Fighter-versus-Bomber Tactics

Up to the autumn of 1942 the standard German tactics against enemy day bombers involved quarter or stern attacks by Rotten or Schwärme. When engaging American bomber formations, however, German fighters attacking from the rear often suffered losses from the powerful defensive crossfire.

The first major change in tactics was to deliver the attacks from head-on, where the bombers' defensive armament was less powerful and their armour protection less effective. The bombers cruised at speeds around 175 mph and the fighters ran in at about 300 mph, so their closing speed was nearly 500 mph. That allowed time for only a brief half-second burst before the fighter pilot had to break away to avoid colliding with his prey. To bring down a heavy bomber with such a brief firing pass called for exceptionally good shooting. A few skilful pilots built up large victory scores using this method, but the average German fighter pilot achieved little. On the other hand, during a Staffel attack there was a good chance of damaging one or two bombers and forcing them to leave the relative safety of the formation. Aircraft flying alone could then be finished off at leisure.

Fig. 7 (above). A head-on attack oni a B-17. Hold the page a comfortable arm’s length (about two feet) from your eyes to see the apparent size of a B-17 at the various ranges. During a head-on attack, the closing speed of the two aircraft was about 500 mph, or more than 200 yards per second.
1. Range 800yards. At this distance the bomber had to be centred in the fighter’s gunsight graticule if it was to be hit.
2. One second later, range 600 yards: fighter about to open fire.
3. Half a second later, range 500 yards: the fighter commenced firing.
4. Half a second later; range 400 yards: the fighter ceased firing.
5. Half a second later, range 300 yards: the fighter pilot eased up his nose to move out of the path of the bomber.
6. Half a second later; range 200 yards: if the fighter was not out of the bomber’s path by this time, a collision was almost inevitable.

During the spring and summer of 1943 the Luftwaffe experimented with air-to-air bombing attacks, and attacks with large unguided rockets from outside the range of the bombers' defensive fire. Again, the intention was to damage aircraft and force them to leave formation, so that they could be picked off. The bombs and the unguided rockets proved to be inaccurate weapons, however. Although they achieved a few spectacular successes, for the most part they detonated too far from the bombers to inflict serious damage.

In the autumn of 1943 two Zerstörergeschwader, 26 and 76, returned to the homeland to buttress the fighter defences. The twin-engined bomber-destroyers, Messerschmitt Bf 110s and Me 410s, carried a forward-firing armament of four 20m cannon, two 30mm cannon and four 21cm rocket launchers. Against unescorted bomber formations the twin-engined fighters proved highly effective. Their fire-power was sufficient to inflict lethal damage on the American heavy bombers, and they carried enough fuel and ammunition to permit repeated attacks on the enemy formations.

The extending reach of the US escorts quickly imposed constraints on the twin-engined fighters' operations, however. During an attack on Frankfurt am Main on 4 October 1943, P-47 Thunderbolts caught a Gruppe of Bf 110s as it was moving into position to launch rockets into a bomber formation. In the ensuing combat the escorts shot down more than ten of the unwieldy twin-engined fighters, without loss to themselves. From then on bomber-destroyers tried to keep beyond the reach of the US escorts, and initially they restricted their operations to cast of the line Bremen-Kassel-Frankfurt. During the months that followed the US escorts penetrated progressively deeper into Germany and eventually, after suffering heavy losses, the twin-engined fighter units were forced to cease operations.

In the spring of 1944 the increasing strength, reach and performance of the American escort fighters led to a further change in tactics. German fighter units would assemble into large attack formations comprising three or four Gruppen, sometimes with more than a hundred fighters, to punch through the escorts and attack the bombers. However, in such actions the German fighters faced a fundamental problem. To stand a good chance of knocking down the rugged American bombers, the German fighters needed to carry batteries of heavy cannon and rockets, but any fighter carrying such a heavy weapons load was easy meat for the fast and nimble American escort fighters.

To overcome this problem Generalmajor Galland, the Inspector of Fighters, devised a new tactic. Special units, Sturmgruppen, were formed with heavily armoured Fw 190s fitted with heavy 30mm cannon. These were to engage the bombers. Lightly armed fighter Gruppen were to escort each Sturmgruppe and hold off the American escorts while the Focke Wulfs delivered their attacks. The Sturmgruppe with its two covering 'light' Gruppen made up a Gefechtsverband (battle formation) with a strength of up to a hundred aircraft.

During the summer and autumn of 1944 individual Gefechtsverbände sometimes engaged bomber formations with considerable success. The huge German fighter formations needed a long time to form up and climb to the raiders' altitude, however, and they were most unwieldy. Frequently the wide-ranging American fighters were able to engage the German attack formations and break them up before they could get close to the bombers.

During the final nine months of the war the Luftwaffe sent small forces of Me 262 jet fighters against the American heavy bombers, although there were never enough of these fighters airborne to achieve a significant success. The jet fighters were fast enough to operate successfully without escorts, and their armament of four 30mm cannon was powerful enough to knock down the bombers.

When they attacked bombers from astern, the jet fighters' high overtaking speeds allowed their pilots only a brief firing pass. To overcome this problem, jet fighters would dive past the escorts at speeds around 500 mph, aiming for a position about one mile behind and 1,500 feet below the bombers. When they reached that point they made a high-G pull-up to 'dump' speed, then they levelled off behind the bombers. At the end of the manoeuvre the jet fighters were in an ideal position to attack - inside the screen of escort fighters, behind the bombers and closing at about 100 mph. If the fighter carried rockets it would fire those first, then, unless the bomber had obviously suffered fatal damage, it would attack the same target with its cannon. When about 100 yards from the bomber the jet pilot would pull up and break away over the target, to avoid falling debris.

The Luftwaffe Data Book: Table of Content

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