One-Drous Chapters

The Anglo-French Conflict
in North America (1756-1763)

by Alberto Rosselli

Excerpt: Chapter III: The Siege of Quebec

© 2001 and Published by:
ERGA Editrice
(reproduced on MagWeb.com with permission)



By July 1759, the Anglo-American forces had penetrated well into New France, although Montcalm's army continued to control the upper part of the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu.

The French-Canadian forces held various crucial positions along the St. Lawrence, such as Fort Levis and Trois Rivieres (between Quebec and Montreal), and they had also reinforced the strongholds of Ile-aux-Noix and Chambly along the Richelieu. These two defences were in fact the last obstacle in the way of General Jeffrey Amherst's army.

In August of the same year, General Wolfe sent Major James Murray with a reconnaissance unit to Trois Rivieres in order to establish direct contact with Amherst, who sent a detachment of Rangers to meet them and also ordered some of the troops at Oswego to begin marching northwards again. Wolfe ordered General William Haviland's troops to abandon their camp at Crown Point and make their way up the Richelieu to meet up with the other two AngloAmerican formations.

Major Murray and a party of a hundred and twenty men left Pointe Levis on 13th July and headed off in canoes towards Trois Rivieres. On their way, they tried to land at Pointe-aux-Trembles but were fought back by the French. Murray's party tried to land a second time but suffered such serious losses that they were forced to abandon the landing. They finally managed to land a little further up the St. Lawrence at Deschambault, where they surprised and overcame a small French detachment that was guarding a sizeable supply depot. Murray set fire to the camp and the food and munitions stores, and the glow of the fire was apparently visible several miles away from the walls of Quebec. Montcalm was tempted to make a personal inspection of the damage that had been inflicted but in the end sent out a detachment to Deschambault. By the time it arrived, Murray and his men were already back on their way to Trois Rivieres, which they reached on 17th August.

Amherst left Oswego on 10th August and encountered a number of difficulties during his expedition. The small garrison at Fort Levis (a total of three hundred men) under the command of an officer named Pierre Pouchot had been warned by a despatch from Montcalm that the British were arriving and been ordered to defend the fort to the last man. Pouchot held out for six days against eleven thousand British troops and only surrendered when the ammunition ran out. On 6 September 1759, having overrun the last minor outposts, Amherst began marching towards Lachine, just outside Montreal.

In the meantime, Haviland's column had left Crown Point on 11th August and followed the Richelieu as far as Ile-aux-Noix, which was defended by a garrison of fifteen hundred French-Canadian troops under the command of Louis-Antoine de Bougainville. His men fought off an attack by 3400 British soldiers and inflicted serious losses. Then under cover of darkness on 29th August he made a surprise move and evacuated the stronghold, retreating with his men to the small stockade of Saint Jean. Finding this position almost indefensible, Bougainville had it mined and destroyed and led his few surviving troops in a memorable retreat towards the St. Lawrence. During this journey, which involved a number of short but violent encounters, Bougainville's party was dogged and regularly attacked by a force of three thousand soldiers flanked by a number of Indian units.

Around the same time (between 28th August and 1st September) Amherst's and Haviland's forces made a definitive break through the French-Canadian front and took the forts of Sainte Th6r6se and Chambly. On 6th September, Major Murray's column was thus able to join up with Amherst's army at Lachine.

Following Montcalm's orders to the letter, Bougainville had managed to save most of the forces from the Richelieu garrison and lead them towards Quebec. Montcalm had achieved his objective: a considerable number of experienced fighting men had managed to escape from the enemy and were now under his command in the defence of the last remaining part of French colonial territory.

London was continuing to send regular supplies to the North American army. Every month dozens of merchant ships escorted by the British fleet supplied the various colonial ports in North America with thousands of tons of food, arms and ammunition. Indeed, there was an unbroken flow of supplies right through to the end of the conflict. Despite these hard facts, which were confirmed by the French secret service and by despatches arriving from France, the governor and his entourage continued to insist that all of the territories still under French control should be actively defended. This attitude rekindled the animosity between Vaudreuil and Montcalm that had never been entirely overcome. Once again, however, the general managed to prevail and the governor was obliged to accept his defence strategy.

The strategic position and structure of Quebec made it a solid stronghold. It was manned by a force of fifteen thousand officers and men from the army, navy and the Canadian militia, who were flanked by about two thousand Indians. Most of the soldiers were positioned outside the city walls between the Saint Charles and the Montmorency and along the St. Lawrence up-river of the capital.

On the morning of 28th June, Montcalm, worried by the proximity of Admiral Saunders' fleet, decided to send some fire-ships against the British vessels. At about ten o'clock in the evening, a detachment of French seamen led by Captain Delouche set sail from the port with seven fire-ships and two rafts loaded with barrels of gunpowder and a mixture of tar and sawdust. Under cover of darkness, an attack was made on the enemy fleet anchored off the Isle d'Orleans. However, the operation failed because the British reacted in time to avoid impact with the highly explosive vessels.

On the following morning, Montcalm decided to reinforce the external defences, especially the positions along the Beauport-Montmorency line, which is where he believed the British would apply the greatest pressure'. In the meantime, the people of Quebec were beginning to feel the effects of the lengthening siege. Supplies were only getting through with great difficulty and were very strictly rationed. Most of the food supplies came from the stores in Montreal and could only be brought to Quebec on barges and rafts down the river because the Chemin du Roy, an unsurfaced road built in 1734 and the only major link between the two cities, was badly in need of maintenance and had now become almost impassable. In the meantime, Quebec was short of horses, mules and oxen and there was also a shortage of fresh meat. All animals that could be used either for transport or as food had been requisitioned by the army either for the transport of convoys and artillery or to feed the troops and poorer civilians.

The many families of settlers who had moved inside or just outside the city walls were determined to form a united front against the enemy. Social and racial barriers were broken down and suddenly Samuel Champlain's dream of creating a new French-Canadian race seemed to be coming true. Many settlers took up arms in defence of their homeland. Old men of eighty and young boys of twelve went of their own accord to the military commands to enrol in the militia.

Even the young pupils of the Jesuit College in Quebec joined up and formed a company called the Royal Syntaxe. Montcalm had every right to feel satisfied. In such circumstances, the governor decided to confirm his loyalty to the national cause and deference of the general's directives. "I am doing everything in my power", he wrote to Berryer, "to protect and feed the defenceless citizens and organise the best possible military defence of Quebec. A safe place has been found for the elderly and the women and children, as well as for livestock and supplies. Though the enemy is mighty, I am determined to fight to the bitter end". As ever, Vaudreuil praised the "excellent" work of Cadet and promised that all of the disagreements with Montcalm would be ironed outlo. However, there was some discrepancy between Vaudreuil's version of the situation and the true facts. While General Montcalm, Bishop de Pontbriand and the governor himself were certainly acting with great courage and honesty, the same could not be said of others who were close to Vaudreuil, such as Nan, Bigot and Cadet. Despite the severe restrictions imposed by the war, these three men continued to live a life of luxury and excess. Their private chefs prepared sumptuous dinners with fowl that had been fattened up on the wheat intended for hungry civilians and soldiers, while ordinary people were now having to live on a daily ration of two ounces of bread and a handful of vegetables.

The Bishop of Quebec, Henri Marie Dubreuil de Pontbriand, urged the people to defend their homeland and did all that he could to support them spiritually and materially by arranging processions and religious services and distributing wheat. Although he was seriously ill, the elderly churchman left his residence in Charlesbourg every day to visit the city hospitals and shelters and give comfort to ordinary people and the wounded. Rather naively, however, the bishop ordered all the curates of the city and the surrounding districts to donate their tithes to the local revenue office. Unfortunately, this was controlled by Bigot so it is not difficult to imagine how these funds were used.

The dignified behaviour of the people of Quebec led General Wolfe to issue a number of menacing proclamations. As Wolfe saw it, Canadians should not be taking part in a war that concerned only France and England". He therefore ordered that all civilians who took up arms in defence of their country were to be treated as common outlaws". Wolfe then authorised his soldiers and militiamen to sack and bum all of the houses, farms and parishes in the immediate vicinity of Quebec City. During these operations, the atrocities committed by British and American soldiers even outdid the proverbial bloodthirstiness of their Iroquois allies. Hundreds of civilians were massacred and scalped or, like their Acadian fellow countrymen in 1758, deported. Wolfe was convinced that such brutal reprisals would eventually break civilian resistance and force Montcalm out of his stronghold to come to the aid of the settlers. The French general, however, did not fall into the trap and the civilians continued to suffer. He wished to keep his army compact. "All of our efforts", he wrote in his diary on 31 st May, "must be directed towards defending Quebec. It would be folly to allow our troops to disperse"". And so enemy violence continued, and some units of the Highlanders and the American militia units were involved in acts of ineffable savagery.

"The British", wrote Bigot to Francois Levis in a letter dated 1st September, "have even shot the local priest at Saint Joachim together with nine civilians, including some women and children who had refused to be taken prisoner"".

In the meantime, the shelling of Quebec continued. On 12th July, Monckton carried out the first heavy bombardment of the inhabited area, destroying numerous buildings. During the next few days, the shells pounded the city incessantly, causing damage to the cathedral and the seminary of the Maison du Clerge. Once again, the replies from the Royale and Dauphine batteries in the city were weak and inefficient.

At this time, Montcalm was worried by the manoeuvres of the enemy fleet below the city walls (some British ships had approached in order to shell the walls and test their resistance) and he ordered yet another fireship attack against Saunders' fleet. But once again this tactic met with failure.

As the siege continued and hardship increased, the French garrison still showed no visible signs of yielding. But the situation of the civilians living in Quebec and the surrounding areas was worsening. Almost all of the inhabitants of the lower town had taken refuge either in the upper district, where the wealthier residences and churches were located, or in the surrounding countryside, in small villages such as Saint Roch, which was teeming with terrified refugees. Inside the city, the Ursuline nuns and those in the Hospital had been obliged to evacuate the sick and injured to safer areas in the upper town, as far away as possible from the British howitzers. Once these areas were evacuated, however, there was an outbreak of looting in the lower town. In order to put a swift end to this deplorable pillaging. the French military command hanged those who had been caught in the act. Within the space of a few days, the severe application of martial law had put a total end to pillaging.

As time went by, British persecution of the settlers in the rural areas led to the desertion of Canadian militiamen who feared for their own families' safety. Before that time there had been very few cases of desertion from the French-Canadian ranks. But in late July Montcalm was forced to take serious preventive measures. On 19th July, a Canadian deserter informed Wolfe that Vaudreuil was using loyal Indian units to prevent the Canadian settlers from deserting. On 25th July, other prisoners said that Indian groups under the command of French officers had actually attacked the houses of settlers accused of desertion. A French reporter stated that desertion in the Canadian ranks was increasing from day to day despite the surveillance of Indian patrols.

At this time, Wolfe was starting to show signs of nervousness. The objective of a rapid victory was beginning to fade, yet he knew that Quebec had to be taken before autumn set in, for Admiral Saunders' fleet could certainly not risk getting trapped in the winter ice. Although Wolfe had expressed his concern to his officers in early July, he was unable to come to a decision and seemed almost resigned to prolonging the siege with a series of bombardments that were not weakening the city sufficiently to force the French to surrender or come out and fight in the open. The dilemma was underlined in a curious letter sent to Wolfe in early July by a high-ranking Canadian (probably Dumas): "My dear General, you can certainly destroy the whole city of Quebec with your cannon but you will never conquer it or break the spirit of its people". Wolfe's reply was: "There is no need to worry about me. By early November, I shall have taken your city and your heads without lifting a finger."

On 9th July, Wolfe called his officers together and announced a change in tactics. He moved his headquarters onto the left bank of the Montmorency and transferred 4000 soldiers and forty cannon to the area. He had decided to launch a surprise attack on the enemy positions at Beauport so as to take Quebec from the rear". By misfortune, or by simple miscalculation, Wolfe had opted, after much reflection, for an attack that Montcalm had predicted some time before. While the British engineers were digging the trenches, a contingent of Pontiac Indians (one of the Canadian tribes most loyal to the French) suddenly rushed out of the thick woodland and attacked the soldiers. The Pontiacs killed about forty of them and, under heavy rifle fire, vanished back into the forest as quickly as they had appeared. Fearing other such attacks, Wolfe ordered that the trenches be completed as soon as possible, for these were needed as a base for his offensive against Beauport.

A few days before the attack, Vaudreuil had decided to send the last fireships against the British fleet off the Ile d'Orleans. Montcalm did not object, although he considered the operation futile. In his memoirs Knox wrote: "The enemy attacked our ships with about seventy rafts and lifeboats, all chained together and loaded with tar and gunpowder"". The attack was yet another failure, though this was not the fault of the Canadian commanding officer, Courval (who directed the operation well). It failed because of the composure of the British, who once again calmly manoeuvred the ships so as to avoid impact".

On 30th July the British began the offensive on the Montmorency line. Weather conditions were unstable. It was a very sultry day with occasional showers that caused brusque shifts in temperature. Along the banks of the St. Lawrence and its tributary, the Montmorency, the earth was very soft and muddy. With supporting artillery fire from the Porcupine, the Boscawen and a third ship, almost four thousand men (thirteen companies of regulars flanked by two hundred soldiers from the Royal Americans and the Highlanders) began their assault on the French-Canadian positions. Wolfe's men encountered the troops of the French commander Franqois Gaston Levis, who were lying in wait for them. The British attack was supported by the landing of several units on the beach, although this was a hurried and badly-organised operation. A detachment of British soldiers aboard a small fleet of boats attacked Levis' flank but the French fusiliers replied impeccably. With the backing of several artillery units and Canadian troops, they opened fire on the detachment and killed many soldiers. The battle continued, and Wolfe's men finally managed to break through and take some enemy trenches despite the serious losses they had suffered.

In the meantime Levis had received reinforcements from Quebec and concentrated all of the fire-power at his disposal on the British units that had taken the positions, finally forcing them to retreat. At the same time, the units of regular soldiers that had until then been ordered to remain in their positions now counterattacked and took the lost positions. The British retreated and tried to dig in behind some dunes near the river. However, in the early afternoon they were forced to retreat towards the river in the direction of their own camp. When darkness fell, Wolfe, who was aboard the Porcupine, ordered all of the troops to return to the ships. The British attempt to break through the Montmorency line had failed.


As if to take immediate revenge, Wolfe ordered Admiral Saunders to make a naval attack up-river of the city. On 18th July, the admiral sent the Sutherland, captained by John Rouse, and the Squirrel, captained by George Hamilton, together with two armed sloops and two transport vessels to go in search of the French ships that Montcalm had moved to Batiscan. Wolfe's dual objective was to "rid the waterway of all enemy ships and establish direct contact with General Jeffrey Amherst's forces". Although the British naval contingent managed to pass by the Royale and Dauphine batteries without suffering damage, they did not succeed in their mission. The same operation was attempted towards the end of July - this time by the Lowestoft, captained by Joseph Deane, the Hunter, captained by William Adams, two sloops and two transport ships. But once again the British expedition achieve its objective.


The French-Canadian forces had prevailed at the Montmorency. In the space of a few hours, Levis, an excellent soldier, had managed to foil Wolfe's plan and "force the British Grenadiers to retreat down the river or make their way back to the ships along the muddy bankside, leaving behind them five hundred dead or wounded together with a lot of light weapons and ammunition".

Yet Montcalm was unable - or unwilling - to take advantage of yet another important success, preferring to consolidate the positions he already held, as was his habit. Nevertheless, the victory raised the morale of the FrenchCanadian troops and a wave of enthusiasm swept through Quebec. Commissioner Berniers wrote in his diary: "Many thought we had more or less brought the campaign to a victorious conclusion".

The defeat on the Montmorency blackened Wolfe's mood even further, and his conduct of the campaign was even criticised by officers from both the army and navy". He had been led by a sense of urgency and had not planned the timing of the naval and land operations with due care. Furthermore, even though General Townshend's battalions had moved rapidly, the manoeuvres themselves had been badly-organised. The British had also had the misfortune to meet with an adversary who was determined, prepared for attack and wellpositioned behind an excellent trench system, which Montcalm's farsightedness had led him to build many weeks earlier in an attempt to forestall an attack on Beauport.

However, Montcalm's over-cautious behaviour during the British retreat displeased his officers. "Given the circumstances, all that had been required were a few well-armed Indians to cause panic among the retreating British troops".

Some historians believe that the explanation for Montcalm's attitude can be traced back to the early days of his military career, when he had often found himself in glorious though unfortunate situations. The misfortune that had dogged him on the battlefield - he had been wounded several times and also taken prisoner - had caused him to become more careful and calculating. The dynamism and recklessness that had distinguished him as an optimistic young officer gradually gave way to staid reflection.

The chapter continues...Chapter IV is an account of the Battle on the Plains of Abraham.--RL

Preface
Review of Anglo-French Conflict in North America

MagWeb.com would like to thank Author Alberto Rosselli for permission to post the beginning to Chapter III from the book.--RL

More Info:
First, visit the web site: www.erga.it
Or, E-mail Alberto Rosselli for more information


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