In July 1864, Confederate President Jefferson Davis wanted the city of Atlanta held to the last man; at the very least, he wanted it held until after the upcoming Union elections. With no new victories, and with their armies stalled in Virginia and Georgia with no prospect of a quick end, the people of the North would more than likely vote for whomever could deliver peace and bring an end to the slaughter. Davis had given the task to Joseph E. Johnston, who had since singularly failed to do what Davis wanted. With Federal armies now poised on the outskirts of Atlanta, Davis had sacked his army commander and replaced him with the more aggressive John Bell Hood.

The tool at Hood's disposal was the Army of Tennessee. This force had started the war as the Army of the Mississippi, and had an almost unbroken record of defeats or, arguably, some losing draws. The soldiers had fought well and were in the main as good as any on either side. However, bad generalship, constant bickering, grudging support from central government, and at times, sheer bad luck had all combined to give this army a less than flattering reputation, one which continues to this day. When Hood took over command, the army had started to doubt Johnston's strategy, and certain officers, among them Hood, had begun agitating behind his back with a more-than-willing Confederate government. All of this had its effect on the rank and file.

Prior to Hood taking over, during a period of little combat, the army could not account for 2,500 men, which can only have been deserters. Some formations suffered worse than others; statistics show that there were high numbers lost in the divisions of French, Walker, Cheatham, Walthall, and Stevenson. The same statistics show very little loss from the divisions of Stewart (Clayton), Bate, and Cleburne. Considering the predicament the army found itself in, not forgetting that many of the soldiers' homes and even states were now subject to Union control, the loss could have been worse.

The Army of Tennessee was also the poor relation of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia - it was always last in line for new cannon, rifled small arms, and the supplies of war. As late as December 1862, some of its regiments charged armed only with sticks. Despite this, it was tasked with keeping the Federals away from the Heartland, which ironically, sent most of its produce east to feed the Virginia army. This was one of the reasons that Atlanta must be saved. If the Army of Tennessee lost and gave up, then it would only be a matter of time before the Confederacy went with it.

Peachtree Creek

Hood, acting on the information he had, saw Peachtree Creek as an excellent opportunity to strike and destroy part of the Union army while the other parts could not intervene to save it. In order to have even the slightest chance of success, he had to act quickly and decisively. He imparted this desire to his generals, as he knew what could go wrong on a battlefield and he didn't want it happening to him. Although he didn't know exactly how many Union troops were in his front, it must be remembered that originally he intended to catch Thomas as he was in the act of crossing Peachtree Creek, not when he was already across and aware that something was up.

An attack on the 19`h may have yielded a favourable result, but one on the 20th was not so going to do so unless carried out perfectly, and not many Civil War assaults were ever carried out perfectly. The loss of two hours taken to shift the army to the right with the advent of McPherson has been blamed for Hood's defeat, but in fact it put Hood in a better position and allowed him to flank the Union left. It did, however, reduce the attack to two corps instead of three. Tragically, no allowance was made for the effect of the terrain.

This, considering Hood was fighting on home ground and had local knowledge at his fingertips, was a big mistake. Thick woods, underbrush, creek bottoms, slopes, and ravines hampered the forward movements of brigades, especially those of Bate, but it also affected the rest of the army. The Federals had as many men, if not more, in defence, some behind makeshift barricades and well supported by the excellent Yankee artillery. Also, they held the high ground and this was mentioned in several reports as being of critical advantage. Worse than the terrain problems was an issue that was the curse of many Civil War battles, coordination. Hood envisioned his troops attacking en echelon. This didn't happen, as the terrain played its part, but so too did the southern generals. Hardee was ready by 2 p.m.

Shortly after this, Maney adjusted his line, and Loring, thinking that the attack had started, stepped off and was beaten before the formations to his right actually attacked. When it came to Walthall's turn, his assault was ill prepared, resulting in a disaster. French to his left simply just didn't attack.

I believe Hood had no choice but to attack as he had painted himself into a corner by promising Davis he could deliver what Johnston couldn't. He had tried to bring superior numbers to bear locally, which was the only way he could possibly stop or delay the Union campaign. There is nothing wrong with his thinking. 

Although he would have known Thomas led the largest of the three armies, his plan was to catch part of the Army of the Cumberland and not all of it. Again he cannot be faulted for this. He certainly could, and should, have done more on the field instead of being behind the lines in Atlanta awaiting the outcome of his designs. Granted, the terrain and deployment may have frustrated some of these, but his personal leadership just might have made some difference on the day. At the very least, he could have kept a closer eye on Walthall and French. With hindsight, we know that he may even have kept Cheatham on station as McPherson had no intention of stabbing for the city, but Hood didn't know that.

The final outcome caused more bad blood in the army high command. Hood had no qualms about blaming Hardee, unjustly, I think, for not attacking "with vigour," Hardee had toyed with the idea of putting Cleburne in, but it wasn't until the after the initial assaults failed, and by then, night was nigh and it was too late.

Battle of Atlanta

This battle, as it turned out, was Hood's best chance at inflicting a good defeat on the Federals. He responded well to the threat from the east, and this had partly ruined his chances at Peachtree Creek. His plan was to march past the Union flank and attack it from behind. Once it began to collapse and was being driven by Hardee, Cheatham was to move in to finish the job.

In the event, it was too much to ask of his army to withdraw from Atlanta's northern front, without being seen, and then march south, east, and north in order to come up behind McPherson. Hardee, despite misgivings, was made the spearhead of the attack. The assault troops managed to pull out and complete their march, but in order to attack when Hood required they did not have the time to continue into the rear of the Federals but instead had to turn in on their flank. This would not have been so bad if, by a sheer stroke of misfortune, the Federals had not moved two brigades down to cover this exposed part of their line, coming on a formed line of infantry. Union guns stopped the divisions of Walker and Bate in their tracks. Walker paid with his life.

Hood once again was not on the battlefield. Having given his instructions, he retired to await the hopefully good news. The terrain and the tenacious Union defence began once again to play hell with Hood's careful timetable. Cheatham did not go forward quickly enough, and his brigades were repulsed with heavy losses. Further to the north, the Rebels achieved a-breakthrough along the rail line, but due to a lack of support and a certain reluctance on the part of Generals Brown and Clayton, this sadly came to nothing and the penetration was sealed off and forced I to retire.

Hood cannot be blamed for the appearance of Sweeny's division, but he once again should have been at the front. He could have overridden Brown and Clayton and saw that the desperate fighting of his men at the railroad and previously, south of the Bald Hill, amounted to something, but he didn't, as he remained in Atlanta. He had nevertheless managed to once again surprise Sherman, twice in only a matter of days. Sherman may have given the perception later that this is exactly what he wanted, but looking closer at his performance on the day shows a different picture. The Army of Tennessee had fought well in places, but badly or reluctantly in others. It could not afford to fight this way.

Ezra Church

Hood managed to once again spring a surprise on the Federals, but out of the three actions around Atlanta, this one was the weakest. It was supposed to be another crushing flank attack, and this time, Hardee would not be allowed to mess it up. It fell to Stephen Dill Lee, Hood's latest corps commander, to lead the attack. Hood may have been asking too much of his army, and even if the plan had succeeded, it would not have been as much of a setback to Sherman's plans as victory on the 22nd would have been.

Nevertheless, Lee and Stewart were set in motion to attack Howard west of the city. Hood wanted the battle to begin on the 29th, but for some reason which I have failed to find an explanation for so far, Lee led his corps into action on the 28th a day early, and once again straight at the Union lines instead of behind them. The ensuing battle was merely a slaughter. The Confederates, weakened by the previous battles, just did not have the manpower to deliver a crushing blow, and Stephen Lee did not have the savvy to conduct a successful infantry battle anyway.

Although Hood's premise for this battle was as good as the others, he again left everything to his subordinates and an inexperienced one at that. He could possibly have lain in wait for Howard instead of attacking, but that just wasn't in his nature.

Overall

Within ten days of taking command, Hood had tried three times to stop or at least delay the Union campaign against Atlanta. At Peachtree Creek, he had tried to catch Thomas crossing the river and inflict heavy damage on him. The other two attacks were classic Confederate flank attacks. For many diverse reasons, all these attacks failed. They did not bring the desired victory, and, in the end, did not delay Union entry to Atlanta. The only thing stopping the Federals taking Atlanta. sooner was actually the Federals themselves.

Even Sherman acknowledged this as he tried to goad his commanders into making a lightning strike on the city. Despite Sherman guessing that Hood would attack, Hood caught him on the hop in all three of his battles. The terrain and Union barricades made a big difference to the outcome as the Rebels attacked piecemeal and lost cohesion. It must be remembered, however, that there weren't many Civil War battles where this was not the case, especially in the West. Hood was saddled by a few men who were not up to commanding troops in combat, and by a few formations that also were not up to the job.

Brown and Lee were the main culprits, and Lee certainly put an end to any hopes that Ezra Church would reverse Hood's string of defeats. I cannot find any real case for blaming Hardee, although I am sure John Hood would disagree. Hardee did not like Hood, but he seems to have been professional enough to put it behind him and get on with the job in hand.

The later battle of Franklin haunts Hood's reputation, and all his work up until then is wiped out by this one, albeit crushing, failure of the general's art. This is unfair, as up until Atlanta, Hood was a good general and rightly or wrongly an aggressive fighter. His performance at Atlanta was bold and inventive, and brought to naught by circumstances mostly beyond his control and a little luck on the side of the Yankees. Robert E. Lee used the same kind of generalship and was never once criticized for his methods.

In January of 1865, Hood was relieved of command of the Army of Tennessee at his own request. Crippled, wracked by pain, and dulled by drugs, he should not have been left in charge for so long after the Atlanta campaign. He surrendered himself to Union forces on May 31, 1865 at Natchez. Hood later became a prosperous businessman in New Orleans, fathering 11 children in 10 years. Later, he wrote a memoir entitled "Advance and Retreat." The yellow fever epidemic of 1878 and the financial crises it caused destroyed his business and eventually killed Hood, his wife, and their eldest daughter in 1879. He is buried in New Orleans.

I said before that if the Army of Tennessee lost and gave up, then the Confederacy would share the same fate. It is to that army's credit that it did not, and even after suffering at Franklin and Nashville, it fought to the bitter end. Led again by Johnston, it managed in the last days of the war to give Sherman a fright at Bentonville, North Carolina. The army later surrendered on April 26, 1865, seventeen days after the Army of Northern Virginia had handed over its weapons.

Bibliography for the "Hood at Atlanta" series

Boatner, M. "Civil War Dictionary"
Warner, E. "Generals in Blue"
Warner, E. "Generals in Gray"
Castel, A. "Decision in the West"
Newton, S. H. "Lost for the Cause"
McMurray, R. M. "Two Great Rebel Armies"
"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Vol. IV
Official Records of the Union & Confederate Armies