A Study of the Mobilization and Concentration of the French Army in the War of 1870
by Thomas J. Adriance.

Direct and to the point as the title is long, The Last Gaiter Button, insightfully demonstrates how the French army's mobilization and deployment significantly influenced the outcome the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

Adriance looks at why France failed to place as many trained men under arms as possible and how the French army was paralyzed by its inadequate logistical support. He also goes on to analyze the deployment of the French army on its northeastern frontier and the chaotic use of the French railroads during the fateful days of July 1870.

The author also looks at Prussian mobilization and concentration during the Seven Weeks War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and points out a major weakness in the Prussian war machine during the conflict: its concentration of logistical support, where bloated supply columns couldn't catch up with the victorious Prussian army until after the Battle of Koniggratz. General von Moltke and the Prussian General Staff learned from their mistakes during the Bruderskrieg of 1866 and used this knowledge in planning their invasion of France in the winter of 1868-69 (especially concerning the use of railheads.) However, the French and the Austrians were still under the impression that Prussia would not be able to mobilize and concentrate her armies along the frontier in two weeks.

Based upon everything that the author presented, it's easy to see how their pre-war preparations doomed the French army to failure before a shot was fired. I was amazed by the ad hoc higher level unit organization beyond the regimental level and the idiocy of keeping the regimental recruitment centers away from the regimental supply depots (again, a famous example of "L'on se debrouillera toujours" or Systeme D). The most exasperating thing was finding out that errors which had been pointed out during mobilizations for the Crimean War of 1854 and the Italian Campaign of 1859, were again repeated during the War of 1870.

Besides the above mentioned, The Last Gaiter Button dealt with the incompetent leadership of the French high command and its amateurish staff. Given the lack of coherent French war plans, alienation of potential Austrian and Italian allies, needless changing of experienced corps commanders on the part of a whimsical Emperor Louis Napoleon, no wonder the Prussian army had its work cut out. The book finally ended with actual engagements that were fought during the first six weeks of the War and the destruction of the Army of the Rhine.

Though rather pricey for a small hardback, I found The Last Gaiter Button informative and enlightening concerning the lack of the pre-1870 French war effort and their subsequent defeat, and well worth the money.

Publisher; Greenwood Press. 169 pages. Pub. Price: $49.95.