A Separate Peace?

In these weeks of permanent crises the idea was circulated for a compromise with one enemy. Ribbentrop and Goebbels were behind it and attempted to win Hitler over. What they had in mind was an agreement with Stalin. Hitler said that basically he was so inclined but it would only be possible from a position of strength. He thought a breakdown in the enemy alliance would be better. Any agreement with the Western powers was out of the question, however. Churchill was his enemy from innermost conviction and would not rest until Germany was destroyed, even if he lost the British Empire in doing so. He could not go for a compromise with the Soviets, for the Communists were the enemy of the Reich.

Thus his attitude towards separate peace negotiations in the autumn of 1943 seemed disjointed. I do not think that he dismissed them entirely but rather held to the view that victory only came to those who fought for it. Eventually he alone thought this. German troops were retreating on all fronts. Confidence in victory had evaporated: only the belief that Hitler would find the way out remained unbroken. This certainty increased his concept of mission. He could not believe that all the efforts, the enormous casualties in the air raids and the sacrifices at the front were in vain.

In the autumn of 1943 I observed how Hitler was filled with a profound sense of mission, and even seemed to expect a miracle. The longer the fighting in Russia went on, the more unrestrained became his hatred of the Jews. He had no sympathy whatever for them. In his conversations with Goebbels and Himmler he left no room for doubt that he was not in the least concerned about what happened to the Jews. Incidentally, Goebbels seemed to me the most radical of the National Socialist leaders, whilst Himmler had an eye increasingly to the future in all that he did.

About this time people began to ask me how we could still win the war-a very difficult question for me to answer. I did not let anybody think that I believed personally in total victory. The catastrophic situation in which the Luftwaffe found itself made defeat certain unless a miracle happened. In such conversations I left no doubt however that I considered a change of fortune in our favour possible by the introduction of the new technical weapons. Here I was thinking of the new jet fighters and the development of the V-1 and V-2 at Peenemunde. Actually I did not believe in this myself. I was sure that these weapons had no significance in the final analysis. I accepted that the war would end in 1944.

I was also asked if there was no way in which a stop could be put to Hitler-in other words to assassinate him. I had to deny this for myself outright. I had now served as his adjutant for six years and had seen his trust in me grow steadily. It would have been impossible for me to have turned against him. I was determined to fulfil my obligations irrespective of what might happen. To bring about the change, others would have to do that if they considered it to be the answer.

Exit Engel

At the end of September 1943 Hitler dispensed with the services of Army adjutant Engel. He had dropped a hint about this a year or so earlier but I had thought nothing more of it. I was therefore very surprised when Engel told me one day that Hitler had released him for ordinary Army service. From Engel's reaction I saw that he had been taken completely by surprise. To leave our Adjutantur came as a severe blow to him.

I suspected that General Zeitzler had had a hand in it. Engel's successor had already been found. Contrary to the previous terms of reference for the position, a 33-year-old General Staff officer, Major Heinrich Borgmann, had been appointed, and he took up his duties in early October. Borgmann was not at ease in the job and seemed to be constantly on the lookout for something else. He was seriously wounded on 20 July 1944 and was incapacitated for some time afterwards.

In the autumn of 1943 the war entered a ferocious stage. The morale of the German front soldier was admirable. Of the millions who wore Army uniform, only a relatively small number were involved in the immediate fighting at the front. Supply and catering formed a considerable part of the Army's function. Hitler regularly issued instructions to comb through the support services and reserves for young men to put at the front. I do not know why these efforts to find large numbers of young replacements only ever had moderate success.

All Army front-line units were under strength. Battalion commanders were happy if they commanded 200 to 300 men. If there was an action, the numbers were quickly cut. But the morale of the men, their readiness and their will to fight, were constant, and Hitler's role as Fuhrer was undisputed. Many men were absolutely convinced that Hitler had weapons in preparation which would pave the way to victory. Those such as myself who had an overview of the situation knew to the contrary--that defeat was just a question of time.

Landings in Italy

In September 1943 the Allies landed in southern Italy. They moved up northwards relatively quickly as far as Naples and Foggia. The latter seemed very important to them: there were airfields there and favourable terrain to lay down more. This they accomplished in a few weeks. In October the Americans flew their first major air raid from Foggia against the Messerschmitt factories at Wiener Neustadt which turned out the Me 109.

Hitler sent me there at once in order to obtain clarification of the conflicting reports submitted by the flak units and Homeland Air Defence organisation about the strength and success of the attack. I had already experienced the impenetrability of the secret world of air defences. The responsible commanders here had not seen very much of what went on since there was no protected observation point where an air raid could be watched from beginning to end.

By the beginning of October almost 300,000 Italian soldiers had been transported to Germany as prisoners-of-war and put to work. The Allied land forces took their time coming up from southern Italy and Kesselring, C-in-C South-West Army Group, was not only able to marshal his few forces for a spirited defence but became so firmly established that he allayed Hitler's fears about the Italian Front. Eventually the theatre was left in his hands and Hitler hardly ever interfered there.

Further Intensification of the Air War

The Reich was becoming more and more the hapless target for British air raids. On 7 September Hitler asked Professor Messerschmitt how things stood with the Me 262, and, to everybody's surprise, if it could also be used as a bomber. Messerschmitt said that it could, and added that Milch was always making difficulties and not putting a sufficient workforce at his disposal. This struggle between Messerschmitt and Milch had been smouldering for years. Explaining the problem to Hitler, I told him that Messerschmitt had already exceeded his entitlement having regard to the stage his developments were justifying. He had a knack of presenting individual achievements in such a way that it seemed he was ready to mass-produce. I requested Hitler to discuss the question again with Milch.

Hitler's main preoccupation at this time was anti-aircraft defence. He racked his brain day and night for new ways to reduce the effects of the bombing. Earlier he had left this job to G6ring, but even the latter was now dissatisfied with results. Therefore Hitler consulted only the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff on Luftwaffe questions and ignored Goring, who began to appear more infrequently at daily situation conferences.

The air raids increased. On 2 October the fighter factory at Emden was seriously damaged, on the 4th the industrial area of Frankfurt and on the 10th Munster and Anklam in Pomerania. On 14 October the Americans carried out a heavy raid on Schweinfurt which virtually paralysed ball-bearing production. On this occasion the bombers suffered heavy losses. After this latter German success, which was due primarily to Hitler's persistent criticisms, the daylight attacks stopped. The British night attacks against cities continued, however, and Hanover, Leipzig and Kassel also received attention.

On 5 October Hitler discussed with Goring and Korten how the day attacks could be ended permanently. Hitler said that the major part of the fighter force ought to be concentrated to oppose the enemy bomber fleets. It was important to prevent the destruction of our production centres. After every air raid Hitler received reports from the appropriate Gauleiter. He was therefore in the picture about the completely inadequate Air Raid Defence organisation. Often during the day attacks it was next to useless.

When fighters could not get up because of bad weather or were occupied elsewhere, this made Hitler especially irate. What made it worse was when bombers protected by enemy fighters were not engaged by our fighters because of poor direction techniques. At situation conferences Hitler was able to present detailed reports about individual air raids and was swift to jump to conclusions based partly on his misunderstanding of air defence and partly on the conflicting reports submitted.

Hitler had been made aware of the Japanese kamikaze phenomenon, which had been advocated repeatedly in Luftwaffe circles on the premise that the sacrifice was justified if victory resulted as a consequence. He was not of this view. He thought that inspired, selfless commitment for the Fatherland was right, but this price was too high. The names of volunteers were noted, however, in case the need for German kamikazes should ever arise in the future.

On 7 October the Gau- and Reichsleiters were summoned to Wolfschanze to be instructed as to the unfavourable situation and the future difficulties to be overcome. Hitler emphasised that the will of the people and 'unremitting perseverance in pursuit of the goal' must remain constant, continuing: 'Your warrior spirit, your energy, your firm resolve and utter readiness give the people backbone and steadiness to withstand above all the violence of the bomber war.' He closed with words expressing his unshakeable confidence in victory and succeeded in convincing his devoted listeners, who then returned to their Gaue in the firm belief that he had in preparation certain weapons which would yet win this war for Germany; his Decree Respecting Preparations to Reconstruct BombDamaged Cities' reinforced their hopes.

Hitler's Intransigence

Hitler foresaw threatening developments on the Eastern Front earlier and with greater clarity than his military advisers, but he was determined with great obstinacy not to accede to the requests of his Army commanders to pull back fronts, or would do so exceptionally only at the last minute. The Crimea was to be held at whatever cost, and he refused to entertain Manstein's arguments in the matter.

In October Saporoshye and Dnyepropetrovsk were lost. On 6 November Kiev fell and fierce fighting continued in the bend of the Dnieper, yet Hitler informed Zeitzler and Jodl that our first priority was the Italian Front and the bomber war. He viewed the Russian victories on the Eastern Front with a certain equanimity and was resting his hopes on a new offensive in the New Year and on the new weapons which would then be at his disposal. Zeitzler did not believe a word of it but Jodl still cherished certain hopes for the success of the new weapons.

Getting Ready for the Invasion

On 3 November Directive No 51 was issued. It said: 'The danger in the East remains but a greater threatens to the West--the Anglo-Saxon landings. In the East, in the worst scenario, the vast size of the territory allows a loss of ground even on the large scale without delivering us a mortal blow. But it is different in the West! If the enemy breaks through our defences here on a broad front, the short-term consequences are unforeseeable.

Signs indicate that the enemy will launch an invasion of the European Western Front at the latest by the spring, but perhaps even earlier. I can therefore no longer allow the West to be further weakened in favour of other theatres. I have decided to strengthen its defences at the place where we will commence the long- range battle against England. For it is there that the enemy has to attack, there-if we are not deceived-that the decisive landing battles will be fought.' Although drafted by Jodl, it was completely Hitler's style. He was only wrong about when. He expected the Normandy invasion at the beginning of 1944.

On 5 November Hitler appointed Rommel as C-in-C Special Purposes and the responsibility for fortifying the invasion front devolved on him. He had full responsibility for the security of the French coastline. At the time Rommel was still an unconditional follower of Hitler and obeyed his orders without protest. Accordingly he threw himself wholeheartedly into his new task.

When Manstein, beset with grave anxieties about the Kiev region and Crimea, discussed the subject on 7 November, Hitler, who was not open to reason regarding the Crimea or Nikopol--on account of its manganese ore mines--released three divisions involved in the shipments with instructions that they were to be used on the Crimean front and not in the fighting for Kiev. Thus he was accepting a high risk on the Eastern Front.

Air raid defence remained in the foreground. 'Aviation' was the decisive keyword for 1944, and Hitler considered the fast bomber to be the most important factor entering the equation. Repeatedly he asked how the Me 262 was coming along: he was impatient on account of the long delivery date for the aircraft.

On 8 November Hitler addressed Party veterans in Munich. As usual he spoke very frankly to this circle, mentioning the extraordinary severity of the fighting in Russia and the impressive achievements of our soldiers there. But he also referred to 'the bestial bombing raids' on German cities and the sufferings of German women and children and added: 'This war may last as long as it will but Germany will never capitulate.' The help of Providence was certain and would send us victory.

Despite the continuing adverse reports from the Eastern Front and about the air raids, a restful week was spent at the Berghof afterwards. The horizons were different, and one noticed of Hitler how relaxed he was in the old familiar private atmosphere.

When we returned to Wolfschanze on 16 November, Ambassador von Papen was waiting for Hitler. Papen knew that a few days previously the enemy Foreign Ministers had met in Moscow; Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin would meet again shortly. Papen had long been carrying on a successful struggle to prevent the Allies drawing Turkey into their camp. Now he had a highly secret report to communicate: in Ankara the manservant of the British ambassador was supplying him with secret documents for cash.

Papen had with him the first information about Operation 'Overlord' but few details at present. He saw the diplomatic situation as poised on a knife edge and said that the Crimea must absolutely remain in German hands if Turkish neutrality were to be maintained. Every fresh Russian victory endangered stability. Hitler concurred.

Firmness in Defence

The ability of our front to withstand really massive attacks never ceased to amaze me in the late autumn of 1943, but eventually the Soviets succeeded in driving a corridor 150 kilometres deep through the lines of the Second Army and Fourth Panzer Army between Kiev and Gomel. Places such as Shitomir were recaptured, but generally the Russians did not capitalise on it. Their attacks against Army Groups North and Centre also faltered. In the south, against Army Group A, they crossed the Dnieper and pushed forward their front along a line Cherson-NikopolKrivoi Rog-Kirovograd. The penetration from Melitopol to the Dnieper was especially damaging. The Russians were very adept at identifying and attacking at the join between Army Groups.

On 20 November Hitler flew to Breslau to address senior cadets of all Wehrmacht branches in the Jahrhunderthalle-since the destruction of the Sportpalast this annual speech could not be held in Berlin-and the current officer intake took to heart his grave admonition that 'the Volk, if we lose, ends its existence'. Therefore every German soldier must be aware that 'this gruelling war, which our enemies accuse us of starting' but which they wanted, and have forced us into, can have no other ending than a German victory. In order to achieve this victory, everyone must be filled with a single unshakeable belief in our eternal Germany.' Keitel concluded the address with a recognition of Hitler, who left the hall to a storming ovation and shouts of Sieg Heil! from the cadets. He was not unimpressed by this echo.

The Me 262 Displayed

Air raids on 22 and 23 November caused substantial devastation to the heart of Berlin. The Gauleiter of Berlin, Dr Groeb, reported personally to Hitler and made particular mention of the outstanding morale shown by the people of the city over the two nights. Hitler was again filled with rage and anger against the Luftwaffe, which was never able to stop a raid taking place. He repeated these criticisms in bitter terms on 26 November at the impatiently awaited aircraft exhibition at Insterburg airfield.

All those in some way responsible for aircraft production were present Goring, Milch, Speer, Saur, Messerschmitt, Galland, Vorwald and others. In my opinion the Luftwaffe had repeated the error here of setting out mostly those models which were not yet ready for service. Hitler passed very calmly before the long line of aircraft, which included the newest version of the Me 109, the Me 410, Ar 234, Do 335 and Me 262.

Milch accompanied him with full specifications to hand. Hitler was seeing the Me 262 for the first time and was very impressed by the look of it. He called Messerschmitt over and asked him pointedly if the aircraft could be built as a bomber. The designer agreed, and said that it would be capable of carrying two 250kg bombs. Hitler said, 'That is the fast bomber' and gave orders that the Me 262 should be built exclusively as such. Milch intervened at once to explain that only a number of the aircraft coming off the production line could be released to the bomber role, but Hitler insisted.

Even Goring, when attempting to have Hitler's decision reversed a few days later, was rebuffed sharply. As it turned out, however, the Luftwaffe could only offer the type as a fighter-bomber because a true fast bomber would need extensive redesign for bomb carriage, release gear and sights. Hitler was forced to accept this. On our return to Wolfschanze, I tackled him on the subject in the hope of saving the Me 262 for its fighter role. He replied that in principle I was right and he wanted as many fighters as possible for the Reich, bearing in mind the existing problems--the worst of which would be the Allied landings in France. We had to do everything to prevent this.

Teheran

The Teheran Conference took place on 28 November. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin spent a week there with a large staff of officers and politicians. The results of this conference seeped through gradually, mainly through Papen's source in the British Embassy at Ankara. There had obviously been serious difficulties at Teheran, particularly on the subject of where the landings would take place. Roosevelt had got his way over Churchill for northern France; Churchill wanted to go for northern Greece. Hitler decided from this that Churchill wanted to drive a wedge between the Germans and Russians. The Russians would not agree to this as it would tend to rob them of the influence they wanted in the Balkans. Hitler assumed from Papen's reports that the invasion was still some way off and ordered a build-up of defence units on the Channel coast.

December on the Russian Front was less active than feared. The bombing of the Reich had also slackened while the British concentrated on picking off the 96 V-1 launch ramps. They knocked out a quarter but these could be replaced. Apparently they worried the British and this gave Hitler a reason to step up production of these flying bombs. He regretted only that they were not immediately available for use.

In December Hitler ordered the setting up of a National Socialist Command Staff at OKW. General Reinecke was appointed Chief of Staff. The intention had been in the wind for some time and had been much discussed in Army circles. Hitler had been convinced of the need by Himmlerl Bormann and many SS officers that his internal opponents were spreading anti- National Socialist propaganda through the fighting fronts. Most dangerous were the 'Seydlitz officers', who disseminated propaganda urging officers and men to give up fighting. Reinecke was instructed to form and train a National Socialist Command Officer Corps for the front.

This went ahead in 1944. The organisation found some recognition since these NSFOs were active in the welfare field, but many commanders would not have them around. The way in which the war developed prevented the institution from realising its full potential.

Situation at the End of 1943

In 1943, for the first time in the war, I spent Christmas at home with my family. I was confronted by the realities upon my return to Wolfschanze. On 2 6 December Donitz reported the sinking of Scharnhorst. The battleship had sailed out alone to attack an eastbound convoy in the Arctic and had been intercepted by a superior enemy naval force. Hitler was blameless here: for some time he had condemned the use of heavy units against enemy convoys as senseless.

The Russians had resumed their offensive on the Eastern Front; the first impressions suggested that a major offensive was brewing. Hitler spent New Year's Eve alone in his private rooms with Bormann. What was discussed between them is not recorded.

In 1943 the Russians had driven us back from the Don to the Dnieper and an Army Group Centre section from the gates of Moscow to the other side of Smolensk. It was difficult to divine Hitler's real beliefs about the situation. I attempted to form a picture composed of all the pros and cons. I had a number of conversations with him and noticed how often he contradicted himself. The Russian victories of 1943 had not worried him too much. The German front lines stood well in advance of our borders. There was still plenty of space in which to operate. The great danger, besides the increasing Russian pressure, seemed to be our failing strength. I was not sure if he was seeing things correctly. In my opinion we stood in a very much worse position altogether that at the end of 1942.

The Army Group commanders consulted him much more frequently, usually seeking leave to bring the front back to spare their forces and build up urgently needed reserves. But Hitler would rarely agree. The result was a severe blood-letting. The senior commanders had come to the stage where they despaired of ever understanding his leadership. For his part Hitler could not understand why the senior commanders had lost confidence in him. Yet he would fight on, for there was really no other way. Defensive successes of very short-term value reinforced his confidence, yet he hardly noticed the catastrophic casualty lists.

The prospect of rest and replacement was so remote that most had given up hope of it. Despite all this, if the mass of fighting men looked with confidence to the New Year, this was due entirely to their belief in Hitler. To the extent that the commanding generals had lost their unconditional belief in Hitler, to that same extent the simple German soldier trusted in his unerring leadership. I had no doubt that this fact alone was responsible for the fronts holding together.

During 1943 the importance of the Waffen-SS had increased. At the beginning of the war, and more so since the beginning of the Russian campaign, Hitler had built up these divisions systematically. They embodied all his ideas for a fighting force. Division after division was formed, privileged as to its personnel and materiel. Thus there had slowly emerged a fourth arm of the Wehrmacht which by 1943, and more so in 1944, was put to especially endangered sectors of the front. Hitler was extraordinarily proud of these SS divisions and trusted in them and their commanders utterly.

At the year's end I reflected most frequently on how the bomber war would progress. It was quite obvious that we could never make up the leeway between the Luftwaffe and the Allied air forces. Hitler believed that the fighter groups would have new aircraft during the coming spring or summer. I told him that I considered this unlikely. I hoped only that the efforts of Milch to increase the production figures for the old wellknown types such as Me 109 and FW 190 would be successful so that our squadrons would have at least have material replacements to be going on with.

Nothing more could be expected for 1944. For some time I had not believed in victory, but neither did I foresee defeat. At the end of 1943 I was convinced that Hitler could still find a political and military solution. In this paradoxical belief, I was not alone.

Book Review: At Hitler's Side: Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant 1937-1945

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