Attempts to exploit a daytime success often lead to continuation of an attack at night. Surprise is especially effective in conducting limited-objective attacks in darkness. During a night attack the individual soldier's moral stamina is of particular importance. In many instances he will be engaged in hand-to-hand fighting.

The success of a night operation will depend upon meticulous and detailed preparations, including proper evaluation of reconnaissance reports; study of maps, including captured ones; terrain reconnaissance; familiarizing all officers and the maximum number of NCO's with terrain features in daytime and during the night; reconnoitering and marking roads; carrying out road repairs and improvements with the assistance of engineer troops; preparing a fire plan for all supporting weapons; preparing a plan of maneuver; and establishing a communication network.

Surprise can be achieved by unexpected intervention of friendly forces at a point where there has been no previous contact, or by a variation in the direction and timing of the night attack if contact with the enemy has previously been established. In an effort to produce surprise the enemy should be lulled into a false sense of security by staging concentrations, by conducting deceptive movements behind the front accompanied by the noise of motor vehicles, etc. Other means of confusing the enemy before the start of an attack include unexpected variations in combat methods, deceptive and diversionary maneuvers, radio deception, and sudden concentrations fired by all weapons.

The timing of an attack depends on the over-all plan, strength and disposition of the attack forces, delays that may be encountered while assembling them and preparing all weapons for action, the strength of the enemy forces and their alertness, and, finally, visibility and weather conditions.

If the intent is to break through a well-established defense system in order to gain freedom of action, the attack should be timed to start a few hours before dawn. Against a well-prepared enemy such an atack will have a chance of success only if a complete penetration is achieved before daybreak, so that it can be exploited during the early morning hours. On the other hand, since limited-objective attacks launched at night ought to be concluded by daybreak, it is best to start them during the early hours of the night. In general, night attacks directed against enemy flanks are particularly effective.

The assault columns should be developed early in the attack, but deployed as late as possible. They should be echeloned in depth along a narrow zone of action. By keeping closed up, the columns will be able to maintain contact. Infantry heavy weapons should be placed in the center of the march columns until the battalions arrive at the jump-off positions. It may be advisable to assign a few guns to the lead battalions; artillery observers should always accompany the forward elements. Self- propelled guns, assault guns, and tanks are more mobile, but make more noise than horse-drawn guns.

Unit commanders should be well forward; reserves and engineer elements ought to be within their reach. Radio silence should be imposed until the start of the attack; if this is not feasible, the assault forces, which must be amply provided with radio sets, must impose strict radio discipline.

There will be no need for artillery preparation if it is expected that the night attack will achieve complete surprise and that the enemy forces will disintegrate after the initial assault. Every effort must be made to move the assault forces as close to the objective as possible without firing a shot, even though this may lead to premature detection of the plan by the enemy. Absolute silence must be maintained during the approach. The preparatory fire will commence upon request by telephone or radio. Light signals betray the presence of troops and may lead to confusion among the friendly forces.

Protected by the preparatory fire, the assault forces will make their way to the jump-off positions. Then, while the artillery shifts to counterbattery fire or to adjacent enemy sectors, the assault forces will advance, supported by their own heavy weapons and guns firing from the line of departure. Forming small attack groups the assault forces will fight their way into the enemy lines, using bayonets and other close- combat weapons. The simultaneous appearance of tanks and assault guns, as well as the use of flame throwers, may have a great psychological impact on the enemy.

Depending on the situation and the scope of their mission, the assault forces must regroup for the continuation of the attack or prepare themselves for defense against counterthrusts immediately after reaching their designated objective. Uninterrupted communication with the heavy weapons and artillery is essential. The direct-support guns attached to the assault force should remain under the same jurisdiction until daybreak.

The attack should be broken off without any hesititation if it bogs down within the enemy's defense system and if there is no prospect of concluding it successfully by additional fire support, a change in maneuvers, or other means. In that event it may be necessary to move the assault forces back to their jump-off positions. If this should not be feasible, the attack forces will have to organize themselves for defense in the terrain they have seized. To repeat the attack during the same night at the same point is not advisable.

In the event that the assault force is composed exclusively of armored units, then the tanks, armored engineers, and armored infantry must operate as a team and stay close together to lend mutual support.

If the armored force is sufficiently strong, it is advisable to divide it into two waves. The first one should consist Of tanks to lead the attack in line formation, their hatches closed, their lights off, and their guns firing; the second should be composed of the main body of armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons, and should be echeloned in depth to facilitate the shifting of forces and the protection of the flanks. The armored engineers should stay close to the assault force commander so that they can remove mine fields and other obstacles in an emergency. By refueling at the last possible moment and assuring the replenishment of ammunition, the forces should be fortified against the moment of weakness that occurs immediately after the initial objective has been seized.

As soon as the assault forces have penetrated the enemy's defense system, strong formations that possess maximum mobility and have been held in readiness in the rear area must advance through the gap without delay. A local penetration achieved at night may easily transform a static situation into a fluid one during which motorized formations can obtain freedom of maneuver. The annihilation of hostile elements capable of offering continued resistance must be left to the reserves backing up the initial assault wave.

If visibility is good, tactical air formations can lend effective support to the ground forces by attacking hostile artillery positions, units on the move, and troop concentrations in rear areas. Since detailed planning and close co-ordination with the ground forces are essential, air liaison detachments equipped with adequate means of communication should be made available for this purpose.

The carefully planned commitment of parachute units in conjunction with ground operations may lead to decisive results by paralyzing the enemy's will to resist. To find suitable drop zones and establish intra-unit contact after landing are the principal difficulties connected with the employment of airborne troops by night. On the other hand, darkness handicaps the defender in determining the scope of landings and in distinguishing between actual airdrops and deceptive measures, such as the dropping of dummies.

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