"No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs may change during the night."

Part 1. The Austrian Breakout

At 10 p.m. on June 13, senior Austrian generals arrived at number 1 Faa di Bruno in Alessandria to join their leader for a council of war. Everyone agreed that the situation was critical. Of the 120,000 men who had begun the campaign only about half remained. Twenty-thousand of the survivors occupied various fortresses. This was the usual Habsburg practice. Still, the assignment of 2,816 men to Milan, 5,800 to Genoa, 4,390 to Coni, and 3,860 to Turin, as well as additional thousands to several lesser citadels, was wanton disregard for economy of force. Only 40,000 soldiers remained in and about Alessandria. While opinions about what to do with them were divided, GdK Melas had no doubts. For the past eight days he and GM Zach had been preparing an offensive. They had anticipated it would be based on Piacenza. Instead, it would occur on the plains of the Scrivia. Melas issued orders: the army would risk all and attack at dawn!

The objective was to open the road east so the army could safely move toward Mantua and thus draw closer to Austria itself. The commanding general based his hopes for victory upon "the preponderance and superiority of our artillery and cavalry". He judged that the army was in good spirits. During the past several days he had opened the great storehouses in Alessandria to allow the soldiers to replace worn equipment, clothing, and shoes. He had distributed meat, rice, and wine on a lavish scale. To encourage further the soldiers to their duty, Melas issued a stirring proclamation.

Melas and Zach devised a two-prong offensive. As would have been the case at Piacenza, artillery from within the fortified bridgehead would provide fire support. Under its protective barrage, FML O'Reilly would lead the main body out from the bridgehead against Marengo while FML Ott conducted a secondary force across the pontoon bridge that lay downstream from the bridgehead. Ott's mission was to march on Castel Ceriolo and secure the army's left flank from any French force operating to the north while simultaneously fixing the French center. Meanwhile, the mainbody would move from Marengo to San Giuliano and then turn to its left to roll up the French flank. O'Reilly, who initially would spearhead the breakout from the bridgehead, would turn south to secure the army's right flank. If all went according to plan, the offensive would drive the Army of Reserve northward into a cul de sac formed by the Scrivia and Po rivers. If the attack failed, the Austrians would retreat to Genoa where the garrison was gathering provisions to feed them.

While commendably bold, Melas' plan contained several important flaws. He labored under a misapprehension regarding French dispositions. First Consul Bonaparte's decision to spread his forces wide to prevent an Austrian escape had confused Melas. He believed that a sizeable French force was at Sale whereas in fact only 760 troopers belonging to Jean Rivaud's light cavalry brigade were there. On battle's eve Melas dispatched a hussar regiment north to Casale to check any French advance from Sale. In addition, because of concerns about the Sale force, Ott received instructions to pay particular attention to the army's left flank. Moreover, because Austrian scouts could see Lannes' campfires on the high ground south of Castel Ceriolo but not those of most of Victor's men, Melas incorrectly judged that the French center lay well north of the main highway.

In detail there were also several other errors and omissions. Three thousand men remained inside Alessandria to garrison the citadel, which was an unnecessary waste. Sometime during the night someone worried that the downstream bridge was too vulnerable at its original location and ordered it moved to the bridgehead. Thus, the entire army would have to debouch from the confines of the bridgehead. It is among a chief of staff's duties to take steps to ensure that the commander's strategy can be implemented. Zach badly let Melas down by failing to foresee how slow would be the army's exit from the bridgehead. Whereas gaps might have been cut in the earthworks to permit a more speedy exit, this was not done. The entire army had to march out from the one opening where the highway emerged onto the plain.

The original plan had been formed with the notion that O'Reilly would still occupy Marengo and thus the army would have the space to deploy for battle. When this proved not to be the case, it meant that the army would have to fight for the ground on which to deploy. Yet no one adjusted the plan to the new reality. Three consequences flowed from this omission. First, once the army exited the bridgehead, no particular unit had the mission to capture Marengo. Second, instead of being able to move freely on Castel Ceriolo, Ott would have to wait for the leading units to clear his front before he could being his maneuver. Lastly, the original plan called for the army to begin moving at midnight. Since the French occupied the deployment ground, movement was postponed until 7 a.m. During the night, 24,073 infantry and 7,543 cavalry along with 92 guns prepared to attack. Officers circulated among the bivouacs to prohibit camp fires that might reveal their presence. This subterfuge succeeded. Although Victor's pickets reported the sounds of movement, everyone assumed it indicated a retreat.

The highway connecting Alessandria with Piacenza along which the Austrian army was to march issued southeast from the Bormida bridgehead to Marengo, and then continued east through San Giuliano, Torre di Garofoli, and over the Scrivia. It was the main axis alongside of which the armies fought. The battle ground was gently rolling farm country. The highest elevations were around the village of Castel Ceriolo. Here was the only truly rough terrain on the entire battlefield. A series of irregular undulations extended southeast from this village to the hamlet of Cassina Grossa, just south of the highway. The remainder of the field appeared generally flat when viewed on a broad scale. However, there were numerous swales that, at the short ranges fire fights occurred, restricted lines of sight. The fields were planted with grape vines and wheat, and these also reduced tactical visibility.

About one mile from the bridgehead, bordering the highway's northern side, was the stoutly built Pietrabuona farm, where would occur the day's first fighting. Six to seven hundred yards further along the highway was the Fontanone Creek. The Fontanone rose from a marsh adjacent to the Bormida River and wound its way sluggishly northward. Its high banks made it a natural barrier, its location made it a natural trench blocking egress from the Austrian bridgehead. On the creek's eastern side was Marengo, site of the ancient villa of the Lombard kings. Marengo contained three significant, highly defensible structures: a large silkworm farm that included a sixty foot high square tower; and two buildings that housed farm workers.

Twice within the past thirteen months France and her enemies had battled on the Marengo plain. On May 16, 1799, Victor had been serving in Moreau's army during its campaign against Suvorov. Victor led his command eastward out of Alessandria, crossed a bridge and ford over the Bormida, and advanced against Russian- held Marengo. His men had driven the Russians from Marengo and continued through San Giuliano until they encountered overwhelming numbers. Victor then conducted a fighting withdrawal back to his bridgehead. Then as now Gardanne served as Victor's subordinate. This experience provided the two with a fine understanding of the terrain, including the defensive advantages of the Fontanone ravine.

On June 20, 1799 came a second battle of Marengo. This time the French and Austrians occupied the same relative positions they were to occupy the following year. In a curious preview of Bonaparte's battle, at first the advantage lay with the Austrians. General Emmanuel Grouchy fought a stubborn battle against superior numbers but his lack of cavalry and artillery told against him. A column of Hungarian grenadiers was on the verge of driving him from the field when fresh French forces arrived to turn the tide of battle. Although he had a horse shot out from under him, Moreau displayed fine energy throughout the day and drove the Austrians back to Alessandria.

On the morning of June 14, 1800, about 26,029 French infantry, 3,851 cavalry, and 493 gunners crewing 35 artillery pieces lay scattered across the countryside between the Scrivia and Bormida rivers. The rank and file of the Army of Reserve spent a miserable night. Supply wagons were well to the rear so they had little to eat. It rained during the night and naturally only the senior officers occupied the few places of shelter. During the night, neither Victor nor Gardanne took measures to ensure security. Given the remarkably short distance from the French picket line to the Austrian bridgehead, the inability to detect Melas' buildup can only be attributed to gross negligence. Dawn found the French army blissfully unaware that battle was imminent. Gardanne's 3,178-man division had its right flank resting on the Fontanone Creek, its left dangling in the air 600 yards short of the Bormida River. His outposts occupied the Pietrabuona farm. Chambarlhac's division lay in its camps about Marengo. Kellermann's three heavy cavalry regiments occupied the hamlet of Spinetta, south of Marengo. Lannes' people, Watrin's division and the Swiss-born General Joseph Mainoni's brigade were in the rear near the Buzana farm some 1,500 yards southeast of Castel Ceriolo. Pierre Champeaux's cavalry brigade was in Castel Ceriolo with general of brigade Bernard Duvigneau's cavalry nearby.

Within the bridgehead, the Austrian position was very cramped. At daybreak, the main column cautiously filed through the bridgehead's only gate. They appeared to be in fighting fettle. "See how cheerful the soldiers are," commented FML Ludwig Vogelsang to an aide. Melas observed his army debouch while chief of staff Zach ordered a cavalry patrol to scout southward to locate the French flank. At the same time, FML O'Reilly led his force toward Marengo. Behind O'Reilly, the balance of the army began to deploy as soon as it exited the bridgehead. FML Karl Haddick's division was in the first line. Behind him was FML Conrad Kaim's division. FML Peter Morzin's grenadiers stood in column in reserve. While some cavalry took station on both wings, FML Elsnitz's cavalry division remained in the rear. The deployment took time. Not until 7 a.m. did the leading Austrian troops commanded by Oberst (colonel) Johann Frimont (832 infantry; 458 cavalry) contact Victor's outposts at the Pietrabuona farm. Unlike French practice, there were few men deployed as skirmishers to screen the advance. In their stead were two artillery batteries which unlimbered next to a mulberry grove with tubes trained in the direction of Marengo.

Frimont's men marched across a series of ditches and advanced against the Pietrabuona farm. The startled French fired a shaky volley and withdrew. This served as a signal for the Austrian artillery to open fire. The bombardment caught the soldiers of the 101st Demi-brigade still in their bivouacs. As the French scrambled into battle formation, Frimont's men pressed forward along the highway until staggered by battalion volleys delivered from Gardanne's infantry. They fell back and spent the next thirty minutes deploying into line. This gave Gardanne invaluable time to organize a defense. Meanwhile, O'Reilly who, recall, had responsibility to protect the Austrian right flank and was not charged with capturing Marengo deployed his men(2,228 infantry; 769 cavalry) so that their rightmost files touched the willows that bordered the Bormida River. During his deployment, his two batteries continued to savage the French position some 500 paces northwest of Marengo. Austrian batteries positioned across the Bormida added their fire whenever a target became unmasked. It was a killing bombardment to which the French had no answer. Because of the delay at Fort Bard, the army had never received sufficient artillery. Gardanne's division possessed only two artillery pieces. The only reasons the Austrians did not immediately bowl over Gardanne's men were the difficulty of moving out from the bridgehead it took until 8:30 a.m. for the entire Austrian force simply to cross the Bormida River and the constricted, half-mile long front that prevented Melas from using his overwhelming numerical advantage.

Displaying admirable battlefield judgement, Victor reacted quickly to the surprise Austrian assault. He ordered Gardanne to stand fast to absorb the initial shock. By delaying the enemy onslaught, Gardanne would buy time to allow Chambarlhac's division (6,564 infantry) to move forward and deploy behind Marengo. Duvigneau's cavalry brigade, which was without the 6thDragoon Regiment, was the closest mounted support. Unbeknownst to Victor, the brigade was also without its leader. Eight years earlier, Bernard Duvigneau had received a grievous wound at Valmy. Although this earned him a battlefield promotion, it also gave him a shocking introduction to the perils of combat. The next time he was under fire he was wounded again. Marengo was his third battle and the memory of what had happened twice before unmanned him. Pleading illness in fact he had suffered a severe fall from his horse the previous evening while inspecting his picket line Duvigneau fled the field. Victor personally took charge and ordered Duvigneau's 8th Dragoons to move to protect Gardanne's left flank. Then Victor scrawled a hasty note reporting the Habsburg attackand dispatched a cavalry captain to convey it to Bonaparte. It was 8 a.m.

Obeying Victor's orders, Gardanne spread his division's men from near the Pietrabuona farm to a convenient bend in the Bormida River. This was such a narrow front that the Austrians could attack with a deployed line of only some 4,300 men. Around 9 a.m. came the first serious assault. The French line fired platoon volleys that repelled the initial Austrian charges. There were no available rises from which could fire the Austrian artillery. When the whitecoated infantry charged, they masked their own guns. However, in between charges the Habsburg artillery maintained a steady fire. The iron balls bounded along the nearly flat ground, undeflected by natural obstacles, to create a beaten zone deep into the French rear. Since Gardanne's men were in line, they did not suffer unduly from this fire as long as they held their position. Still it took great discipline to endure a bombardment to which they had no reply. However, French tactics relied upon counterattacks to regain lost ground. Showing great spirit, the soldiers cheered and sang la Marseillaise while they advanced. When these counterattacks pressed too far forward the men suffered dearly from enfilade artillery fire delivered by Austrian batteries sited on the far side of the Bormida River.

About this time Melas received a misleading report from one of his scouting detachments. As noted, Bonaparte's dispersal of his force up and down the Scrivia River had worried Melas. In addition, Melas feared the pending arrival of Suchet's and Mass‚na's commands from the southwest. Accordingly he sent a Captain Ceiwrany with a squadron of the Kaiser Dragoons southwest toward Acqui to scout for Suchet. Around 9 a.m., Ceiwrany sent a message to Melas stating that he had been "attacked by a strong column of French cavalry followed by infantry" and that the enemy was driving hard on Alessandria. If true, this was alarming intelligence. Melas sent GM Nimptsch and his cavalry brigade to counter this threat. Although Nimptsch easily drove Suchet's patrols back to Acqui Ceiwrany's report wildly exaggerated the proximity of the French threat his departure subtracted 2,341 hussars from Melas' attack.

On the battlefield, FML Haddick (3,677 infantry; 1,362 cavalry) was dissatisfied with the attack's lack of progress. He placed himself at the head of GM Friedrich Bellegarde's brigade and led them toward Marengo. According to Victor, Haddick's line "finally deployed; with flags flying in the breeze, and musical fanfares as if at a triumphant fete: it threatened to destroy the small French division with its enormous superiority." Recognizing that the enemy would soon prevail, at 10 a.m. Victor ordered Gardanne to retreat in echelon across Fontanone Creek. The challenge of disengaging, reforming, and marching across fireswept ground severely tested the French infantry. Some soldiers could not withstand the pressure and broke to the rear. By and large, Gardanne's division performed superbly.

While serving in Normandy during the campaign against the rebels, Gardanne had written repeatedly to the First Consul begging for a position with the Army of Reserve. His leadership at Marengo justified his brashness. At a cost of nearly half its men, Gardanne's division bought the Army of Reserve an invaluable two hours. And, they were not yet done.

Recalling his previous battle on this ground, Victor positioned Gardanne's remaining soldiers behind the creek to the left of Marengo. From this position their musketry would sweep the right flank of the expected Austrian assault against Marengo. In addition, one of Chambarlhac's battalions from the 43rd Demi- brigade took position in front of the village. To these soldiers it seemed that they alone faced the entire Austrian army. Because French possession of Marengo thwarted a comfortable Austrian deployment, Melas resolved to capture it at all hazards. Accordingly, Haddick hurled wave after wave into the assault. The Fontanone ravine was enough of an obstacle to slow the Austrian advance while the brush along its banks offered the defenders some concealment. A French staff officer related, "The enemy came up and formed within a very short musket range of us. The irregularity of the ravine giving us a flank fire during his deployment we annoyed him a great deal; we could see men fall in his ranks at every discharge." Habsburg officers exhibited unaccustomed front line leadership to urge their men forward. Although some Austrian soldiers managed to cross the ravine, it was clear to Haddick that for the moment his division was fought out. He had just ordered it to retire when he received what was to prove a mortal wound. While GM Bellegarde reformed Haddick's division, FML Conrad Kaim (4,939 infantry) committed his division to the assault. They too could make no progress. For ninety minutes Gardanne's division, assisted by a single battalion, stopped the Austrian infantry along the creek line. But in between assaults they had to endure the terrible Austrian artillery fire.

Published by Napoleon Books. © James Arnold. All rights reserved. Reproduced on MagWeb with permission of the author and publisher.

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