One-Drous Chapters

Fighting in Hell:
The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front

by
GENERALOBERST ERHARD RAUSS
Commander, 4th and 3rd Panzer Armies
GENERAL DER INFANTERIE HANS VON GREIFFENBERG
Chief of Staff to Army Groups Center and A
GENERAL DER INFANTERIE DR WALDEMAR ERFURTH
Wehrmacht Representative to Finnish Headquarters

Edited by PETER G. TSOURAS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A.R.



IV. The Use of Armor

The Russian armored force played only a subordinate role at the beginning of the war. In the advance of 1941, most German troops encountered only small units which supported the infantry in the same manner as the German self-propelled assault guns. The Russian ranks operated in a very clumsy manner and were quickly eliminated by German antitank weapons. The Russians carried out counterattacks with large tank forces, either alone or in combined operations with other arms, only at individual, important sectors.

On 23 June 1941 the German Fourth Panzer Group, after a thrust from East Prussia, had reached the Dubysa and had formed several bridgeheads. The defeated enemy infantry units scattered into the extensive forests and high grain fields, where they constituted a threat to the German supply lines. As early as 25 June the Russians launched a surprise counterattack on the southern bridgehead in the direction of Raseiniai with their hastily brought-up XIV Tank Corps. They overpowered the 6th Motorcycle Battalion which was committed in the bridgehead, took the bridge, and pushed on in the direction of the city. The German 114th Armored Infantry Regiment, reinforced by 2 artillery battalions and 100 tanks, was immediately put into action and stopped the main body of enemy forces. Then there suddenly appeared for the first time a battalion of heavy enemy tanks of previously unknown type. The tanks overran the armored infantry regiment and broke through into the artillery position. The projectiles of all defense weapons (except the 88-mm. Flak) bounced off the thick enemy armor. The 100 tanks were unable to check the 20 enemy dreadnaughts, and suffered losses. Several Czech-built tanks (T36's) which had bogged down in the grain fields because of mechanical trouble were flattened by the enemy monsters. The same fate befell a 150-mm. medium howitzer battery which kept on firing until the last minute. Despite the fact that it scored numerous direct hits from as close a range as 200 yards, its heavy shells were unable to put even a single tank out of action. The situation became critical. Only the 88-mm. Flak finally knocked out a few of the Russian KV1's and forced the others to withdraw into the woods.

One of the KV1's even managed to reach the only supply route of the German task force located in the northern bridgehead, and blocked it for several days. The first unsuspecting trucks to arrive with supplies were immediately shot afire by the tank. There were practically no means of eliminating the monster. It was impossible to bypass it because of the swampy surrounding terrain. Neither supplies nor ammunition could be brought up. The severely wounded could not be removed to the hospital for the necessary operations, so they died. The attempt to put the tank out of action with the 50-mm. antitank gun battery, which had just been introduced at that time, at a range of 500 yards ended with heavy losses to crews and equipment of the battery. The tank remained undamaged in spite of the fact that, as was later determined, it got 14 direct hits. These merely produced blue spots on its armor. When a camouflaged 88 was brought up, the tank calmly permitted it to be put into position at a distance of 700 yards, and then smashed it and its crew before it was even ready to fire. The attempt of engineers to blow it up at night likewise proved abortive. To be sure, the engineers managed to get to the tank after midnight, and laid the prescribed demolition charge under the caterpillar tracks. The charge went off according to plan, but was insufficient for the oversized tracks. Pieces were broken off the tracks, but the tank remained mobile and continued to molest the rear of the front and to block all supplies. At first it received supplies at night from scattered Russian groups and civilians, but the Germans later prevented this procedure by blocking off the surrounding area. However, even this isolation did not induce it to give up its favorable position. It finally became the victim of a German ruse. Fifty tanks were ordered to feign an attack from three sides and to fire on it so as to draw all of its attention in those directions. Under the protection of this feint it was possible to set up and camouflage another 88-mm. Flak to the rear of the tank, so that this time it actually was able to fire. Of the 12 direct hits scored by this medium gun, 3 pierced the tank and destroyed it.

The Russian had not taken advantage of the critical situation of the German division which had resulted from the employment of the heavy 65-ton tanks. His infantry, which had broken through, did not become active again, but passively watched the proceedings. Therefore, it was possible to withdraw strong forces from the northern bridgehead and send them against the rear of the attacking tank corps. The latter immediately abandoned its success and retired to the east bank of the river. There, despite the fact that strong neighboring armored forces had already enveloped it and were attacking from the rear, it again held out far too long. The result was that the Russian tank corps lost the bulk of its tanks in the swamps. The infantry scattered and made its way through the woods along swamp paths.

On 26 June 1941 the Russians, by a tank corps thrust, wanted to relieve their forces which were encircled near Rawa Ruska, north of Lwow. This tank corps consisted only of tank chassis mounting machine guns and guns up to 150-mm.; it had no motorized infantry support. Near Magierow it encountered organized defense of the German 97th Light Infantry Division in a day and night attack, and was repulsed. Sixty-three Russian armored vehicles were knocked out.

In the thrust on Vyazma (early in October 1941) the German 6th Panzer Division, committed in the main effort, reached the upper Dnepr and captured the two bridges there by a coup de main. (Map 6) That maneuver cut off Russian forces which were still west of the river and assured a continued thrust to the east.

On the following day the Russians attempted to parry this severe blow by a flank attack. One hundred tanks drove from the south against the road hub of Kholm. They were, for the most part, medium tanks, against which the Germans could send only 40 light tanks and 1 armored infantry company. However, these weak forces were sufficient to contain the dangerous thrust until antiaircraft and antitank guns could be organized into an adequate antitank defense between Kholm and the southern Dnepr bridge. Split up by tanks in forest fighting, the Russians never succeeded in making a powerful, unified tank thrust. Their leading elements were eliminated as they encountered the antitank front. As a result, the Reds became even more timid and scattered in breadth and depth in such a way that all subsequent tank thrusts, carried out in detail by small groups, could be met by the German antitank front and smashed. Kholm and the Dnepr bridge, as well as their connecting road - which the Russians had already taken under intermittent tank fire - remained in German hands, After 80 Russian tanks had been put out of action, a break was made through the strongly fortified position on the east bank of the Dnepr, which was occupied by Red reserves, and the thrust from the southern bridgehead continued without concern for the Russians. The flank attack in detail by 100 Russian tanks near Kholm succeeded in delaying, but not in stopping, the advance of the German 6th Panzer Division.

While the German division with all its combat elements rolled along a road deep into Russian territory, hastily assembled Russian tank units and infantry, supported by several batteries, attempted to attack the 25-mile flank of the march column and stop its advance. Some of the Soviet batteries remained in their former positions and merely turned their guns around, while others rushed up at full speed and assumed fire positions in the open. Infantry and tanks advanced in a widespread chain against the German column, and the artillery immediately opened fire with every battery as soon as it had shifted its front.

The attack turned out badly for the Russians. In an instant the German division was firing all its weapons. The division resembled a mighty battleship, smashing all targets within reach with the heavy caliber of its broadsides. Artillery and mortar shells from 300 throats of fire hailed down on the enemy batteries and tanks. Soon the Soviet tanks were in flames, the batteries transformed into smoking heaps of rubble, and the lines of skirmishers swept away by a swath of fire from hundreds of machine guns. In 20 minutes the work of destruction was completed. The advance continued and on the same day reached Vyazma, its objective. This completed the encirclement of 400,000 Russians.

The Russian clearly recognized and twice tried to prevent the division's intent to break out of the bridgehead and push eastward from Kholm. He failed each time, although he had adequate forces and means at his disposal. In both cases the Russian command was at fault. In the first instance it was unable to execute a coordinated blow with a force of 100 tanks; in the second, it did not succeed in readying and coordinating all the available forces and antitank defenses in time.

The command of large tank units was usually difficult for the Russians even in later years. They had only a few competent armored commanders. In the tank force, too, successes were achieved only by the reckless use of masses. However, those tactics failed whenever even relatively adequate defense means were available to the Germans.

In the winter of 1942-43 the Russians employed four tank corps for a break-through near Kamenka on the Donets. By a thrust on Voroshilovgrad, the Russians would have been able to strike a crushing strategic blow at the deep left flank of Army Group von Manstein on the south bank of the Donets. instead, they were attracted by Kamenka and Millerovo and therefore made an assault only against the wings of a provisional army which were strongly defended at that point, and in spite of their superiority achieved only a tactical success. At that time the attack of the Russian main force came as a surprise. In minor thrusts launched during the preceding days the Russians had probed the front of the provisional army, which consisted only of separate strong points (a frontage of 120 miles, and held by one infantry division, one reinforced mountain infantry regiment, one SS regiment reinforced by armor, one panzer battalion, and several Flak batteries). The Russians proved that they were still unable at that time to employ large tank units strategically.

During the course of the well-commanded Russian counteroffensive of Byelgorod, massed Russian tanks reached the area around Bogodukhov, northwest of Kharkov, and Graivoron on the first day (5 August 1943), and then flowed like lava into the broad plain east of the Vorskla, where they were halted by German counteroperations from the Poltava-Akhtirka area. (Map 8)

Kharkov constituted a deep German salient to the east, which prevented the enemy from making use of this important traffic and supply center. All previous Russian attempts to take it had failed. Neither tank assaults nor infantry mass attacks had succeeded in bringing about the fall of this large city. Boastful reports made by the Russian radio, and erroneous ones by German pilots, announcing the entry of Russian troops into Kharkov at a time when the German front stood unwavering, did not alter the facts. When the Russian command perceived its mistake, Marshal Stalin ordered the immediate capture of Kharkov.

The rehabilitated Russian Fifth Tank Army was assigned this mission. The German XI Infantry Corps, however, whose five divisions firmly sealed off the city in a long arc, recognized the new danger in time. It was clear that the Russian Fifth Tank Army would not make a frontal assault on the projecting Kharkov bastion, but would attempt to break through the narrowest part of the arc west of the city, the so-called bottleneck, in order to encircle Kharkov. Antitank defenses were installed at once. All available antitank guns were set up on the northern edge of the bottleneck, which rose like a bastion, and numerous 88-mm. Flak guns were set up in depth on the high ground. The antitank defense would not have been sufficient to repulse the expected mass attack of Russian tanks, but at the last moment the requested 2d SS Panzer Division ('Das Reich’) arrived with strong armored forces and was immediately dispatched to the sector most endangered.

The 96 Panthers, 3g Tigers, and 25 self-propelled assault guns had hardly taken their assigned positions when the first large-scale attack of the Russian Fifth Tank Army got under way. The first hard German blow, however, hit the assembled mass of Russian tanks which had been recognized while they were still assembling in the villages and the flood plains of a brook valley. Escorted by German fighters, which cleared the sky of Russian aircraft within a few minutes, wings of heavily laden Stukas came on in wedge formation and unloaded their cargoes of destruction in well-aimed dives on the assembled tanks. Dark fountains of earth erupted skyward and were followed by heavy thunderclaps and shocks which resembled an earthquake. These were the heaviest, 2-ton bombs, designed for use against Russian battleships, which were all the Luftwaffe had to counter the Russian attack. Wing after wing approached with majestic calm, and carried out its work of destruction without interference. Soon all the villages occupied by Soviet tanks were in flames. A sea of dust and smoke clouds illuminated by the setting sun hung over the brook valley. Dark mushrooms of smoke from burning tanks, victims of the heavy air attacks, stood out in sharp contrast. The gruesome picture bore witness to an undertaking that left death and destruction in its wake. It had hit the Russian so hard that he could no longer launch the projected attack on that day, in spite of Stalin's order. A severe blow had been inflicted on the Russians, and the time needed for organizing German measures had been gained.

The next day the Russians avoided mass grouping of tanks, crossed the brook valley at several places, and disappeared into the broad cornfields which were located ahead of the front, but which ended at the east-west main highway several hundred yards in front of the main line of resistance. During the night motorized infantry had already infiltrated through the defense lines in several places and made a surprise penetration near Lyubotin into the artillery position. After stubborn fighting with the gun crews, 12 howitzers without breechlocks - which the crews took with them - fell into Russian hands. The points of the infiltrated motorized infantry already were shooting it out with the German local security in the wood adjoining the corps command post.

During the morning Red tanks had worked their way forward in the hollows up to the southern edges of the cornfields. Then they made a mass dash across the road in full sight. The leading waves of Russian T34’s were caught in the fierce defensive fire of the Panthers, and were on fire before they could reach the main line of resistance. But wave after wave followed, until they flowed across in the protecting hollows and pushed forward into the battle position. Here they were trapped in the net of antitank and antiaircraft guns, Hornets (88-mm. tank destroyers), and Wasps (self-propelled 105-mm. light field howitzers), were split up, and large numbers of them put out of action. The last waves were still attempting to force a break-through in concentrated masses when they were attacked by Tigers and self-propelled assault guns, until then mobile reserves behind the front, and were repulsed with heavy losses. The first thrust of the Russians was repelled. The price they paid for this mass tank assault amounted to 184 knocked-out T34’s.

In the meantime, German infantry reserves supported by self-propelled assault guns from the 3d Panzer Division had captured the lost battery positions together with all pieces and, west of Lyubotin behind the main line of resistance, had bottled up the battalion of infiltrated enemy motorized infantry. Stubbornly defending themselves, the Russians awaited the help that their radio had promised.

The Russian changed his tactics and the next day attacked farther east in a single deep wedge, using several hundred tanks simultaneously. But even while they moved across open terrain along the railroad, numerous tanks were set on fire at a range of 2,000 yards by the long-range weapons of the Tigers and Hornets. The large-scale Red attack was not launched until late in the forenoon. As the tanks emerged from the cornfields this time, they were assailed by the concentrated defense of all Tigers, Hornets, Panthers, self-propelled assault guns, and antiaircraft and antitank guns, and the attack collapsed in a short time with the loss of 154 tanks. The weak rifle units which followed were mowed down by the concentrated fire of German infantry and artillery as they emerged from the cornfields. The encircled Red motorized battalion had waited in vain for aid, but continued to fight on with incredible tenacity. In the late afternoon its radio announced the defeat of the unit and then fell silent forever. After 48 hours of heroic defense, the Red battalion was killed to the last man, including radio operators.

The losses thus far incurred by the Russians were enormous. However, they still possessed more than a hundred tanks, and experience had taught the Germans that further attacks were to be expected, even though they were predestined to failure in view of the now vastly superior defense. The few tankers taken prisoners were aware that death, or, if they were lucky, capture, awaited every one of their comrades.

Contrary to all expectations, an eerie calm prevailed throughout the following day. Several Red tanks crawled about in the cornfields and towed the damaged tanks away in order to reinforce their greatly depleted ranks. Summer heat shimmered over the bloody fields of the past days of battle. A last glow of sunset brought the peaceful day to a close. Might the enemy have given up his plan, or even refused to obey the supreme order to repeat the attack?

He came back, and on the same day. Before midnight, considerable noise from tanks in the cornfields betrayed his approach. The enemy intended to achieve during the night what he had failed to gain by daylight attacks.

Before he had reached the foot of the elevated terrain, numerous flashes from firing tanks had ripped the pitch-black darkness of the night and illuminated a mass attack of the entire Russian Tank Army on a broad front. Tanks knocked out at close range already were burning like torches and lighting up portions of the battlefield. More tanks joined them. The German antitank guns could no longer fire properly, since they could hardly distinguish between friend and foe; German tanks had entered the fray, ramming Russian tanks in a counterthrust or piercing them with shells at gun-barrel range in order to block the break-through. A steady increase in the flash and thunder of tank, antitank, and antiaircraft guns could be perceived after midnight. The main force of the German tanks had launched a counterattack. Many tanks and several farm buildings went up in flames. The plateau on which this great night tank duel was fought was illuminated by their pale light. This made it possible to recognize the contours of Red tanks at a distance of more than 100 yards, and to shell them. The thunderous roll turned into a din like the crescendo of kettledrums as the two main tank forces clashed. Gun flashes from all around ripped the darkness of night throughout an extensive area. For miles, armor-piercing projectiles whizzed into the night in all directions. Gradually the pandemonium of the tank battle shifted to the north. However, flashes also appeared farther and farther behind the German front, and fiery torches stood out against the night sky. Not until 2 or 3 hours later was calm restored in the depth of the German front. The conflict also gradually subsided in the battle position.

After daybreak the Germans could feel the battle was won although there were still Red tanks and motorized infantry in and behind the German position, and here and there a small gap still remained to be closed. The mopping up of the battle position, however, lasted all morning. By noon the position was in German hands and again ready for defense. Only a small patch of woodland, close behind the main line of resistance, was still occupied by Red motorized infantry supported by a few tanks and antitank guns. All attempts to retake this patch of woods had failed with heavy German losses. Even heavy, concerted fires of strong artillery units could not force the Russians to yield.

The tenacious resistance was ended only by an attack of flamethrowing tanks, which burned the entire strip of woods to the ground. The foremost of the Red tanks which had made the deep forward thrust was captured at the western outskirts of Kharkov by a divisional headquarters, and the crew members were taken prisoner. All the rest were put out of action by Flak teams.

The Red plan to take Kharkov by a large-scale night attack of the entire tank army had failed. The losses were more than eighty burned-out tanks, many hundreds of dead, thousands of wounded, and a considerable amount of equipment in this night of battle. The Russian Fifth Tank Army in the effort to recapture Kharkov lost 420 tanks in 3 days of fighting, and suffered such heavy losses of men and equipment that it ceased to be a combat factor for the foreseeable future. Kharkov remained in German hands until the high command ordered the troops stationed there to retire.

Blunders on the part of the leaders were only partially responsible for the fact that every one of the Red tank attacks failed, although the troops fought with extraordinary bravery. It was striking that the enemy had only weak infantry and artillery forces, and that his air forces did not participate effectively enough in operations. For these reasons the tank forces could not be adequately supported and their successes could not be exploited. The Fifth Tank Army seems to have been forced to premature action for reasons of prestige by orders of the Russian Supreme Command.

In the winter of 1943-44 the German XXX Infantry Corps' 16th Panzer Grenadier Division experienced a break-through of strong Russian tank forces with a long-range objective in the Dnepr bend south of Dnepropetrovsk. Here the Russians, with tank divisions followed by motorized forces, made a deep thrust against the left flank of the German Sixth Army forces which were withdrawing in front of Nikopol. At that time, the German front enclosed Nikopol in a semicircle east of the city. As this strong tank thrust gained in depth, it decreased in power because it split up. It did not achieve its strategic objective. In spite of the fact the Russian forces were many times superior in number, the German Sixth Army succeeded in containing the thrust in the depth of its sector and in forming new fronts. Even after a double envelopment by far superior tank forces (nine tank corps), the Russians, after encircling the German Sixth Army in Bessarabia, did not succeed in blocking the road over the Transylvanian Alps against the remnants of the Sixth and Eighth Armies. In the tank battle of Debrecen (summer 1944), too, Russian tanks and motorized units split up in such a manner, without being reconcentrated, that weak German panzer divisions succeeded not only in preventing a break-through but also in throwing the Russians back again toward Debrecen. The leadership of these large, strategic armored forces was inadequate. In this instance only the enemy’s enormous numerical superiority, and his mobility, brought him local successes.

Even in the last months of the war the Russians committed blunders in the command of their armored forces. They continued either to advance timidly when there was scarcely any resistance left, or else they carried out deep, isolated tank thrusts which the infantry was unable to follow and which, consequently, could not lead to permanent success. Russian armored forces always incurred severe losses wherever they encountered German armor still organized in units of any appreciable strength. Thus, as late as April 1945, the battle-weary German 6th Panzer Division succeeded, in what was probably the last tank battle, in repulsing vastly superior Russian tank forces in the plains of the lower March River, and in knocking out 80 tanks.

If the Russian tank forces with their vastly superior numbers had had proper leadership, the Russians would have been able to bring about the end of the war at a much earlier stage.

Russian Combat Methods: III. Development of Russian Offensive Tactics
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