"In the daytime, the combatants see more clearly; though even then only what is going on immediately around them, and that imperfectly - nothing of the battle as a whole. But in a night engagement like this in which two great armies fought . . . who could be certain of anything?"
. . Thucydides (of the night attack on Epipolae)

Many World War II naval wargames seem to have certain characteristics. Usually there are two fairly "balanced" forces facing each other. The action opens and immediately, like circling Gladiators, the opposing forces close to decisive ranges, Often tactics are simple or non-existant, Vessels are disabled on both sides; armor is now being constantly penetrated (ranges have closed that fast and decisively); and with no thought of tomorrow a melee usually results, Torpedoes fill the water and several hits result. One side or the other is Aped out, while the victor can usually just manage to wallow off with at least one or two capital ships being towed. Often times visability is perfect, smoke screens are not encouraged, and radar is not used.

There are several reasons why such an action as described above is unrealistic. But there is one very important point often overlooked, other than some of the methodology problems within the rules;

This point being that most daylight naval actions fought in WWII were indecisive. The exceptions to this general rule had some unusual circumstances. For instance, the loss of the Hood can be accounted to her magazine being penetrated by a vessel 22 years more modern. The Bartolomeo Colleoni was hit by an extremely lucky hit that penetrated her thin armor and brought her to a dead stop. The Bismarck was a cripple and at short range when the Repulse and King George V closed to a decisive range (even then the Germans apparently scuttled their vessel: It was not sunk).

Another factor that must be considered in the attempt to bring about a decisive daylight action (or night action) is the element of surprise. The surprise of Vian's force at the First Battle of the Sirte; the "Baby Flattops" off Samar in 1944 when Kurita suddenly appeared; and innumerable night actions, two of the most well-known being Savo Island and Matapan, bear this point out. This is just one consideration that aids in creating a daylight action. Yet it should be noted that the two daylight actions above were anything but decisive.

With exceptions, one also needs for a decisive daylight action two willing admirals.

As Admiral James once put it:

It is because the speed of rival fleets, sail or steam, has always been the same, and because one of the rival Commanders has had no intention of fighting to a finish, that major battles in the open sea are so rare in maritime history. At Quiberon Bay, the Nile, and Copenhagen the enemy could not refuse battle. Trafalgar, one of the few cases of pitched battle, way fought out because Villeneuve had been warned that he was in disgrace, and decided to try to retrieve his fortunes by a victory, Jellicoe jas as eager as Hawke mid Nelson to bring the enemy to battle; but it takes two to make a fight.

So let us step back for a moment and see where this myth of a decisive daylight action was born. One of the roots goes back to the loss of the three British Battlecruisers at Jutland. As Professor Marder has pointed out, if it had not been for the poor flash arrangements on the three Battlecrusiers that were lost, all might have survived. Penetrations of the ship's armor, while inflicting considerable damage would most likely not have been as decisive. When one views the pounding the Lutzow took before she was scuttled, the dramatic loss of the Queen Mary, Invincible, and Indefatigable begins to dim. Yet attention is focused on the dramatic and not the long term pounding the Lutzow underwent.

Between the wars service opinion and theory of what the "Next War" would be like differed from the reality of WWII. This same process had taken place before WWI also: For instance, the Grand Fleet only had one target practice at over 16,000 yards at a 12 knot target before 1914.

An example of this myth in light of WWII is pointed out by S.E. Morrison in his account of the Battle of the Java Sea. He writes:

The most surprising thing about the battle was its length. Before WWII, most strategints thought that gun and torpedo fire had been developed to such a point that naval battle would be decided in a few minutes, at the end of which one side would either be annihilated or so crippled that it could fight no more. Several battles in this war notably Savo Island (a night action ed.) were of this description. But in the Battle of the Java Sea the two opponents a lugged each other intermittently over a period of some several hours before the Allied survivors had to break off and admit defeat.

It should be pointed out that the loss of the Dutch cruisers were to torpedoes. Gunfire had not been that decisive. Furthermore, there was an element of surprise as this was the first large scale encounter with the Japanese "Long Lance" torpedo.

Hector Bywater supports Morrison's comments with his 1920's account in The Great Pacific War. This is a hypothetical account of a war between the United States of America and Japan. The decisive battle action that culminated the book witnesses highly destructive gunfire in a short period of time, and the loss of seven Capital ships. These losses include two of the heavily armored Japanese battleships. So then this was the myth that naval officers carried with them into WWII. A daylight action would be short and decisive. Airpower would be available, mainly for spotting. as AA work and friendly airpower would cancel the enemy's air attack strength.* (* Bywater supports this point as does the Regina Marina. One reason Italian aircraft carriers were never started, until the pratical events of WWII, was the general acceptance of the ability of the Italian Air Force to intervene favorable when the Navy needed it.)

At this point I would like to examine three daylight surface actions between fleets. They are the action off of Samar, the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, and the Second battle of the Sirte.

The battle off Samar is quite interesting for several reasons. In the early morning of the 25th October. 1944, 4 Japanese battleships (including the Yamato), 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 2 destroyer squadrons totally surprised 6 escort carriers (top speed of 18 knots) which were escorted by 3 destroyers and 4 destroyer escorts. Visability was excellent.

For the next two and 1/2 hours, an action took place with ranges closing to 10,000 yards against the aircraft carriers. Yet the Japanese suffered more damage than the Americans and only one carrier was lost.

Rear Admiral Sprague would say that the

...failure of the enemy main body and encircling light forces to completely wipe out all vessels of this task unit can be attributed to our successful smoke screens, our torpedo counterattack continuous harassment of the enemy by bomb, torpedo and strafing air attacks, (and) timely maneuvers...

It should be added that Admiral Kurita made an uncoordinated attack and that the Japanese force had suffered several at- tacks previous to this that had tired both their crews and their admiral. Yet ammunition and fuel for the destroyers were still sufficient when the action end- ed. But, none the less, 5 out of 6 "Wool- worth" carriers had escaped destruction. This should be accounted also to the fact that a retiring force in daylight has many weapons and tricks, such as smoke, that can delay and hurt the enemy to such a degree that an inconclusive engagement is the result.

The Japanese would have had to press their attacks for a much longer period of time for Samar to have been a Japanese victory. Furthermore, they would have remained under constant air attack for that entire period. They had already lost three heavy cruisers largely to air attacks that morning.

But what about a daylight action in which airpower was present in a minor way? The Battle of the Komandorski Islands illustrates this point perfectly. This little known action was fought during the Aleutian campaign on March 26th, 1943. S.E. Morrison writes of it,

A small task group under Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris fought a retiring action against a Japanese force, under Admiral Hosogaya, of twice its size and fire power; the battle lasted without a break for three and a half hours of daylight; the contestants slugged it out with gunfire at ranges of 8-12 miles (13,000 to 20,000 yards), without the intrusion of air power or submarines. It was a miniature fleet action of the sort that the Navy after World War I. had expected to fight in the "next war", with one important dif ference, that neither side did the other any great harm.

The Japanese force consisted of the Nachi and Maya heavy cruisers, the Abukuma and Tama light cruisers, and 3 destroyers vs. the American heavy cruiser Salt Lake City, the light cruiser Richmond, and 4 destroyers.

This action featured very few hits. about a dozen on either side, though fire was so steady as to expend 85% of the ammunition of the Salt Lake City and 75% of the Maya. The Machi had to cease fire, for technical reasons, for part of the action, so she had only expended 59%. Torpedo firing had been fairly frequent but at extreme ranges, and no hits were scored.

With the Salt Lake City in steering difficulties, due to shock from her own firing, a smoke screen was requested and continued for the last third of the action. The Japanese heavy cruisers fearing the smoke screen naturally refused to close the range, but did order an ineffective light forces attack. A bit later, nearing the end of the action, arctic water coming through one of the 4 eight-inch shell hits snuffed the burners of the Salt Lake City and brought her to a dead stop.

Yet this condition was concealed by smoke from the enemy. An American destroyer attack was launched and the Japanese turned away and broke off the action. Hosogaya ended the action because of the ineffective torpedo work of his forces, lack of ammunition, fear of American airpower (which never materialized), and the inconclusive nature of the entire action.

A total of 48 torpedoes, 2,443 eightinch, and 3,041 smaller shells had been fired. The damage inflicted was minor in comparison.

The Americans and Japanese discovered that land-based airpower often times takes immense amounts of time to arrive at the scene of an action, though actual flying tine might be quite short. This was shown at the Korman Dorski's when neither side was supported by land based airpower. This was a situation the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean had to live with throughout the war. The Italian attempts to solve this problem of inadequate air support and the nature of the indecisive daylight action culminated at the Second Battle of the Sirte.

At this action the Italians brought the Littorio, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 7 destroyers against a convoy escorted by 5 light cruisers and 18 destroyers (several being Hunt's). Visability was good though seas were quite rough. The Italian destroyers were limited to 22 knots because of the rough seas. For approximately three hours the action was fought with smoke screens being continuous the entire time.

Admiral Iachino of the Italian fleet closed the range to 11,000 yards in his attempt to overcome the disadvantage of both smoke screens and foul weather. The British tactics of smoke and destroyer attacks did eat up valuable time and also kept the Italians from closing with the convoy.

Eventually the Littorio would get within 5,000 yards of the British destroyers (a very dangerous step) in her attempts to bring about a decisive action against an inferior force Torpedoes forced her away, and with night falling (the Italian large guns still lacked night fighting equipment), the action ended.

Total damage from this battle included several British destroyers knocked about, 3 cruisers damaged, and only one six-inch-shell hit on the Littorio. No torpedoes scored a hit. Though the delay of the British in arriving at Malta would result in severe losses, the actual combat had been ineffective.

As Admiral Cunningham would write, '

"Nor must the mistake be made of thinking the Italians were inefficient in this action. our destroyers . . . were received by heavy and accurate gunfire, and it was only by the mercy of providence that many were not sunk and still more severely damaged."

Here are three daylight actions in which the competent superior enemy was unable to gain a decisive victory; results much different from corresponding night actions. Extreme or long range gunnery was not that accurate (salvo chasing had been developed to an art), torpedoes were wasted, and the tricks of the defense had effectively blocked the attacker. Two thoughts I was left with after examining this situation in light of naval wargaming were: 1) concentrating on more night actions run by a full-time umpire(s) who can therefore introduce a factor of surprise, and 2) using strategic campaigns which in turn set up the actions that will be fought. Therefore the naval action does not become a simple knock the enemy harder then he knocks you, but a strategic reason for fighting (or not) is established In turn, a brilliant "Nelson" can place the enemy in a position where he must gamble, such as with the Bismarck or the Battle of Tsushima. We must decide if we are simply trying to play a game or if we are trying to simulate real naval combat.

Sources Consulted:

The appropriate volumes of the History of the United States Navy in World War II by SE Morrison
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol III by A.J. Marder
The Italian Navy in World War II by M.A. Bragadin.
The Great Pacific War by H. Bywater
The Mediterranean 1912-14 edited by E.W.R. Lumby. This work is especially interesting as it touched on several of the "myths" held to be true before the reality of World War I. It really caused me to pause and consider the possibilities of a German victory at sea in 1914 or early 1915. It also makes one realize the great work Jellicoe performed in making the Grand Fleet a fighting fleet.