When one closely examines the tactics that were employed on the Civil War battlefield, one finds numerous examples of the French-inspired spirited bayonet charge wilere the troops were ordered not to fire until very close up, if at all. It is now possible to conduct electronic linguistic searches of the 140,000 + page Official Records. Performing this type of analysis, one is able to turn up only 1 or 2 instances where an officer reported that his men adjusted their back guides while firing in standard formation. Using the same type of electronic search, one is able to quickly scan the entire 128 volumes, and establish the range at which firing erupted by searching for "10 yards", "15 yards" ... "500 yards" and then repeating the entire process for different ranges in "rods." The tentative result of this type of analysis might surprise, as one finds firefights occurring at every range between 5 and 500 yards with most lying within the 40 and 200 yard range. There were many reasons why such close-in fighting occurred, most common among them smoke, fog, night and the general confusion of battle. At Fair Oaks, Virginia, for example, the woods were so thick that a part of the Fifty Second New York Infantry could only open fire upon the Third Georgia at 15-20 paces. [1] During an engagement at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on Aug. 5, 1862, it was impossible to see more than a few yards through the fog. The Twentieth Tennessee Infantry was able to close to about 20 yards before they were spotted and fired upon. [2] However, short ranged firefights also frequently occurred in clear terrain where the opposing forces could have opened fire at longer ranges. Attacking Union forces at Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862), General James Chalmers' men were allowed to advance in ,'most perfect order and splendid style" until they had come within 40 yards of the enemy. [3] During the battle of Gaines' Mill, Major Henry Clitz of the Twelfth U.S. Infantry only issued the order to fire when the Confederate infantry had advanced to within 50 yards. [4] The Sixty-fifth New York allowed the Confederates to advance to within 25 yards at Fair Oaks. [5] Of course, one can also easily find examples where firefights were conducted at much longer ranges. At Fredericksburg, the Twenty-first Massachusetts Infantry only started to fire when the enemy approached to within 220 yards. [6] At Gettysburg, the Sixth Wisconsin Infantry began to fire when the Rebels were still about 220 yards away. [7] Of course, one can find numerous instances where sharpshooters achieved extremely accurate fire at ranges greater than 800 yards. However, invariably they acted independently and were not in formation. When one starts to try to calculate "averages," one finds that Paddy Griffith's conclusion that an "average" firefight in 1864 occurred while both sides were 141 yards, if anything, is an overstatement. Anyone rejecting this out of hand should read Basil Duke's Morgan's Cavalry. All of the ranges cited by Duke are under 90 yards (I chose this work only because it is the one I am currently reading.) Although my conclusions seem to correspond to Mr. Griffith's, they differ in one important way. Those opposing Mr. Griffith's views have also argued that the increased effectiveness and range of the rifle musket made existing European tactics obsolete. I feel that even if the average range of a Civil War firefight turned out to be little as 120 yards it was still greater than the corresponding average during earlier wars when troops were armed with snioothbores. The increased effectiveness of the new rifle musket was enough to slightly reduce the effectiveness of traditional tactics, but was not enough to be immediately noticed. This proved as it turned out to be a more dangerous situation. Not realizing that bayonet charges, let's say, now only worked about 29% of the time instead of about 33%, officers were slow at diagnosing the problem and developing countermeasures. Of course, everything changed in 1864 when armies learned to stay proximate to one another, the heroic aspect of battle withered away, men dug trenches and built fortifications constantly and did everything to stay alive. Notes to the Above [1] OR 1, 9 (1), 785. [2] OR 1 15, 89. [3] OR 1 10 (1), 549. [4] OR, S 1, Vol. XI/2, p. 366, Seven Days' Battles, Gaines' Mill No. 144, Maj. Henry B. Clitz. Twelfth U.S. Infantry. [5] OR, SI, Vol. XI/ 1, pp. 899-900, May 3 1 - June 1, 1862 -- Battle of Fair Oaks, Va., No. 82, Col. John Cochrane, Sixty-fifth New York Infantry. [6] OR 121, 327. [7] OR 127 (1), 276. Brent Nosworthy As a military simulation designer, first for Simulations Publications Incorporated (SPI) and then Operational Studies Group (OSG), Brent Nosworthy became interested in the evolution of weapons technology and its impact on tactics and fighting methods during the age of the flintlock. His first two works, The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689 - 1763 and With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies have received international acclaim among military scholars and enthusiasts. Turning his attention to the rifle musket and the advent of breechloaders and repeaters, he has just published a smimilar work dealing with the Civil War - The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War. The book is available from leading dealers, as well as on the internet. Back to Table of Contents -- Charge! #1 Back to Charge! List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2003 by Scott Mingus. This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com