by Kenneth Macksey
© and Published by:
Greenhill Books
(reproduced on MagWeb with permission)
Excerpts from Chapter 7: The Green Light Through FranceOn 14th May OKW and OKH had concurred in withdrawing XVI from Army Group B in Belgium so as to reinforce the success of Rundstedt's Army Group A in France. On the 16th Halder was expressing delight at a breakthrough which '... is developing on almost classical lines', an opinion which found support at OKW. Rundstedt, however, had begun to fuss on the 15th, when the advance from the Meuse had barely started. His War Diary suggested the necessity of halting on the River Oise for fear Of the threat from the south and because the enemy must in no circumstances be allowed a success '... on the Aisne or later in the Laon region'. On the 16th these fears overflowed. Guderian thrust forward on the 16th with only 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions, leaving 10th Panzer Division and Grossdeutschland Regiment to the south of Sedan as insurance against interference from the south and in deference to Kleist's anxiety. The French again repeatedly attacked the hinge at Stonne and caused losses to the arriving German infantry. But they made no progress. The rest of XIX Corps shot ahead and by nightfall was 40 miles distant at Dercy on the Serre at the same moment as a battlegroup from XXXXI Corps arrived at Guise on the Oise and began the process of mopping up the stalled tanks of 2nd DCR. Conveniently overlooking Kleist's twenty-four hour time limit, Guderian blandly sent out radio orders that evening to continue the advance next day, orders which were monitored by Kleist's headquarters and which, at once, brought down a peremptory counter-order along with instructions for Guderian to report to Kleist next morning. At 0700 hours on the 17th Kleist stepped from his aircraft at XIX Corps Headquarters and, without ado, roundly accused Guderian of deliberately disobeying orders. Guderian at once tendered his resignation. Neither could be credited with much common sense at that moment, but both were on edge - Kleist to a far greater extent than Guderian could have known. For Kleist was not much more in favour of a halt than Guderian. The uncertainty was germinated by Rundstedt. Again his War Diary reflected tremors of doubt, for after it recorded, on the 16th, that the commanders of the motorised formations were convinced they could push on over the Oise '... especially Generals Guderian and Kleist', it went on: 'But looking at operations as a whole the risk involved does not seem to be justified. The extended flank between La Fère and Rethel is too sensitive, especially in the Laon area . . . If the spearheads of the attack are temporarily halted it will be possible to effect a certain stiffening of the threatened flank within twenty-four hours’. It is apparent that Kleist did not bother to explain Rundstedt's underlying anxieties to Guderian - their relationship was already too far strained. But Rundstedt was shaken when Guderian's report of resignation arrived. Things had gone too far when a favourite of Hitler did that! He sent him a curt order to remain in his post and await a plenipotentiary - no less than the Twelfth Amy Commander, Generaloberst List. List arrived in the afternoon, swiftly declined Guderian's resignation and with the authority of the Amy Group Commander told him to begin a 'reconnaissance in force', leaving Corps HQ where it was. In effect this gave Guderian a free hand, one which he made all the freer by laying cable to his tactical headquarters so that his orders could no longer be monitored by superior officers. List confirms these events as well as Guderian's request to be peacemaker on his own behalf with Kleist. Between resignation and reinstatement Guderian sat down to pour out his troubles in a letter to Gretel. It no longer exists but its purport is made plain by her reply on 27th May, in which she wrote, 'It would be lunacy and tragic if at the crowning moment of your life's work you stood aside ... Despite all your troubles, do not take steps that will harm you and which you will regret for the rest of your life. Darling, I beg of you from the bottom of my heart not to do this. If you have to act I think you should send a direct report to the Führer: anything else would be, as always, to your disadvantage.' She went on to warn him to have care in what he wrote - ‘that important letter of yours was opened by the censor' - and added, 'I almost asked Bodewin [Keitel] yesterday for an explanation but could not make up my mind since I was not sure if it would be in your best interests.' The vigilance of the Amy authorities - it is unlikely that this act of censorship was State-inspired - seems to throw a revealing shaft of light upon their mistrust of Guderian. That the mail of a senior general should be censored (even by a rampant bureaucracy) was, to say the least, unusual, while the despatch of a Major to instruct his wife to keep silent about the letter's content demonstrated a distinct official uneasiness at what bad passed. But the disagreements that had raised the incident were but a storm in a tea-cup compared with what was brewing between the leaders of OKW, OKH and Amy Group A. That day Hitler became scared at success and drove to see Rundstedt (a ready fellow worrier) to tell him it was more important to maintain a flow of safe successes rather than take a risk by reaching for the Channel. The scope of Guderian's advance once more outreached the Führer's limited notion of mobile operations: ripples of the Führer's worries washed through OKW, sometimes in the form of direct instructions to specific Amy divisions, and aroused anger in Halder who, that morning, was perfectly satisfied that there was ‘no danger whatsoever’. He assessed the situation with the same, accurate insight as the spearhead commander and kept his head in the days to come as Hitler and his entourage soared between euphoria and melancholy, over-confidence and funk. Published by Greenhill Books. © Greenhill Books. All rights reserved. Reproduced on MagWeb with permission of the publisher. Back to List of One-Drous Chapters: World War II Back to List of All One-Drous Chapters Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List Magazine articles and contents are copyrighted property of the respective publication. All copyrights, trademarks, and other rights are held by the respective magazines, companies, and/or licensors, with all rights reserved. MagWeb, its contents, and HTML coding are © Copyright 1998 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. |