Mail Call


Dear Don,

You deserve a 21 gun salute for your stand on Wally Williams. I intend to write SPI to tell them how much I appreciate MY money going to the bums who smuggle dope into this country. I know SPI can't operate at a loss, so if SPI gives free games to these people and raises my rates accordingly, then I am helping them indirectly - which I resent.

Bill Byron,
Los Angeles, CA


Dear Mr. Lowry,

Your magazine seems to be on fairly solid ground insofar as quality of articles is concerned, especially considering your limited circulation base and therefore pool of potential writers. I hope you will prosper, and eventually weather the period of accusations of anti-SPI bias. While you may not be so biased, a few of your contributors seem to be, and I think you hurt yourself (or at least used to - the problem seems to be fading these days) by not making it abundantly clear that you personally, and Campaign editorially, do not subscribe to every opinion printed in its pages.

Sincerely,
Steve List
Levittown, PA

I try to, every time the subject comes up, though one would think it should be obvious. - DSL


Dear Don,

Today got COI & Crusader, mailed 12/1. Reflecting on them, I realize anew that this used to be a hobby of games, but it's become one of individual games which - in themselves - represent a hobby!

The time it would take to learn thoroughly and play well either game - & many others - would be all the time most people could devote to a hobby. How long can it last?

From what I hear, SPI is in disarray. I don't understand Dunnigan.

The Game Design booklet was excellent.

Best (& thanks),
Tom Oleson
Madrid, Spain


Dear Don,

Your magazine continues to fulfill my literary wargaming needs; no matter how it is organized, each time there is something to pique my curiosity, be it the very enlightening "Thumbnail Analysis", the all-encompassing "Mail Call", or the articles on history/gaming. Such is Lorrin Bird's newest addition to his series on tactical games, Tobruk. This game has recently grabbed my curiosity, though I traditionally avoid tactical land games, and Bird's article was appreciated. I especially enjoyed Mr. Dworschak's analysis of High Seas Fleet, though I feel he was, perhaps, a bit harsh. Think of what might have occurred if, at the Marne, the German Army had been victorious. France, and with it the French Fleet, would have fallen to the Kaiser. With all of France's ports at her disposal, not to mention at least some of the French Fleet, Germany would have posed a much greater threat to the British lifeline than she did. And with France gone, would not the Italians have swiftly reassessed their position and gone over to the Central Powers (as she was to originally)? The British would be faced with an Austro-Italian-Turkish lake in the Mediterranean, or a greatly increased Mediterranean Fleet. When one considers how close Germany came to defeating France in the opening battles, it cannot be disregarded as a possibility. Basically I agree with Mr. Dworschak about the impotence of the High Seas Fleet, but it is something to consider.

Concerning Steven Apergis' letter complaining about the SPI "roast" in the Mail Call, I can only say it is his loss to cut his subscription. Do you really have to read the anti-SPI letters, Mr Apergis? (Of course, he is not reading this). In my opinion, SPI deserves everything they get. I refuse to approve a wargame - no, simulation - company that turns out impersonal simulations and impersonal errata sheets, and worse yet, doesn't seem to mind. Mr. Aperqis says there are implications that those who like SPI are idiots. I submit that they are not idiots, but geniuses. If one can understand, play, AND enjoy a typical recent SPI game (e.g. Drive on Stalingrad, Raid! War in the East/West, et al) then that person's intelligence level is on a plane I cannot even comprehend. Incidentally, I'm just waiting for SPI to come out with Iran and Cambodia/Vietnam '79.

Now comes the one unpleasant point. I, of course, realize that you, Don, have no control over this at all, so I only hope to save others from my fate.

Last September I saw a very interesting ad in the "Want Ads" section, placed by a magazine called Enfilade. It claimed that at $1.50 a sample issue, you couldn't lose. Apparently, I have. I sent my $1.50 off in early October to the address listed. No reply. I sent a second letter in early December, and a third in early January. Again, each time there was no answer. In all three letters I enclosed my home address, and in the first, of course, my check. My specifications were precise: one sample issue of Enfilade. If this letter is published in Campaign, I challenge Enfilde to answer with even a faintly plausible response as to why I never received my magazine.

Truly,
Paul Purman
Sykesville, MD


Don,

Recently I placed an ad in Campaign offering a variety of boardgames and micro armor for sale, and I thought you might be interested in the responses I received.

Even though the boardgames included such "biggies" as Arab-Israeli Wars and SL/COI, practically all of the inquiries (and there were well over 25) were for the micro armor. I thought this might interest you since it indicates that Campaign is read by a sizable armor miniatures group who must look to other magazines for microarmor articles.

Now that I've "shown" that the interest in armor miniatures by Campaign readers is worth a few "crumbs" every so often, here's a list of revisions to rules that. have been compiled by a local wargame club:

1. In Tractics, the frontal armor on the Sherman and T34 should be sloped at 45º (not 60º). The Crusader upper hull armor should be 25mm at 60º not 51mm).

2. WRG's Armor & Infantry 1925-1950 lists only one version of the 6pdr gun, which appears to be the long barreled anti-tank gun with APDS ammunition. In order to correctly model the 6pdr carried by English tanks and the 1942-1943 ATG version, the results for the German 50mmL/60 are a reasonable substitute (English 6pdrs probably didn't utilize APDS in tanks).

3. In the WRG rules, additional detail can be created by subtracting "l" from the hit scores against small vehicle targets and shots taken by Soviet gunners over 500 meters range.

4. Actual battle experience indicated that T34/76s and Shermans could penetrate a Tiger from the flank provided the range was sufficiently short. Since WRG at present rates the Tiger side armor beyond the capabilities of the T34/Sherman weapons, a "C" KO score of "4" from 0-100 meters might be a reasonable revision (only the Tiger's "C" class side armor is effected, the frontal armor still cannot be pierced by T34s/Shermans).

5. Due to their semi-automatic rifle, U.S. infantry packed considerably more firepower than their adversaries. This can be reflected by adding "1" to all I.D.F. rolls at over 50 meters when using the WRG WWII rules.

6. The U.S. bazooka was considerably less effective than the German panzerfaust, and the 57mm bazooka's KO factor against all armor (WRG rules) should be a "5".

The inclusion of the aforementioned suggestions will add additional realism/detail to two of the most popular armor rules systems with only a small increase in complexity.

Lorrin Bird
Mechanicville, NY


Don,

While recuperating from my car accident, I had the good luck to have a gun expert as my roommate, and we discussed the conclusions of the "Tank Gun Effectiveness" article in Campaign and wargame rules in general.

Based on what we could support according to our "experience", wargame rules seem to neglect one major advantage of sloped armor over vertical plate. While the effective armor of a T34 or Sherman was roughly equal to that of a Mark IIIj, the slope of the former's armor plate would deflect many more shots that would normally penetrate.

While some books have pointed out the superior shot deflecting abilities of the T34 armor, and how poor the Tiger's vertical armor was at causing ricochets, no wargame rules seem to give any deflective advantages to slanted armor plate.

Cross Of Iron, while assuming some deflection of shots, does not differentiate between sloped and vertical plate While there is no data in circulation that quantifies the increased deflection capabilities of angled armor, perhaps in the future some designer will attempt to crank in a factor to take it into account (increase COI's DRM's by +1 for sloped armor as a starting point). In view of the lack of solid data regarding most armor design topics anyway, and the general disagreement between rules, whatever advantage is granted to T34 armor with regard to shot deflection will suffice as long as it's not too large.

As a final note, after reading a few books on the North African theater many wargamers have been puzzled by the author's statement that Shermans were able to stand up to the German "88s". Since the "88" could theoretically pierce the front of a Sherman out to extreme ranges (a point most wargame rules will "verify") , we thought that the writer was crazy. In light of the somewhat "mysterious" ability of armor at 45 degrees to cause ricochets, perhaps the Shermans could survive some hits that a Grant would "Brew up" from.

If any readers have any info that can clarify this issue, it might be beneficial if they could submit it to Campaign either as an article or letter.

Lorrin Bird
Mechanicville, NY


Don,

Mostly due to John Desmond's letter in Campaign #88, I recently obtained a copy of S.L.A. Marshall's Men Under Fire. Due to my hospitalization I can't do a full review of the book, but the following is a neat summary that your readers might find interesting.

As a result of Marshall's studies of WWII infantry actions, the following characteristics of troops were identified:

    1. Whether on offense or defense, no more than 15-25% of the troops could be expected to use their arms.

    2. After obtaining an objective, soldiers have a tendency to lose their "drive", and became useless for further pushes.

    3. Troops under surprise fire from concealed enemy forces, due to training which emphasized visual targets, have a tendency to "go to ground" unless led by superior officers.

    4. Infantry sent on ill-thought-out and somewhat useless missions will "break" fairly easily.

With regard to miniature wargaming, Marshall's findings are fairly significant. Since infantry participation in firefights is a low percentage affair, small arms fire results would be better associated with a stand of several men rather than individual figures. One of the most important objects of fire is also to pin the enemy in place, limiting their flexibility, a combat result which should be more probable than a kill.

The current tendency of small unit gamers to send squads to almost certain death by enemy firepower definitely runs contrary to Marshall's case histories, where actual troops were not so foolhardy with their lives (Marshall did not study Russian and Japanese actions which were not typical of U.S. Army characteristics).

Probably of primary importance is the fact that most firefights were led by the men crewing weapons with two or more crewmembers and those soldiers manning the more sophisticated weaponry (bazooka's, flamethrowers, etc.). Despite M1 rifle which would put out almost as lethal a fire output as the German light machine gun, the "proven" tendency of G.I.s to fail to fire their rifles of necessity put the burden on the heavier arms which were often manned by the more aggressive riflemen. The 75% or so of the troops which went "along for the ride" without shooting played a vital role, however, since they "supported" the firing troops by providing nearby friends and a general show of "force".

Without going into any great detail, comparing Marshall's findings to most miniature type games (WWII) reveals a host of discrepancies regarding the characteristics of infantry. In view of Marshall's great research and the general acceptance of Men Under Fire by the military, it would have been less disturbing if more designers had used Marshall's work instead of inventing their own systems based on what appears to have been a rather fanatical belief in such source documents at the "Charge Of The Light Brigade".

By the way, as general reading for the average wargamer Men Under Fire may be too "heavy" for the most part, and skim reading of it is greatly suggested (it's interesting to note that tanks supporting infantry in the book hardly ever used smoke).

Sorry for the length of this letter but here in the hospital there's little to do other than stare at the walls. Every issue of Campaign helps me retain what sanity I have left after three months.

Lorrin Bird
Mecahicville, NY


Don,

The comments on the Squad Leader article made by Mr. Morley in Campaign #90 were very interesting, and if possible I'd like to clarify some of the points made.

with regard to the "mobility and tactical expertise" issue where the Germans are not given any advantage in the game, Mr. Morley's point is more than well taken. The German Abundance of leaders gives their infantry more staying power, but my reference was to the Armor, where the T34 can do more than the Mark IVf2 due to its greater speed.

The American bazooka lethality issue is an interesting one, and Squad Leader's assessment of the weapon appears realistic.

During WWII, the U.S. 57mm bazooka was fairly effective against tanks so long as German tank crews thought the gases created by a penetration were poisonous. After crews stopped bailing out and curbed their fear of the explosive gas, the bazooka's lack of real destructive power made it a "paper tiger".

In Korea, the 57mm bazooka was virtually worthless, since the soldiers lacked confidence in it and its shells were next to useless against T34s.

In an odd twist, the Army came out with a larger and more effective bazooka for the troops in Korea, but they discarded it on the battlefield thinking it was as worthless as the 57mm version. The N. Koreans snatched up the abandoned bazookas and used them to destroy quite a few American tanks, proving their worth. All of this resulted in a Congressional Inquiry.

Flame is treated as an anti-tank weapon since its anti-personnel use is obvious, but in some scenarios it must be used against tanks and transport vehicles. For American infantry with little or no real anti-tank weaponry, flame can be used on occasion to burn halftracks and trucks.

Hopefully, the innovations in Cross Of Iron have put to rest many of the criticisms generated by Squad Leader's relative simplicity and gamers' desire for more detail.

By the way, the Article on the Confederate Navy was the most interesting and well written article I've ever seen, and for one with just a minor appreciation of Civil War naval action and strategy it really was enlightening.

While I thought Campaign was the best magazine in its class previously, now I believe it's in a class by itself. Keep up the excellent diversified format and great article selection.

Lorrin Bird
Utica, MY

Thanks. We forgot to identify the Confederate Navy article as a reprint from SDC's old COMFLICT magazine - our second. So far we've only used one of these a year.


Don,

After rereading the Tobruk article in Campaign and reviewing some books on the North African campaign, the following comments regarding Tobruk came to mind:

1. One of the features of the Grant that makes it so lethal in the game is the existance of two main guns, but it appears that the 37mm weapon was virtually unusable. The turret which housed the 37mm gun was manned by only the tank commander, who was usually too occupied with other matters to aim, load, and fire the secondary weapon.

2. The Grant's greatest attribute was the 75mm medium velocity gun, which while not as accurate as the 2pdr, 37mm and German 50mm (long) at short and medium range (500 meters) was much more accurate and deadly at longer ranges (larger, heavier shells carry further than small shot in general, even when fired at slower initial velocities). The Grant would defeat the panzers by firing high explosive at long ranges which could blow off tracks and mess up the tanks. Since Tobruk appears to base weapon accuracy almost entirely on muzzle velocity without considering shell size (which is related to diameter), the very poor accuracy of the 75mm L/30 in the game greatly minimizes the effectiveness of what was the Grants' main armament.

3. There is some evidence that the Mark IIIj did not have face-hardened armor, and that the 2pdr and 37mm guns could pierce the Mark IIIh and j armor at short range. Actual plate-piercing data also indicates that while the German 50mm long could barely penetrate the Matilda's armor (77mm at 500 yards, it could defeat the Grant (51mm at a slight slope) out to much greater ranges. The game appears to be inconsistent on these and a number of other details with some "source" documents (the Grant's "heavy" armor was actually only great when compared to Stuarts and Crusaders, compared to German armor it was slightly inferior).

4. While under proving ground conditions a tank such as a Crusader might be able to make 6 good shots in 30 seconds at a stationary target, under actual battlefield conditions with glare, smoke from burning tanks, dust from moving tanks, etc, such high fire rates appear overly optimistic. It is interesting that in the desert the effective range of the 2pdr was limited by glare from the ground more than by the properties of the gun (about 1000 yards was the limit during the day).

5. The 50mm APCR round, due to its high initial velocity and light weight, was more accurate than the regular shot at close ranges, but due to its low mass had much less range (and long range accuracy) than the standard 50mm shell. APCR in general should be fairly inaccurate at the greater distances, and used primarily against close-in targets (Tobruk deviates somewhat in this regard).

6. The tendency of shells to ricochet off of armor appears greatly exaggerated, and leads to the great number of dice rolls that Tobruk is "famous" (or should it be "infamous") for. A suggestion that may make the game more playable and realistic is to roll for ricochets as if they were "hits" when determining which part of the tank was struck, and if the "ricochet" roil would-have resulted in a "K-kill" then the target vehicle is destroyed. Utilizing this suggestion will also cut down on the uncomfortable playing times associated with the game (when a ricochet is rolled after a hit, roll again to see if the hit "stuck" instead of ricocheted).

Hopefully, once I get out of the hospital, I can prepare some improved accurate data for the Grant's 75mm gun and APCR ammo (in addition to most of the other weapons) in conjunction with my gaming partners that will improve the realism of the game. If you believe that there is sufficient interest in such a project amongst your readers then it will be submitted to Campaign.

Lorrin Bird
Mechanicville, NY

I'm sure there is. -DSL


Don,

I've received a number of letters praising my prior articles, stating that they bought the games due to my write-up, and they really felt bad that I was hurt and couldn't write anymore for Campaign.

I really appreciate the kind letters from your readers as they bring a little light to an otherwise "dull" hospital life that winds into its fourth month in a few weeks.

You've helped to make things a little cheerier by printing some of my scribblings, and it is also greatly appreciated.

I wish to thank everybody for being so nice (especially the readers who've yet to receive answers to their "classified ad" inquires).

Lorrin Bird
Mechanicville, NY

For a guy who can't write you do a very good imitation! - DSL


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© Copyright 1979 by Donald S. Lowry
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