The El Alamein defeat I am referring to is not that suffered by the Afrika Korps near an obscure little Egyptian town in 1942 but the one suffered by Simulations Publications, Inc., in the wargaming company in 1973-74. The game EL ALAMEIN, published in September, 1973, has the lowest rating for any non-magazine game SPI has ever published. To show you how poorly EL ALAMEIN has done, its recent rating of 5,19 is only .08 of a point above FALL OF ROME! Before we consider why EL ALAMEIN has done so poorly, consider some figures: It's 1st rating in S&T 41 was 5.94. It was listed as 6.30 in numbers 42 thru 46, and 5.19 in S&T 47. According to the Playback rating in MOVES 15, those responding rated the game's play balance as 4.95 (the average is 6.2 - 6,8), realism as 6.41 (the average is 5.8 - 6.4), and overall acceptability as 5.72 (the average is 6.2 - 6.3). Also, only 50% of those responding to the MOVES poll said they would buy the game to-day knowing what they know now.

My comments about EL ALAMEIN can be divided into two parts. First, I will talk about the game itself and why I feel its low ratings are unjustified. Second, I will comment on what lessons game designers and publishers can learn from the "defeat" of EL ALAMEIN.

While EL ALAMEIN is not a super game, it is a lot better than its ratings would seem to indicate. Let me explain why I think the game gets such poor ratings and why they are not completely deserved. First, many people buying EL ALAMEIN were expecting a very different type of game than they got. Instead of the sweeping movement typical of most actions in North Africa, the battles near El Alamein, as the game's Designer's Notes state, were mainly slugging matches. And, unfortunately for those buying EL ALAMEIN thinking it would be a game of movement, the game is quite realistic.

The supply and minefield rules and a defense-oriented combat results table all combine to foil any attempt at mobile actions. The supply rules especially restrict the Axis player, and, in fact, I think they are probably overly restrictive. I find it hard to believe that a German unit could not leave its source of supply for a day or two and still keep its full attack strength for at least one attack. However, the supply rules do not allow this, and the combat results table effectively prevents the success of virtually any attack by units with less than full supply.

This seems to indicate that mistaken purchases account for many of those who told MOVES they would not buy the game again. At this point I should note that SPI itself is a good deal to blame for the mistaken impression's about the game.

The ad for EL ALAMEIN in S&T 38 says that "the game of EL ALAMEIN simulates the sweeping fluidity of the Desert War" and that it provides "a taste of fast-moving desert combat." Oh well, caveat euptor.)

The second reason for EL ALAMETN's unpopularity, also due to the game's realism, is that there is virtually no play balance. Historically, there was no way the Germans and Italians could have won at El Alamein even with Rommel, and the came accurately reflects that. This problem of balance is increased in the game because, in spite of what many of us would like to think, there are not very many Rommels among us and because it is hard to provide for a Rommel in the rules. The absence of any "fog of war" further accentuates the problem by eliminating any element of surprise. The people at SPI tried to lessen the play balance problem by providing victory conditions based on how well a player did in improving on the actual result and not on whether a historical victory was achieved or not. However, they did not do a very good job (but more about that in the next paragraph).

Third, the game has a number of design defects which severely inhibit playability and reduce enjoyability and which would not affect realism if changed. For example, as mentioned above, the handicapped victory conditions are very poorly set up.

In the September Alam Halfa scenario, the Axis player starts out with a draw and cannot do any worse! Also in the September scenario, the victory conditions provided have nothing to do with what the Axis should be trying to accomplish in that offensive. Instead of getting points for how far west he is able to go, the rules provide victory points for clearing minefields. What this can result in is a "decisive victory" for the Axis player because he has cleared enough mine fields, no matter where they are situated and in spite of the fact the Allied player has broken through the Axis line and is wreaking havoc in the Axis rear.

Also, while a number of "what-if" possibilities are presented, there is no discussion of what they mean. This is absurd. What ifs are interesting only when one knows what outside circumstances and factors are involved in the hypotheticals. Further, the rules are very long and needlessly confusing, In fact, the rule on combat and zones of control is incomprehensible without the Errata sheet.

In spite of its flaws, I do think that EL ALAMEIN is a pretty good game, at least for the historian-gamer. It realistically represents what is often considered a turning-point battle, and it deflates many myths about the great Allied "victory" at El Alamein in October of 1942, It really shows how much bigger their victory could (should ?) have been.

Lessons Learned

Now to the second question posed above: What lessons can game designers and publishers learn from this "defeat" of EL ALAMEIN? First, merely treating a popular subject realistically is not enough to give a game broad popularity. While EL ALAMEIN was published before SPI's Feedback poll was picking its games, there seems little doubt it would have ranked high if a vote had been taken. And as noted before, the MOVES Playback review shows realism is EL ALAMEIN's only better than average feature.

1. Apparently a game must be at least moderately playable and balanced to be popular. Balance seems to be especially important. EL ALAMEIN's ratings indicate that gamers do not want to merely try to improve on a foregone conclusion. It appears that even many realism buffs want a chance to reverse history. not just an opportunity to slightly deflect its irresistable flow.

2. Also, if some artificial play balance is required and the designer plans to get it thru handicapped victory conditions, it is essential that the victory conditions force the real-life victory, regardless of the objective hopelessness of the task (Using victory conditions similar to those in the July scenario, instead of the ones provided for the September scenario and discussed above, will solve this problem in EL ALAMEIN.)

3. If "what-if" scenarios are to be provided, and I think they really improve a game when properly done, the game designer should give some explanation as to what they mean. As stated above, if you do not know what a variation means, it is of no interest.

4. Finally, the game designer and publisher should not misrepresent the game in their ad. The game should be described accurately as it has been developed, and if it is different from the popular myths about the battle, the ad should say so. The result will be happier and more satisfied customers (who will not be so wary of coming back for another game later ).