The Battle of Middleton

Scenario

by Pete Rice

The American Civil War period presents the 9mm wargamer with some serious problems he must overcome in order to keep the field at the end of the contest. The power of the defense is so much greater than that found in the Napoleonic period, that if the offensive player does not handle his brigades well, he will have nothing left to charge with by the time he comes within range of his enemy. The fact that the defender can retire his artillery by prolong in front of the attacker gives the defender yet another advantage that the attacker (and the gamemaster) must overcome.

The game master can overcome the problem by giving the defender certain terrain he must defend or lose the game. The attacker can handle the problem in much the same way, but he must put artificial obstacles in the way of the defender-- such as enemy cavalry.

The following situation was presented at the recent Second Down East Wargamer's Convention (DEWCON II) held in Belfast, Maine. It presents the Confederate commander with the problem of having to defend given terrain for a specific amount of time in order for him to win. It also gives the Federal Player the opportunity to seize and hold key terrain that the Rebel must then attack. Thus it does not allow either side to play a passive role as the defender in all areas.

GENERAL SITUATION (Fictional)

On 1 June 1863 General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia struck north from his winter quarters near Fredricksburg, Virginia. Hill's III Corps led the march, with Stuart's cavalry acting as a screen in the mountain passes. Hill was followed by Ewell's Il Corps, and Lonnstreet's I Corps brought up the rear.

Lee planned to either force the Army of the Potomac to attack him on around of his own choosing, or to use the strike north to gather much needed supplies for a later foray into Union territory. He banked his thrust on the belief that the Army of the Potomac, still nursing its wounds from Chancellorsville, would be slow in starting its pursuit, and that he (Lee) would be north of the Potomac before Hooker could react. There were two things that had to happen in order for the Plan to succeed; first, Harper's Ferry would have to fall quickly to clear the communications through the Valley, and second, Stuart would have to keep the newly aggressive Federal cavalry at bay. Neither worked.

Stuart, being the dashing cavalryman he was, tried to ride around the Union army and found his path blocked by V and VI Corps. On the rebound he was taken in flank by Pleasanton at Brandy Station. In a two day running fight he was able to save his brigades, but the Federals kept the field and Stuart was out of the fight. Lee was blind. Stuart's manuever left only Fitz Lee's brigade (-) to hold the Passes and act as a screen. It would not prove to be enough.

And Harper's Ferry held. An aggressive Pennsylvania Colonel decided not to surrender the place. He wanted to see if Hill's bite was as bad as his bark, and he ordered him men to dig in and fight it out. Hill, not having the heavy guns or time necessary for a long siege, tapped at Harper's Ferry, thought better of its frowning earth works, and pulled back. Hooker had reacted faster than planned, and there was nothing left for the Confederates to do but pull back and wait for another day.

Prodded by Lincoln and Stanton, Hooker had moved quickly. As had happened so many times during the Civil War, Lincoln, with only rudimentary training in the art of war, had seen the advantages in the Federal Position. With Lee strung out along the valley, Hooker could break him in any one of a number of places.

The Federals were closer to the center of the Army of Northern Virginia than were either of the wings of that army! But the Union would have to move quickly.

CURRENT SITUATION

The Union I and III Corps struck west throuqh Snicker's Gap (South of Harper's Ferry). Lee, his army strung out along the Shenandoah Valley, beat a hasty re- treat. With Longstreet's I Corps to hold the passes, II and III Corps slipped to the south. Hooker, stopping to think about the situation, lost valuable time. He also lost his army. On 26 June Hooker was relieved, and George Gordon Meade, commander of V Corps, was named to replace him. With his army spread out almost to the point of being out of control, Meade could only issue directives to his corps commanders. But he was lucky.

The dispositions of the various Union corps on 27 June was as follows; one at A/3, one at B/1, one at D/2, one at F/4 and the rest off the map to the east.

The Confederate forces, on the other hand, had not been idle either. Once the danger of their situation had become apparent, they made haste to escape the trap. By 29 June the chance that Lincoln had been looking for was almost lost. Virtually all of Lee's army had escaped the pursuing Federals except the trains and one division of III Corps, and the rear guard elements of I Corps.

APPRECIATION (not shown to players)

The situation gives the Confederate player the central position, but his larger force, the elements of III Corps, are too far away to influence the immediate action. When this force reaches the field they may have to take the offensive in order to break through to the south. The Union commanders may not talk or communicate with each other in any way once the action begins. They will have no way of knowing what the corps on the opposite side of the table will do, and they may not ask.

CSA SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Hooker has goofed again! He was slow, very slow, and now we are almost safe. The wagons which must be allowed to pass safely off the table to the south are with Heth's Division at the cross roads west of Porterstown. These wagons contain ammunition, food and wounded, and they are the victory condition for the CSA. If they can escape, the Confederates will have won the battle.

Mission Extract the wagons through Middleton to the south. Heth is in overall command when he arrives. F. Lee and his cavalry are from the command of Stuart, but he has advised them to cooperate with McLaws.

PLACEMENT
McLaws Div.: Within 12" of Bald Hill, in any formation
Heth's Div. - Head of column at cross-road west of Porterstown facing south
F. Lee - At least 12" from the edge of the board and within 3" of any road.

APPRECIATION (not shown to CSA players)

McLaws will soon be faced by overwhelming force, although) he does not know that yet. He must decide quickly where the main threat will come from, and then throw all of his force to meet it. His other prohlem is that he does not know which road Heth will take up the valley. Lee, with the cavalry, has a fine opportunity to act as a screen and provide early warning for the rebels. If he is aggressive and places his units as far forward as the situation allows, he will be able to hold the Federals at bay long enough for McLaws to react, and perhaps even long enough for Heth to get into the action. Heth has the problem of where to place the wagons in the line of march. If he places them in the front they will slow the infantry and guns that follow. If lie places them in the rear, time may have run out before they are ready to enter Middleton.

USA SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

A new man is now in charge, but the situation is not as bad as it may seem. The two corps that are closest to the enemy are led by probably the two best corps commanders in the army, if not either army. Reynold's I Corps is at Franklin, and Hancock's II Corps is pounding down the Plank Road.

MISSION: Destroy the CSA trains now in the valley. If you can do this before they escape to the south you will, have won. Hays will be the overall commander, but he may not communicate with Wadsworth once the action has started unless their forces are in contact with each other. Cavalry is attached as indicated in the order of battle.

PLACEMENT: Both Union units have stolen a march on the Rebels, and you are now much closer to him than he thinks.

    1/I: Within 12" of the edge of the board on either of the roads from Franklin to Middleton, but no closer than 12" from the nearest CSA unit.
    2/II and 3/II - Within 12" of the edge of the board on either the Plank Road or Washington Pike, but no closer than 12" from the nearest CSA unit.

    APPRECIATION (not shown to USA players)

    The opening moves are the best chance that the Union has. If they are not aggressive they will allow the Confederates to unite their forces on the table, and then the USA situation will be almost impossible. The Union commanders placed their units on the map first, and the name master checked these with the locations of the CSA units already on the table. If CSA cavalry were placed within 12" of the edge of the table on any of the roads mentioned, then the USA player was forced to back his units up to the edge of the table.

    THE BATTLE

    F. Lee was a flop. It is a good thing that his uncle has a high position in the Confederacy, or he'd never command again. Instead of sending his squadrons out along the roads to act as a screen, he kept them huddled around Middleton; the pretty young things and the wine were better there than out on some lonely vidette. As a result no early warning of the Federal approach was given, and by the time the mist rose out of the valley the morning of 29 June, 1863, the Union forces were onto the sleeping Confederates. Wadsworth and Hays had both taken superb advantage of the ability to get onto the table. They pushed their units along every road as if there were no tomorrow.

    On the western front, Wadsworth rushed his batteries on to Pine and Seminary Ridges, and then proceeded to slice the Rebel horse batteries to ribbons before they could bring any effective fire on his division. Without artillery support, Lee's cavalry crumbled in the face of determined infantry. On the east side the Rebels were having no better luck, McLaws had placed his men to repel an attack down the Washington Pike, and this they did with some ease, but they should have looked to their own left. Webb's Brigade came crushing down the Plank Road, overwhelmed the batallion that was in its way, and pounced on South Bull Ridge. they now sat squarely astride the most important hill in the valley.

    McLaws tried to counter this threat to his rear by sending Semmes Brigade to the ridge, but it was too little, too late. The First Maine Cavalry, attached to Webb, was dismounted along the south face of the ridge. With their breechloading carbines they shattered the charge of the 50th Ga., and sent it reeling back down the hill. The charge of the 10th and 51st GA. carried home, and the Maine Cavalry died where they stood, but they had done their job. The two Georgia regiments were stunned and disorganized, and when Cutler of Wadsworth's Division approached their left they could not hold the ground they had taken. They followed the remnants of the 50th Ga. back down the face of the hill.

    Kershaw's Brigade left alone to face all of Hay's Division, was in no better shape. With Semmes gone from his own left, Bald Hill was virtually undefended except for the two division batteries. These guns put up a valiant fight, but there were just too many targets for them to shoot at. When they tried to support Semmes they were taken in the rear by Carroll's Brigade. So they tried to move back to the eastern side of Bald Hill, but they were charged by the 3rd Indiana Cavalry, and the guns were taken. Kershaw was now in a desperate situation. His rear was unprotected; Union forces held Bald Hill to his left front; two Federal Brigades were attacking from his front and right; and troops were marching toward him from Middleton-Merideth's Iron Brigade of the West!

    He was surrounded, two thirds of his men were down, his ammunition was running low, his guns were gone, his division Commander was dead or captured, there was no help in sight. When the Iron Brigade hit home, he had only one course of action left open to him. He surrendered.

    Heth was beaten, and he knew it. He tried vainly to force-march his green brigades to the scene of the debacle, but it was no use. With Webb solidly across South Bull Ridge, and Cutler coming up fast, there was nothing Heth could do. Abandoning his wagons, he led his men on a breakout to the west. Thus ended the battle.

    Assuming that Heth ever got back to rejoin Lee at Fredricksburg, I don't imagine he had many nice things to say about Fitz Lee. It was the Confederate cavalry who lost the battle in its opening moments, and nothing the infantry commanders could do was of any use. Heth and McLaws did the best they could in a hopeless situation, but the Battle of Middleton will rank as one of the most severe defeats of the Army of Northern Virginia.

    More Middleton

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