The Battle for Germany

Opening Moves

by Harold Totten


One of the advantages of having a fixed, historical set-up in a game is that the opening lends itself to technical analysis, and hence "optimum strategies," much as the openings in chess have been analyzed and studied. It is my intention here to discuss precisely what such an opening strategy would look like for the Soviet-West German player in SPI's The Battle for Germany.

In the east, for the Soviet player, the problem of the opening move roughly divides itself into north and south fronts, where the northern front is from Krakow north along the Vistula River, and the southern front is from Krakow south including Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia is an interesting case in the south, since the resrictions placed on Yugoslav and Soviet units (Rules 5.4) tend to create a freewheeling situation in the south as the German attempts to exit the board. Soviet units are spread extremely thin in the south, whereas to the north their large concentration makes the threat of German units exitting the board rather weak. The Soviet player has two distinct options, which I will characterize as the "conservative" and "aggressive" strategies.

The conservative strategy seeks to consolidate the Danube River line until the Yugoslavs fight their way up and can assist on an attack on hex 1122. This strategy means the Russian will have to fight his way back across the Danube, however, a series of 1-1 attacks should accomplish this purpose. The aggressive strategy makes an additional attack and actively threatens Budapest, but it also runs the risk of losing Soviet units in exchanges and giving the Germans not only good position for making surrounded attacks, but also allows them to actively threaten to exit the map in the east. (The Soviet, if you recall, loses two units for every German unit exited.)

Two attacks are common to both strategies. The 8-20-3 at 1724 holds its position, the 7-7-4 at 1926 moves to 1925, and the 6-4-6 at 2325 moves to 2125. The 8-20-3 then attacks the German 2-4-4 at 1-1 surrounded, and the other two units attack the 3-2-5 at 3-1. These attacks, if successful, will open up the area of rough terrain south of Krakow and will divert German units that could easily be used elsewhere.

The conservative strategy then completes itself in the following moves, and makes no further attacks in the south. The 2-5-4 at 1123 moves to 1023, the 8-20-3 at 1220 moves to 1222, and the 8-20-3 at 1422 moves to 1523. (1 am assuming that throughout the game the Yugoslav units will attack at every opportunity in order to push back the Germans.)

The aggressive strategy would have the 8-20-3 at 1422 and the 2-5-4 at 1123 hold their positions, and the 8-20-3 at 1220 moves to 1321, and the two 8-20-3s attack the 53-7 at 2-1. If an advance is called for, the 8-20-3 at 1321 advances (if the other advances, the two German units at 1622 have nothing barring them from heading east to exit).

What makes the aggressive strategy questionable is the reply open to the German. If the 5-3-7 is retreated to 1522 because it survived combat, then the German can surround both 8-20-3s and the 2-5-4 in a counterattack. The 1-214 unit goes to 1521, the 3-4-5 to 1522, the 7-5-8 to 1523, and the 3-2-7 and the 3-2-4 both go to 1322. The 4-3-6 and 4-4-5 units in Yugoslavia surround the 2-5-4. Then the Soviet attacks the 8- 20-3 at 1422 and the 2-5-4 at 1-1 surrounded: a 5/6 chance of victory in both battles. This counterattack leaves the east edge wide open, and both Soviet replacements in the next turn will be needed to plug up the line.

If the 5-3-7 is lost due to an exchange in the 2-1 attack, the Soviet loses one 8-20-3, and then the other 8-20-3 is surrounded at 1-1 (the 3-2-7 moves instead to 1421 and the 1- 2-4 moves instead to 1523). The possible loss for the Soviet is as high as both 8-20-3 units and the 2-5-4. Although both replacement units can block the gap created, they would be extended paper thin. In this case not only is vulnerability to German attack high, but also the Soviet is spread so thin that he is forced to take the defensive and cannot concentrate his forces for the attack. Beyond this, if we assume for the moment that due to events in the north we need those replacements there, then the German player will gain some sort of leverage that is needed to exit the map: and it is this largely strategic threat that gives the German his best chance early in the game.

Therefore, I must conclude that the conservative strategy is far superior to the aggressive strategy. The 820-3s are preserved for future offensive power and for garrison duty. Excessive loss of those 8-20-3s will usually spell defeat for the Soviet. It is, in my estimation, better to choose to go defensive and preserve units than to be forced to go on the defensive by German counterattacks and to be dependent on the arrival of replacements in order to repulse a German offensive.

1-1 Blitz

The northern strategy is much less placid, and I will refer to the strategy I am advocating as the "1-1 Blitz." Only three units in the north are moved: the 7-7-4 at 3325 to 3424, the 7-7-4 at 3025 to 3125, and the 6-4-6 at 2325 to 2224. All other units hold their initial positions. All German front line stacks are attacked at 1-1 odds (hence the name of the strategy) with the exception of the 2-3-4 at 2525, which is attacked at 4-1 surrounded.

There are seven 1-1 attacks, which should assure at least one exchange result. Thus the 1-1 Blitz should kill an average of 9.5 factors (2-3 German units) and lose 1-2 Soviet units. The 4-1 (not figured in the above) will positively kill the 2-3-4 (3 factors: I'm using defense strength to figure German losses) and has a 1/3 chance of exchange, causing Soviet casualties. So the 1-1 Blitz engages all front line units, has a 12.5 factor kill rate, and on the average 9.33 out of the 14 units attacked will get a DR result (as you can see, the fraction appears statistically and not in the actual play of the game). The most damaging exchanges are the attacks on 3423 and 3224 (the northernmost attacks), as an exchange would result in the loss of two Soviet units per attack. There is also a 1/36 chance of exchanges happening in such a way as to expose the east edge of the map (for example, at 3024 and 2823) and would require the replacement units to plug the gap and mop up and German units that have been pushed into the gap. (Note here that the use of the southern aggressive strategy puts the 1-1 Blitz in jeopardy: 1/36 is a slim chance, that of rolling "snake-eyes," but it's solid enough not to be ignored.) In conjunction with the conservative southern strategy, which has a 4.67 kill rate, the total average defense factors killed would be 17.17: which translates out to about 5 units.

In case you're interested in trivial and improbable events, the probability that all the 1-ls result in exchange is 1/279,936 and would leave one 8-20-3, two 7-74s, and three 6-4- 6s for the Soviet, and one German 4-38 (which was behind the front and could not be attacked). I mention this simply because it happened in the course of a solitaire game I played for the writing of this article.

For those of you who might play Battle for Germany extensively face-to-face, you will note the ease with which one can memorize the 1-1 Blitz, as it involves only three units in the movement. The southern strategy is a bit more difficult to remember, but compared to, for example, an optimum set-up for the Russian in Stalingrad it's like trying to remember 2 + 2 =4.

What about the alternatives? I will briefly consider three, and please keep in mind the kill rate for the 1-1 Blitz is 9.5 not counting the 4-1 attack. The 4-1 attack will be assumed in each of the below alternatives, because it is forced by the initial set-up. The first alternate would involve two 2-1s (on 2424 and 2623) and two 1-1s (on 3423 and 3224). The average kill rate here is 7.67 factors, with 5.33 units retreated, and 6 units unattacked. The second alternate would involve two 2- Is (on 2424 and 3024) and three 1-1s (on 3423, 3224, and 2623). The average kill rate improves to 9.17 factors, 6.67 units retreat, and only 4 units unattacked. The third alternate has only one 2-1 (on 2424) and the five northernmost 1-1s as in the 1-1 Blitz. The kill rate is 9.33 factors, 8 units retreat, and 2 units are unattacked. As you can see, upping the odds to 2-1 on any number of the attacks decreases the possibility of success, and so the 1-1 Blitz (if only by a margin of 9.5 to 9.33) is superior.

Although the purpose of this article is to discuss opening strategy, I will digress at this point for an important reason. I have found that the 1-1 Blitz strategy is quite effective as a turn-to-turn approach by the Soviet player. That is, the Soviet player should mount at least one strong attack per turn at 3-1 or 4-1 to insure some kills, and then should try to get all the 1-1s he can. If for the sake of argument we suppose that the Russian is able to mount six such 1-1s per turn, then he is statistically assured of one exchange per turn in addition to whatever he gets from his 3-1 (or 4- 1) attack. The Soviet can use all or almost all of his units to good effect every turn.

As the East German cannot trade too much space for time (the Soviet begins 11 hexes away from Berlin, and there are ten turns, so the German can safely only give up one hex per turn) and because he has a broad front to cover (it takes 7 units to hold a coherent line), the 1-1 Blitz strategy will stretch the German beyond the breaking point. The East German has 29 units, and gets 9 replacements, which gives us a total of 38 "units." The German should attempt to preserve 5 of the 38 for the final defense of Berlin, so he can "afford" to lose between 30-33 units over a ten turn period: or, his affordable loss rate is three units per turn. Anything more spells eventual collapse: and the 1-1 Blitz should deliver up about five units on the first turn, and should kill at least two units a turn thereafter, if not more. So the patient hex by hex advance of the 1-1 Blitz will not in the early three fourths of the game create spectacular results. Nevertheless, around turn 8 or 9 the German should be weakened beyond repair and collapse. (A note on sudden collapse: Rules 11.0 on Garrison are important! If you're going to use this strategy, you must be prepared to get one of those 8-20-3s into Berlin for the garrison, or all your effort goes up in smoke. If you occupy Berlin, you must have a 8-20-3 in the city by the end of your movement phase, or you lose those ten big fat victory points.) And even the crassest tyro can see that Berlin is the key to victory in this game.

West German Strategy

West German strategy is fairly simple. Two attacks must be made on the first turn, and two Allied hexes stick out like sore thumbs. These are hexes 2204 and 1706, both surrounded, both accessible from four German hexes. These attacks, if successful, would eliminate possible four hex attacks by the Allies on the subsequent turn.

The attack on 2204 uses all the units already present, and shifts the two 6-5-8s at 2005 to 2305. This gives a 1-1 surrounded attack with a 5/6 (87%) chance of success. The danger against hex 2304 (which could have given the Allies a 4-1 attack) is reduced to a 2-1 possibility by a successful attack. Also, the 4-5-5 at 1906 is moved to 2005 to take up the line.

The attack on 1706 is even simpler to execute, as the units already available there make 1-1 surrounded. One of the two 2-3-4s is moved from 1606 to 1506 to reinforce the line, which reduces the possible Allied counterattack from 3-1 to 2- 1. This attack also has the 5/6 (87%) chance of success.

All told, the strategy I have outlined is simple yet effective. In the continuing turns, the West German will obviously attempt to create as cohesive a line as possible. He should also use 1-1 surrounded attacks whenever these are available to him, as this type of attack is his best chance for turning back Allied units that have penetrated his line. It is rare indeed that the West German will have high odds attacks available to him: usually only because the Allied player has done something radically wrong.

On the Western front, the German can hold the entire line on a minimalistic basis with 5 units. He has 17 units at start, and gets 4 replacements. This gives him 21 "units" for the game. The German will want to preserve 6 units for the final defense of Berlin, although he can get along with as few as 3. This means he can afford to lose 15-18 units: which makes the maximum affordable loss rate at 1 1/2 units per turn (3 units every two turns). The West German can make up for his dearth of units by tenaciously defending the terrain around his initial position as long as possible, giving up positions only when they are no longer tenable. As on the eastern front, the Allies are 11 hexes away from Berlin, but the West German player cannot afford to give up one hex per turn, as the East German can and often must. This is because the terrain between the Rhine and Elbe Rivers is open (except for the Kassel- Erfurt- Hannover triangle) and once the West German is backed into this terrain it is only a matter of time: if this occurs before or on turn 5, odds are favorable the Allies will make it to Berlin, after turn 5 gives an excellent chance that the West Germans will be able to protect Berlin. Either way, once out in the open the Allies will be able to inflict twice as much damage, as the German units are exposed and cannot afford to retreat to the Elbe until the final turns of the game. The German should retreat to the Elbe only in case of imminent collapse, or the final turn of the game. It is my estimation that the German has a bit of a better chance at the Elbe (because of terrain) and may have prospects for counter-attack, whereas continual defense in open terrain spreads his units too widely for counter-attack and leaves them exposed to the full fury of the Allied onslaught.

Finally, I would say that Battle for Germany is definitely slanted toward the Soviet-West German player, but not any more than 60-40. Yet as a two-player game it is unique. It plays quickly and cleanly, and both players must command an offensive game on one front, and a defensive game on the other: rarely does a game demand all the player's talents and yet remain both playable and fairly balanced. Needless to say, it's one of my personal favorites.


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© Copyright 1979 by Donald S. Lowry
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