The standard view of the first day's battle at Gettysburg envisions attacking Rebel columns pushing back Federal troops in stages, until the Yankees finally collapse to their fall-back position on Cemetery Hill. The Confederates are portrayed as surging time after time like the incoming surf The Union forces are seen as desperately struggling to hold a hopeless defense. While that simple picture is an acceptable generalization, as one studies the details of fighting the image comes into focus of repeated instances of Union regiments undertaking the tactical offensive.

The gutsy charge of the 6th Wisconsin at the railroad cut is most familiar, but it does not stand alone. If the charge is the heart of offensive tactics, stirring the heart and generating the adrenalin rush in soldiers, then the counter-assault is the most dramatic moment in all of war. Seeing a formidable enemy line advance upon your position and then being told to rise up and charge against it requires the greatest courage, discipline, and fortitude. Typically the soldiers must move out of what protection they have from the extended line of battle and terrain, exposing themselves. But seizing the initiative at a critical moment -- and often at great sacrifice -- can indeed make a notable difference in terms of the final outcome of the fighting.

What were the these aggressive advances under hot fire by Union forces on the afternoon of July 1? What aroused the orders to charge? And what were the consequences? It is surprising to some to learn that each of the three Federal divisions deployed north of town- Robinson's of the 1st Corps, and both Barlow's and Schimmelfennig's of the 11th Corps- undertook countercharges. Effects of these offensive moves varied widely. Sometimes hundreds of prisoners were taken; at other times the attacks faltered at great loss. But the fighting spirit of these Yankees cannot be disputed.

The AoP troops being deployed north of town did not have the advantages of terrain and coverage experienced by their comrades to the west. And the positions they would be seeking to gain were already held by Rebel skirmishers. Iverson's skirmishers had crossed Black's Turnpike (Mummasburg Road) south of Oak Hill. McNeal's skirmishers--the redoubtable sharpshooters of Major Eugene Blackford- had advanced into the plain between that road and the Harrisburg (or Heidlersburg) Road. In order to extend and protect the 1st Corps line, these skirmishers would first have to be driven back by their Union counterparts.

The Federals had but a short time to establish an intermittent line of battle on the eastern slope of Oak Ridge, then extending at an angle eastward to Blocher's Knoll and Rock Creek. Each of the three divisions was separated several hundred yards from the others; moreover, the middle division had a line composed of but one brigade, Schimmelfennig's, now under command of Colonel George Von Amsberg. They had an insufficient number of men to form a true line of battle, and actually constituted a heavy skirmish line.

It did not take long for the arriving Rebels under 2nd Corps commander, Major General Richard Ewell, to seek benefit from the advantages they held by way of direction of approach and numbers. Yet the initial Rebel assault, undertaken by O'Neal's brigade heading south on the slope of Oak Ridge, was repulsed. As the historian of the 88thPennsylvania recounted, "the boys never appeared in better spirits for battle; they were full of fight... every man and boy felt it was now or never, and all resolved to fight as they had never fought before."

It was not simply these 1st Corps soldiers who repulsed O'Neal, but a valiant artillery and musketry fire by the 11th Corps on the lower plain. When O'Neal faltered, elements of the 45th New York of that corps charged toward the McLean homestead under orders from Colonel Adolphus Dobke. They advanced some 400 yards at great risk and took a number of the startled and frightened Alabamians prisoner, many of whom had sought refuge in the barn. It was a gallant charge and a surprising brief victory.

Shortly thereafter Baxter's Brigade of Robinson's 1st Corps division were able to shock Iverson's Tarheels with a sheet of fire as they had advanced across Forney field. Survivors of three of his four regiments sought protection falling back to a gully. As command and control was lost among these North Carolinians, some of them lifted tokens of surrender, while others were returning fire. What now? As Brigadier General Henry Baxter was issuing orders for an intended bayonet charge, men from several of his regiments took initiative to charge on their own. Colonel Wheelock of the 97th New York was startled to discover that a subordinate had ordered his men to charge, but he did not interfere and followed his men forward. Among the 88th Pennsylvanians, "the officers held a brief consultation as to whether it would be advisable," but the men "wanted to charge, and the order was quickly passed along the line."

Chaplain William Locke of the 11th Pennsylvania observed, "It was our time to charge; and rushing upon the broken ranks with the spirit of men who had everything at stake...." This countercharge was daring in several ways. First, many of the men were nearly out of ammunition. Secondly, there was no time to organize a charge, as greater numbers of Rebels could be seen maneuvering in the distance. Moreover, there was hot fire coming from their flank as well as from some men in the swale. Lieutenant Samuel Boone of the 88th Pennsylvania described the perilous situation:

..."while we were mixed up with the Rebels out on the field another body of confederates poured a destructive, enfilading fire into us from the Mummasburg Road on our right... the course of the bullets could be seen cutting the high grass.... Here our retreat commenced as the enemy was receiving reinforcements from all directions, and those who remained lying on the ground, and who were uninjured again took up arms against us."

Several of the regiments describe having taken more prisoners during this charge than they themselves numbered. The situation continued to be precarious, though Colonel Wheelock of the 97th New York reported, that soon after returning to the protection o1 the stone wall, his men made a second charge across the field am brought in 80 more captives!

At this point in the chronology, the action shifts to Blocher's Knoll. With oversight from the commanding general on the field Major General Oliver Otis Howard, Brigadier General Francis Barlow had moved his division to the knoll. Though positioned well to engage the brigade of Colonel George Doles, these 11th Corps troops were hastily repositioned when Rebels from another division appeared on their right flank.

It would be the men of Brigadier General John B. Gordon's brigade of Early's Division who would be charging against the knoll in conjunction with Doles. The two small Yankee brigades of the red crescent sought to blunt the Rebel assault, but they were out-manned and outflanked. It was then, in a gutsy move, that Brigadier General Adelbert Ames ordered his reserves to fix bayonets and countercharge. "It was a fearful advance and made at dreadful cost of life," reported Colonel Andrew Harris of the 75th Ohio Volunteers. Four of his officers were mortally wounded, another four down with serious wounds, and only four left to direct the assault. Though they had stopped the Confederate advance to their front, the enemy lapped around each flank, making their situation "perilous to the extreme." Six companies of the 17th Connecticut were likewise ordered to make a counterassault, and at one point as the "din reached the standard of hell" their color bearer banged his staff against the flag staff of a Georgian!

The countercharges could not long be sustained. As Ames' and Von Gilsa's brigades retreated, it was now for Kryzanowski's brigade to advance in their support. But they were struck hard as they sought to advance and move from column of companies into line of battle.

As the situation for the 11th Corps grew increasingly hopeless, a further charge was ordered, this by the 157th New York Volunteers of Von Amsberg's brigade. They advanced diagonally across the field from the Mummasburg Road seeking to strike Doles on the flank. But the Georgian commander was able to turn one regiment to face them and bring a second in on the flank of the 157th. These New York boys threw themselves into the fray with noble sacrifice, suffering nearly 80% casualties in a matter of minutes. By now the Confederate juggernaut across the field was unstoppable. Meanwhile the action was continuing for Robinson's Division on Oak Ridge facing the surging Rebel lines of battle. "Quick as one line was swept away another and a stronger line took its place." Robinson threw his reserve brigade, under Brigadier General Rene Paul to boost Baxter's men. The latter, now out of ammunition, were instructed to fix bayonets and hold their position regardless. The 97th New York reported engaging elements of Ramseur's brigade, advancing to capture another 80 prisoners.

As Paul fell grievously wounded, Robinson took personal charge of the brigade. The 104th New York was ordered to charge against a further advance being attempted by McNeal, and did so effectively, not only repulsing his brigade again, but gaining another three dozen prisoners.

But the Rebels had ever more regiments to throw into the fight. Despite their desperate circumstances, the Yankees continued their aggressive moves. The 13th Massachusetts Volunteers advanced boldly to the Mummasburg Road. "Give it to them for Fredericksburg!" shouted someone. 132 gray-clad prisoners were reportedly taken. One survivor poignantly observed, "About this time a charge was ordered, but luckily abandoned before our weakness was shown." The general order of retreat was finally issued by Robinson, but not before directing the 16th Maine to advance to the road at the top of the slope of Oak Ridge. Major Small later commented one might "as well set a corporal's guard to stop the rebel army." But the men made a dash for the advanced position, planted their flag, and sought to give their comrades the opportunity to retreat.

Lt. Col. (ret) Charles "Chuck" Teague is a former military chaplain and civilian pastor, as well as a retired attorney. He lives in Gettysburg, PA with his wife, and is a seasonal park ranger at the Eisenhower National Homestead. Chuck has avidly studied the Day I fighting at Gettysburg, and served as a consultant, battlefield tramping partner, and reviewer of the Blocher's Knoll and Forney's Fields scenarios for Scott Mingus's "Enduring Valor: Gettysburg in Miniature. " Chuck has written extensively on Lee's health at Gettysburg for "North & South" magazine.