Fighter-versus-Fighter Tactics

In the Luftwaffe fighter-versus-fighter tactics depended on aggressive manoeuvring and exploiting known performance advantages over enemy fighter types. The basic fighter unit was the Rotte (cell), comprising a leader (Rottenführer) and his wing-man (Katchmarek). During cruising flight the two aircraft flew almost in line abreast about 200 yards (metres) apart. Each pilot concentrated his search inwards to cover his partner's blind area behind and below. When in combat against enemy fighters the wing-man kept guard on his leader's tail, allowing the latter to concentrate on the task of setting up his attack.

Two Rotten made up a Schwarm, with the leading Rotte to one side and slightly ahead of the other and the aircraft stepped down into the sun. A Staffel formation comprised three Schwärme stepped up in line astern.

While operating in areas where contact with the enemy was likely, the fighters maintained a high cruising speed. With its component aircraft spaced about 200 yards apart, the Schwarm formation was approximately 600 yards wide. That meant it was almost impossible for the aircraft to hold position during a tight turn at high speed. The answer was the 'cross-over' turn: each aircraft turned as tightly as it could, and swapped sides in the formation.

In determining the effectiveness of a combat formation for fighters there are three factors to consider: first, the ability of the formation to manoeuvre while maintaining cohesion; secondly, the ability of the pilots to cover each others' blind areas and thus prevent a surprise attack; and thirdly, the ease with which an aircraft in the formation could receive support if it came under attack. On each of these three criteria, the German tactical formation was greatly superior to any of those used by other air forces early in the war.

Using the 'cross-over' turn, the Schwarm could turn as tightly as each aircraft was able. In cruising flight, every pilot in the Schwarm kept watch over his comrades' blind areas. If an aircraft in a Rotte or a Schwarm came under attack from behind, a simple turn placed the attacker under threat of attack.

Over Poland, France and during the early part of the Battle of Britain, the German fighters' tactics outclassed those of their opponents. Also, during this period, the altitude performance of the Messerschmitt Bf 109E was superior to that of any of the opposing fighter types. In general, therefore, the German tactics were to move into position above their opponents and 'bounce' them, if possible from out of the sun. After a single firing pass, the German fighters would use the speed gained in the dive to zoom back into position above their opponent. If necessary, the process was then repeated. Since the opposing fighters were usually slower and more manoeuvrable than the Bf 109, the German pilots preferred to avoid turning fights.

If the German fighters were themselves 'bounced' from above, if there was time each would turn independently to face the attackers. If there was not time, the German fighters would often bunt into high-speed dives. That exploited the advantages of the direct injection fuel system fitted to their Daimler Benz or BMW engines. If an enemy fighter fitted with an engine with the normal float carburettor tried to follow, that engine would cut out due to fuel starvation. An alternative was the Abschwung (American 'Split-S') manoeuvre - a half roll pulled through into a steep dive at full throttle. However, this tactic produced a considerable altitude loss - between 10,000 and 15,000 feet - which precluded its use except as a measure of desperation.

These tactics served the German fighter force well, provided units were allowed the tactical freedom to exploit the performance of their aircraft. Often during bomber escort missions this was not the case, however. During the Battle of Britain part of the fighter force was tasked with providing a close escort for each individual bomber Gruppe. In this case fighter pilots had strict orders not to engage enemy fighters unless they or their assigned bomber formation came under direct threat of attack. The fighter pilots hated this duty, for it meant they surrendered the initiative to the enemy. Given free rein, fighter commanders preferred to range aggressively ahead of the bombers and sweep the area clear of enemy fighters.

The Luftwaffe Data Book: Table of Content

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