the 4 miles to the Nyezane River. FORCES ENGAGED
ZULU: Induna Godide Umxhapo Ibutho 35 year olds, unmarried, 1000 strong Ngulubi Ibutho 55 year olds, married, 500 strong Udlambedhlu Ibutho 64 year olds, married, 2-300 maximum (Above regiments present in force) Nsugamtni Ibutho, Iqwa Ibutho, Udududu Ibutho, InDabakawombu Ibutho, local irregular tribes 650 men (detachments only present, 2-3000 approx), TOTAL 4-6000 warriors Positions of regiments in action unclear, Umxhapo regt. probably on left horn. ZULU IMPIThe King had sent the 3 main regiments present from Ulundi and together with the local elements of regiments and irregulars, their orders were to watch the columns advance up to the Nyezane River and there to stop it by way of a surprise attack. A Zulu impi was known to be in this area. Eyewitness AccountFor this action we have Col. Pearson's report to Lord Chelmsford about this action, a purnal report by an unnamed officer of the Natal Brigade, a letter written by Colour Sgt. J.W. Burnett, 99th Regt., and a Private, Tom Cullern R.E. From the Zulu viewpoint there is a short but graphic account from a warrior of the urnXhapo regt. FROM COLONEL PEARSON COMMANDING No. 1 COLUMN, TO THE MILITARY SECRETARY TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR Etshowi, Zululand 23rd January, 1879. Sir, I have the honour to report my arrival here at 10 a.m. this day, with the Column under my command, and I am happy to state, without a casualty of any kind except, of course, those which occurred in the engagement of yesterday, of which I have already duly informed you by telegram, despatched yesterday evening. Yesterday morning, the mounted troops which preceded the Column, under Major Barrow, had crossed the Inyezani River - which is about four miles from our camping ground of the previous night, when I received a note from him to say that he had selected a fairly open space for a haiting-place, which he had carefully videtted. I at once rode forward to reconnoitre, and found the ground covered with more bush than seemed desirable for an outspan; but as there was no water between the Inyezani and the places where we bivouacked last night four miles further on, and with several steep hills to climb,--I decided upon outspanning for a couple of hours to feed and rest the oxen, and to enable the men to breakfast. It was then just eight o'clock, and I was in the act of giving directions about the piquets and scouts required for our protection, and the waggons had already begun to park, when the leading company of the Native Contingent, who were scouting in front personally directed by Captain Hart, Staff officer to the officer commanding that regiment, discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges in our front, [Zulu left horn] and making for the clumps of bush around us. This Company was sent up the central ridge to clear away a small group of Zulus. Following up the retreating warriors, who had withdrawn to the right ridge, it became disordered whilst crossing the dense scrub between the ridges. The officers were trying to regroup the Company. The Zulus at once opened a heavy fire upon the men of the company who had shown themselves in the open, and they lost one officer, four non-commissioned officers and three men killed, almost immedialtely after the firing began. Unfortunately, owing to scarcely any of the officers or non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent being able to speak Kaffir, and some not even English (there were several foreigners among them), it has been found most difficult to communicate orders, and it is to be feared that these men who lost their lives by gallantly holding, their ground, did so under the impression that it was the duty of the contingent to fight in the first line, instead of scouting only, and, after an engagement, to pursue. [Majority of Company routed leaving a few officers/NCOs]. I must add, however, that every exertion has been made by Major Graves, Commandant Nettleton, and Captain Hart, to explain to both the officers and men the duties expected of them. These officers, indeed, have been indefatigable in their exertions. As soon as the firing commenced, I directed the Naval Brigade, under Commander Campbeli, Lieutenant Lloyd's division of guns, and Captain Jackson's and Lieutenant Martini's companies of "The Buffs," to take on a position on a knoll close by the road (and under which they were halted), and from thence the whole of the Zulu advances could be seen and dealt with. [Naval Brigade Gattling brought up - first time used on land]. Meanwhile the waggons continued to park, and as soon as the length of the Column had thereby sufficiently decreased, I directed the two companies of the Buffs, which were guarding the waggons about half way down the Column, to clear the enemy out of the bush, which had been already shelled and fired into with rockets and musketry by the troops on the knoll above mentioned. These Companies, led by Captains Harrison and Wyld, and guided by Captain Macgregor, D.A.Q.M.G.; whom I sent back for this purpose, moved out in excellent order, and quickly getting into skirmishing order, brought their right shoulders gradually forward, and drove the Zulus before them back into the open, which again exposed them to the rockets, shells, and musketry from the knoll. This movement released the main body of the Mounted Infantry and Volunteers, who, with the company Royal Engineers, had remained near the Inyezani, to protect that portion of the convoy of waggons. The Royal Engineers happened to be working at the drift when the engagement began. When thus released, both the Engineers and mounted troops, under Captain Wynne and Major Barrow respectively, moved forward with the infantry skirmishers on the left of the latter, the whole being supported by a half-company of "The Buffs" and a half company of the 99th Regiment, sent out by Lieutenant Colonel Welman, 99th Regiment, who, with the rear of the column, was now coming up. About this time the enemy was observed by Commander Campbell to be trying to outflank our left, [Zulu chest] and he offered to go with a portion of the Naval Brigade to drive away a body of Zulus who had got possession of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll, and which was helping their fuming movement. The Naval Brigade was supported by a party of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Native Contingent, under Captain Hart, who were posted on high ground on the left of the Etshowi Road, and who checked the Zulus from making any farther attempt on our left. Shortly afterwards, when the kraal was evacuated, Commander Campbell suggested that the enemy should be driven off still farther, to which I at once assented, and I desired Colonel Parnell to take Captain Forster's Company, "The Buffs," which up to this time had remained at the foot of the knoll, and assist the Naval Brigade to attack some heights beyond the kraal upon which a considerable body of Zulus were still posted. The action was completely successful, and the Zulus now fled in all directions, both from our front and left, and before the skimmishers on the right. [Zulu right horn] fared to advance any distance, held back by 2 Mounted Veddettes, 4 Mounted Hussars, 4 Mounted Infantry. I now ordered the Column to be reformed, and at noon we resumed our march, and bivouacked for the night on the ground described in the first part of my letter. The last shot was fired about half-past nine a.m. I enclose a list of the killed and wounded, and, in addition, I beg to state that both Colonel Parnell and myself had our horses shot under us. The loss of the enemy I can, of course, only approximately give. By all accounts, however - and I have taken every pains to verify and confirm the statements made,-upwards of 300 Zulus were killed. The wounded, if there were any, were either carried off or hid in the bush, as only two were found. The dead were Iying about in heaps of seven or eight, and in one place ten dead bodies were found close together At another thirty-five were counted within a very small space. As far as I can ascertain, the numbers opposed to us were about 4,000, composed of the Umxapu, Umdhlanefu, and the Ingulubi regiments, and some 650 men of the district. I had already been warned although Mr. Fynney, border agent, and other sources, that I might expect to be attacked at any moment after crossing the Umsindusi River, but the number of Zulus stated to be in the neighbourhood was estimated at about 8,000. All the commanding officers speak highly of the behaviour of the men during the engagement, and of the coolness of the officers and the pains taken bv them to control the expenditure of ammunition. This I can personally vouch for as regards the troops on the knoll, as I was present with them the whole time. The practice made by Lieutenant Lloyd's guns, and by the rockets of the Naval Brigade, directed by Mr. Cotter, boatswain of H.M.S. Active, was excellent, and no doubt contributed materially to the success of the day. Major Barrow particularly wishes me to mention the steadiness and good conduct under fire of the Natal Mounted Volunteer Corps. Those engaged were the Victoria and Stanger Mounted Rifles, and the Natal Hussars. Of the commanding officers themselves I have already spoken. From the officers of my Staff, Colonel Walker C.B., Captain MacGregor, and Lieutenant Knight, "The Buffs" - my orderly officer, - I have received every assistance - not only during yesterday's engagement, but ever since they joined me. I cannot speak too highly of the energy and attention to their duties of Staff Surgeon Norburg, R.N., my senior medical officer, and his assistants. The Field Hospital was established in a convenient place almost immediately after the firing began, and the wounded received every attention. Lastly, I wish to report the good example shown to the Native Pioneers by Captain Beddoes and Lieutenant Porrington, who, throughout our march, under the direction of Lieutenant Main, R.E., repaired our road in front, and during the engagement remained on the knoll fighting rifle in hand. I must apologise for the great length of this letter; but as the present is the first campaign of British troops against the Zulus, and as the Natal natives were being tested as soldiers for the first time, I have purposely gone into details. Should we again be engaged with the enemy, there will, of course, be no farther necessity for describing everything so minutely. To-morrow morning I propose sending two companies of the Buffs, two companies of the Native Contingent, and a small number of mounted men, to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who, with three companies of his regiment, left behind for the purpose, is now on his way to Etshowi, with a convoy of sixty Commissariat waggons. I have written to request Colonel Ely not to advance beyond the Umsindusi till reinforced. On Saturday Major Coates starts for the Tugela with fifty empty waggons, escorted by four companies infantry, two native companies, and a few troopers to bring up more stores. I enclose a couple of sketches of the ground on which the engagement took place, made by Captain MacGregor and Lieutenant Knight from memory. I have the honour to be, Sir, Col. Sgt. J.W. BURNETTThere is a mail down from the front tonight, so I take the opportunity of making you the general newsagent for my friends in Chatham, and give you an account of our first battle. On the morning before last, we started in two columns on the march. My company formed the advance guard of the second column, and we had only just started when we heard the artillery going ahead. We were pushed up as quickly as we could be, when we found that we were being attacked by some 4,000 or 5,000 Zulus. Our cavalry had dismounted, and the advanced guard of the first column were having their breakfast while some were bathing, when these gentlemen popped in. They had selected a spot to attack us which, in their language means 'Victory Hill', and it appears since from the prisoners that it is a favourite fighting ground of theirs, and one where they beat the Dutch and every nigger tribe they ever tackled. They have a mark on the hill where the spot is beyond which they were never beaten back. However, on this occasion they were destined to find out they were not to have it all their own way. They came down a ravine on each side of the hill, and right over the top of it, attempting to surround our columns, and on the first shot being fired our native levies skedaddled and left their officers, five of whom were shot before you could look round. Directly they were down, the Kaffirs were upon them, and assegaied them cruelly, stabbing them in twenty or thirty places. The Zulus got away with their breechloaders, about 600 rounds of ammunition, and a horse, but we got the horse again. The Zulus stood for about four hours, our people firing shells, rockets, Martinis, and the Gatling guns. I never thought niggers would make such a stand. They came on with an utter disregard of danger. The men that fired did not load the guns. They would fire and run into the bush, and have fresh guns loaded for them, and out again. They fire young cannon balls, slugs, and even gravel. I tell you what it is: our 'school' at Chatham, over one hot whisky, used to laugh about these niggers, but I assure you that fighting with them is terribly earnest work, and not child's play. Sergeant Tuckett's party, Royal Engineers, were in the thick of it, but none of the Royal Engineers were killed. Three Buffs were killed, and some volunteers wounded, but none of ours. We do not go on from here for a week, as we have to build a fort for a depot for stores. We have advanced about fifteen miles from where the fight took place, so you may imagine we gave them a good whacking. Sergeant Tuckett knocked two or three niggers over. He was in far greater danger than I was, as he was with the leading column, while I was in the second but came in time to assist. About 400 niggers were killed. These were Cetshwayo's picked shots, and came down with the amiable intention of chasing us into the sea. In this, I am happy to say, they failed. The King told them that if they did not succeed they need not go back to his place, so we expect to have to kraal them all. They are hovering about somewhere. They can scatter and collect again. We thus have to sleep with arms and accoutrements on, and are under arms every morning at three. We have not had our clothes off, except to bathe, for three weeks. UNNAMED NAVAL BRIGADE OFFICER22 January. Started at daylight. I was looking after the waggons in the centre of the column when, about eight o'clock, I heard firing at the front. I immediately pushed forward, when I found the advance guard hotly engaged. The staff, Lloyd's guns, some of the Buffs, and the bluejackets occupied a low knoll to the right of the road; in front of them was a high hill overlooking our position, in possession of the Zulus. The mounted men were on a plain to our right, and the road was completely commanded by the enemy, who were concealed over the ridge of their hill, and kept up a heavy fire. When I arrived both of our companies were engaged on the left of the knoll; the Zulus annoyed us very much from a kraal further to the left, but a couple of rockets dislodged them and the Native Contingent took it. The Zulus advancing on our left, the bluejackets were ordered there, and being very exposed moving up the road, four of our men were wounded. Driving the enemy along the road, and being supported by two companies of the Buffs under Colonel Parnell, we charged up the hill, when the Zulus took to flight. The estimated number of Zulus was between 4,000 and 5,000, and 390 were counted dead, but they carried off their wounded. We had eight white men killed and sixteen wounded, two officers among the former and seven of the Naval Brigade in the latter, one very dangerously, so that we had our share of the work. The Zulus had a very strong position, which was chosen with great judgment, as it completely commanded the road, their intention evidently being to cut off some of the waggons. They were well armed, a good many having rifles. Our men behaved very well, being exposed to a flank fire while they were advancing. Both Colonels Pearson and Pamell had their horses shot under them; the action is called Inyezane, after the river of that name. As soon as the enemy had taken to flight we continued our trek and bivouacked on a high hiO six miles from Eshowe. T. Cullen, RE.(Appeared in the South Wales Daily Telegram), 17th March 1879 Thank God, I escaped without hurt. We had an engagement on the 22nd instant, at a place called Victory Hill. We had a heavy loss of twenty-seven killed and wounded. About 600 of us were in the engagement, and opposed to 4,000 Zulus and Kaffirs. Their loss was about 300 killed, not known how many wounded, because they carry away with them as many as they can. The fight lasted from three to four hours, hard fighting. I am thankful to say I escaped. We expect another battle in a few days. We were taken by surprise in the bush, or else perhaps we should not have lost so heavily. We are working very hard now, cutting down wood, etc., for making fortifications. It is very hard work and warm. I am glad to say I am in good health and spirits, considering the hardships we have to endure in the time of war. We are to stay at the above address--Eshowe--for a few days to make a fort, as we expect a heavy attack. I will try and write you more the first opportunity, and hope you will remember me to my Monmouth friends, whom I hope some day to see, if I am spared to set foot on Old England again. ZULU ACCOUNT: Warrior UMXHAPO IBUTHOWe were told to advance and grasping our weapons we went forward packed close together like a lot of bees . . . we never got nearer than 50 paces to the English, and although we tried to climb over our fallen brothers, we could not get very far ahead because the white men were firing heavily close to the ground into our front ranks while the cannon was firing over our heads into the regiments behind us . . . this battle was so fierce that we had to wipe the blood and brains of the killed and wounded from our heads, faces, arms, legs and shields after the fighting. Casualties:
Killed: 2 officers N.N.C. 9 NOCs/men Wounded: 1 officer N.N.C. Col. Pearson and Col. Pamell had their horses shot under them. (Col. Pamell, commander of the Buffs). Zulu:
BATTLE PROFILENyezane is an interesting battle overshadowed by greater deeds at Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift, but important as it was the only time the Zulus attacked a moving column and had laid a surprise attack for the task. It it interesting to think that had the impi been successful, the tactic may have been adopted wholesale, and the advance by the slow cumbersome columns would have been ever slower with all requiring full escorts ever watchful for an attack. The Zulu impi was unlucky to say the least. The N.N.C. Company sprung the trap prematurely. It has to be said though that had the small group of Zulu warriors not appeared on the central ridge the N.N.C. Company would not have been sent ahead to drive it off, the earlier mounted patrols had all failed to detect the impi. The impi had adopted the classic buds horns formation which had it developed would certainly have been successful. Unfortunately for the Zulus only the left horn pushed its advance forward allowing the full weight of firepower from the British to be directed against it. The chest was slow to advance at first and when it finally did it was too late as sufficient firepower could now be directed against it followed up by an advance by the Naval Brigade and I Company of the Buffs and some N.N.C. The Zulu right hoan's advance failed to materialise, held back by a few horsemen. There was probably some confusion as to what to do, and to what was going on by the chest and right horn as the surprise had been sprung, the right hom could only hear the gunfire and may have been made up of local irregulars who were less keen to advance towards British lines. If the impi had been made up of Zulu regiments present in strength, the battle would surely have been another story. WARGAMING - NYEZANEThe best way to wargame this action is to let the Zulu regiments attack without being discovered, whilst the British column has halted for breakfast. To add to the realism of the day the Zulu chest and right hom should have to roll a D10 dice or D6 to check if they advance or not, 1-7 obeys orders, 8 halts, 9-10 halts for 4 moves or like. The British column should halt far enough forward to make for an interesting game, also restrictions should be piaced or can be placed on the amount of British forces across the river and able to deploy. A D6 can be used with different combinations of troop strengths for each roll. 6 is say a company of the N.N.C. and you--happy wargaming! Finally the Zulu figures should only be put on the table when the attacks start. Terrain and FigsFigs as previously mentioned. The terrain is basically 3 ridges and dare I say use the book and cloth method if you have no suitable ridge type hills. Scrub etc. can be represented by lichen and broom bristles for better realism (see Ntombi River). The river can easily be made if you have no proper sections, blue paint and a touch of white on card. Scatter sand and green scatter liberally and whalla. The best sand is kiln dried at DIY stores, a large bag for around £ 4.50. More Nyezane Back to Colonial Conquest Issue 1 Table of Contents Back to Colonial Conquest List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master List of Magazines © Copyright 1992 by Partizan Press. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |