Introduction And Acknowledgements

The book (let) you are about to read started out as a relatively modest project: to provide for the first time in one volume all of the orders of battle for both belligerents during the 1 st Sikh War (1845-46). But, as usual when one begins a project, the more I worked on the book the more I unearthed mysteries surrounding the Sikh and Anglo-Indian armies that were fielded during the war and, the more I tried to reconcile these conundrums, the more involved I became. Eventually, I had to say “Enough is enough” in order to keep the book on subject as much as possible, but my modest effort had now turned into a book numbering some 100 typed pages.

Nonetheless, I am very proud of the work that I, and my colleagues, put into the book you are about to read. It is as complete in detail as possible and loaded with information that has not been seen by the general public since the war began almost 160 years ago. At this point in time though, I would like to point out to the reader exactly what this book is, and also what it isn’t, about.

This book is not a detailed history of the 1 st Sikh War. It does contain a concise history of the war and some background material, but it is in no way a detailed account of the war, which has been handled quite well by other authors listed in the bibliography. This work is not a detailed history of the Sikhs, the Khalsa or Ranjit Singh, but there is an absolutely brilliant chapter written by Chris Ferree explaining just how the war came about. This book does not explain battles, tactics or strategy in detail, but it does contain an essential chapter by one of the true experts on the subject, Neil Carleton, dealing with the elite arm of the Khalsa, the Sikh artillery corps. Last but not least, despite my extensive wargaming background, both miniature and board; this booklet has absolutely no interest in providing information on uniform (or flag) colors, details or schemes for either army. If you’re looking for that type of information, please look elsewhere.

Having listed what this book is not, I will briefly explain what the book is all about. Inside you will find the most complete, detailed and correct collection of orders of battle from the 1 st Sikh War (1845-1846). Not only are regiments, battalions and batteries mentioned for both sides in just about any battle, but details are also given regarding names and ranks of commanding officers and a veritable “Who’s who” list of senior and staff officers who participated throughout the campaign (or until wounded or killed in action). While the most detailed orders of battle deal with the Anglo-Indian “Army of the Sutlej”, the true heart of the book revolves around the Sikh orders of battle, the majority of which appear written in English for the first time outside the subcontinent of India in one collection.

Not only will you find out exactly what regiment took part in which battle (where that information is provided), but you will also see how the Khalsa grew from a mercenary cavalry raiding force in 1799 into one of the most professional armies ever to take the field against a veteran adversary less than fifty years later. With this book and a good solid history of the war from another author, you will have just about all the information on the 1 st Sikh War there is to know.

In closing, I would be remiss if I did not thank the following people for their assistance in getting this book to press. To Chris Ferree and Neil Carleton for their contributions I can only say that I am both proud and honored to have there works gracing the pages of my humble effort. I would also like to thank Patrick Wilson and Dennis L. Bishop for both their assistance and support in getting this book on paper. Last but not least, this book would not have seen the light of day without the hard work and contributions of Bob Giglio, who helped edit and proof-read most of the manuscript chapters you are about to read, and Aaron Silverman who took my finished Word.doc version of the book and converted it into a more professional looking .pdf (Acrobat) format. To all of you, Thanks again!

Andrew Preziosi
Khyber Pass Games and Books
Miami, Summer 2003

PARADE STATE AND ORDER OF BATTLE THE EVOLUTION OF THE SIKH ARMY, 1839

Commander in Chief:
The Maharajah Ranjit Singh

Ghorchurras: M(10,795, plus Swivels)
Original Derahs
2 nd Generation Derahs
¨ Ghorchurra Khas Derah (1,320)
¨ Sham Singh Attariwala Derah
¨ Gurmukh Singh Lamba Derah
¨ Sandhanwalia’s Derah
3 rd Generation Derahs:
¨ Ardalyan (Orderly) Derah
¨ Pindiwalla Derah
¨ Attariwalla Derah
¨ Mul Raja Derah
¨ The Dogra Derah
4 th Generation Derahs:
¨ Naulakha (Charyari) Derah was split into two:
¨ Naulakha Kalan (The Big) Derah- Raja Suchet Singh
¨ Naulakha Khurd (The Small) Derah- Raja Kesri Singh
¨ Khas Derah (1,377)-Rajah Hira Singh

Regular Infantry: (30,000)
¨ Fauj-I-Khas (French) Brigade
¨ Colonel Amir Singh Man’s Brigade
¨ Tej Singh’s Brigade
¨ Dhonkhal Singh’s Brigade
¨ Misar Sukh Raj’s Brigade
¨ Court’s Brigade
¨ Colonel Guloub Singh’s Brigade

Note:
Each Brigade averaged 3 or 4 Battalions, one Cavalry
Regiment of 200-600 men and one Artillery Battery
¨ 31* Regular Infantry Battalions (800-1,100 men/bn)
¨ Several Independent Companies
* = Some sources claim 40 battalions were present

Regular Cavalry: (4,664)
¨ 1 st Dragoon Regiment
¨ 2 nd “Lancia” (Lancer) Dragoon Regiment
¨ Gurmukh Singh Rajman
¨ Hira Singh Rajman
¨ Mehtab Singh Rajman
¨ Horse Grenadier Rajman
¨ Ram Rajman
¨ Three other Rajmans

Irregular Infantry: (25,000)
¨ Garrison Infantry
¨ Personal Guards
¨ Constabulary

Artillery: (4,490)
¨ Horse Artillery “Aspis”(1 Battery/ Brigade)
¨ Jinsi/Siege Trains-Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia
Total: 14 Batteries of Jinsi and Aspi-192 guns
¨ Garrison Artillery (100)
¨ Zambureks (500)

Jagirdari: (27,000)
¨ Feudal Infantry (30+ Battalions-including Rajah Dhion Singh’s Contingent)
¨ Feudal Horse (11,800)
¨ Some Feudal artillery (50 Zambureks and older pcs)

Overall Note:
This is basically the Army that so impressed and later assisted the British during the 1 st Afghan War. At the same time, other than Feudal elements, it was a “Sikh” army in all respects.

Source:
Bajwa. Military System of the Sikhs.4

Khalsa To Catastrophe!

Chaos As Statecraft: The Sikhs Slide To War

BY CHRIS FERREE

Rumors were soon spread that Karruck and Cheyt were in league with the British and planning to sell out the Punjab. Forged documents, apparently signed by Karruck, were produced, backing these rumors up. Dehan's deception was so successful that even Karruck's own son, Nau Nihal, and his wife Chund Kour, turned against him. Then, one sinister night, Dehan' minions imprisoned Karruck while Cheyt was conveniently murdered. Nau Nihal was proclaimed the new Maharajah.

However, the Wazir was not finished. He continued to destroy the relationship between the new Maharajah and his imprisoned father. He so embittered each toward the other that no reconciliation was possible. When, a year later, Karruck finally succumbed to slow poisoning, instead of being saddened the new Maharajah Nau Nihal Singh thought it should be a day of rejoicing.

Karruck was given a State funeral as befitted a former Maharajah, but Nau Nihal, the current Maharajah, tried twice to leave his father's funeral early. The ever watchful Wazir thoughtfully persuaded him to stay until he finally left to perform the ceremony of ablution in a nearby nullah. On his return to the city, Nau Nihal was joined by Dehan's nephew, Meean Oottum (Gulab's eldest son). As they passed through the main gateway, Nau Nihal stopped to say something to his friend when, some said it was the two hundred-and-one gun salutes that loosened the masonry, others said sabotage, the archway collapsed. Meean Oottum was killed instantly and the solicitous Wazir whisked Nau Nihal away for “treatment”. No one was allowed to see the Maharajah except Dehan himself and two of his fellow Jammoo Hillmen.

After two hours, the Wazir informed Chund Kour, his mother, of the Maharajah's death-and quickly reminded her of the chance to rule the country. She was convinced to keep the Maharajah's death a secret while the wheels were being turned. Leaving Chund Kour with dreams of power to balance her loss, the Wazir then informed Shere, the first of Runjeet Singh's illegitimate sons, that the time was ripe for him to take power. In the resulting struggle, Gulab championed Chund Kour while Dehan backed Shere Singh, giving the appearance of the Dogra Brothers being at odds for the first time. In fact, the rivalry was a performance conceived in order to allow them to control both sides in the looming civil war.

Gulab and his nephew, Hira, holed up in the Lahore fort with 2,000 men and a Horse Artillery Battery of ten guns. Dehan convinced Shere to back away from Lahore with his own troops and allow him, the Wazir, to rally the Khalsa to their cause. Then, as Shere vacated Lahore, Dehan went home to Jammoo on another matter. Shere's advisor, Jawalla, argued for returning to Lahore and striking fast without waiting for Dehan. Shere agreed, marched back to Lahore, and stormed the old fort-to no avail.

On the sixth day of siege, Dehan, with his brother Suchet, returned to Shere's camp. Shere apologized for his hasty actions and asked Dehan to stop the fighting. In a short time, the Wazir convinced the troops (perhaps easily) to stop the battle which had cost them 4,786 men, with the defenders having lost less than 130 killed and wounded. Negotiations between Dehan and Gulab did not take long. On the eighth day since the siege began, Gulab marched out of Lahore with a jagir worth 9 lahks rupees, in the name of Chund Kour, and most of the treasury of Lahore. Shere was made Maharajah and left with an Army that he could not control and Dehan as his loyal Wazir.

Gulab retired to Jammoo for a short time until drawn off to Cashmere and Hazareh to handle some mutinous troops, while later gaining prestige when he helped the British back through the Khyber Pass to relieve Sale at Jallalabad during the disastrous First Afghan War. Jawalla, Shere's advisor who almost ruined the Dogra Brothers' plans, attempted to escape the wrath of the Wazir and fled. Six thousand Ghorchurras pursued him and, as resistance was futile, he surrendered, was imprisoned and tortured to death.

Chund Kour was persuaded to retire to her jagir by the Dogras. However, in a move that surprised even them, Shere announced he wished to marry her, his former rival to the throne. The Jammoo Rajas knew that such a union could be disastrous to their plans. Conveniently, Chund Kour refused Shere's proposal, a refusal that the crafty Dehan embellished in the retelling. Enraged by the rebuke, Shere gave orders to Chund Kour's slave girls to put their mistress to death with a promise of jagirs worth 5,000 rupees upon success. Accordingly, four of the girls dispatched their mistress with a serviceable rock. In revenge cloaked as the law, Dehan arrested all but one of.5

Reconciling the 1844-45 Sikh Parade State Orders of Battle

by Andrew Preziosi

Another interesting fact one can read from Carmichael-Smyth is that despite the government sending troops against Raja Gulab Singh, they made very sure of the fact that at least twenty battalions of regulars and Jagirdari regulars were in and about Lahore along with a good solid portion of the cavalry (all three permutations) and artillery. The Triumvirate might have been willing to take a swipe at Gulab, but they weren’t about to leave their seat of power unprotected.

Before leaving this document, if you look at the Ghorchurra cavalry as listed in C-S, it is easy to surmise that most of the units are higher formation headquarters (semi-divisional in nature) in which the derahs were placed for field duties, either against Gulab or in preparation for battle with the HEIC; both Macgregor and Broadfoot make reference to such formations under various Sirdars just prior to the start of the 1 st Sikh War (though this command structure pretty much collapses once the Sutlej is crossed).

The Order of Battle for the Khalsa in 1845 is a particularly fine document, as it gives details and numbers throughout, especially for the infantry brigades and artillery and is a very good lead in to the formal orders of battle that I present. It is also a gold mine due to the fact that it details the racial composition of each brigade and tophkhana. However, the OB fails on three particular fronts. Cavalry details, especially for the Ghorchurras and Jagirdari, are considerably lacking, except for strengths. Regular regiments are accounted for, but you have to know what brigade is what in order to identify all of them with ease.

The artillery is presented to us in a fair amount of detail, though again the usual Sikh formation designations are done away with, but if you look at the artillery commanders from 1844 and those that commanded during the war, you will notice that, according to this document, very few of them were around at this point in time. There is absolutely no information given to us in regards to these officers and the changes, so all I can do is note and reference them for later investigation.

Last, but far from least, is that while this order of battle is rather detailed in regards to the brigades involved and drawing upon other sources (either those listed earlier or the Khalsa master list) I can almost, but not quite, point out which brigades are Regular and which are Sirdar (or Regular Jagirdari) formations. The only reason I cannot quite do this, is due to the fact that (again), between the 1844 information and the 1 st Sikh War orders of battle, several of the brigade commanders have been changed or are missing. Approximately one third of the brigades listed are Regular army and another third I can clearly identify as Sirdar formations, but it is the remaining third that I can’t identify due to the name of its commanding officer, so I decided not to point these units out other than the fact that you can pretty much take it to the bank that the first six or seven brigades listed are Khalsa formations while most of the last units listed are territorial Sirdar units, its those units that are lumped in the middle that I can’t easily identify.

Having qualified these orders of battle, I am still very happy to make them available to you so that you might better understand the internal situation of the Punjab during this period just prior to the 1 st Sikh War..6

Order of Battle, The Khalsa (Army of Lahore), 1845

The Wazir:
Raja Lal Sing

Commander in Chief:
The Sirdar, Tej Singh

Special (French) Brigade: (Fauj-I-Khas) (Ex-General Ventura) Diwan Ajudhia Parshad
¨ Four Infantry Paltans (Sikh)
¨ Two Cavalry Rajmans
¨ Artillery: (Sikh and Muslim)

Topkhana of General Ilahi Baksh: (attached)

Artillery of General Illahi Baksh Khan (34 pieces)
¨ M. Illahi Baksh
¨ Sikandar Khan (Son of Illahi Baksh)
¨ Fateh Khan and Lahora Singh
¨ 12 Light Artillery pieces
¨ 22 Heavy Field cannon

Ex-General Avitabile’s Brigade: (Sikh, Muslim and Hill-men)
Diwan Jodha Ram
¨ Four Infantry Paltans
¨ One Cavalry Rajman
¨ Artillery: 12 Light artillery pieces and 3 Heavy Field cannon

General Kanh Singh Man’s Brigade: (Sikh and Muslim)
¨ Four Infantry Paltans
¨ Artillery: 10 Light artillery pieces

General Mehtab Singh Majithia’s Brigade:
¨ Four Infantry Paltans (Sikh)
¨ One Cavalry Rajman (Mixed)
¨ Artillery: (Sikh and Muslim) 12 Light artillery pieces

General S. Tej Singh’s Brigade: (Sikh)
¨ Four Infantry Paltans
¨ One Cavalry Rajman
¨ Artillery: 10 Light artillery pieces

General Gulab Singh Puhuvindhia’s Brigade:
¨ Three Infantry Paltans (Muslim)
¨ Artillery: (Sikh and Muslim) 14 Light artillery pieces

Ex-Raja Suchet Singh’s Brigade: (deceased) (Hill-men, with some Muslims)
¨ Two Infantry Paltans
¨ One Cavalry Rajman
¨ Artillery: 4 Light artillery pieces and 10 Heavy garrison cannon

Ex-General Gulab Singh Calcuttawala’s Brigade:
(deceased) (Sikh)
¨ 4 Infantry Paltans
¨ 1 Cavalry Rajman
¨ Artillery: 16 Light artillery pieces

General Jawala Singh’s Brigade:
¨ Two Infantry Paltans (Sikh)
¨ Artillery: (Sikh and Muslim) 4 Light Artillery pieces

Sirdar Lahna Singh Majithia’s Brigade:
¨ Two Infantry Paltans (Sikh)
¨ Artillery: (mainly Sikh)10 Light artillery pieces, 3 Heavy Field guns and 2 Heavy garrison pieces

General Bishan Singh’s Brigade: (chiefly Muslim, some Sikhs)
¨ Two Infantry Paltans
¨ Artillery: 3 Light Artillery pieces

General Gurdit Singh Majithia’s Brigade:
¨ Three Infantry Paltans (mainly Sikh)
¨ Artillery: (Sikh and Muslim) ? pieces

Ex-General Court’s Brigade: (now supervised by General Gurdit Singh Majithia)
Colonel John Holmes
¨ One Infantry Paltan
¨ Artillery:10 Light artillery guns.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE FIRST SIKH WAR, 1845-46

by Andrew Preziosi

The Road to War

Prior to 1839, the Sikh Army considered the British troops as true fellow warriors and held them in the highest regard. While their attitude towards the Bengal and Bombay native troops was not nearly as high, they considered the Anglo-native armies of Bengal and Bombay a formidable weapon.

By1842 this opinion had undergone a drastic change. The British Army that invaded Afghanistan a few years earlier, had almost been wiped out to a man and the few troops that drifted back across the border were pitiful remnants of a once proud force. Admittedly, an “Army of Retribution” returned to Afghanistan for just that reason and exacted some measure of revenge, but it was too late to change Sikh opinion. If the Sikhs could beat their former overlords and keep the NWF tribes in check, then how could the vaunted Englishmen have been so easily defeated?

The seed of contention was now planted. The Sikh army began to view the Bengal and Bombay native troops with downright contempt (though they did respect the few remaining “warlike race” regiments) and no longer felt the British soldier to be near invincible.

While this was occurring, the Sikh Army was busily extorting its “masters” for more pay and privileges and as each new ruler stepped forward, the ante’ was upped. The army also began to disobey their officers and set up committees (punchayets) headed by senior NCOs who ran the regiments and met on a regular basis with the current ruler in order to press their demands. It was very seldom when a ruler refused to accede to these “requests” and this meant even further strain on an already overburdened treasury.

So, by 1845 there was much tension within the Punjab. The Sikh Army was more than upset that the British had gone to war with neighboring Scindia and Gwalior and had seized their land (especially the latter country, which they felt had been theirs to conquer) and that fellow Sikhs on the opposite bank of the Sutlej were under British control. They strongly resented British interference in their own country and were champing at the bit to test themselves against their former allies.

The Triumvirate saw this as an opportunity that could not be squandered. If they went to war against the British, the odds were that the Sikh Army would, in all likelihood, be defeated or even destroyed, and they would rid themselves of their Near Eastern version of the Praetorian Guard. If, by some miracle, the Sikh Army did win, then they would have new land and wealth at their fingertips and an option to expand their Kingdom at the expense of a greatly diminished HEIC. The Triumvirate would then be firmly in control with nothing to fear. In their eyes, war with the HEIC was a Win-Win situation and they soon began to support the army’s war fever. If they wanted war, then they would have it.

Far from Blind

The newly arrived Governor General of India, Lt. General Sir Henry Hardinge and his subordinate, The Commander in Chief of the Army of India, General Sir Hugh Gough, were well aware of what was taking place in the Punjab and busily made quiet preparations in case the Sikh Army crossed the Sutlej.

Hardinge, former Aide-de-Camp to Wellington and a veteran of the Peninsular War, a bit more circumspect and cautious than Gough, agreed in principle that the troops of the Sirhind Military Administrative Division had to be close enough to the border where they could be assembled within four days of the Sikh’s crossing. Gough was not as subtle; he argued that the division size border garrisons of Ferozepore and Ludhiana needed to be strongly reinforced and that the flag should be shown in the form of field exercises and elaborate garrison changes at every opportunity.

Neither man was blind and both knew the stakes, but it was Hardinge as Governor General who called the shots. He did not want to provoke war and felt Gough’s plan would only exacerbate the situation. Hardinge may have been correct, but if Gough’s plan had been followed, the Sirhind Division would have been on the border in force and could have reacted speedily to whatever the Sikhs attempted. Considering what DID actually happen between December 18 th and 22 nd, 1845, General Gough was probably correct in his assessments and had his plans been carried out, the HEIC may not have come so close to disaster.

General Sir Hugh Gough was a “character” in an age full of such men; he initially made his name during the.8

Order of Battle, British “Army of the Sutlej”, Mudki, December 18, 1843

Commander in Chief, Army of India:
General Sir Hugh Gough

Aide-de-Camp:
Captain H. B. Edwardes

Governor General of India:
Lt. General Sir Henry Hardinge

Aide-de-Camps:
Brevet Major W.R. Herries
Brevet Captain G.E. Hillier
Lt. John Munro

Adjutant General: (vice Major General Sir James Lumley [ill])
Lt. Colonel M. Barr

Deputy Adjutant General:
Major Patrick Grant

Quartermaster General, Army of India: (vice Major General Sir Harry Smith-1 st Div.)
Major General Sir Robert Henry Sale, GCB

Deputy Quartermaster General:
Lt. Colonel Garden

1 st Infantry Division:
Major General Sir Harry Smith

Deputy Assistant Adjutant General:
Captain E. Lugard

1 st Brigade:
Brigadier (Lt. Col.) Samuel Bolton, CB
¨ HM 31 st Foot Regiment-Lt. Colonel J. Byrne
¨ 24 th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment
¨ 47 th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment

2 nd Brigade:
Brigadier (Lt. Col.) Hugh M. Wheeler, CB
¨ HM 50 th Foot Regiment
¨ 42 nd Bengal Native Infantry Regiment
¨ 48 th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment

2 nd Infantry Division:
Major General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert

Assistant Quartermaster General:
Major R. Codrington

1 st Brigade:
¨ 2 nd Bengal (Grenadiers) Native Infantry Regiment
¨ 45 th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment

2 nd Brigade:
¨ 16 th Bengal (Grenadiers) Native Infantry Regiment

3 rd Infantry Division:
Major General Sir John McCaskill, KCB and KH

1 st Brigade:
Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) Newton Wallace
¨ HM 9 th Foot Regiment
¨ HM 80 th Foot Regiment-Lt. Colonel T. Bunbury
¨ 26 th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment
¨ 73 rd Bengal Native Infantry Regiment

Cavalry Division: (OC and most staff not present at battle)
Major General Sir Joseph Thackwell
Brigadier (Lt. Col.) M. White, CB (Officiating)

Assistant Adjutant General:
Captain Tritton

Brigade Major:
Lt. (Brevet Captain) T.L. Harrington

1 st Brigade:
Brigadier (Lt. Col.) W. Mactier
¨ 9 th (Christie’s Horse) Bengal Irregular Cavalry
Regiment-Captain Christie
¨ 4 th Bengal Light Cavalry (Lancer) Regiment (2 sqdns)

2 nd Brigade:
Brigadier (Lt. Col.) J.B. Gough
¨ Governor General’s Bodyguard-Lt. Charles Digby Dawkins
¨ 5 th Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment-Major Alexander.

A Note on the British Orders of Battle The First Sikh War, 1845-46

Each Order of Battle for the Anglo-Indian (British) “Army of the Sutlej” during the 1 st Sikh War has some sort of discrepancy that has been promulgated and proliferated almost from the closing days of the war itself. Some of these errors are fairly natural and almost to be expected, but others are due to mistakes that have never been corrected and therefore have been passed down over the years as fact by various authors, when they are indeed most incorrect.

The following notes track the errors from their source and provide as much primary data as possible to document the changes that I have made. I must however make two small provisos.

First, I had access to “Despatches from the War in India” (hereafter referred to as “Despatches”) and that book remains the cornerstone of my efforts since it is, essentially, a primary source document (well, to be honest, it’s a secondary source full of primary source material). “Despatches” in and of itself was a highly charged political document and does not contain several of the division level reports that, quite honestly, should be present in such a work; the most glaring omission being Sir Harry Smith’s report on Ferozeshah (which, admittedly, reads more like a Sci-Fi short story than an official report by a British officer). It must also be stated that “Despatches” does not provide reports below division level, which means that vital support documentation from brigade commanders is not available to corroborate certain pieces of information.

Having said that though, “Despatches” does contain enough detailed information (for the most part), to provide the basis for this book.

In regards to detail, “Despatches” hits its stride with the Battles of Ferozeshah and Aliwal, which either have a lot of support documentation that is easily attainable, or (as in the case of Aliwal) a single, well written account. Mudki presents a problem as it was written after Ferozeshah (in the case of Hardinge), so there is little support documentation attached and Hardinge is writing his report of the battle as a necessary evil to get out of the way prior to his report on Ferozeshah, while Gough is in a rush to get it completed prior to that battle.

Sabraon presents another problem, not so much for the lack of detail in Gough’s report, but rather, none of the divisional level dispatches are included since the war effectively ends with the last musket shot and the book proceeds very quickly through the peace negotiations and then subsequent reports and several “Thanks of Parliament” instead of sticking to the “meat and potatoes” of the battle reports themselves. Nonetheless, reading Gough’s account of Sobraon, one comes across the names of Brigade Majors with no brigades (though they were figured out to by using earlier documentation), artillery battery commanders named without mentioning what numbered battery they actually commanded (a problem repeated not only during the Sikh Wars but throughout the entire period 1838-1858) and a few battalions that are mentioned as having fought, but according to all the sources, were not present (the exact opposite of what happened to two units at Ferozeshah).

While I was able to get a hold of most of the primary and secondary sources used by previous authors, I was unable to get any of Broadfoot’s reports (except those printed or alluded to in other texts) or any of the lower level reports, especially from the brigade commanders. On top of that I was unable to get a copy of Burton’s more or less unofficial official account of the war, which may or may not have helped clear up any remaining questions.

On the plus side, however, I did get several written efforts that helped tremendously. First off, Gough’s biographer, Rait, included Harry Smith’s missing “Ferozeshah” dispatch in his book, along with the reports of all the divisional commanders present at Chillianwalla (though unfortunately none for Gujerat are included). Wylly’s “Thackwell” also proved to be extremely useful by having several official reports written by himself and Gough for Sobroan, Chillianwalla and Gujerat. Indeed, Thackwell is a veritable gold mine for the period 1840-1849 as far as Official Dispatches are concerned, but because he was not present at either Mudki or Ferozeshah, he still leaves a maddening gap of information for those battles.

Additionally, I was able to secure copies of Hughes “Bengal Horse Artillery” and Stubbs “History of the Bengal Artillery”, both of which have disgorged heaps of information, not only for their respective corps but also for the entire “Army of the Sutlej”.

That being said, short of going to India or England to dig for the lower level official reports, I have gone over every primary source document available to me at this point in time with a fine-toothed comb and I can honestly state that these orders of battle are the most correct and complete documents available today and far surpass anything offered up since the end of the war itself.

Where possible I have listed all staff personnel and the positions they held within the army, along with all participating units (and their strengths).

Now, on to the discrepancies:

Published by Khyber Pass Games and Books. © Andrew Preziosi. All rights reserved. Reproduced on MagWeb.com with permission of the publisher.

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