One-Drous Chapters
For Want of a Nail
If Burgoyne Had Won
at Saratoga
Chapter 3: Victory in America
By Robert Sobel
© 1973, 1997
and Reprinted by Permission of Greenhill Books, Publisher
 |
A man of common abilities and little imagination, Gage was clearly
the wrong man for the position. By the time he was dismissed
and replaced by General William Howe, Washington had been
able to whip his men into a semblance of order. Then in January,
captured cannon arrived at rebel headquarters and Washington
prepared for the attack. But the battle never took place.
Wisely realizing his position in the city was untenable, Howe
evacuated Boston in March, taking with him some thousand
loyalists who feared reprisal once the rebels took the city.
Washington entered Boston in late March, amid rebel fanfare
and violence against those loyalists who had remained. He had
won the city without firing a shot. It was to be the only major
rebel victory Washington would enjoy.
Far more important than Washington's seizure of Boston, was
the failure of rebel forces to take Canada. The Continental Congress
had reason to believe French Canadians would welcome rebel armies
with open arms; differences with Britain had made many French
Canadians sympathetic to the cause of independence, if not that of
rebellion. The Collector of the Port of Quebec, Thomas Ainslie,
warned London in June, 1775, that "the Canadian peasants begin to
show a disposition little to be expected from a conquered people who
had been treated with so much leniency by Government." When
American commander Benedict Arnold entered the Canadian town of
St John's in May, he was greeted enthusiastically by the French-
speaking citizens. Arnold sent word of his reception to Philadelphia, and urged the Congress to
give him the men and weapons necessary to take Quebec and Montreal
before winter made such an attack impossible.
But New York General Philip Schuyler refused to cooperate, while
the Congress seemed more intent on taking Boston than winning all of
Canada. General Richard Montgomery, Schuyler's second-in-command,
agreed with Arnold, but his pleas went unheeded. By the time Congress
and Schuyler decided to act, the moment had passed. In late
September, Montgomery received word that he could proceed to
Montreal and Quebec.
"A winter compaign in Canada!" he shouted. "Posterity won't
believe it!" Still, Montgomery went north, while Arnold's ragged band
closed in on Quebec, hounded by Indian royalism, and most importantly,
the cold of winter. 1
Arnold crossed the St. Lawrence on November 14, as Colonel
Allan McLean and Govemor Sir Guy Carleton prepared for the rebel
assault. Montgomery arrived on December 2, and took command of the
combined forces. The two men, probably the best field commanders on
the rebel side, had reason to expect victory.
"I found a style of discipline among Amold's men much
superior to what I have been used to seeing in this campaign," wrote
Montgomery to Schuyler. "Fortune often baffles the sanguine
expectations of poor mortals. I am not intoxicated with the favors I
have received at her hands, but I do think there is a fair prospect of
success." 2
The British defenders proved tougher than anticipated, and the
weather colder than the attackers could bear. Wave after wave of
rebels was thrown back, as Montgomery was unable to breach the
Quebec defenses. A surprise attack on December 27 failed when a
loyalist learned of the preparations and informed Sir Guy. Since all
enlistments ran out on January 1, Montgomery was obliged to risk an all-
out attack on December 30, and the rebels approached the walls in a
blinding snowstorm. It was a glorious, brave, but futile gesture.
Montgomery himself was killed in the battle, and Arnold seriously
wounded, while hundreds of rebels fell in bloody pools outside the city.
Quebec was saved, and with it Canada. The most talented Amencan
commander was dead; the man whom Hawkes called the "Rebel
Wolfe," would no longer lend his energies and brilliance to the rebel
cause, while Arnold would be relegated by unimaginative rebel
politicians to secondary roles. 3
Meanwhile Washington, who in taking Boston had shown no military skills or abilities at leadership, was the toast of Philadelphia.
The scene of battle shifted to New York that summer.
Washington had taken his army to the city early in 1776, and prepared
to defend it against the British The rebel leader concentrated his
forces on Long Island, Bedloe (now Howe) Island, and Manhattan, in
such a way as to invite easy attack from thc rear.
At first Howe thought Washington had some trick in mind,
but later he realized this disposition of forces -- dividing an already
inferior army, neglecting the rear, poor discipline, etc. -- was actually
the result of his American counterpart's inexperience. 4
Howe's armies took up positions on Staten Island, so that by July 2 -- the day the Declaration of Independence was signed -- he had a firm foothold and was prepared for the attack. Yet Howe hesitated, and the assault on Long Island did not take place until August 22. 5
Howe won a victory on Long Island, as the Americans
fled before the well-disciplined royal troops. Had he wished, Howe
could have destroyed Washington with ease, but political
considerations and his hope for a negotiated truce led him to withhold
the final blow. He landed on Manhattan Island on September 15, and
proceeded to force Washington northward, always believing the
American would concede defeat before massive losses were incurred.
Howe's humanitarianism was misplaced, however, as
Washington used the time given him to beat a hasty retreat. The rebel
general mistook kindness and forbearance for weakness, and
constructed a hasty fortification on the northern tip of Manhattan,
where he expected his weary and dissident force to meet and defeat
the triumphant, larger, and better equipped British attackers! Finally,
Generals Lee and Nathanael Greene, fresh from victories in the South
against General Sir Henry Clinton, prevailed upon Washington to
abandon his fort and cross the Hudson into New Jersey. Siill
Washington was adamant, and moved into the Bronx and then
Westchester before making the crossing. 6
From there he was pursued by General Charles Cornwallis across the colony and into Pennsylvania, and he crossed the Delaware River to comparative safety on December 11. Washington's failure in New York convinced the more astute rebels that their cause could not prevail and led to a general demoralization in thc Congress. Had not General Lee been captured by the British on December 13, it seems probable he would have assumed the rebel command that
winter. 7
The first full year of fighting had proven disastrous for the
rebels. Whatever victories they could claim were symbolic rather than
substantive. The capture of Boston, for example, had little military
meaning, and was recognized as such everywhere but Massachusetts.
The Declaration of Independence hadn't its expected effect in the
palaces of Britain's foes. The New York campaign had been a
debacle, the Canadian expedition a failure.
At winter camp, General Edward Grant wrote that his men were "almost naked, dying of cold, without blankets, and very ill-supplied with provisions." No munitions and men were to be sent from France, for after New York, enthusiasm for the rebel cause waned in Versailles, and a year later would vanish completely.
In early 1777, General Burgoyne spoke to North of his plan for
ending the war that year. It involved a two-pronged drive from Canada
and New York City to Albany, which would divide the colonies in half,
and in this way, dishearten the rebels and dissuade the French from
entering the conflict. Burgoyne had proposed the plan the prenous year,
but it had been rejected at that time. Again his plan faced opposition.
Howe believed his troops could capture the rebel capital at Philadelphia
without too much trouble, and this victory would end the war. It was a
classic confrontation. Burgoyne argued the war was a logistical and
psychological contest, while Howe considered it as a huge game of
chess, which ended once you captured the enemy's capital. In this
struggle, Burgoyne represented the future of warfare and the ability to
adapt oneself to new circumstances; Howe, the past, with his rigid
refusal to be flenble. To his credit North approved the Burgoyne plan,
setting into motion the force that would end the war, and bringing into
new prominence one of the most interesting figures in British history.
Burgoyne was 55 years old in 1777. He was still known as "Gentleman Johnny" to London society, a tribute to a reputation earned prior to the Rebellion. His career was filled with accomplishment and spiced with adventure. Burgoyne was an illegitimate son of Lord
Bingley, Chancellor of the Exchequer under Queen Anne. 8
At the age of eighteen he purchased a commission, and three years
later ran off with the Earl of Derby's daughter. Rather than being
angered, Derby accepted his son-in-law and acted as his sponsor. This
required considerable funds, for even then Burgoyne was a social lion.
In 1754, in order to settle some debts, he sold his commission and fled
to France to escape unpaid creditors. But the Earl set things right, and
Burgoyne re-entered the Army in 1756, in time to participate in the
Seven Years' War. Burgoyne led several daring raids on the French
coast and, later on, was named lieutenant colonel of the 16th Dragoons,
the famous "Burgoyne's Light Horse." His exploits in the Portuguese campaign made him as famous as a military man as he had earlier been as a rake. 9
Burgoyne remained in the army after the war and also won a
seat in Commons. While there he became interested in colonial affairs.
He favored a strong line toward the colonists, voting for the Stamp Act
and related measures. In 1774 he said, "I look upon Amenca to be our
child, which I think we have already spoiled by too much indulgence."
But unlike the ultras, Burgoyne did not want war. "I wish to see America convinced by persuasion rather than the sword," he exclaimed. 10
Burgoyne was sent to the colonies in February, 1775, where
he first acted as Gage's second-in-command. He was the only one of
what the rebels called "the triumvirate of reputation" respected for his
abilities. Arthur Lee, for example, dismissed Howe and Clinton as
unimaginative leaders who would give the rebels little trouble.
Burgoyne was different, he said. "You will judge," he wrote, "that he is
a dangerous character; and therefore be on your guard." 11
A large part of this danger came from Burgoyne's talent at communicating with the North American moderates and attempting to understand their feelings. Long before the term was coined, Burgoyne was a master of psychological warfare, and more than any other officer able to convince waverers to remain loyal. 12
In addition, he was the only important British officer to grasp the nature of the struggle once it had begun. While Clinton and Howe insisted on using European methods in combat, Burgoyne readily disposed of earlier prejudices and tactics learned during the Seven Years' War, and adapted himself to the new military environment.
In his famous "Reflections on the Rebellion," he wrote:
When the Rebellion erupted Burgoyne was sent to Canada, where he served under Carleton. It was from St. John's that he embarked on his expedition to Albany.
Early in 1777 Burgoyne organized his men for the march. His
"Army of Nations" included some 4,000 regulars, 3,000 German
mercenaries, 650 Gnadians and American loyalists, and 500 Indians.
He was assured that Colonel St. Leger would drive from the west to
meet him above Albany, while Howe would send help from New York
City. The plan should have worked without difficulty, for the
Americans were unorganized and unprepared in central New York.
But Lord Germain bungled the transmission of information to the British
commands, and as a result, Howe was uninformed of the final plans.
On April 2, Howe sent a letter to Carleton in Canada saying he
was on his way to Philadelphia, leaving Clinton in charge in the city.
Because of this, he would be unable "to detach a corps in the beginning
of the campaign to move up Hudson's River consistent with the
operations already determined upon." 14
A copy went to Germain, who now realized his mistake Germain sent word of this to Howe, but by the time the message arrived in New York, the General was already at sea, on his way south. 15
Unaware of these developments, Burgoyne set out on June 17. At first all went well. He captured Ticonderoga on June 30 and two days later Fort Defiance, followed by victories at Skenseborough and Fort Anne. Then the campaign ground to a near-halt, as the Army of Nations became bogged down in the forests of central New York. During this period, St. Leger's force managed to defeat rebel General Nicholas Herkimer's column, but was routed by the brilliant and erratic Arnold. As Burgoyne slogged through the woods, the expected and badly-needed St. Leger reinforcements were lost.
Now desperate, Burgoyne sent messages for aid to New York. On September 12, Clinton informed him that he would soon attack Fort Montgomery (near Peekskill) and from there take the
Hudson route to Saratoga. Burgoyne replied that even greater haste was needed, and Clinton promised to speed his men northward. 16
After collecting what meager supplies he could, Burgoyne crossed the Hudson on September 13-14. In so doing he was taking a tremendous risk, but Burgoyne was used to such dangers. Retreat was now no longer possible. Burgoyne was, in effect, wagering the Army of Nations against the rebel Gates' stronger force, his own skill against that of his American counterpart, and Clinton's abilities against the wilds of New York. 17
By this time, Arnold's force had joined the main rebel army.
Almost at once he clashed with his commander, General Horatio
Gates, a political appointee like Washington, but a tough and innovative
leader. Burgoyne attacked on September 18, but was forced to retreat
before Gates' withering fire. Then the Army of Nations advanced
toward Freeman's Farm and once again was repulsed. Decimated and
battered, the Army of Nations regrouped to hear Burgoyne's plan.
Caution would have dictated retreat into the woods, but he held fast.
Awakening on the morning of October 8, Burgoyne learned
his force was all but surrounded, and would have to fight its way out of
a cordon of rebels. Still morale held. As one survivor later wrote, "The
men were willing and ready to face any danger, when led by officers
whom they loved and respected and who shared with them in every
toil and hardship." 18
Rallying his men, Burgoyne took them to Schuyler's Farm, and
the next morning crossed the Fishkill River. Had Gates attacked then,
he could have destroyed the Army of Nations. But he hesitated at that
crucial moment, spending his time arguing with Arnold, regrouping his
forces, and considering the next move. Meanwhile, unknown to the
rebels, Clinton's force moved swiftly up the Hudson, and prepared to
attack Gates from the rear. 19
Time was working for the British. Burgoyne knew this; Gates did not.
On October 13, Burgoyne sent a delegation to ask Gates his terms for a truce. The answer was "unconditional surrender." Burgoyne replied that he was not unwilling to admit defeat, but insisted his men be allowed to march from the field with all honors. Gates wavered; he wanted the satisfaction of receiving Burgoyne's sword on the field of battle. At the time Gates had ambitions to succeed Washington, who was in bad grace in Philadelphia. Such a victory, conceded on the field, would assure him of supreme command. 20
As Gates hesitated, Clinton's force smashed Israel Putnam's
rebel army and continued toward Saratoga. Pumam sent messengers
with news of his defeat to Gates, but the men were lost in the woods,
and never appeared at headquarters. By the time Gates learned of
Clinton's immanent appearance, it was too late to do much about it.
The rebel general was now obliged to act in an impromptu fashion. His
plan was simple. The rebels would attack Burgoyne's position in force,
massacring all and then turn to face Clinton's army, which was
expected in a matter of hours.
The attack came on the morning of October 21. Wave upon
wave of rebels advanced on the weakened Army of Nations, and each
time they were repulsed. Then, on October 22, Clinton's men broke
through Gates' rear. Heartened by the sound of their comrades' bullets,
Burgoyne's ragged force, now numbering less than 2,000 staged its
final assault, in this way placing the now-panicky rebels in the jaws of
a pincer movement. It was now Gates' turn to flee, and so he did. Within two days the rebels were on the outskirts of Albany, vulnerable to attack, unable to respond. On the afternoon of October 25, Burgoyne offered Gates a generous peace. All his troops could return to their homes, while Gates himself would be free to leave, upon his pledge never to fight again. The proposal was accepted; Gates had no choice but to do so. Thus ended one of the most glorious episodes in the history of eighteenth century warfare. 21
Burgoyne's great victory at Saratoga had been the result of many factors. Gentleman Johnny's abilities and the bravery of the Army of Nations were doubtless of great importance. Burgoyne's
daring move in crossing the Hudson when he did, and his brilliance in holding Gates at bay while Clinton moved north, have become textbook cases in military academies throughout the world. This is not to say that other factors do not enter into great victories, for indeed every man's success implies the failure of another. Gates, at best an acceptable officer and at worst an amateur in over his head at Saratoga, performed at the top of his form during the battle. His was not the major failure. Rather, the rebel defeat must be rightly attributed to George Washington.
Washington had been unable to fathom the British plan of
1777. Above all, he wanted to protect Philadelphia from royal control,
but it appeared Albany was also in danger and had to be guarded at all
costs. Then Howe set sail for Chesapeake Bay, and Washington now
knew he meant to attack Philadelphia from the south At the time, he
had sufficient rebel troops to defend only one city; either Philadelphia
or Albany would have to be sacrificed. Now Washington repeated his
error of the New York campaign: he divided his forces. A small
detachment was sent to Albany, one too small to do much good there,
but large enough to weaken Washington,s main force which was
stationed near Philadelphia. Then the rebel leader marched his men
south ward to meet Howe, who landed at Head of Elk on Chesapeake
Bay on August 15.
The two armies clashed on September near Brandywine Creek, and Howe easily defeated the smaller rebel army. Ten days later he won another victory at Paoli, and on September 16, Howe
entered Philadelphia in triumph. After establishing headquarters in the city, Howe sent a large number of his men in pursuit of Washington and the Congress, which hastily fled the city. Howe engaged Washington next at Germantown. This time, the rebel leader was able to win the upper hand; he caught Howe in a pincers movement and began to squeeze. But fate intervened in the form of a heavy fog that settled over the battlefield. While the rebels searched in vain for
Howe's forces, the British regrouped and began their march back to Philadelphia. On his part, Washington ordered his troops to winter quarters at Valley Forge. Discouraged, and by now aware of his own inadequacies, Washington learned soon after of Burgoyne's victory at Saratoga. Only a half year earlier he had sworn to defend both Philadelphia and Albany from royal troops. Now both had fallen, and before that Washington had lost New York as well.
The winter camp at Valley Forge was poorly organized and
filled with dispirited men. "Poor food, hard lodging -- cold weather --
fatigue -- nasty clothes -- nasty cookery -- vomit half my time -- smoked
out of my senses -- the Devil's in it -- I can't endure it" wrote one
common soldier. 22
Over two thousand troops including two hundred officers,
deserted at Valley Forge. Washington thought for a moment to lift the
army's spirit with a surprise attack on Philadelphia, but abandoned the
plan when informed by his officers that the troops would no longer
follow his orders. In the winter of 1777-78, the rebels learned the bitter
implications of defeat in war. 23
The Continental Congress had also lost faith in Washington.
Even John Adams began to doubt his abilities Benjamin Rush thought
Washington was trying to rule America like a king. "All would be well
had this general given us victories. Such has not been the case.
Washington must be replaced, or at least given less authority over the
conduct of our struggle." 24
Others spoke of replacing Washington with a more able man.
General Lee had been released, and had his supporters. Colonel James
Wilkinson thought highly of Gates, observing that he could not be
blamed for the loss at Saratoga, which had been caused by improper
support from Washington. Others spoke for Greene, Schuyler, and
Arnold, but a majority could not be found for any of them.
In the end, the Congress reached a compromise. General
Arternas Ward would be named chairman of a new body, the Board of
War, whose members would include Washington, Gates, Lee, and
Schuyler. Each general would be given command of a different theater
of war. Gates, for example, would take charge in New York, while
Washington was assigned Virginia and the Carolinas. On February 14,
the Congress summoned Washington to its temporary quarters at York
Pennsylvania, and notified him of the change. The commander was not
surprised by the confrontation, having been forewarned of it by his
staff. In an eloquent address he admitted his failures and confessed his
shortcomings. He would not oppose the decision, but rejected the
southern command. On February 16, Washington resigned his
commission and returned to his home at Mount Vernon. The Congress
expressed its thanks for his efforts, and selected Greene as his
replaccment in the southern theater. 25
By this time it was also evident that France would no longer
support the Rebellion. Benjamin Franklin, the rebels' envoy to
Versailles, had worked long and hard for French aid, but even he could
do little after news of Saratoga and the fall of Philadelphia reached
Vergennes' ears. France would support the rebels so long as they
were anti-British and showed the ability to win in the field. The latter
condition had not been fulfilled; France, and soon after, Spain, left
Congress to its own devices. 26
Franklin relayed this information to Congress, and
recommended immediate negotiations with London for a truce, to be
followed by a general peace. Without waiting for orders, he opened
talks with Lord North's agent, Paul Wentworth, toward that end. While
Congress awaited word from Versailles, Franklin busied himself with
negotiations, so that North actually knew more of what was going on in
Versailles than did the Congress.
North had never been enthusiastic in his prosecution of the
war. Essentially a moderate, he viewed the conflict as both unfortunate
and unnecessary. Initially, he had been caught between the extremes
of men like Burke on the one side and King George on the other, each
of whom seemed to nave welcomed the war. By 1778, the pro-rebels
had been discredited by charges of treason made in Parliament and
disheartened by news of the failures at Saratoga and Philedelphia
At tbe same time, those who called for rebel blood were no
longer as willing as they had been in 1775 to pay the price of
continued fighting. The interest France and Spain had shown in the
Rebellion threatened more direct attack against Britain, and
American loyalty would be critical in such a conflict. All these factors,
together with North's increased prestige by 1778, led the majority of
Parliament to support a magnanimous peace with the rebels. Franklin
had indicated privately that a generous offer would be well-received by
Congress, and he expressed his willingness to serve as mediator
between the two sides.
A similar development had taken place in Congress. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and others of their group had lost favor after Saratoga, while Sam Adams and Patrick Henry were considered
little more than outright traitors by men who earlier had remained silent while they condemned Britain. At the same time, the ultra-loyalists had left America, some with Howe when he abandoned Boston, others chased by mobs who had been inflamed with the virus of independence in 1775-1777. Moderates like Dickinson and Galloway now came to the fore, and by early 1778, they had taken command at the Congress. More than ever, they were eager for peace with the mother country.
On February 16, North called a secret meeting of the Cabinet to discuss overtures to the American moderates. All present agreed that many of the laws passed prior to 1775 had been mistaken, and had served to throw their colonial counterparts into radical hands. On the
other hand, too much English blood and treasure had been spent in the Rebellion to allow them to offer the Americans an easy peace. The leaders of the Rebellion must be made to answer for their crimes, but the broad mass of their sympathizers would be granted amnesty. Then
North raised the problem of future governance of the colonies, and spoke highly of the Galloway Plan of 1774, by which the colonists would have control of their own internal affairs, with a parliamentary veto to prevent unwise legislation from going into effect.
Over serious objections by a few members of Lords, the
Cabinet majority agreed that such a plan was well-worth considering,
so long as it be made to appear a British rather than an American
proposal. London's acceptance of limited self-government would sit
well with the moderates, win over many radicals, and succeed in
mollifying the more temperate royalists in America. 27
North was able to win approval for such a plan, and on March
16 a commission, headed by the Earl of Carlisle, was sent to America
to present it to the congressional moderates. 28
By the time Carlisle had arrived at York, the moderates had
taken command at the Congress, with Galloway (who returned as a
delegate in January) its most influential member. Congress debated the
proposals in early May in an atmosphere of fear and doubt. Most
members conceded the Rebellion had failed, but they were uncertain as
to the reception such a peace might receive as a whole. But Congress
had no choice in the matter, as the rebel armies lost more men with
each passing day. On May 23, Galloway replaced Henry Laurens as
president of the Congress, which four days later agreed to ask North
for an armistice based on the Carlisle proposals. The Earl had been
empowered to accept such a reply, and informed Howe, Clinton, and
Burgoyne of the Congress's actions. Negotiations continued for another week. On June 12, 1778, the formal articles of armistice were signed by Galloway and Carlisle. During the next two
weeks the rebel commanders were notified of the fact, and most surrendered to their British counterparts. The North American Rebellion was over. 29
1 Sir Humphrey Fay. The Canada Campaign of 1775 (Montreal, 1887), p. 860. Bamford Parkes. Benedict Arnold: The Rebel Genius (New York, 1965) is the best biography of Arnold.
Published by Greenhill Books. © Greenhill Books. All rights reserved. Reproduced on MagWeb with permission of the publisher.
|
WASHINGTON arrived on
the outskirts of Boston in July, 1775, where he was greeted by
the New England irregulars. The rebels outnumbered the British
troops in the city, and had command of the heights overlooking
the harbor. Yet Washington did not attack. His forces were still
unorganized and undisciplined, and he lacked sufficient arms for
an engagement against the well-trained professionals under the
command of General Thomas Gage. On his part, Gage proved
incapable of action and refused to lead his men against the
rebels.